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Introduction. Armed Conflict and Environment –
War Impacts, Impacts of War, and Warscape
Detlef Briesen
This volume gathers contributions from a conference on War and Environ‐
ment that took place at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
National University of Vietnam, Hanoi, (USSH) in autumn 2014. The con‐
ference which was generously funded by the DFG (German Science Asso‐
ciation) and supported by Prof Pham Quang Minh and Prof Hoang Anh
Tuan of the USSH in a wonderful way brought together an international
group of scientists. They discussed the connections between war and the
environment using the example of the war that is internationally denomi‐
nated the Vietnam War – in Vietnam itself, the war that lasted from the
early 1960s to the mid-1970s is called the American War. The expertise
gathered at this time with participants from Vietnam, Cambodia, Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, France, the USA, Japan and India seemed to
suggest publishing an anthology on this topic.
While the Vietnam War was originally taken for the conference only as
a (frightening) example of the connection between war and environment,
it soon became clear that a historical classification was solely meaningful
if the history of this interdependence was traced back at least for the entire
20th century. Only in this way was it is possible to understand the changes
that took place during this period, for which the Vietnam War somehow is
a culmination and a turning point at the same time. We will come back to
this aspect later; first, we will deal with the two basic concepts of the con‐
ference, war and environment.
Looking for a definition, war is often understood as an organized type
of violent conflict employing weapons and other agents of violent action,
or äußerste Gewalt (utmost force) as Clausewitz put it, to impose the will
of another party on one party. According to Clausewitz, a war does not be‐
gin with the attack but with the defence, i.e. the decision to resist the at‐
tempt to get one’s own actions determined by others. According to Clause‐
witz’ classical theory, war is an organized conflict which is fought out
with considerable means of arms and violence. The aim of the participat‐
ing collectives is to assert their interests. The resulting acts of violence
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specifically attack the physical integrity of opposing individuals and thus
lead to death and injury. In addition to damage to those actively involved
in the war, damage also always occurs, which could be unintentional or in‐
tentional. Therefore, war also damages the infrastructure and livelihoods
of the collectives. There is no uniformly accepted definition of war and its
demarcation from other forms of armed conflict. Wars can, therefore, be
classified into different basic types, whereby previous definitions often
still concentrate on armed conflicts between two or more states. In addi‐
tion, there are also guerrilla wars between a population and an enemy state
army, civil wars, the struggle between different groups within a state,
sometimes even beyond state borders, and wars of nationalities and inde‐
pendence. Wars are sometimes separated from armed conflicts, the latter
are regarded as sporadic, rather accidental and non-strategic armed clashes
between fighting parties. Since the end of the Soviet Union, so-called
asymmetric wars, in which state-backed, conventionally highly superior
military forces on the one hand, and opponents balancing their weakness
with guerrilla techniques on the other, have multiplied. Examples of such
a conflict are today’s war on terror or the US drone war and the actions of
Israel and Russia in the Middle East. These asymmetric wars, in particular,
are now often semantically downgraded to police actions.
Despite intensive discussions, it was not possible to find a uniform defi‐
nition under international law that restricts the concept of war. The Con‐
ference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (1932–1934)
therefore replaced the unspecific term war with the clearer use of armed
force. The United Nations Charter banned not war but the use or threat of
force in international relations in principle1 and allowed it only as a sanc‐
tion measure adopted by the Security Council or as an act of self-defence.
The Geneva Conventions use the term armed international conflicts to be
distinguished from other forms of violence, such as internal conflicts.
What an international armed conflict is, however, is not defined by the
Geneva Conventions. The same is true for other types of violence, as a re‐
sult of this unclear terminology, it can be helpful to look at the history of
armed conflict instead.
1 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Charter of the




Historically, until Napoleonic times, the history of war fluctuated be‐
tween the two poles of an agonal war and an unlimited war that primarily
affected the population not directly involved in the fighting. Examples of
this are the so-called Cabinet Wars of the 18th century and the Thirty
Years’ War. To what extent this subdivision could only have been fiction
shall not be answered here, after all, it is important to emphasize that even
this subdivision has only been applied to conflicts between states. Many
uses of violence against actors declared non-state have therefore not been
taken into account. Under international law at least, an important caesura
occurred in the 19th century: its fundament was the continuing warfare in
the 19th century and the increasing role of the modern armaments industry
for war (visible in the Crimean War, the American Secession War and the
German and German-French War). Since then, the first attempts were
made to limit and regulate armed conflicts, which established themselves
as modern international law. This resulted in a codified martial law or law
of armed conflict. Its most important cornerstones were already laid before
1914:
• firstly, the Geneva Convention of 1864 primarily provided for the hu‐
mane care of war victims;
• secondly, and the Hague Convention of 1907, which for the first time
strictly separated civilians and combatants.
The latter also laid down a revolutionary sentence in Article 22: “The right
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”2
The most important thing about this provision was the fact that it intro‐
duced a principle to limit warfare in international conflicts – and that this
principle was increasingly ignored in the real warfare of the 20th century.
If one looks at it from a European perspective, the Balkan Wars already
ushered in an era of extreme violence, including the Colonial Wars and the
wars in Asia, one can even understand the Hague Convention as a docu‐
ment of an epoch in which warfare increasingly began to evade control.
Without a doubt, however, in the First World War the use of machine
guns, tanks, airplanes, submarines, battleships, poisonous gas and the total
war economy led to a new face of war. Field and naval battles claimed
millions of lives and millions of people were seriously injured. However,





the wars on the various fronts waged between 1914 and 1918 were by no
means the only acts of violence attributable to the collapse of the interna‐
tional order in 1914. What followed the peace treaties since 1919 was
rather a continuation of violence at various levels: civil wars, revolutions,
anti-colonial uprisings, mass murders, expulsions, wilfully produced
famines and, last but not least, major international conflicts such as the
Japanese-Chinese wars. There was, therefore, a gradual transition from
World War I to World War II rather than a definitive period of peace in the
1920s and 1930s. Such an idea is apparently decisively determined by the
propagandistic appropriation of history, as it was apparently pursued by
the victorious powers of the Second World War in retrospect.
Like the first, this began as a conventional war, but quickly and unstop‐
pably became a total war. State-controlled war economy, martial law, gen‐
eral conscription and propaganda battles on the home front involved the
peoples completely in the fighting. The mobilisation of all national re‐
serves for war purposes removed the distinction between civilians and
combatants. Warfare, especially in Eastern Europe and East Asia, largely
ignored the international law of armed conflict:
• by an ever-escalating bomb war, especially on targets in densely popu‐
lated areas, which culminated in the Allied bomb attacks on Germany
and Japan;
• by combining territorial conquest and mass killings of civilians on the
Eastern Front and in China;
• by leaving to die millions of POWs;
• by the strategy of the burnt earth in the theatres of war in East Asia
and Eastern Europe;
• by the atomic bombings of the USA on the Japanese cities Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
With the surrender of the Wehrmacht and the Japanese Empire in 1945,
however, this history of violence by no means came to an end, despite the
founding of the UN. Especially in the Korean War, it continued as a more
or less direct confrontation of the superpowers of that time. It was only
with the establishment of a Balance of Power, around the mid-1950s, that
a new chapter in the war history of mankind began. Most of the wars that
then took place until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were so-
called proxy wars. A proxy war is a war in which two or more major pow‐
ers do not engage in direct military conflict, but instead, conduct this mili‐
tary conflict in one or more third countries. The third countries thus act
Detlef Briesen
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quasi as representatives of the major powers that are often only involved
in the background.
The proxy war is characterized by the fact that a conflict, civil war or
war that usually already exists in third countries is exploited for the re‐
spective own purposes of the major powers involved and, if this is not yet
the case, expanded into a military conflict. The primary goal of the major
powers in the proxy war is to preserve or expand their respective spheres
of interest at the expense of the other major powers. The warring parties in
the third countries receive direct or indirect support with the aim of help‐
ing the respective warring party to victory. The support can be indirect
through military aid, logistical, financial or other, or direct by military in‐
tervention. The sphere of interest of the supporting great power is expand‐
ed and strengthened by a victory of the respective war party. The main
cause of a proxy war is generally the fact that the major powers involved
do not want a direct military confrontation. Under the conditions of the
Cold War and the nuclear weapons of the superpowers, this was a basic
condition that ensured the survival of mankind. The level of violence and
war destruction was even higher in some proxy wars (especially like Ko‐
rea, if you consider this conflict as a proxy war and in Vietnam) than on
the western and southern fronts of World War II; among other things due
to the further development of weapons and because another aspect was
added there, the complete destruction of the human and natural environ‐
ment.
Characteristic of the period after 1987, the beginning of the disintegra‐
tion of the Eastern Bloc, were initially major international military inter‐
ventions, which were legitimized by decisions of the World Security
Council and were considered supranational peace missions. In a second
phase, they were replaced by unilaterally decided military actions, which
NATO and finally the USA carried out alone with the respective coalitions
of the willing. In the meantime, asymmetric wars have prevailed. An
asymmetric war is a military conflict between parties that have very differ‐
ent orientations in terms of weaponry, organization, and strategy. Because
asymmetric warfare differs from the familiar image of war, the term asym‐
metric conflict is also used. Officially, they are often portrayed by the
hegemonic side as police actions.
Typically, one of the warring parties involved is so superior in terms of
weaponry and numbers that the other warring party cannot win militarily
in open battles. In the long term, however, needle-sting losses and weari‐
ness caused by repeated minor attacks can lead to the withdrawal of the
Introduction
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superior party, also due to the overstretching of its forces. In most cases,
the militarily superior party, usually the regular military of one state, acts
on the territory of another or its own country and fights against a militant
resistance or underground movement.
Let us now turn to the second term, the environment. This has a basical‐
ly similar complexity as the term war, since the term environment can sig‐
nify different meanings in the context of various discourses: in political-
ecological debate, in the humanities, in system theory, in organizational
theory, in science, and in biology in particular.
Since this anthology is a contribution to a novel debate on armed con‐
flict and environment, a restrictive definition is not given below. Rather,
the aim is to show the various options for dealing with the interdependen‐
cies between armed conflicts and environments on the time axis outlined
above and at various levels. The relationship between war and the envi‐
ronment can be summarized in three models or systematizing questions.
What are the effects of the human and natural environment on war, its
course and the way war is fought?
This is the longest of any discussion of the subject. The leading military
theorists always have known that an entire war or single military opera‐
tions do not take place in sandboxes, but in the field of battle. Since the
Napoleonic Wars, the social conditions of war, Clausewitz called it will,
have repeatedly being discussed, taking into account the influence of natu‐
ral factors on warfare, terrain and geostrategic space for warfare in partic‐
ular. A look at military theory of the 19th and 20th centuries still provides
interesting insights into the role of the human and physical environment in
warfare: Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Charles Edward
Caldwell, and Mao Zedong, to name but the most important contributors.
Today, this approach is often being expanded to ask how the change in
natural environments has generated wars – we can consider the role El Ni‐





How are wars, their course and conduct, influenced by human and
natural environments?
Furthermore, there has long been a manifest complaint about the devasta‐
tion of war, for example in Europe in relation to the Thirty Years’ War.
However, a more systematic approach to the consequences of the war did
not emerge until much later. With a view to the destruction of the human
environment, especially since the First World War, in relation to the natu‐
ral environment, not before the 1950s, initially in the context of the de‐
bates on the consequences of the nuclear winter. The first historical war in
which a specific combination of peace research and pacifism combined
with modern scientific methods was the American War in Indochina and
the resulting damage to human and natural environments deliberately
caused by the USA. These approaches were then further elaborated in the
analysis of the Second Gulf War. The result is a current state of research
that has put the actions of the most warlike nation of the second half of the
20th century, the USA, at the centre of attention, particularly in the field of
the destruction of nature.
How can we understand war as a human-natural interaction system?
This approach begins to prevail only in recent years and it is based on sys‐
tem theory and on adoptions of ecological concepts on war. The basic idea
of an ecology of war puts Micah Muscolino very well. I quote from him:
“Environmental factors mold the experience of war for soldiers and civilians
alike, while war and militarization transform people’s relationships with the
environment in enduring ways.”3
This means that, especially under the conditions of total war, complex
war-landscapes emerge, which – compared to times of peace – are based
on completely different relationships of mankind to the natural and man-
made environment. Or vice versa: that natural and man-made environ‐
ments predispose human behaviour in a different way than is the case in
peacetime. The war, as Kurt Lewin had already recognized in 1917,
2.
3.
3 Mucsolino, Micah S. (2015): The Ecology of War in China. Henan Province, the
Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938–1950. Cambridge. 3.
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changes people’s view of their environments just as much as the war envi‐
ronments change people.4
The contributions gathered here attempt to understand these three as‐
pects of the relationship between armed conflict and the environment for
the historical developments outlined above in the 20th century: from the
total wars of the first half of the century to the Vietnam War as an example
of the proxy war par excellence to today’s asymmetric wars in Sri Lanka
and India. Reading this will reveal an implicit division of tasks.
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The War-Landscape of Stalingrad.
Destroyed and Destructive Environments in World War II
Detlef Briesen
Introduction: Warscape
This article uses an infamous example, the Battle of Stalingrad, one of the
peaks of the Second World War in Europe, to make the idea of the war-
landscape or warscape productive for the analysis of wars. This is done to
show the connections between war and the environment in a broader
sense, which includes both the environment lived and built by man and the
natural environment. The Battle of Stalingrad was the most loss-making
battle of the Second World War in Europe. Although estimates differ
somewhat, it seems clear that the troops of the Axis powers – Germans,
Italians, Romanians and Hungarians – together had to mourn about half a
million dead and prisoners. About 150,000 German soldiers from 300,000
before the beginning of the battle died in the fighting or as a result of
hunger or cold. With the end of the carnage, some 108,000 men fell into
Soviet captivity, from which only 6,000 survivors returned to their home
countries by 1956. The losses of the Red Army were similarly high; it also
suffered about half a million deaths. About another 500,000 combatants
were wounded or fell ill during the battle. In addition, numerous civilian
deaths occurred on the Soviet side.
Recent studies show that this gigantic massacre and the appalling treat‐
ment of prisoners of war and civilians by both sides cannot be attributed
solely to the will of two ruthless dictators, Hitler and Stalin who fought a
prestige duel on the Volga. Their unconditional will to win a war beyond
all international conventions, which the German side had triggered, may
explain the carnage in parts. The battle was actually fought over a strategic
line of communication, the Volga, which was to prove decisive for the fur‐
ther course of the war. But above all, it should be borne in mind that the
acts of violence took place against a background of continued lack of
1.
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peace in an area that Timothy Snyder rightly described as bloodlands.1
This was a consequence of the First World War. In large parts of Central,
Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the war and the subsequent peace
treaties had broken up the old European empires and inspired dreams of
new national greatness. The dynastic idea – Romanov, Habsburg, and Ho‐
henzollern – was replaced by the fragile concept of popular sovereignty.
Since then, millions of people have been prepared to obey orders, fight,
die or commit the most heinous crimes in the name of the nation. In the
interwar period, in Europe between 1919 and 1939, states were often arbi‐
trarily defined and hundreds of thousands of people were murdered or dis‐
placed.
In the former Russian Empire, the Soviet Union in particular, violence
and even genocide continued with millions of deaths already prior to
1941. Keywords must suffice here: revolutions, civil war, famines,
Holodomor, forced collectivization and mass deportations. This per se
non-peaceful world was invaded by other violent actors, the troops of Nazi
Germany and its allies. Terrible events that took place under German rule
in Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe are all too well known, especially
the Shoah, to a lesser extent the mass killings of Poles, Belarusians,
Ukrainians and other peoples of the European East.
In short, the Eastern Front of the Second World War was in an area of
the world that had been anything but peaceful even before the German in‐
vasion in 1941. This fact played a decisive role for all the key actors in
this conflict and for their personnel, soldiers, mass murderers and war
mongers too. It also determined the formation of a terrible, unique war
landscape, the Eastern Front, which we are trying to approach here with
the term warscape.
The term is derived from considerations that Kurt Lewin, one of the
founders of Gestalt and social psychology, had developed from his own
war experiences, among other things.2 These considerations are based on
the fact that there is a connection between a war and the natural and cul‐
tural landscape in which the war is fought. It is not only about objective
conditions, but also about the combatants’ ideas about and perceptions of
the natural and cultural landscape in which a war takes place. As a result,
1 Snyder, Timothy (2010): Bloodlands. Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin. München.
23ff.




there are many connections between the landscape and the way in which
war is waged, which could be described as a specific entity, war-land‐
scape. War-landscapes or warscapes are areas marked by violence and in‐
security. It is, therefore, to be expected that the Eastern Front was not only
because of Hitler’s and Stalin’s murderous intentions a much more terrible
theatre of war than the Western and Mediterranean fronts. The structures
of violence that ruled Eastern Central and Eastern Europe before 1941 also
contributed to the extreme inhumanity of the fighting, with which the Ger‐
man side, in particular is by no means exculpated for its mass murders.
A specific warscape depends on many factors, for example, terrain, cli‐
mate, buildings and other components of human-influenced environments.
The term environment is therefore not only understood here in terms of en‐
vironmental protection. Other environments also influence warscape, in‐
cluding of course the military itself and its development during a long war.
This story of the rise of the Red Army and the decline of the Wehrmacht
belongs to one of the best described areas of historiography about the Sec‐
ond World War. The following, mostly excellent works of art also provide
indirect or direct information about the changes in the war-landscape:
Beevor (2014), Beevor (2010), Craig (1973), Glantz/House (2017), Kee‐
gan (2004), Merridale (2006), Overy (2000), Overy (2012), and Ulrich
(2005).3
Warscapes also have an iconic function, especially after the end of a
war; Stalingrad is a particularly remarkable example of this. As early as
the 1950s, Stalingrad became a symbol of West Germany’s concern with
the horrors and crimes on the Eastern Front.4 This was conducted under
moral, at first predominantly even religious auspices, which at the same
time refers to the turn to the Christian roots of German culture that took
place after the Second World War, resulting in numerous films, novels,
factual reports and first editions of military mail.5 These historic sources
also contain numerous testimonies to the changes in the war-landscape
that happened especially in the last weeks of the Battle of Stalingrad.
3 The detailed bibliographical references can be found in the literature list below.
4 See e.g. Förster, Jürgen (ed.) (1992): Stalingrad. Ereignis, Wirkung, Symbol.
München. Kumpfmüller, Michael (1995): Die Schlacht von Stalingrad. Metamor‐
phosen eines deutschen Mythos. München. Wette, Wolfram/Ueberschär Gerd R.
(eds.) (1993): Stalingrad. Mythos und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht. Frankfurt.
5 See e.g. Kluge, Alexander (1964): Schlachtbeschreibung. Frankfurt.
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In particular, attempts were made to reconstruct the perception of sim‐
ple German soldiers. For this purpose, collections and analyzes of military
mail, which are now available in increasing numbers, are suitable. They
show – so the general picture – the attitude change of most soldiers: Ini‐
tially, there was obviously a mixture of hubris, feeling the need to defend
the homeland, duty and skepticism. Depending on the location and the ex‐
perience of the war, military mail expressed increasing doubts, fears, long‐
ings, and desperation.6 Even the original sense of superiority to the East‐
ern Europeans, or even the affirmation of the racist propaganda spread by
the Nazi regime, was being replaced by personal opinions about individu‐
als.7 This process has been so often described by the German side that it is
not depicted here. On the other hand, editions of Russian experience re‐
ports beyond hero worship, which continued even after 1991, have so far
been rather rare. Much has been edited and published with German help.8
It is important to emphasize that there was not a single warscape Stalin‐
grad. Perception, action and suffering of the war took place on various
levels. These are therefore reconstructed at four levels: that of the politico-
military leadership of the war, that of the operational leadership and that
of those involved in the struggle. Finally, a fourth war-landscape is pre‐
sented, which was museumized after the end of the Second World War. In
short, the article tries to answer an important question that John Keegan
asked: What could the individual even see in battle?9 In this way, it is to
be prevented that the retrospective interpretation, which always character‐
izes the historical analysis, becomes too important here.
6 For example see, Wiesen, Bertold (ed.) (1991): Es grüßt Euch alle, Bertold. Von
Koblenz nach Stalingrad. Die Feldpostbriefe des Pioniers Bertold Paulus aus Kas‐
tel. Nonnweiler. Birnbaum, Christoph (2012): Es ist wie ein Wunder, dass ich noch
lebe. Feldpostbriefe aus Stalingrad, 1942–43. Königswinter.
7 Kipp, Michaela (2014): Grossreinemachen im Osten. Feindbilder in deutschen
Feldpostbriefen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Frankfurt.
8 See e.g. Ebert, Jens Ebert (ed.) (2018): Junge deutsche und sowjetische Soldaten in
Stalingrad. Briefe, Dokumente und Darstellungen. Göttingen. Hellbeck, Jochen
(2012): Die Stalingrad–Protokolle. Sowjetische Augenzeugen berichten aus der
Schlacht. Frankfurt.




Let us first take the perspective of the leaders of the Second World War,
Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt. Certainly the big perspective was
their agenda. It can be reconstructed in the following way.
Wars, civil wars, anti-colonial rebellions, revolutions, famines, mas‐
sacres and revolts continued to take place in the 1920s and 30s. Anything
else would be right but to call this epoch a time of peace between two
world wars. The First World War had finally destroyed the post-Napoleon‐
ic peace order. Immediately after the end of the Great War, the still most
powerful loser of the First World War, the German Empire, was subject to
considerable control by the victorious powers of Great Britain and France.
However, this dominance was already lost by the end of the 1920s, which
was due to a plethora of factors: the conflicting interests between the
Great Powers, the beginning collapse of the colonial empires, the extreme
economic vicissitudes, etc. had led in Europe and Asia to the final disinte‐
gration of an international order, which the victorious powers had aimed at
building up during the Paris Peace Conferences since 1918. One result of
this was the rise of the Hitler’s Empire in Europe and the Japanese Empire
in Asia, which in turn had enabled the German attack on the Soviet Union
in the summer of 1941. The German goal was to restore under racist con‐
ditions the empire in the European East which it had gained for a few
months in the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk already.
But Nazi Germany’s military operations had not achieved the intended
goals in the war against the Soviet Union until the spring of 1942. The
Blitzkrieg got stuck in mud, snow and ice, and in particular, the Wehrma‐
cht failed to capture the strategically important Moscow. Therefore, a new
offensive was planned for the summer of 1942, which at the same time
changed the overall objectives of German operations. The German OKW,
and especially Hitler himself, believed that the Soviet Union had been
largely defeated and wanted to put it to death in a second blitzkrieg. By a
major offensive in eastern Ukraine, the Soviet Union was to lose decisive
agricultural and industrial resources, especially as the offensive had an
even more ambitious goal: the Soviet Union was to be cut off from the
supply from the Cape oil fields, the areas were eventually even to be con‐
quered by the Wehrmacht. Caspian oil was central to motorized Soviet
warfare; but until the attack in the summer of 1941, Germany had also ob‐
tained most of its oil from there. Since the war in the East took much
longer and was much more internecine than planned, central resources for
2.
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German warfare began to be scarce. This was due to the cut off of Central
Europe from the world market and the low availability there, in particular,
due to the insufficient production of crude oil.
The German summer offensive received the name Fall Blau (Case
Blue) and reached its operational goals very quickly: One reason was that
the Soviet defensive potential was initially insufficient because the Stavka
had expected a German offensive on Moscow. By the summer of 1942,
about 50 percent of the Red Army had been concentrated there. Therefore,
the result of the three attack phases from late June to November 1942 was
initially very impressive from a German point of view: until the onset of
winter, the Wehrmacht had conquered large parts of the area between the
Black and Caspian Seas. First oilfields were under German control, the
western bank of the Don River had been won as a defensive line. The Ger‐
man troops also managed to reach the Volga River at Stalingrad, thus oc‐
cupying a strategically important place in large parts. However, again the
Germans had failed to defeat the Red Army decisively.
Looking at the German orders prior to the beginning of Fall Blau an
important aspect is missing, which should prove crucial for the entire
course of the Second World War and the perspectives of Stalin, Churchill
and Roosevelt: the battle was central to keeping open the Persian Corridor.
This aspect has long been overlooked, especially in German scholarly lit‐
erature: either because the global context of the battle was unknown to the
authors or because the OKW, on which actions the historiography was es‐
sentially based, had also no knowledge about the real relevance of the bat‐
tle for the Allied side.
The latter, however, is rather unlikely, because since 1925, with the
seizure of power by Reza Shah an intensive collaboration between the
German Reich and Persia had begun. It was especially at the expense of
Great Britain, which had agreed with Russia on a joint, informal control of
Iran before the First World War. After the Great War, in particular, Britain
controlled Iran’s oil production in the Persian Gulf and operated the then
world’s largest refinery at Abadan. This presence was threatened by the
German development aid for Persia and the phased cooperation with the
USSR, first and foremost by the largest project, which had been tackled
with German aid: the construction of a Trans-Iranian Railway from the
Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. However, the further expansion of the
Trans-Iranian Railway came to a standstill with the outbreak of the war
between Germany and Great Britain in September 1939.
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In the following it becomes more apparent, in which global war land‐
scape of great powers, political and natural geography and central re‐
sources the Battle of Stalingrad was integrated. Despite the fact that the
Persian government had already declared its neutrality with the outbreak
of the war in 1939, Persia was increasingly involved in the fight to control
the Middle East that broke out between Hitler’s Germany and the British
Empire after the collapse of France in 1940.
The tensions continued to increase with the German attack on the Sovi‐
et Union. Already two weeks after the assault, in early July 1941, the
British Government ordered its military to plan an attack on Iran support‐
ed by the Soviet Union. But immediately after the German invasion, the
Soviet Union had no resources for such an operation and officially de‐
clared that it would see no threat to relief supplies from Britain and the US
via the Trans-Iranian route. This changed abruptly as it became clear how
vulnerable other supply routes were: Turkey prohibited the transport of
military goods through Dardanelles and Bosporus, the northern route to
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk proved extremely endangered by German at‐
tacks. The long supply routes from the USA to the Russian Pacific coast
could be stopped at any time by Japanese interventions.
Therefore, on July 23, 1941, the British and Soviet governments agreed
to occupy Iran. A joint operation plan for it was already created until Au‐
gust 7, 1941. The aim of the joint Operation Countenance was to secure
the Iranian oil fields and at the same time build up a secure supply line
through Iran. It would allow military supplies to be transported by ship
from the United States through the Suez Canal to ports on the Persian
Gulf. From there, the supplies could then be transported by rail and road to
the Caspian Sea, and finally by boat across the Caspian Sea and the Volga
to the interior of Russia, to the industrial areas and to the fronts. On Au‐
gust 25, 1941, British and Russian soldiers invaded Iran, which among
other things led to the abdication of the former Persian emperor in favour
of his son Mohammed Reza. The Allies assured him of full national
sovereignty after the end of the war. In return, the Allies were granted full
control over all transport and communications links such as railways,
roads, airports, ports, pipelines, telephone networks and radio. Thus, the
transport route from the Persian Gulf through Iran to the Caspian Sea and
then on ships to Astrakhan was open.
The aid deliveries on the Trans-Iranian route started quickly, especially
as the US was soon directly involved in their organization in Iran. Already
on September 27, 1941, an American military mission began work in Iran.
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American technicians and specialists built and ensured safe traffic through
the Persian Corridor to ensure massive military material support for Soviet
troops. The Americans improved the Iranian infrastructure by constructing
port facilities, roads and assembly halls for aircrafts and trucks.
In October 1942, the American troops took over the primary responsi‐
bility in Iran. The US Persian Gulf Command (P.G.C.) replaced the British
troops and began with the beginning of the Battle at Stalingrad the deliv‐
ery of many millions of tons of material directly to the fighting Soviet
forces through Iran, weapons, planes, food, clothing, and medicines. The
supplies were crucial for the Battle at Stalingrad but even intensified with
the final end of the fighting on the Volga in the late winter of 1943. There‐
fore, Stalingrad was a victory of the Allies, which went far beyond the
narrower operational objectives: The transport route across the Volga was
free-fought; the Persian corridor proved to be crucial for the subsequent
military operations of the Soviet Union in 1943 and 1944 and therefore for
the entire Second World War.
The Regional Warscape: the City and its Nature
But the Battle of Stalingrad was also part of a gigantic military operation
planned by men like Erich von Manstein, Friedrich Paulus, Hermann
Hoth, Vasily Chuikov, Aleksandr Vasilevsky, and on the Soviet side, espe‐
cially by Georgy Zhukov. What was their perspective?
Stalingrad bore the name of the Russian dictator, and lies on the Volga,
a river that has a tremendous national significance in Russia. So maybe the
battle there had significant symbolic meaning for the warring parties.
More important, however, was Stalingrad’s role for Soviet and German
warfare. Let’s take a closer look at its geographical location and economic
and logistic function.
The city is located about 1,000 km southeast of Moscow on the western
bank of the Volga, about 400 km north of the mouth of the river into the
Caspian Sea. After the effective climate classification, a system dating
back to Vladimir Peter Köppen (1846–1940), the city lies in the cold con‐
tinental climate zone, with cold winters, but also with hot summers and
sufficient rainfall throughout the year. Thus, the city is neither lying, as it
is sometimes claimed in the Russian steppe, nor are the winters really
Siberian cold (on average only -10 degrees in January and February, al‐




the city stretched over a width of up to 10 km over 60 km along the west‐
ern banks of the Volga River. The western banks of the Volga are dominat‐
ed by hills (the Mamayev Kurgan in particular) and numerous erosion
gorges (Balkas) which the Germans called Suchaja-Metschetka-, Banny-,
Todes- (Death), Lange- (Long) and Tiefe (Deep) Schlucht (gorge), while
the eastern shore belongs to the lowlands of the Volga River delta already.
Although the height differences are not large, the city literally watches
over the river from its steep western shoreline before it flows into the
Caspian basin which was one of the reasons for the foundation of a
fortress and later a city there. More additional geographical factors are to
be added: The Volga reaches a few km south of Stalingrad the western‐
most point of its lower reaches and then turns sharply to the southeast. At
about the same latitude, the Don reaches its eastern point; it is less than
100 km from Stalingrad to Kalach-on-Don.
Therefore, the area around Stalingrad was an important trade route
since ancient times due to its geographical location on the isthmus be‐
tween the Volga and Don Rivers. As a result of the military expansion of
the Russian Empire, and especially after the conquest of the Crimea and
the Kuban area in 1783, Stalingrad (Tsaritsyn) lost its strategic importance
and gradually developed into a commercial and economic centre. Above
all, the construction of the railway line to Kalach-on-Don in 1862 and to
Gryazi in 1872 led to an economic boom and made Tsaritsyn a hub of oil
supply and transport links from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and from
the Caucasus to central Russia. As a result, large-scale industry settled
here, including metal and wood processing companies, petroleum refiner‐
ies for crude oil from Baku, several mills, and tanneries.
The industrial capacity of the city was considerably expanded in the
context of Stalin’s planned economy in the 1930s. The state-controlled in‐
dustrialization of the Soviet Union at that time aimed primarily at the cre‐
ation of an arms industry or industries that could easily be converted from
the production of capital goods to military equipment. In the northern part
of the city, along the Volga River, there were three huge industrial enter‐
prises: the gigantic tractor plant Felix Dzerzhinsky, the gun factory Barri‐
cades and the metal factory Red October. The latter produced until the
summer of 1942 about ten percent of all Soviet steel and supplied in par‐
ticular the aircraft and tank production sites, but also produced rocket
launchers. Incidentally, the construction of the tractor factory began in
1926, with the help of the US-company Ford. Four years later, the first
tractor from local production rolled off the assembly line of the Stalingrad
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tractor plant. Until the war, 300,000 tractors were delivered, especially
large tractors of the type of CT3-3, which was also the platform for the
T-34 tank. Felix Dzerzhinsky was converted entirely to weapons produc‐
tion even before 1941 and became the biggest producer of dreaded T-34
tanks in Soviet Union.
The Mamayev Kurgan separated the industrial heart of the city from its
more urban infrastructure south of it. It included other industrial plants, an
electricity plant, the central station, grain silos, meat and bread factory,
cold storage, brewery, more or less drab cottages, apartment blocks and
party buildings, but also the department store Krasnaja Univermag,
schools, parks and wide avenues. Remaining images of the city convey
until shortly before the start of the German bombing raids the impression
of a thriving, modern industrial city with theatres, colleges and companies:
the parks of the alleged green city invited the residents to linger, and pho‐
tos show lovers and those seeking relaxation in the parks, and vibrant life
on the streets and squares of the city. The war in the far west seemed far
away to the city’s inhabitants, although within a few years one of the Sovi‐
et Union’s most important armament centres had been conjured up in Stal‐
ingrad.
Was this all just propaganda or fake memory? Probably yes, because in
fact the allegedly stony built city at the banks of a mighty river rather con‐
sisted of several sometimes huge industrial complexes in the middle of a
belt of countless wooden houses and barracks. The latter stretched along
the western bank of the Volga and mingled with numerous larger and
smaller industrial complexes.
How did the Volga look like? Shortly before the German attack, Victor
Nekrasov describes the Volga as a river
“with greasy, petroleum-pearly waves, reminiscent of an industrial landscape.
Here everything is full of serious activity. Here are rafts and barges, sooty,
greyish cutters whose steel hawsers strike in the water (...) And now these
broad, gleaming waters, completely covered with rafts and full of cranes and
long, boring sheds, seem more like an industrial enterprise. And yet it is the
Volga. You can lie face down for hours and watch the rafts swim down the
river, like the naphta puddles shimmering in all colors. And further on, his
comrade Igor says after a bath in the Volga: (...) and in general, this is not a
river but rather a naphtha container.”10
10 Nekrassow, Viktor (1948): In den Schützengräben von Stalingrad (In the Trenches
of Stalingrad). Berlin. 78–79. In the text quoted as Victor Nekrasov, all transla‐
tions by the author.
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The wooden town of Stalingrad was already largely destroyed on August
23 in a day attack by the VIII Air Corps, better set on fire. Through this
smouldering debris, the 6th Army moved forward to the Volga River until
November 1942.11 The wooden construction of most of the buildings also
explains why the German bombing raids claimed so many civilian deaths
and that the street fighting that started in late August was more likely to
involve factories and public buildings rather than rows of houses.
More considerations contradict an idyllic picture of pre-war Stalingrad.
As a modern industrial city and a highly significant armaments centre, the
city must have been subjected to particularly keen surveillance by the
NKVD – more about these prerequisites of Russian warfare below. More‐
over, Stalin’s policy of collectivization and industrialization hardly paid
any attention to the central needs of man and nature. It is known from the
general literature, for example, how restrictive the living conditions in the
housing blocks of the Stalin era were, how poor the diet and how poor the
health care. So far, it has hardly been sufficiently documented what dam‐
age to human health and the natural environment caused the forced indus‐
trialization of Stalingrad, especially by the large mining and armament
factories, before they were destroyed by the German bombing raids and
during the street fighting. Photos occasionally show smoking chimneys
and wooden landing stages, which were used to handle critical goods such
as manganese ores and especially oil. But mud and environmental damage
were not photographed. In general, pollution was still described with
topoi, which interpreted industrial contamination as a sign of industrial
wear and tear, bustle and economic prosperity:
“When the pleasure boats approached the beautiful white city on the Volga
(...) they also saw the smoke that rose above the three industrial giants to the
sky: the tractor factory, the Red October, the Barricades. Through the black‐
ened factory windows you could see the glowing steel pouring sparks into the
pans, and you could hear a heavy roar that sounded like the surf of the sea.”12
The Creation of a Local Warscape
Let us now take a look at the tactical level of warscape. After the late sum‐
mer of 1942, the pre-war city of Stalingrad could only be transfigured into
4.
11 Keegan (2004), 33.
12 Grossmann (1946), 41.
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an idyll because everything that came afterwards was even by far worse.
Nonetheless, even before the Wehrmacht’s direct attack, the city with its
terrible living and environmental conditions was part of a regional
warscape that played a significant role in the overall context of the global
war. It determined the actions of those who actually had to fight and die in
the war. This aspect becomes more evident when one looks more closely
at the events in the first stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. The first Ger‐
man bombers had already attacked Stalingrad in October 1941; since the
second half of July 1942 there were air raids almost daily on the city.
Nekrasov describes the consequences of one of these first attacks:
“The southern part of the city is on fire, an ammunition car has also been hit,
and the shells are still exploding. A woman’s head was torn off. She has just
left the cinema. The show just ended (...) Biting smoke that crawls in the
throat, creeps out of the houses, spreads on the streets. Under the feet crum‐
bles glass. Bricks, concrete pieces, tables, upturned cabinets. People rush,
rush, bustle (...) The smoke spreads over the whole city, covering the sky, bit‐
ing the eyes and scratching the throat. Long yellow tongues of fire break out
of the windows, licking the walls of the corner house.”13
As early as the beginning of this month, district officials were preparing
for a major evacuation of the city, especially for industrial production
plants and their employees. First, the leaders of the Stalingrad military dis‐
trict were evacuated with their families to the hinterland; until mid-August
they were followed by another 8,000 people from the urban upper class.
According to NKVD reports, these evacuations led to considerable unrest
among the population of the city, especially as in the same period the or‐
der of the People’s Commissar for Defence of the USSR of July 28, 1942,
Number 227 was issued (Not a step back!). The order made surrender pun‐
ishable by death, ordered the establishment of firing squads behind attack‐
ing troops, and the establishment of penal companies. Since then, all able-
bodied city residents, who did not already work for the armaments indus‐
try, were conscripted for entrenchment work. Persons could only be evac‐
uated for war purposes: until the devastating air raids on August 23, these
included around 50,000 injured Red Army soldiers and their medical staff
as well as all children from the municipal orphanages. Despite the ever
more threatening situation, the communist leadership pretended that the
city could never be taken by the Germans. Even preparations for the new
13 Nekrassow (1948), 81–82.
Detlef Briesen
30
school year continued until August 22, one day before the German city
raid…
The number of losses inflicted by the devastating air raid on August 23
and the daily bombing that followed until September 13 is still a matter of
dispute – a total of around 40,000 killed civilians is mentioned. Probably
alone the approximately 2,000 bombing operations in the afternoon and
evening hours of August 23 cost the lives of about 10,000 civilians. There‐
fore, a meeting of the military leadership with the local representatives of
the Party, NKVD and factory leaders took place in the headquarters of
General Jeremyenko that evening. With a call to Stalin, they wanted to ob‐
tain the immediate evacuation of Stalingrad’s workforce and the mining of
industrial production facilities. Stalin forbade not only this measure but
their discussion, as only defeatism would be evoked.
This strategy was gradually abandoned with the imposition of the siege
on August 25; initially only technical specialists were evacuated and
workers whose factories had burned down. The mass evacuations began
on August 29 with ferry boats to the eastern bank of the Volga, at a time
when the ships were already in the firing range of German artillery. By
September 14, the day the Germans reached the central ferry terminal
around 315,000 people were evacuated, but several thousands of civilians
had lost their lives during the evacuations alone. According to estimates,
at this time another 300,000 civilians were still trapped in the already
largely destroyed city. But for a complete evacuation of Stalingrad, it was
too late with such a large population. In October it was clear that
around 75,000 civilians had to stay in the ruined city. Neither the Red
Army nor the Germans paid any attention to the civilian population. Many
inhabitants had to live in potholes, many froze to death in the winter of
1942/1943; others died of starvation because there was no food left. Thou‐
sands more died on the deportation marches organized by the Wehrmacht
after the conquest of almost the entire city. It remains a mystery how more
than 10,000 civilians, including nearly a thousand children, managed to
survive all hell that was let loose at Stalingrad until March 1943.
However, the operation of the important industrial installations was
kept as long as possible, Red October produced until October 2, the last
technicians of Barricades fled on October 5, one day after the Germans
had begun their direct assault on the industrial plant. Already on August
23, the German front had moved directly to the factory premises of Felix
Dzerzhinsky, yet the factory delivered on September 13 the last T-34
tanks. Some surviving workers were only evacuated in the following days.
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Under the threat of the German attacks, the production in the industrial
plants took therefore not only place under conditions of accelerating
bombing war: the factories had to continue their production under direct
artillery fire until they were destroyed or to be relocated. However, many
workers were not evacuated at all; they had to join as militias in the strug‐
gle for the industrial ruins now serving as fortresses after the loss of pro‐
duction. Grossmann writes:
“Hundreds of workers, armed with submachine guns and light and heavy ma‐
chine guns, moved out to the northern edge of the factory site that first night
and put their lives on the hill. They fought, and next to them fought the heavy
grenade launcher division of Lieutenant Sarkisjan, which was the first to
bring the German tank column to a standstill. They fought, and beside them
fought the flak department of Lieutenant Colonel Gerrmann, which fought the
German storm bombers with half of its barrels and brought down the German
tanks with the other guns in direct fire.”14
The Soviet side thus blurred the separation of combatants and non-com‐
batants established by the Hague Convention – but it is also questionable
whether the German side differed in its murderous warfare. Anyway, the
Soviets waged a total war in which all resources were used to stop the ene‐
my. Even destroyed civil and industrial infrastructure played a major role
in this.
From the very beginning of the battle, Soviet warfare dealt with its own
resources mercilessly and prepared a warscape which’s inhumanity was
simply unbearable. Another outcome of this incredible brutality, which
hardly differed from German warfare, was the way in which the evacua‐
tions of the civilian population were carried out. It is difficult to say
whether the Stalinist leadership was indifferent to the populace, whether
its suffering should be functionalized for propaganda purposes and to mo‐
tivate the Red Army, whether the surviving civilian population was sched‐
uled for military tasks, or whether the evacuations were simply too late
and des-organized. Considering the intensity with which the NKVD super‐
vised evacuations, one has the impression that the suffering of the civilian
population was not simply ignored by the Soviet side, but wilfully in‐
creased – Stalingrad was thus made a place, behind which there was no
retreat. And this, in fact, corresponded to the enormous importance that
the battle there had for the entire course of the war from the perspective of
the Soviet leaders.
14 Grossman, Wassilij (1946): Stalingrad. Berlin. 43.
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From July 12, the Stavka began preparing for the defence of Stalingrad.
For this purpose, until August 19, when the 6th Army had reached its
starting point for the attack on the city, a makeshift defensive belt was
built, as strong as those created in the fall and early winter off Leningrad
and Moscow. However, the 62nd and 64th Armies which had been ordered
to defend the city had to give up the defence belt against the advancing
Germans step by step until September 14. This started the fierce fighting
in a landscape of hilly and rugged terrain. Littered in it were the smoking
remains of the wooden barracks, as well as the ruins of the iron, concrete
and steel structures that made up the former factories and public buildings
of Stalingrad. This started a fierce battle for houses, workshops, water
towers, walls, cellars, floors, and piles of rubble that had not even existed
on the Western Front during the First World War.
This battle had been planned by the Stavka, for on the day of the Ger‐
man attack, September 13, Zhukov and Vasilevsky had had a talk with
Stalin in the Kremlin. The two Soviet military leaders sketched a bold
plan, which envisaged the encirclement of German troops on the Volga
and the destruction of the 6th Army in the interior of the city. This plan
was accepted by Stalin on condition that he added that the city should not
be conquered in any way. Therefore, it was Stavka’s declared goal to per‐
manently tie the German offensive forces in the city into loss-making
struggles and to prepare in the background Operation Uranus, a large-scale
counter-offensive in the entire southern front arc of the Don. The 62nd
Army was commanded to defending the city at any cost, and began trans‐
forming the ruins into a fortress. In the Soviet defensive line, strategically
important buildings and complexes formed defensive support bases, which
were linked by trenches. Already bombed buildings could hardly be fur‐
ther destroyed and were defended by platoons, companies or battalions in
all-round defence. Each soldier was equipped with anti-tank handguns
whenever possible, usually tank shells or fire bottles. The infantry pla‐
toons were mixed with other branches of service, snipers, pioneers, and
paramedics. Several bases formed a defensive knot. The ideal defence
points were factory halls, especially massive steel and concrete complexes
with deep basements. Only in the course of the battle, the sewer system of
Stalingrad was discovered as a preferred staging area for rapid thrusts into
the depths of the opposing lines. On large streets and squares, the fire
points were arranged in a checkerboard pattern to combat German in‐
fantrymen with different fire areas. General Chuikov ordered his forces to
remain in close physical proximity to the German front line, to neutralize
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air strikes of the enemy and to engage him in close combat with as many
casualties as possible.
How did the German side contribute to the creation of this battlefield?
The attack on Stalingrad was undertaken by the 6th Army, a field army
which consisted in November 1942 of four army corps, a tank corps and
subordinate Romanian, Italian and Croatian troops. This 6th Army was
considered one of the elite formations of the Wehrmacht. But the soldiers
had been trained for mobile and not for trench warfare; the armament was
designed for fast mobile warfare in summer conditions too. Both should
later contribute to the high casualties of the Germans in the rat war to be
described below. The 6th Army had achieved numerous military successes
until the attack on Stalingrad; first in the war against France, and later in
the context of the operations of Army Group South. In the Case Blue oper‐
ation, the army attacked from Ukraine into the direction of the Don River.
As a result, the army fought the battle of encirclement and annihilation at
Kalach-on-Don and then advanced to Stalingrad.
Since the Barbarossa Case, the 6th Army has been heavily involved in
German war crimes and genocide in the European East. It is well-known
that the leadership of the Nazi Reich requested their troops through orders
to do so. Antony Beevor15 describes in great detail the criminal track left
by the 6th Army on its southeast thrust: mass shootings of Jews, Gypsies,
political officials, actual or supposed partisans, prisoners of war and their
systematic assassination in camps, looting, rape and burning of entire vil‐
lages as so-called retaliatory measures. The plundering condemned thou‐
sands of civilians to starvation and did not always happen on the orders of
the officers: the supply situation of the German soldiers became difficult
already in late 1941, and the military discipline was by no means guaran‐
teed.
The fighting for the city of Stalingrad began with the German major of‐
fensive on September 13. The advance of the German troops was deter‐
mined by the special topography of Stalingrad. The ridge in the west of
the city and the deep ravines that led to the Volga prevented the broad de‐
ployment of motorized formations. Therefore, Stalingrad could be only at‐
tacked via three routes, along the Mokraia Metschetka and Elschenka
rivers, or along the Tatar ramparts. At the beginning of the fighting, when
the German side had a great superiority to humans and material, the troops
15 Beevor (2010), 73ff.
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were still stationed west of Stalingrad, especially in the protection of nu‐
merous erosion canyons there. From there infantry and tanks were driven
to their missions. After the missions, where it was often unclear to the sol‐
diers what was to be fired on, for example, the tanks drove back about 20
to 30 km to the army ordnance sites to collect ammunition.16
Unlike in other battles successfully fought by the Wehrmacht, encir‐
clement was impossible due to the topographic situation of the city at the
banks of the Volga. This was one of the main reasons why the 6th Army
had to carry out costly frontal attacks with high losses against tactically
important buildings and landmarks. Therefore, the city was systematically
divided by the Army High Command (AOK) into grid squares, to which
different tactical meaning was assigned. This strategy of the Germans was
quickly recognized by the Russian infantry, by watching where the first
stukas flew in the early morning:
“The moment we have rubbed our eyes, we crawl out of our shelters, cough‐
ing from the first morning cigarette, and with narrowed eyes we follow the
first ten. They determine the whole day, through which we learn what the
square is, where the German timetable today will make shake the earth like
brawn, where the sun will not be seen through smoke and dust, in which sec‐
tion you will bury the dead all night, repair damaged machine guns and can‐
nons, dig new trenches and shelters. When the chain flies over us, we breathe
a sigh of relief, throw off our shirts and pour water on our hands from the bil‐
ly-can.”17
The plan was to break out, isolate and combat separate sectors of the Sovi‐
et counter-defensive sector, as it proved impossible to cut off the city from
supply from the eastern Volga banks or even to destroy by bombing or ar‐
tillery fire the positions of the Red Army at the western shoreline of the
river. There, the Russians had dug shafts and bunkers in the steep slope on
the Volga. However, in four stages of attack from September 13 until to
October 31, the Wehrmacht succeeded in conquering almost the entire city
but the western shoreline of the Volga. Phase 4, Operation Hubertus,
which took place between 9 and 12 November to occupy the rest of the
city, was already a failure, but led to perhaps the most horrific fighting so
far:
16 Fritz Schreiber. In: Schüddekopf, Carl (2004): Im Kessel. Erzählen von Stalingrad.
München. 50.
17 Nekrassow (1948), 136.
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“We then left the Red Square and came just very close to Volga. There the
Russians were with the river in the back. Now we were so close together,
Russian and German soldiers, that we started treating each other with spades.
We were to occupy the strip of land that was still between us and the Volga.
The officers said: This is an order of the Führer! It was a big bloody carnage,
but the Russians did not go away (...) And then it was said that we, the ar‐
tillery, are pulling back. We escaped from the large Sichtotschlagen (beat to
death). Back to Zybenko, thirty kilometers southwest of Stalingrad in the
Kalmuck Steppe.”18
Rat War – a New Warscape
The course of the battle can be divided into three major phases. During the
first phase, the 6th Army tried to conquer Stalingrad. After capturing ap‐
proximately 90 percent of its territory and a phase of extremely high loss‐
es on the Soviet side, in particular, the situation turned in favour of the
Red Army, even before the large encircling operation Uranus took place,
which marks the beginning of the second phase. After Hitler’s ban on at‐
tempting an outbreak on November 24, the army proceeded to a defensive
strategy, expecting a rupture of the siege from the outside. Since Operation
Wintergewitter failed on December 23 finally, the trapped German army
was increasingly compressed into the ruins of the former urban and indus‐
trial areas. November 24 could be regarded as the beginning of the third
phase, because from this day on the supply shortages of the German troops
became obvious: at that time the food rations of the soldiers were reduced
by 50 percent. Due to exhaustion, ammunition and other shortcomings in
materials, an effective defense could no longer be opposed to the reinforc‐
ing Russian attacks. However, most of the encircled Axis soldiers did not
die as a result of hostilities, but to malnutrition and hypothermia.
Since the German attacks in September 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad
developed more and more from significant operations involving thousands
of soldiers and heavy weapons into a fierce house-to-house fighting (better
ruin-to-ruin fighting), which was characterized by sniper fire and bloody
close combat. This type of violence was later referred to as rat war which
came from the fact that the battle was often fought for the appropriation of
insignificant foxholes and basements. In the following, this development
5.
18 Bertold König. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 146–147.
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will be presented in two examples, first at the famous deployment of the
13th Guards Rifle Division under Alexander Rodimzev.
By the afternoon of September 14, it looked as if the 6th Army would
succeed in conquering downtown Stalingrad. The primary objective was
to conquer the main ferry landing, cutting off the 62nd Army from sup‐
plies. German troops fought their way up to 100 meters to the Volga and
the ferry terminal. As a result of the fact that even the house of the special‐
ists went over to the Germans, the ferry dock came within the reach of
German heavy machine guns. Chuikov therefore mobilized his last re‐
serves to save Stalingrad from a rapid conquest by the Wehrmacht. At this
time, only about 1,500 men defended Stalingrad center. Meanwhile, on the
other side of the Volga, the 13th Guards Rifle Division was on standby,
which had been taken there in forced marches. The Guards Division had
over 10,000 soldiers hastily armed with ammunition, grenades and some
machine guns and food on the banks of the Volga River on the afternoon
of September 14. After his conference with Chuikov on the western Volga
bank did not wait with embarkation until it was completely dark. Because
of the many fires, it was never dark during the first weeks of the war in
Stalingrad. A good picture of the city, as the soldiers had to see it when
crossing the river, Nekrasov:
“The city is burning. Not just the city, but the whole bank in all its length. As
far as the eye can see. This cannot be called a conflagration anymore, that’s
more than that. (...) A purple sky, covered with clenched clouds of smoke.
The dark silhouette of the burning city is as sawed out as with a fretsaw.
Black and red. There are no other colours here. Even the Volga is red – like
blood, it twitches in my head. Flames are barely visible. Only at one point
downstream are small jumping tongues. And opposite us, as from paper,
crushed cylinders of oil containers, collapsed, crushed by the gas. Flames
spew out of them – powerful prominences that tear themselves away and lose
themselves in the heavy, slowly forming, fantastically looking grey-red
smoke clouds.”19
In the evening twilight, the first guardsmen began to sail across the Volga:
in gunboats, but especially in civilian vehicles such as tugboats, fishing
boats and even rowboats. At first, the soldiers only heard distant gunfire
and exploding shells. Then the Germans spotted the flotilla and put it un‐
der fire with artillery, grenade launchers and heavy machine guns. Finally,
first boats were hit. The closer the ships came to the western shore, the
19 Nekrassow (1948), 111–112.
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more dreadful it became for the soldiers. Large fires and dark clouds of
smoke became even more terrifying, Stalingrad was already in September
1942 a mess of rubble and fire, from which large columns of black oily
smoke from the burning oil tanks climbed up to 3,000 m, as the German
air reconnaissance and bomber fleet had to realize too. The ferry landing
was littered with burned machines and ships thrown to the shore. The
stench of charred buildings and decaying corpses stuck in their noses. The
first wave of the soldiers of Rodimzev fell over the edges of the boats into
the shallow water and hurried as fast as possible up the steep, sandy shore
and attacked immediately.
Already the first wave of the 13th Guards Rifle Division came in merci‐
less close combat on the central station and a large mill made of red brick.
The second wave, which was disembarked some time later, even advanced
to the Mamayev kurgan. On September 16, the troops of Rodimzev at‐
tacked the hill directly, which was soon covered with countless fragments
of shrapnel, bombs, shells and explosive craters. This hill was of particular
importance for the battle at Stalingrad, as from there artillery could take
the Volga from one bank to the other under fire. The hill changed hands
several times and thousands of soldiers died during these battles. They lay
unburied in the churning earth of the hill, were whirled up by grenades
and were buried again in the endless hail of shells.
The 13th Guards regiment suffered losses of 30 percent in the first 24
hours of its mission, but this operation succeeded in securing the river‐
bank, which proved to be crucial in resisting the Germans until operation
Uranus. Overall, only 320 of the 10,000 soldiers deployed in this division
survived the Battle of Stalingrad.
But large-scale attacks such as those on the Mamayev hill or the tractor
factory were an exception, as even the German blitzkrieg tactics failed in
Stalingrad increasingly. It had been based on the concentration of firepow‐
er on narrowly limited front sections, with coordinated cooperation of ar‐
tillery, infantry, air force and motorized units. These tactics simply didn’t
succeed in the ruins, into which the Wehrmacht had been lured by the
plans of Chukov and Chuikov. In addition, the 6th Army soon suffered
from material shortage and wear. Therefore, the struggle for Stalingrad
turned into a particularly brutal variant of that war, which had been fought
since 1916 on the then Western Front already.
On the tactical maps the units of both sides appeared as contiguous di‐
visions, brigades and regiments, and a structured battle over greater dis‐
tance may have been existed still in the first days of the German assault.
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During this phase of the attack, each German infantry company was as‐
signed three to four tanks. However, this tactic was quickly doomed to
failure, as the tracked vehicles were ambushed and fought there with ar‐
mour-piercing weapons. The tanks could not fight snipers from the higher
floors of a building. In particular, during the defensive measures in the in‐
dustrial district, the Red Army created so-called death zones, heavily
mined streets and squares, in whose vicinity soldiers were stationed with
armour-piercing weapons to destroy German invaders in an ambush.
For this purpose, the troops of Chuikov had created so-called breakwa‐
ters to channel the force of German attacks. Fortified buildings, which
were manned by infantry with antitank weapons and machine guns, were
to divert the attackers into channels where armor-piercing weapons and
buried T-34 tanks awaited them. These channeled attack routes were also
mined by anti-tank mines. After a couple of days with these terrible on‐
slaughts, only small units, shock troops and groups of a maximum of 50
soldiers operated on both sides. Since then, a major part of the fighting has
not consisted of major attacks, but of incessant, small, deadly battles. The
Germans used in particular so-called Sturmkeile, attack platoons of about
10 men who stormed with machine guns, light mortars and flame guns
bunkers, cellars and sewers. The Russian attack troops included about 6 to
8 men who were equipped with submachine guns and hand grenades and
who supplied themselves with additional knives and sharpened spades, in
order to kill as quietly as possible after nightfall. The 62nd Army resorted
more and more to these nocturnal attacks, on the one hand because they
were convinced that German soldiers were more afraid at night, and on the
other hand to force the Germans to shoot at night for anything that moved.
The troops of Chuikov maintained the tension in the battle permanently, in
order to tire the Germans and to force them at the same time to high am‐
munition consumption. This could not be compensated under the logistical
conditions of the Russian war and in particular not after the encirclement
of the 6th Army in November. Above all, the Red Army assembled their
small mobile combat units of soldiers with different ethnic background
and weapons. If a building, a foxhole or a basement was conquered by the
Wehrmacht and some defenders escaped, they could easily join a neigh‐
bouring unit.
Both parties to the conflict experienced an almost nightmarish environ‐
ment in the Battle of Stalingrad. The melee in ruins, bunkers, cellars and
canals were called by the German soldiers soon rat war. This related, on
the one hand, to the complexity of the battlefield. Danger came in Stalin‐
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grad from all sides, frontally, laterally, in the back, from the sewers, above
floors and from the top floors, where snipers had taken cover.
“The next morning, as it became light, the Russian snipers began to shoot.
They lay in the big houses in front of us, in the upper floors. And from there
they could target us. One by one they killed. Who lay so that they could see
him, there was scarcely any rescue for him. Those who were able to be small
enough, lying on their tummy until evening, peed under themselves, pulled
the canvas over their heads, so that they did not see us.”20
In addition, the sky had to be constantly monitored: When the respective
air forces attacked, both German and Soviet soldiers had to throw them‐
selves to the ground. On the other hand, the fighting took place mainly in
an industrial landscape that had already been destroyed by Stalinist indus‐
trialization. The battle was fought for fuel tanks, tank, ammunition and
metallurgical factories, which had by no means handled large quantities of
toxic substances carefully even before the fighting broke out. Nekrasov,
for example, describes a battle in a loading station, where tanks and
freight cars were still filled with petroleum:
“Some bullets strike the tank car, just above my head, a thin bent jet of
petroleum pouring on the rails in front of me, and I feel on the face splashes
like from an atomizer.”21
The fighting does not only set fire to wooden parts, but also gasoline, oil
and other toxic substances. The heavy fires that erupted, especially at the
beginning of the battle, burned in the soldiers’ eyes and respiratory tracts
and covered their unprotected body parts with a layer of smear and dust.
Through the dust and soot of the collapsed and burning buildings, the sol‐
diers were hardly distinguishable from each other externally, so that it
came especially in close combat to fatal confusion between friend and foe.
The fires submerged the city in a ghastly dim light, which was further
darkened by the wandering dust clouds, especially as the impacts in still
standing parts of buildings caused veritable clouds of dust, stones, and
shrapnel. The conflagrations consumed so much oxygen that sometimes
the officers of the command posts, which were housed in bunkers, fainted.
During daytime the battle zones were filled with a terrible noise that fur‐
ther shattered the combatants’ nerves: the howling of Stukas, thunder of
flak and artillery, the clank of tank tracks, the shrieking of Stalin organs,
20 Hans Horn. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 114.
21 Nekrassow (1948), 118.
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the rattling of MGs. The soldiers found the cries of the wounded and dy‐
ing particularly distressing.
During the sudden nightfall typical of the southern Russian region, the
German air and artillery attacks were largely halted, but the cries of the
wounded continued, and unfamiliar nocturnal noises and the permanent
threat of snipers made sleeping impossible for the soldiers. Indeed, the
Battle of Stalingrad could not have been anything more different from the
deep war which took place before and after it in Europe’s east. It was a
new kind of warfare which was fought in the ruins of human civilization,
in the debris of industrial plants and houses. The rubble of war mingled
with the remnants of civilian life and industrial production and the fighting
very soon surpassed the horror of the battles of attrition which were fought
in the trenches of the First World War.
Despite even contemporary theoreticians had criticized trench war as a
military aberration, Stalingrad brought it to its extremes: the specific war
environment of the debris landscape Stalingrad and the much more ex‐
treme climatic conditions made the fighting in Stalingrad even more terri‐
ble than the butcheries at Verdun or at the Somme. The destroyed civil and
industrial infra structure played a major role in this. Grossmann writes:
“The people learned to keep large houses in the shelter of a barrage fire that
was emitted from the ground floor to the fourth floor, they set up amazingly
camouflaged observation stands right in front of their opponents’ noses and
used the funnels of heavy bombs and the whole intricate system of under‐
ground gas, oil and water pipes of the factory for defense.”22
The terrible living conditions of the soldiers contributed to this. They had
to continue fighting without detachment on both sides, such as the ap‐
palling conditions of nutrition, drinking water, health care, shelter, and
clothing, and the merciless disciplinary methods by which the soldiers
were forced into the fight. In the first weeks of the battle, the Russian
troops suffered considerably more than the Germans. They were shipped
directly into battle from the eastern bank of the Volga River, and the sur‐
vivors of this transport were often cut off in their foxholes or sewer pipes
for days until they were killed or could move to other positions. They had
to endure dust, smoke, hunger and – worst of all – thirst because in the
combat area there was no drinking water since the pumping station was
22 Grossman, Wassilij (1946): Stalingrad. Berlin. 59.
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destroyed in August. In particular, the wounded and dying, in addition to
their pain, must have suffered from a terrible thirst:
“One has a belly shot – he must not drink anything. All the time he beseeches
and begs: Just a drop, Comrade Lieutenant, just a drop, that mouth is so dry ...
and looks at you with such eyes that you would like to sink into the ground.
Also the machine guns want to drink (...) Where to get water from? If we do
not have water, the machine guns fall silent tomorrow, and that means ...”23
The supply of makhorka tobacco and alcohol was perceived as insuffi‐
cient. The daily ration of vodka was officially 100g a day, but the Russian
soldiers, when they came to the winning side, probably drank up to a litre
a day. Especially recently, the use of stimulants such as pervitine has be‐
come better known in research.
Many wounded soldiers were rescued by the courageous and self-sacri‐
ficing female paramedics, who were members of the platoons and often
also directly involved in the fighting. Despite their efforts, the rescue was
often in vain, because the medical treatment of the Soviet wounded was
horrible: they were carried to the western banks of the Volga River, and
left there untreated, until the supply boats at night returned to the eastern
shore. Dumped there, they were often left to their fate, and even if they
reached the field hospitals that were set up about 10 km from the combat
zone which did not mean that they had a chance to survive. The whole or‐
ganization of the Russian army at Stalingrad was more geared to bringing
fresh forces to the battle. Wounded soldiers were a neglected factor, more
important was the replenishment of war victims, who had to march under
NKVD guard to the landings on the east bank and were treated during riv‐
er crossing basically like guarded prisoners. When soldiers panicked, they
were shot on the boats; if they jumped into to river to save their lives, they
were shot too. The Soviet military leadership also tried to make it impossi‐
ble for the soldiers on the actual battlefield to desert or surrender. There‐
fore, so-called lock groups were set up behind units of low morale: well-
armed Komsomol or NKVD units armed with heavy machine guns were
positioned especially behind militia who had been ordered to attack. If
necessary, they opened fire on soldiers who collapsed under stress. They
were thus forced to flee in the direction of the enemy, who also mowed




them down with machine guns. The soldiers had only the choice to be shot
by the Germans or the Russians.
The Russian civilian population was by no means treated better by their
compatriots. During the battles on the settlement of the Barricades’ work‐
ers, the Germans observed that Russian women who wanted to rescue
themselves behind the German positions were mowed down by Soviet
troops with machine guns mercilessly. Especially at the beginning of the
fighting, thousands of civilians, unless they were evacuated or drafted into
the Soviet militia had to persevere in the city. All reports indicate that the
debris landscape was still teeming with life at this time. Old people, chil‐
dren, and women sought shelter in cellars, sewers, and caves dug into the
steep river bank and ravines. The openings of these caves were covered
with charred planks and rags. Even at the height of the battles for the Ma‐
mayev Kurgan, civilians are said to have taken cover in shell funnels.
Since the Russian civilian population did not receive food rations, it was
dependent on the almost impossible self-supply of drinking water and
food. Children proved to be particularly successful. However, they were
also fired upon by the Germans when they tried to steal army food, the
Russians open fire upon them, when they allowed themselves to be har‐
nessed by the Germans to provide drinking water for example. Persons
used by the Germans to transport corpses and wounded were shot by the
Soviet soldiers too. Stalin had ordered to execute every Soviet citizen who
followed German orders, even if he acted under duress. Just as merciless‐
ly, military discipline was enforced: probably about 13,500 Russian sol‐
diers were executed in Stalingrad according to military law or judgments
of court-martial.
In the first weeks of the battle, this was conducted asymmetrically, i.e.
well-equipped German troops tried to crush Russian soldiers hiding in ru‐
ins. The resistance of the Soviet side was based on house-to-house fight‐
ing and guerrilla tactics. As a result of Chuikov’s embrace of German
troops, the strategy to force them into close-quarters combat with high
losses, the 6th Army finally had to fight under the same conditions. Hans
Horn tells about it:
“We got into a bomb crater, big as a room, but deeper. There were a couple of
loopholes at the top, and below was a heel on the flank where you could walk.
The Russians were thirty yards away. Between us only bomb and grenade
craters. A hundred yards behind us lay the houses, or what was left of them.
And then it started to rain, day after day. The water gathered at the bottom of
the funnel and you had no dry thread on your body. There was hardly any‐
thing to eat, you could not sleep, maybe doze once. For more than a week we
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were sitting in this hole. The artillery fired on both sides, but it did not benefit
anyone. Dangerous was the rifle fire and many grenade attacks that we could
hardly repel.”24
This changed with the operation Uranus: The 6th Army was encircled by
the Soviet Union in a large forced movement. At first the Soviet army suf‐
fered from supply problems, but at the latest with the encirclement of the
Germans this asymmetry had been overcome. The German side suffered
increasingly from supply shortages, a situation that could lead to tragic-
comic situations. Bertold König narrates:
“One of us went to get some food. And he came and did not come back when
we were about to go looking, when he appeared, very pale and shuddering
from top to bottom. He had been queuing at the wrong field kitchen, the one
on the Russians. They had a field kitchen with a diesel truck (Einheitsdiesel)
from us captured and thus fed their people. He was done for, but he came with
our rations from the Russians. He had not been recognized in the darkness.”25
The first replenishment problems for the Germans had already been evi‐
dent since October 1942, but the supply had finally stopped weeks before
the German capitulation in early February 1943. A major problem for the
German side was that Hitler had personally banned the breakout of the en‐
circled troops: With the loss of the city, all those operational objectives
which the German side in the south-east had achieved until then had to be
given up. Although this was a strategically comprehensible decision, at the
same time it brought the enclosed 6th Army into an extremely difficult sit‐
uation. For the planned supply of the Germans over an airlift proved not
feasible. Worse still for the German soldiers: The Soviet troops finally
succeeded in completely stopping the supply from the air and also repuls‐
ing the German replacement attempts. As a result, the 6th Army was
doomed. In the two to three months which, surprisingly enough, the 6th
Army was to endure in the ruins of the city and industrial district of Stalin‐
grad, an alignment took place with those Russian troops who had opposed
them during the first weeks of the battle. The advancing Russian units
were repulsed with significant losses, with ruthless disciplinary measures
and improvised combat tactics, and finally no more. In addition, the mass
murder continued: of surviving Russian civilians and finally also of Hilf‐
swilligen, a military auxiliary unit which the Germans had enlisted in
Eastern Europe.
24 Hans Horn. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 116–117.
25 Bertold König. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 146.
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On December 23, 1942, winter thunderstorm finally failed, at the latest
since the 6th Army could only wait for the final attack of the Russian
troops. It began on January 10, 1943, with Operation Kolzo, during which
the Soviets advanced slowly from the west to the encircled German
troops. Since on 16 and 22 January 1943, the two airfields Pitomnik and
Gumrak had been conquered by the Soviet troops the Germans could only
capitulate. The fighting was stopped on February 2, but soldiers stranded
in ruins were probably hiding or trying to make their way west until the
beginning of March.
Until the capitulation, or better until the mass of German troops was
captured by the Russians, the Germans, their allies and Hiwis were ex‐
posed to an increasing process of exhaustion, distress, impoverishment,
and disillusionment. Their warscape now often consisted of a shelter in
some part of the ruins, which had been covered with boards or rags, or a
cellar hole. These shelters were often unheated despite the cold winter
weather, and heat could be created only by the men crowding under
tarpaulins and blankets. There they were plagued by fleas, lice and even
by mice, which had multiplied enormously because of the everywhere ly‐
ing corpses and cadavers. Bertold König narrates:
“One was more and more dulled. The many dead did not seem to mind any‐
more. In Zybenko I slept one night in a bunker. There they all stood, it was so
narrow, none could fall over, not even those who had already died. There
were also people with frostbite and that stinks beastly. So I climbed out of the
bunker through an opening and came to a pile and fell in, between amputated
arms and legs. There used to be a field hospital. Because it was too much of
kicking the bucket everywhere, you just took it.”26
In addition to the cold the soldiers suffered from hunger or even starva‐
tion, because from December on German soldiers mostly were fed with a
barren bread ration and some water soup, in which horsemeat had been
cooked. Cold and hunger caused the soldiers to lose weight and suffer the
effects of malnutrition. Their skin turned yellowish, they were down to the
bone. The intellectual activity was increasingly impaired, it was hardly
possible to concentrate mentally. The lack of water and food also led to
apathy or euphoric hallucinations – and to suicides, violence, mental
breakdown and disease. Many wounds were left untreated and especially
infectious diseases such as typhoid spread. Self-mutilation and suicides in‐
26 Bertold König. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 152–153.
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creased. As early as the beginning of January, a growing number of Ger‐
man soldiers surrendered without resistance or ran over to the enemy. Be‐
sides, military leadership and discipline collapsed more and more. Since
then, the German soldiers joined rather randomly fighting units, it came to
the murder of officers and military police and finally the German soldiers
only fought to the bare survival.
Warscape after the Fighting
After several months of terrible fighting, the city and industrial facilities
of Stalingrad were completely destroyed. After the end of the battle, which
was not the end of all fighting, Stalingrad (or better, what it was) was
nothing but a landscape of rubble and metal parts interspersed with count‐
less human corpses. Only winter prevented an unbearable smell of decay
spreading over the city. Everywhere there were frozen bodies, it had hard‐
ly been possible to bury the many dead. Fallen soldiers were often simply
left lying or put in trenches; mostly half-naked, without pants and jackets,
wrapped with paper bandages, because the survivors took all useful pos‐
sessions of the fallen. Earth burials proved to be almost impossible, espe‐
cially after the onset of winter in frozen soil. If anything, dead people were
buried in holes and temporarily covered. The carcasses of around 54,000
Wehrmacht horses were also lying around in ruins but they continued to
serve as food for all those involved in the battle. After the surrender, ini‐
tially, around 3,500 Russian civilians were used as gravediggers. German
dead were brought into bunkers or armored ditches and buried there. Lat‐
er, about 1,200 German prisoners of war were used for this, almost all of
whom died of typhus or were shot dead by the Russian guards. Decades
later, bodies were found.
Despite knowing that the German troops could not fight any further, no
precautions had been taken to guard or even supply them. The treatment of
prisoners of war mixed brutality, indifference and revenge. German pris‐
oners tried to survive by chewing raw horse meat and eating pussy-willow.
Most German soldiers probably died already on the way to the prison
camps. In addition, the Soviet soldiers and civilians themselves suffered
terrible supply shortages. But it would be a mistake to believe that after
the capitulation of the larger German units peace came or at least an order‐
ly capture according to the rules of the Geneva Convention. Rather, it was




and incredible scenes of mass murder after the capture. Johann Scheins
narrates the incidents after the German surrender:
“We did not know how long we walked with sixty thousand men. We stopped
because we could not stand anymore, and then there were some lying, they
were dead (...) The Russians, the officers, said: Hitler kaputt, you kaputt. And
then tanks came out, they drove over us, slowly, who were standing there be‐
came like broken egg. There were commissioners on the tanks, not Russian
officers. Big guys with blue caps and red ties. With carbines stood on the
tanks. Hitler kaputt, you kaputt. So they drove over the people and with the
pistons from the carabiner, they smash the heads of those who were tall.”27
There has to be mentioned another factor too: While the German soldiers
were driven to death by thousands by their Russian guards, the Red Army
advanced to the Don river to take advantage of the victory on the Volga
for an even greater strategic goal – after the defeat at the Battle of Stalin‐
grad, the entire southern German eastern front was threatened with col‐
lapse. Such an event would have been many times more dramatic for the
Germans and would have led to the collapse of Hitler’s armies on the east‐
ern front. The third battle for Kharkov took place already in February and
March 1943. In the course of the Voronezh-Kharkov operation, the Red
Army was able to temporarily take over the city Kharkov. Field Marshal
Erich von Manstein, however, managed to stabilize the southern flank and
retake the city with a strategic maneuver that is often compared to a
castling. This was the last significant success of the Wehrmacht in the war
against the Soviet Union. The victory delayed the collapse of the German
eastern front by more than a year and was a heavy defeat of the Russians,
which, however, was not considered by the Soviet propaganda with a
word.
Towards the end of the war, the ruins were almost deserted, as the for‐
mer residents would not be allowed to return until the duds were removed.
Only a few people survived in ruins, in a city that was completely marked
by death and destruction and an incredible history of violence which was
never commemorated officially. What took place instead was that the So‐
viet propaganda took the battle already in early 1943 as an opportunity to
reinterpret all the mistakes made so far by party, government, and military
and to invent the myth of the victorious Russian heroic people. The party
claimed the spirit of Stalingrad for itself. In this way, the battles there de‐
picted fraternity and selflessness as the result of the party’s leadership and
27 Johann Scheins. In: Schüddekopf (2004), 208–209.
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ideology. Although it is known that the daily routine of the war looked dif‐
ferent, soon after the end of the war the official propaganda overwhelmed
more and more the individual memory. This created in Stalingrad the
space for a warscape after the war, which had to be built soon after 1945
by thousands of camp prisoners and German POWs: It was characterized
by even larger industries, which were placed on the banks of the Volga
without any environmental concerns, Stalinist socialist classicism and
oversized memorials, such as Motherland Calls, an 85 m high statue with
the weight of 7,900 t, without counting the concrete foundation. Especially
in the Brezhnev era, the shadow of a horrible war reality was re-written
through the narrative of collective splendor.28 The most important differ‐
ence today, that is, for now, three decades after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, meanwhile the collective memory is also operated by numerous ec‐
clesiastical elements. This is in clear contrast to the atheism that character‐
ized the party, army and people of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic
War.
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Transgenerational War-Related Trauma in Post-War Germany:
Evaluation of Results and Research Perspectives
Martin Dinges
Introduction and Statement of Problem
When a war comes to an end, societies commemorate the dead and focus
on the wounded. In Vietnam, the victims of Agent Orange have been giv‐
en particular consideration. This conference is mainly about the environ‐
mental destruction that was carried to an extreme in the American War.
War-related psychological disorders are less obvious than physical injuries
and environmental damage and are therefore discussed less frequently.
This is even more so with the psychological damage that may manifest as
long-term trauma. Today, forty years after what we call the Vietnam War, I
would like to address this issue. The German experience which now, 70
years after the end of the Second World War, goes back one generation
further, can lead us to reflect on many aspects in Vietnam that have so far
not been scrutinized by the historians.1 I would be very interested to hear
more about Vietnamese research on this question.
Dealing with the psychological effect of war is important in two re‐
spects: for the individuals and families affected and for society as a whole.
1.
1 This shows that there has been fruitful cooperation between historians and psychol‐
ogists in dealing with their own country’s history. On psychiatric war trauma in
Vietnamese people I have only found two publications in languages that are acces‐
sible to me. One is the government publication, Lê Thi (Duöng Thi Thoa) (2005):
Single Women in Vietnam. Hanoi. And the other is a French article by Guillemot,
François (2014): Des jeunes filles mutilées. In: Guillemot, François/Larcher-
Goscha, Agathe (eds.): La colonisation des corps: de l'Indochine au Viet Nam.
Paris. P. 343–392. A differentiated account on soldiers’ motivation for fighting is
presented by Guillemot, François (2012): Be Men! Fighting and Dying for the State
of Vietnam (1951–1954). In: War & Society 31, 2. 184–210. 196. For war accounts
of the generation of heroic Vietnam fighters of the period preceding 1968 cf.: Cir‐
culating War Memories: The Diary of Ang Thùy Trâm, in: Journal of Vietnamese
Studies 3, 2. 172–179; Lam, Mariam B. (not yet published): Not coming to terms:
Archival Trauma and Strategic Effect. Durham.
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The urge to justify or even glorify war as well as the wish of simply for‐
getting its horrors, on the other hand, often lead to repression. Individual
and collective denial can reinforce each other.2 What we repress finds its
way into our daily lives in roundabout ways, however, and can become a
burden for individuals as well as for society.3
I would like to make one important point at the beginning in order to
avoid misunderstanding: The Vietnamese War of Liberation was of course
a totally different conflict from the racist and offensive war waged by the
Germans. I will therefore not dwell on the aspect of the extermination of
the Jews (the Holocaust) despite the fact that the research into the process‐
ing of that specific trauma was very important – heuristically and histori‐
cally – for the victims of the Holocaust (and, later, even for the perpetra‐
tors themselves).4
My main concern here is with the general war damage caused by
shelling, bombing, displacement and forced migration, the loss of parents,
partners and other close relatives, by people becoming brutalized through
actively participating in the war, by the shootings and deprivation that are
an inevitable part of any war, however lofty the moral ideals that led to it
in the first place.
2 Regarding the spirit cult as one of the reasons why the commemoration of the war
dead cannot be suppressed in Vietnam Margara, Andreas (2012): Der Amerikanis‐
che Krieg. Erinnerungskultur in Vietnam. Berlin. 91. Rudolf, Gerd (2009):
Kriegskinder und Persönlichkeitsstruktur. In: Radebold, Hartmut/Heuft, Gereon/
Fooken, Insa (eds.): Kindheiten im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Weinheim. 83–91. 89.
3 This is of course also true for the repressed history of the war in South Vietnam
which is still not publically commemorated.
4 Basic reading: Bergmann, M.S./Jucovy, M.E. (eds.) (1982): Generations of the
Holocaust. New York. An up-to-date overview: Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/Möller, Bir‐
git (2013): Kriegskindheit im Hamburger Feuersturm und ihre Folgen. Eine theo‐
retische Einführung in die Perspektiven der Enkel und Familien. In: Lamparter, Ul‐
rich/Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/Wierling, Dorothee (eds.): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger
Feuersturms 1943 und ihre Familien: Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von
Kriegserfahrungen. Göttingen. 295–306. 296f. Bohleber, Werner (2000): Die Ent‐
wicklung der Traumatheorie in der Psychoanalyse. In: Psyche. Zeitschrift für Psy‐




When Do Traumatizing War Memories Affect Individuals or the Society
– or: the Transgenerational Effect of Memory
It is not true, however, that the psychological effects of a war are not spo‐
ken of, too, after a war. There are those who lie sleepless as a result of the
air raids they witnessed. Others start up from their sleep in the middle of
the night because of the violence they experienced; there are soldiers who
return from the war unable to resume their ordinary lives again: they start
drinking or become violent.5 Bao Ninh’s novel is about this. That this nov‐
el has been so hugely successful points to the wider societal need for re‐
flection in Vietnam, too.6 The immense individual suffering in Germany
after 1945 – and it was probably the same in Vietnam after 1975 – was
endured and partly worked through within the family; in isolation, as it
were.7
2.
5 Goltermann, Svenja (2009): Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche
Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. München.
130–162 [engl edition: War in Their Minds: German War Veterans and Their Expe‐
riences of Violence in the Second World War. Michigan UP.]. For a concrete exam‐
ple cf. Meyer-Madaus, Amelie/Wiegand-Grefe, Silke (2013): Familien über drei
Generationen im Familieninterview. Ein Fallbeispiel. In: Lamparter/Wiegand-
Grefe/Wierling (2013), 320–335. 332. Müller-Hohagen, Jürgen (2005): Verleugnet,
verdrängt, verschwiegen. Seelische Nachwirkungen der NS-Zeit und Wege zu ihrer
Überwindung. München. 14ff., 73–80, 108, 200.
6 Ninh, Bao (1996): The Sorrow of War. New York. First published in roneotype in
1990 as Nỗi buồn chiến tranh (Identity of love), then in 1994 in English, and final‐
ly, around 2006, in Vietnamese; pirate editions of the English version were sold be‐
fore to tourists and also to the Vietnamese. Translated into many languages, mostly
based on the English version co-written by the Australian author Frank Palmos, in
close cooperation with the original author. Cf. Meyer, Christina (2008): War and
Trauma Images in Vietnam War Representations. Hildesheim. 161–189.
7 For tolerated local private commemoration, veneration of the dead and clever rea‐
soning see Kwon, Heonik (2013): Cold War in a Vietnamese Community. In: La‐
derman, Scott/Martini, Edwin A. (eds.): Four Decades On. Vietnam, the United
States and the Legacies of the Second Indochina War. Durham. 84–102. 89. For the
publically steered positive commemoration Kwon, Heonik (2013), 90f. and Vương
Trí Nhàn (2008): The Diary of Dang Thùy Trâm and the Postwar Vietnamese Men‐
tality. In: Journal of Vietnamese Studies 3, 2. 180–195. 182–186 for photos, then
the censoring of the first critical literary publications in the 1980s and the beginning
of the Doi Moi reform as the framework for the publication of a – still – heroic di‐
ary by Dang Thùy Trâm, 189; and more comprehensively Margara (2012), particu‐
larly 25ff., on the disregard for the individual suffering of war veterans and those
returning from the war in the commemoration culture 81ff. On further, mostly artis‐
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In Germany there were specific added problems with the processing of
war experiences. In particular, the generation that took part in the war had
often been involved in very disturbing actions or war crimes which they
were determined to forget. They tended to keep these painful experiences
bottled up for decades and never spoke about them.8
In the first years after the war people were primarily preoccupied with
their material needs: the children were malnourished, yet one basically
never reads about their psychological wounds during the post-war period.9
As late as the 1950s, the public and the psychologists thought that young
tic and literary processing of war memories see Ho Tai, Hue-Tam (2001): Situating
Memory. In: Ho Tai, Hue-Tam (ed.): The Country of Memory. Remaking the Past in
Late Socialist Vietnam. Berkeley. 1–17.
8 For other coping mechanisms cf. Mitscherlich, Alexander/Mitscherlich, Margarete
(1967): Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens. Munich.
Particularly 24, 40.
9 Dinges, Martin (2011): Die Gesundheit von Jungen und männlichen Jugendlichen
in historischer Perspektive (1780–2010). In: MedGG 29. 97–121. 109. Coerper,
Carl/Hagen, Wilhelm/Thomae, Hans (eds.) (1954): Deutsche Nachkriegskinder:
Methoden und erste Ergebnisse der deutschen Längsschnittuntersuchungen über die
körperliche und seelische Entwicklung im Schulkindalter. Stuttgart. One result
mentioned, which even surprised the authors, was that children from neglected
backgrounds (poor living conditions, poor care and family dissolution, inner ne‐
glect) did better at school than well cared-for children (278); mention is made of
their lower levels of cheerfulness (284ff.), leaving a higher general readiness to per‐
form. The positive effect of motherly care, even in difficult circumstances, is em‐
phasized in what follows (302). Huth, Albert (1956): Die Entwicklung des Kindes
im Volksschulalter. Donauwörth. “The now 13 to 19 year-olds have been through
the war; their unconscious has been permeated by experiences that continue to have
a negative effect. This is why it is essential to convey true, beautiful, good and sa‐
cred experiences to these young people!” Huth (1956), 152. This seems to imply
that the problems are being perceived, even if the views differ on how to resolve
them. Hau , Theodor F. (1968): Frühkindliches Schicksal und Neurose. Schizoide
und depressive Neurose-Erkrankungen als Folge frühkindlicher Erlebnisschäden in
der Kriegszeit. Göttingen. Hau pointed, as early as 1965, to a “structural change in
the neuroses of adolescents after the war,” although not much attention has been
given to his findings. The lasting psychological effects of the war, which led to “re‐
bellion, protest, extravagance, outsider idolization and a deeply rooted lack of so‐
ciability in adolescents, who at the same time overcompensated by seeking mostly
superficial contacts, extreme psychomotor states in jazz events,” remained unno‐
ticed, or possibly not understood, by the parents because of their different orienta‐
tion. The war experiences, which evoked fear, a sense of being exposed and a lack
of existential safety and self-assurance in the children and adolescents who were
not prepared for the world, continued to affect them detrimentally. The adults and
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children did not remember the war and could therefore not be harmed or
traumatized by it.10 And much praise was lavished on the mothers who
had everything under control.11
The survivors needed a roof over their heads, the soldiers who had
come back and the war widows claimed pensions, the expellees demanded
compensation for everything they had lost.12 For society it was also almost
exclusively about material concerns – housing and factories needed to be
rebuilt.13 Literature was the only place where, even in the early stages, the
surviving soldiers’ loss of orientation and the problems arising from this
for their families were occasionally articulated.
Soon, collective commemoration rituals were introduced.14 But the psy‐
chological consequences of the war remained unarticulated, certainly in
society as a whole were confronted with something they had forgotten, something
they wanted to forget and did not want to be reminded of. Only many years later
the young people began to ask for what they had missed out on in their earliest
childhood.” Hau, Theodor F. (1968), 132f., 32, 81f., in particular on father ab‐
sence, 112. The solution suggested here, too, is “emotional reliability and constan‐
cy of interpersonal relationships,” which need to make up for the deficits incurred
due to the father’s earlier frequent absence (or his substitutes who were not reli‐
able due to their age or because they were not consistently present) as well as the
lack of affection shown by the mother Hau, (1968), 135.
10 For evidence cf. Radebold, Hartmut (2004): Entwicklungspsychologische Aspek‐
te. In: Schulz, Hermann/Radebold, Hartmut/Reulecke, Jürgen: Söhne ohne Väter:
Erfahrungen der Kriegsgeneration. Berlin. 137. Decker, Oliver/Brähler, Elmar
(2012): Die psychosozialen Folgen von Vertreibung, Ausbombung und Vater‐
losigkeit bei den Geburtsjahrgängen 1930–1945. In: Radebold/Heuft/Fooken
(eds.), 119–138. 120. Radebold, Hartmut (2012): Während des Alterns. In: Rade‐
bold/Heuft/Fooken (2012), 139–148. 146. For the sources of this statement see
Hagen, Wilhelm/Thomae, Hans (1962): 10 Jahre deutsche Nachkriegskinder.
München.
11 Reulecke, Jürgen (2010): Vaterlose Söhne. In: Thomä, Dieter (eds.): Vater‐
losigkeit: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer fixen Idee. Frankfurt. 142–159. 152–
156.
12 Mitscherlich/Mitscherlich (1967): 23, 40. Winkler, Christiane (2007):
Männlichkeit und Gesundheit der deutschen Kriegsheimkehrer im Spiegel der
Ärztekongresse des Verbands der Heimkehrer. In: Dinges, Martin (ed.):
Männlichkeit und Gesundheit im historischen Wandel ca. 1800 – ca. 2000.
Stuttgart. 157–173.
13 Not least in order to be able to generate the transfer payments and the burden shar‐
ing – for the displaced and the various groups of war victims.
14 For instance the Hamburg Firestorm etc. where the city commemorated the vic‐
tims of the bombing with annual wreath-laying ceremonies. On their annual con‐
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society. After a phase of repression the society in the Federal Republic of
Germany has by now collectively worked through the war crimes.15 Un‐
like Japan, it tried early on to enter into dialogue with the former enemies
in the neighbouring countries, a step that proved instrumental in the subse‐
quent unification of Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany has paid
considerable damages and has written history books together with histori‐
ans from those neighbouring countries. The younger generation has been
systematically confronted with the wartime atrocities across the school
curriculum. It was nevertheless exactly these war crimes that blocked off
German war memories for a very long time: Germans were allowed, ex‐
pected and willing to publically remember their part as perpetrators, but
not their part as victims. This role was fully occupied by Jews, Russians,
Poles, et cetera.
This changed relatively “suddenly” around 2000-2003, when those born
around 1940 reached retirement age.16 Now most of them had time at their
hands and could no longer repress troubling emotions or stop them from
surging up. Some experienced deep inner crises or even severe depression
which forced them to confront their past. Some went to see a psychiatrist17
where they came to realize that, throughout their lives, they had been un‐
able to free themselves from the burdens of the past:18 they suffered as a
result of their parents’ forced silence, especially regarding the question as
to their contribution to the running of the Nazi state.19
These sixty-somethings went public. They declared themselves collec‐
tively to be the generation of war children, which initially referred to the
now defined memory construct of “war childhood and fatherlessness.”20
They demanded that they should be “allowed to remember without the risk
gresses the territorial associations of the displaced persons bewailed the loss of
their homeland – having asked for it to be returned to them for a long time.
15 The differences between the experiences in East and West Germany cannot be fur‐
ther investigated here.
16 The existing, and frequent, earlier statements and publications, to which Dörr quite
rightly refers, were not perceived nearly as clearly cf. Dörr, Margarete (2007): Der
Krieg hat uns geprägt. Wie Kinder den Zweiten Weltkrieg erlebten. Frankfurt.
17 “A few percent”, Rudolf (2009), 90.
18 Schulz-Hageleit, Peter: Zur Problematik des Durcharbeitens lebensgeschichtlicher
Erfahrungen. In: Reulecke, Jürgen (ed.): Generationalität und Lebensgeschichte im
20. Jahrhundert. München. 17–32. Esp. 29.
19 Mitscherlich/Mitscherlich (1967).
20 Cf. Schulz/Radebold/Reulecke (2004).
Martin Dinges
56
of being accused of offsetting their own grief against the suffering that
Hitler Germany inflicted on other peoples, or of feeling sorry for them‐
selves and styling themselves as ‘victims’.”21
The war-induced fatherlessness that first dominated this generational
construction was a mass phenomenon. “Millions of German soldiers”
were already “absent for long periods of time during the war.”22 In World
War II, which claimed inside Germany 4.7 million lives, every eighth Ger‐
man male died, including all ages from children to old men.23 3.2 million
men were still imprisoned in POW camps in the spring of 1947.
“More than two million civilians were killed whilst fleeing or during dis‐
placement. Half a million fell victim to bombing.”24 “Those who died or went
missing in the war left behind more than 1.7 million widows and almost 2.5
million half or complete orphans. It is estimated that after World War II
around 25 percent of all children grew up fatherless.”25 “Countless others had
a troubled relationship with a father who, traumatized by the war, had fallen
silent.”26
The consequences for these children, boys as well as girls, were horren‐
dous: growing up without a father meant being deprived of the triangula‐
tion (i.e. forming attachments with a mother and a father) that is essential
for children’s psychological development.27 Fathers are very important for
child development.
They can
• promote a secure mother-baby bonding and contribute their own at‐
tachment aspects from an early stage,
21 Reulecke, Jürgen (2012): Die wiedergefundene Vergangenheit. Generationelle As‐
pekte der neueren deutschen Erinnerungskultur. In: Gansel, Carsten/Zimniak,
Pawel (eds.): Kriegskindheiten und Erinnerungsarbeit. Berlin. 15–30. 16.
22 Franz, Matthias/Lieberz, Klaus/Schepank, Heinz (2005): Das Fehlen der Väter und
die spätere seelische Entwicklung der Kriegskinder in einer deutschen
Bevölkerungsstichprobe. In: Radebold, Hartmut (ed.): Kindheiten im II. Weltkrieg.
Gießen. 45–55. 48f.
23 Of those conscripted one in two of the 20 to 30 year-olds died and one in three of
the 30 to 40 year olds.
24 More than half were women and children.
25 Radebold, Hartmut (2004): Abwesende Väter – Fakten und Forschungsergebnisse.
In: Schulz, Hermann/Radebold, Hartmut/Reulecke, Jürgen (eds.): Söhne ohne
Väter: Erfahrungen der Kriegsgeneration. Berlin. 115–119. 115f. With more de‐
tailed information on individual age cohorts.
26 Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 49.
27 Reulecke (2012), 22.
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• promote separation if the one- to two-year old is too closely attached to
the mother, and help to ease the child’s anxiety,
• help to strengthen the sexual identity of the three- to six-year old child,
and
• through their active involvement favourably influence the child’s cog‐
nitive competences and internalization of values so that these influ‐
ences can serve “as models for coping with potentially critical bio‐
graphical transitions in later phases of life”.28
All that was often left to the fatherless children were father projections –
mostly idealized images of the absent father – and “allocations of tasks”
by their mothers such as, “You owe this (a particular, desired behaviour) to
your father.” At the same time, children were often required much too ear‐
ly to take responsibility for their younger siblings. Some children were
treated like partner substitutes (parentification), a role that could only
overtax them. And the mothers themselves were often unable to cope or
depressed.29
Retrospective Psychological Findings
Parallel to this discovery and public articulation – initially by individuals
– of the effects of a repressed war childhood, psychologists came across
phenomena that surprised them. Their original aim was merely to find out
how widespread psychogenic illnesses – alternating states of anxiety and
depression – were in any given urban population.30 At three points in time
the researchers investigated 600 randomly selected individuals (equal
3.
28 Whole paragraph according to Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 50f., quote 51. For
more detail cf. Radebold (2004), 120–130.
29 This view only emerged later: Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 49. Franz,
Matthias/Lieberz, Klaus/Schmitz, Norbert/Schepank, Heinz (1999.): Wenn der
Vater fehlt. Epidemiologische Befunde zur Bedeutung früher Abwesenheit für die
psychische Gesundheit im späteren Leben. In: Zeitschrift für psychosomatische
Medizin, 45, 260–278. Radebold (2004), 130–136. The classic description of this
generation goes back to Schelsky, Helmut (1957): Die skeptische Generation.
Düsseldorf. Specific problems of single mothers after the war, young people’s at‐
tempt to quickly catch up on training, the premature taking on of responsibility –
often for younger siblings, because the working mothers were frequently absent,
helping with the reconstruction, great reluctance to engage in politics.
30 Including a tendency towards symptom shifting.
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numbers of men and women) who were born in 1935, 1945 and 1955, us‐
ing standardized questionnaires and interviews. The survey was first car‐
ried out in 1979-83, then repeated in 1983-1985 and again in 1991-1994.31
This Mannheim Cohort Study showed on the one hand that a quarter of the
population suffered from such disorders; on the other hand – and more im‐
portantly – that these sufferers mostly belonged to the older generation.
This was interpreted as a consequence of the extremely disturbing war ex‐
periences of this age group which showed that the problems had not sorted
themselves out in the course of a long life; on the contrary: when the study
was repeated eleven years later, they were equally prevalent.32
In a follow-up assessment that aimed to isolate the risk factors which
may lead to mental illness, fatherlessness was unexpectedly found to be a
statistically significant indicator of later problems and their persistence
over eleven years.33 Where with children of 6 and younger the father was
absent for more than six month – only in a few cases the father had died –
they displayed even fifty years later more strongly pronounced disorders
than other members of the same birth cohort.34 The absence of a father is
of course only one factor among many, because with psychogenic disor‐
ders several factors come together such as personal characteristics, social
support, chronic stress, genetic influences and other strains of early child‐
hood. But extended separation from the father increases the risk at a statis‐
tically significant level. These findings corroborated the self-interpretation
of the generation of war children.
The specific strains of being a war child have been researched in more
detail since then. In the ELDERMEN study, which was carried out from
1994 to 1997, all over sixty-year old patients admitted to hospitals for
acute internal medicine were, during the last third of their treatment, ques‐
tioned and examined with regard to psychogenic disorders, present physi‐
cal disabilities, subjective wellbeing and subjective physical ailments. As
a first important result the study revealed that those who experienced the
31 Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 45–48.
32 Based on the central study year, the missing “spontaneous remissions” were an im‐
portant topic of psychoanalysis for some time. Franz, Matthias/Lieberz, Klaus/
Schmitz, N./Schepank, Heinz (1999): A Decade of Spontaneous Long-Term
Course of Psychogenic Impairment in a Community Population Sample. In: Soc
Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 34, 651–656. 652f.
33 Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 49.
34 Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 50f.
Transgenerational War-Related Trauma in Post-War Germany
59
war as children or pupils were significantly more stressed by this experi‐
ence than those who were already adults at the time.35 This became appar‐
ent on comparing elderly with very elderly people in the 1990s. The latter
group was born between the wars, before 1930, the younger group were
born later. Members of the younger group had more problems working
through the stressful events because they had not been offered or learnt
ways of coming to terms with their experiences. The older ones had coped
better although they were in a worse physical state at the time of the inves‐
tigation: they were, after all, on average 15 years older!
On closer inspection, the generation of war children born between 1930
and 1945 proved to be rather heterogeneous which meant that further re‐
search was necessary: the question now was how “displacement and being
bombed out had affected their present state of health” and “to what extent
anxiety and depression continued to be more prevalent today among those
who were displaced or bombed out.” In addition, half of this generation
grew up with fathers, with a quarter of them the father was absent part of
the time, and with almost another quarter the father was away for a long
time or permanently.36 Further studies were therefore carried out to see “to
what extent growing up without a father affected people’s present wellbe‐
ing.” In order to further verify these results an investigation representative
of the overall population followed. In two sections, conducted in 2002 and
2003, approximately 4500 (4478) persons aged 14 to 93 years were ques‐
tioned. Of that number, 1247 were war children (born between 1930 and
1945).37
The results were unambiguous: refugees saw themselves as physically
less fit (they reported problems with climbing stairs, walking longer dis‐
tances, taking baths by themselves) than those who had not been forced to
35 Schneider, Gudrun/Driesch, Georg/Kruse, Andreas (2012): Belastende und
fördernde Faktoren im Lebensverlauf der Kriegskinder – Zusammenhänge zur
psychischen Gesundheit im Alter. In: Radebold/Heuft/Fooken (2012), 93–104.
101, 103. (522 of patients over 60, objective physical disability, subjective wellbe‐
ing, subjectively experienced physical complaints, biographical experiences).
36 Brähler, Elmar/Decker, Oliver/Radebold, Hartmut (2012): Ausgebombt, ver‐
trieben, vaterlos – Langzeitfolgen bei den Geburtsjahrgängen 1930–1945 in
Deutschland. In: Radebold, Hartmut (ed.): Kindheiten im Zweiten Weltkrieg und
ihre Folgen. Gießen. 111–136.
37 572 in the first section (2002): Displacement, bombed out and at least two years
without a father; 675 in the second section (2003): mostly grown up without a fa‐
ther, Brähler/Decker/Radebold (2012), 115–117.
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flee. In women this was even more pronounced than in men.38 The same
result emerged when it came to physical role functioning (“doing difficult
jobs in recent weeks”, “not being active for as long as before”) as an ele‐
ment of reduced life satisfaction. The second factor investigated, being
bombed out, compromised physical role functioning in men more than in
women. The same applied to social functioning: men who were bombed
out have more problems keeping in contact with acquaintances, visiting
friends etc. – and they tend to have more pain. The psychological wellbe‐
ing is generally lower in people who were bombed out, and lowest if they
were women. Bombed out people have panic attacks twice as frequently
as the not-bombed out; 13 percent of bombed out men and 18 percent of
bombed-out women display reduced psychosocial functioning: in each
case these figures are about three times as high as for people who never
lost their homes. They have “difficulties doing their work, looking after
their homes and getting on with other people.”39 One therefore needs to
differentiate between the consequences of fleeing, which stressed women
more permanently physically, and being bombed out, which, in men, led to
physical and social problems in particular whilst more often causing men‐
tal stress in women.
38 Brähler/Decker/Radebold (2012), 124f.
39 Brähler/Decker/Radebold (2012), 128f.
Transgenerational War-Related Trauma in Post-War Germany
61
Temporary paternal absence of up to two years had no long-term effect.
Growing up largely without a father, on the other hand, proved to have
further adverse effects on development as the table shows.









increased by a fifth increased by a third
Social phobia (mistrust
towards others)
increased by a third almost twice as high
Somatic symptoms minimally higher increased by a third
Stress increased by half increased by half
The same picture emerged for all forms of fatigue41 - physical, cognitive
or affective: symptoms are higher for all who grew up without a father.
With women they are, at 40 to 50 percent, twice as high as with men
where the increase is only 20-25 percent. Negative affectivity (proneness
to anxiety, anger or depression and pessimistic outlook on life) and social
inhibition are up by about 10 percent in both sexes.
The absence of a father therefore had a permanent negative effect on
boys and girls. Psychological stress is, however, mentioned more often by
women than by men throughout. On the whole, the specific war effects in
people who were bombed out, displaced or fatherless are obvious, with
stress patterns differing between men and women.42 The results of repre‐
sentative population studies and a series of specific studies on smaller
40 Author’s own presentation based on the precise figures in Brähler/Decker/Rade‐
bold (2012), 130ff.
41 Brähler/Decker/Radebold (2012), 134. It should be “fatigue”, not “fatique”.
42 It cannot be discussed here why the reported lower mental stress in men is due to
the phenomenon that mental illness in men remained a taboo until recently. The
fact that the questionnaires and scaling tools used are based on self-evaluations
could have an effect: Maybe men did, “merely” for gender reasons, not think of
reporting such symptoms more often.
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populations – such as refugee children, elderly people in need of care, my‐
ocardial infarction patients, psychotherapeutic patients – corroborate each
other. Personal accounts43 and more recent epidemiological findings also
point in the same direction.44
Finally, a study representative of the overall population on – full or par‐
tial – post-traumatic stress disorder showed the ranking order of traumatic
war experiences in the older patients even more clearly: “Direct war expe‐
riences were most frequent at 23.7 percent, followed by being bombed out
during the war (20.6 percent) and traumatic events in connection with dis‐
placement (17.9 percent).”45
Transmission to the Second and Third Generation
Another important finding of this research is that trauma does not end with
the generation directly affected by the war, but is passed on to the second
and even the third generation, that is, the grandchildren of the survivors.
This transmission can be explicit or implicit.
For Germany this has been investigated in depth with reference to the
severe bombing of Hamburg, known as the Hamburg firestorm: a series of
air raids carried out in the night of 27 July 1943, with 739 bomber planes
not only causing immense damage to buildings but temperatures soaring
up to 1000° degrees as a result of chimney effects, melting the tarmac in
the streets and burning those alive who tried to escape. 30,000 were killed
in that one night. As part of this project, particular families were ques‐
tioned about the entire stretch of 70 years that had passed since the bomb‐
ing.46 Using tried and tested psychological tools – questionnaires for self-
evaluation – as well as objective physiological parameters, it was possible
to show that members of the second or third generations also presented
4.
43 Radebold (2012), 140f.
44 Glaesmer, Heide/Brähler, Elmar (2011): Die Langzeitfolgen des Zweiten
Weltkrieges in der deutschen Bevölkerung: epidemiologische Befunde und deren
klinische Bedeutung. In: Psychotherapeutenjournal 4. 346–353.
45 Maercker, Andreas/Forstmeier, Simon (2008): Posttraumatische Belastungsstörun‐
gen in Deutschland. Ergebnisse einer gesamtdeutschen epidemiologischen Unter‐
suchung. In: Der Nervenarzt 79. 577–586. 582. Fatherlessness was not asked
about in this study.
46 64 were war contemporaries, 45 or 43 from the generation of their children, 16
grandchildren.
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statistically significant dispositions to psychological disorders.47 One of
the particular benefits of this project was that it was also possible to obtain
information in longer interviews on factors that may have reduced the
traumatic effects, such as adults dealing with a harrowing situation in a
calm rather than frantic manner in the presence of children.48 Later on,
speaking about the experiences helped coming to terms with them, but for
this it needed a reliable family member and such a person was often not
available. Women processed many experiences by devoting themselves to
their families, men by seeking success at work or by building family
homes.49
The study also revealed that people found it easier to talk about their
experiences with their grandchildren rather than with their own children, a
fact that points to people’s inhibitions in speaking about their direct war
experiences as parents as well as to the next generation’s lack of interest in
or reluctance to deal with their parents’ problematic experiences. To an
extent, these are dispositions that are conveyed by society: a long-lasting
climate of collective repression or politically imposed glorification of war
memories – as was common in Vietnam for a long time – can also affect
communication within families. It was definitely easier to find access for
47 In the case of the firestorm project there is also a strong correlation of psychologi‐
cal disorders between the degree of stress in the first and second generation, Is‐
sendorff, Philipp von (2013): Transgenerationale Weitergabe von Kriegstraumata.
Eine psychometrische Untersuchung. In: Lamparter, Ulrich/Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/
Wierling, Dorothee (eds): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger Feuersturms 1943 und ihre
Familien: Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von Kriegserfahrungen. Göttingen.
256–273. 267.
48 Möller, Birgit/Lamparter, Ulrich (2013): Erlebnis und Verarbeitung des Feuer‐
sturms im Lebensverlauf. Ein typologischer Ansatz. In: Lamparter, Ulrich/
Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/Wierling, Dorothee (eds): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger Feuer‐
sturms 1943 und ihre Familien: Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von Kriegser‐
fahrungen. Göttingen. 67–103. 88. Drost, Nicole/Lamparter, Ulrich (2013): Das
Tableau diagnostischer Urteile. Eine qualitativ-quantitative Auswertung des
Zeitzeugeninterviews. In: Lamparter, Ulrich/Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/Wierling,
Dorothee (eds): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger Feuersturms 1943 und ihre Familien:
Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von Kriegserfahrungen. Göttingen. 167–192.
174.
49 Möller/Lamparter (2013), 101. Holstein, Christa/Lamparter, Ulrich (2013): Die
zweite Generation. Qualitative Befunde. In: Lamparter, Ulrich/Wiegand-Grefe,
Silke/Wierling, Dorothee (eds.): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger Feuersturms 1943 und
ihre Familien: Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von Kriegserfahrungen. 231–
255. 250. On the generation of children of contemporary witnesses.
Martin Dinges
64
those directly affected, once they had retired from work, and for their
grand-children, who were in any case further removed from the events.
Aside from such explicit ways of processing war trauma there are also
implicit effects – such as total silence about what has been experienced.50
Inner blocks in dealing with traumatizing events affect “the intergenera‐
tional mental structure”, “since the generations do not pass the time allo‐
cated to them in isolation.”51 Experiences that have not been adapted will
eventually come to the surface “behind the backs of the subjects” (as
Hegel put it) – and affect the next generation. The medical scientists were
surprised by the outcome of their research: even in the third generation,
people whose grandparents remembered traumatic war experiences needed
psychiatric treatment more frequently. This greater vulnerability in grand‐
children was statistically significant and therefore not mere coincidence.
This result was the more astonishing as the grandparents in question had
kept their war experiences to themselves for many years and even the par‐
ent generation had often found out little or nothing about their own par‐
ents’ experiences before they began treatment. It is as if there had been a
longstanding vow of silence: people preferred not to talk about the war
and their horrific experiences and it was better not to ask any questions.
These experiences were often mentioned for the first time forty or fifty
years after the end of the war as part of the treatment. This observation
also showed that keeping silent does not help to relieve psychiatric stress.
Those directly affected were clearly so deeply influenced by their war ex‐
periences that they passed on their fears and traumas wordlessly and un‐
aware of their own compensatory actions. Psychologists speak of “implicit
missions” that are passed on to each following generation. With war chil‐
dren these are clearly associated – as has been proven clinically – with the
specific experiences of their parents.
50 Cf. Lamparter, Ulrich/Holstein, Christa (2013): Was ist gefolgt? Erste Ergebnisse
zur Transmission von Erfahrung des Hamburger Feuersturms (1943) zwischen der
ersten und der zweiten Generation. In: Lamparter, Ulrich/Wiegand-Grefe, Silke/
Wierling, Dorothee (eds): Zeitzeugen des Hamburger Feuersturms 1943 und ihre
Familien: Forschungsprojekt zur Weitergabe von Kriegserfahrungen. Göttingen.
274–292. 291. On the effect of not speaking about Nazi involvement see Hanebutt,
Otto F. (2003): Die vaterlosen 68er und ihr Erbe. Identitätsfindung bei Nachkom‐
men der NS-Generation; Entwurf eines intergenerativ und narrativ orientierten
Konzeptes zum Verständnis rechtsextremistischer gewalttätiger Jugendlicher. Hei‐
delberg.
51 Reulecke (2012), 19.
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This is best observed with people who lost their home through bombing
or displacement.52 The generation directly affected often tends to compen‐
sate by being particularly focused on acquiring possessions, hoping that
this will give them – practical and symbolic – security. But the experience
can also give rise to a sense of homelessness and general insecurity re‐
garding the possibility of being able to hold on to anything one has
achieved. This constant insecurity can be unconsciously transmitted to the
next generation who receive the implicit mission not to be disorderly or
conspicuous and not to endanger the status the family has worked so hard
to establish. Or it might be indirectly conveyed to them that they better
choose an apprenticeship as a safe route to professional security rather
than academic studies which would take longer.
These permanent unconscious fears in members of the war generation
manifest, on the one hand, in the inability to speak about them with their
children. On the other hand, these parents tend to be particularly strict
with their adolescent children, especially their daughters, warning them
not to stay out late, because they perceive the night time, beyond any rea‐
sonable measure, as particularly dangerous. Some children rebel vehe‐
mently against such implicit missions, fighting the imposed restrictions,
sometimes for decades, by pursuing often harmful and chaotic lifestyles in
their search for independence. Eating disorders are also frequent. These
young people often do not even know why they seem almost driven to
keep making the same mistakes. The autobiographical and psychological
literature of the recent decades on the consequences of war and displace‐
ment in Germany is full of just such examples. But the inferences are clear
enough: war trauma is transmitted implicitly within families – manifesting
also as feelings of guilt, helplessness, desolation, loss or yearning – and
can heavily impact on the life of the next generations.53 What astonished
the researchers of the Mannheim Cohort Study was that also among the
second and third generations the number of psychiatric diagnoses was
higher for those whose parents or grand-parents were traumatized in the
war. This meant that they were more vulnerable across several genera‐
tions. The German scientists in question would have been less surprised
52 Holstein/Lamparter (2013), 238 seq. Hirsch, Helga (2004): Schweres Gepäck.
Flucht und Vertreibung als Lebensthema, Hamburg.
53 To mention just some of the topics which have been well researched by Lorenz,
Hilke (2012): Weil der Krieg unsere Seelen frisst. Wie die blinden Flecken der
Vergangenheit bis heute nachwirken. Berlin.
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had they been familiar with the research into victims of the holocaust.54
This research focused on the psychological experiences of victims, mainly
in Israel and the US, who had survived the German concentration camps.
One might surmise that these survivors were simply glad to have come
through their ordeal alive. Yet the study found that those who were able
and willing to speak about their experiences at all were tormented by the
question as to why they were saved while their siblings, parents and other
relatives perished. In Israel the generation of grand-children also suffered
particularly from their parents’ and grand-parents’ silence and developed
feelings of guilt. What is important for our context is that the silence, even
in those who were indisputably victims and who, as survivors of the death
camps, were entitled to claim a high moral status for themselves, was – in
the long-term – harmful for their own mental health and that of their chil‐
dren and grand-children.
Long-term studies also revealed that psychoanalytical treatment can be
helpful.55 Special forms of therapy, such as Integrative Testimonial Thera‐
py (ITT), were developed that work with the resources of the trauma suf‐
ferers. The participants of this therapy first undergo a phase of guided bio‐
graphical reconstruction, followed by a phase where they confront the ex‐
periences they have so far repressed and, finally, one of cognitive re-eval‐
uation.56
There is thirdly and lastly a series of investigations that try to establish
how failure to work through war-related trauma can have repercussions in
the wider society: the German student protests of 1968, for instance, were
interpreted as symbolic patricide without fathers.57 One interpretation sees
54 See note 4, in particular Bohleber (2000), 811f., for Niederland’s lecture at the
1967 Psychoanalysis Congress, and 817ff. on the extended silent phases in illness.
55 A catamnesis study (summary of treatment, including in particular psychotherapy
and rehabilitation) showed the absence of symptoms after coming through the en‐
coded illness. More detail and better illustrated in Leuzinger-Bohleber, Marianne
(2012): Kriegskindheiten, ihre lebenslangen Folgen – dargestellt an einigen
Beispielen aus der DPV-Katamnesestudie. In: Fooken/Heuft (eds.), 61–82, 63ff.
56 Among the less specific precursors is “reminiscence therapy” which aims to bring
harmony to the way one looks at one’s life and attach meaning to one’s experi‐
ences. In “testimonial therapy” the main focus is on working through trauma;
Glaesmer/Brähler (2011), 350.
57 Pilzweger, Stefanie (2015): Männlichkeit zwischen Gefühl und Revolution: eine
Emotionsgeschichte der bundesdeutschen 68er-Bewegung. Bielefeld 2015. 215–
219, 224.
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symbolic parentlessness as the underlying cause of the revolts and as a
failed attempt of the generation of ’68 to de-identify from their parents.58
It is thought that, after an apocalyptic childhood during or directly after
the war, the members of this generation felt they had no right to their exis‐
tence because they had been conceived accidentally while their soldier fa‐
thers were on home leave. This made it impossible for them to detach
themselves from their parents in the usual way, leading them to rebel
against them excessively.59 At least partly, the student protests were also
represented as a way for these students to reckon with their Nazi-fathers.
Whether these fathers were still alive or not, the question now had to be
asked what their mothers and fathers, the whole generation in fact, had un‐
dertaken to stop the Nazi regime.
Complementing this interpretation is the hypothesis that the protesting
students were looking for a symbolic father substitute: leaders of revolu‐
tionary liberation movements, such as Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh,
who were viewed as occupying a particularly high moral status, took the
place left empty by fathers. Both these figures were spatially as well as
culturally far enough removed for the students not to have to look more
closely at their actions.60 Whatever one thinks of the scope of such psy‐
cho-historical interpretations of entire social movements, they offer inspir‐
ing socio-psychological hypotheses for historical research.61
58 Before that, but not relating to the actual motives of the generation of 1968,
Mitscherlich/Mitscherlich (19667), 262, 258.
59 Particularly regarding male identity disorders Hanebutt (2003), 70ff., 218–226.
Busche, Jürgen (2003): Die 68er: Biographie einer Generation. Berlin. Simon, An‐
nette (2001): Wir wollten immer artig sein. Generationskonflikte der 68er in Ost
und West. In: Wirth , Hans-Jürgen (ed.): Hitlers Enkel oder Kinder der
Demokratie? Gießen. 45–72. 49. Cf. Bude, Heinz (2010): Metamorphosen des
Ödipus im Generationenverhältnis. In: Thomä, Dieter (ed.): Vaterlosigkeit:
Geschichte und Gegenwart einer fixen Idee. Frankfurt. 269–279. 274.
60 Cf. Franz/Lieberz/Schepank (2005), 53. Some German psychologists and histori‐
ans hold, moreover, that even the grandfathers of those students were yearning for
surrogate fathers, because some of them were also fatherless war children of
World War I. Cf. Stambolis, Barbara (2014): Aufgewachsen in eiserner Zeit:
Kriegskinder zwischen Erstem Weltkrieg und Weltwirtschaftskrise. Gießen. This
idea probably goes back to Mitscherlich, Alexander (1963): Auf dem Weg zur
vaterlosen Gesellschaft. München. 223ff. For earlier thoughts on the “socialized
hatred of fathers” see Bednarik, Karl (1953): Der junge Arbeiter von heute – ein
neuer Typ. Stuttgart. 50ff.
61 One would – when comparing other fascist countries (Italy, Japan) and liberal so‐
cieties (England, USA) as well as the hermaphrodite France (because of the Vichy
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On the whole it can be said that war trauma does not resolve itself in
those directly exposed to the traumatic experiences, not even if they reach
a ripe old age. A warm climate inside the family can be helpful to cope.62
In addition, war trauma is transmitted, explicitly or implicitly, to the sec‐
ond and possibly even the third generation and can ultimately even have a
noticeable effect on society as a whole.
What about the War Trauma in Vietnam?
Against this background it is easily conceivable that traumatic disorders
must be widespread and in Vietnam, following the extensive bombing the
country was exposed to.63 As far as I know, psychological research has
been limited to Vietnamese emigrants who now live in the United States
(originally around 650,000).64 For the historian the question inevitably
arises whether some of the therapies described by psychologists are not
reminiscent of the possibilities of Oral History. Is there not – beyond the
individual processing of war trauma – scope here for parallel historical re‐
search?65 Would guided biographical reconstruction, with the aim of con‐
fronting experiences that may have been repressed so far, not be a way of
allocating a place to these multi-layered experiences and of ultimately re-
5.
regime) – have to operationalize the intensity of revolts (also with a view to spe‐
cific national protest traditions) in order to arrive at conclusions that can be taken
seriously. But many external observers see the split of generations as particularly
strong in Germany. Cf. Gilcher-Holtey, Ingrid (2001): Die 68er Bewegung:
Deutschland – Westeuropa – USA. München. Further interpretations of political
culture are provided in: Generation, Unbewusstes und politische Kultur (1997):
Schwerpunktthema Psychosozial 20, 68. Roberts, Ulla (1997): Anklagen, Ver‐
schweigen, Verdrängen: Die NS-Zeit im Konflikt der Generationen. In: Psy‐
chosozial 20, 67. 61–75.
62 Quindeau, Ilka/Einert, Katrin/Tauber, Nadine (2012): Kindheiten im National‐
sozialismus und Zweiten Weltkrieg. In: Bios 25. 87–117. 113.
63 40 million were directly affected, 2 million widows, orphans and disabled, 50,000
mixed-race children (of American fathers) who were ostracized for a long time –
and the victims of Agent Orange up to the third generation! Details in Margara
(2012), 18f.
64 Lai, Phuong (2008): Impact of Migration and Trauma on Communication in Viet‐
namese Families. San Francisco. Cf. Wilson, John P. (2007): Cross-Cultural As‐
sessment of Psychological Trauma and PTSD. New York.
65 Even if today’s historiography still has only a very narrow scope in Vietnam, cf.
Margara (2012), 23ff., 137.
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evaluating them cognitively? Or should this task be left to the writers who,
as part of the doi moi, were the first in Vietnam to take up this topic after
the 1990s?66 It would certainly be an interesting field for German-Viet‐
namese cooperation with the aim of comparatively researching not entirely
dissimilar experiences from very different wars.67 It can certainly be con‐
cluded that coming to terms with trauma can have a positive effect on so‐
ciety. It saves children and grand-children much suffering and, in the long
term, it saves society expenses in the health-care system caused by multi-
morbidity. From the point of view of the historian this is not about moral
judgements but about “the attempt to work through psychological and his‐
torical experiences as objectively as possible.”68 It is, after all, an unfortu‐
nate truth that “the end of the war is not the end of the war.”69
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Adding Detail to the Anthropocene:
David Halberstam, Korea and Narratives of War and
Environment
David Pickus
“Our choice is over what kind of human-influenced earth we will have. We
may lament this truth, but we no longer have the option to choose not to be
geological change agents…How to do it right – that should be our concern.”1
Had history taken another course the Korean peninsula could easily have
had political and social contours that followed and expanded on the path
set by its first state formations, lines that followed peninsula’s special ge‐
ography.2 In this alternate world Korea – whatever political its form –
would be defined the extent of its mountain ranges and food producing
plains and river valleys.3 Perhaps, like Switzerland it would be sub-divid‐
ed into the equivalent of cantons. Further speculation may be amusing, but
essentially profitless, as we will never know another Korean peninsula
than the one our modern history as produced. The current demarcation line
at the thirty eighth parallel of latitude – a line that follows no natural or
log-standing historical division in the local landmass – is striking confir‐
mation of humanity’s capacity to shape the world according to the dictates
of politics. Furthermore, the development (and non-development) that has
taken place since the cease fires of 1953 is an equally striking demonstra‐
tion of how intertwined considerations of war and environment are. In the
world we have made, they are bound up together. We can only profit for
seeking better ways to comprehend this intertwining.
Simultaneously, in their own ways, wider shifts in intellectual vocabu‐
lary and public consciousness reinforce the notion that the relationship be‐
1 Grinspoon, David (2016): Earth in Human Hands. New York. 243.
2 For Korea’s early political history, see Hoare, James/Pares, Susan (1988): Korea:
An Introduction. London.
3 On the distinctiveness of Korea’s geography, see Kwon, Yongwoo/Lee, Jaeduk
(eds.) (2010): The Geography of Korea: National Geographic Information Institute,
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs. Seoul. Connor, Mary E. (2002):
The Koreas: A Global Studies Handbook. Santa Barbara.
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tween war and the environment is not simply one more item to think
about, but is a subject that fuses some of our most pressing contemporary
concerns – indeed, humanity’s fate itself.4 For instance, every year
Edge.Org., a highly-regarded website devoted to the dissemination of the
latest findings and trends in science asks a question of prominent thinkers.
The goal is not simply to publicize research, but to sensibilities in the
modern-day Republic of Letters. For 2017 the annual question was “What
scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known?” The response
provided by NYU Environmental Studies professor Jennifer Jacquet, was
not only interesting and informative in its own right, but also serves as a
helpful starting point for taking up an aspect of the subject of war and the
environment that has no easy answer. This is the question of how an un‐
derstanding of modern war’s environmental impact can be disseminated to
a popular audience, one which learns about wars primarily through first-
hand accounts and journalistic narratives.
Jacquet chose a term that is certainly becoming more widely used
among the educated public, namely the “Anthropocene,” a human domi‐
nated (but not human controlled) period that replaced the Holocene, in
which humans, at the start of the warming of the Holocene, when the Ne‐
olithic Revolution initiated the slow changes in the environment that even‐
tually accelerated into the Anthropocene. Jacquet wrote:
“The Holocene is outdated because it cannot explain the recent changes to the
planet: the now 400 parts per million of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
from burning fossil fuels, the radioactive elements present in the Earth’s strata
from detonating nuclear weapons, or that one in five species in large ecosys‐
tems is considered invasive.”5
The public must understand that these are not simply facts in a field of
facts. They are signs that now the earth cannot be set back to a natural en‐
vironment, even a dramatically changing environment. It should be noted
that one of the three signs of the Anthropocene mentioned relates directly
to war, and it fits that the scientists working to formalize the term’s usage,
the “Anthropocene Working Group” support a “mid-20th century start
date, which corresponds to the advent of nuclear technology and a global
4 Two fairly recent works taking on the broad issue of irreversible threshold crossing
are Rockström, Johan/Klum, Mattias (2015): Big World, Small Planet: Abundance
within Planetary Boundaries. Stockholm. Dryzek, John/Norgaard, Richard/Schlos‐




reach of industrialization.” But herein lies the challenge for those who not
only want to formalize a new term, but for all of us who want the implica‐
tions of what it means to live in the Anthropocene to percolate into a
broader public consciousness. How can we bring the public to tell them‐
selves a narrative of the start of the Anthropocene?
In broaching this matter, we can focus on the topic of environment and
war as a means to consider what changed at this “mid-20th century start
date,” and what is most pressing for the public to understand about this
transition stage. But of course this “stage,” if we must call it that, is a the‐
ater of politics, conflict and war. Put more plainly, the global topic of the
Anthropocene’s start flows into relatively smaller subject’s like the Korean
War’s impact. The intersecting of war and environment causes them to
flow together.
From this starting point I wish to lay out the subject and thesis of the
essay that follows. It follows from all the has been said that history mat‐
ters, not only the “big” history that large, nature-dominated eras, with our
own, human dominated, time, but also links forged in people’s minds; the
understanding they have of how large and small fit together. However,
there is no easy way to write about this matter because no one, no matter
how perspicacious, can step outside themselves to comment with authority
and full accuracy on how they represent a changing mentality. The best we
can do is observe closely how others understand history and how they re‐
late this understanding to others. This gives us some notion of how they
portray the interplay between war and environment and how they find
meaning in what they see. Hence, in my judgment, it is especially helpful
to turn to the works of popular historians for they are in the business of
conveying broad meaning to a wide audience.
This is why I want to turn to journalist and historian David Halberstam,
especially his The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.6 Halber‐
stam (1934–2007), who first came to wide public notice as a New York
Times reporter during the early stages of the Vietnam War, or, more accu‐
rately, during the early stages of the American phase of the twentieth-cen‐
tury’s wars in Vietnam, made a life-long effort to provide a coherent narra‐
tive to the USA’s military engagement with East Asia in the years follow‐
6 Halberstam, David (2007): The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New
York.
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ing the Second World War.7 As such, this 700 page 2007 work on Korea is
particularly important because it represents the culmination of Halber‐
stam’s prodigious output, while accounting for the war that in significant
ways, served as a prototype for American efforts to use a combination of
force and diplomacy to both reserve and redefine a world order. Hence, he
must take some stand on the question of what happened to the Korean
peninsula and people living there. This, in its own way, focuses our atten‐
tion on the question of war and environment and fills in another empty
space in the larger story of how the Anthropocene got going. Hence, apart
from the intrinsic interest of this work – Halberstam is a good writer who
can tell his story well – The Coldest Winter provides a glimpse of how a
broader public awareness is formed.
To explain this last sentence: I am not claiming that is a hidden ecologi‐
cal narrative within The Coldest Winter. As we shall see, Halberstam’s pri‐
mary concern is with the interconnected politics and morality of US for‐
eign policy. Yet, he does not have the luxury of writing in rarefied aca‐
demic prose. I explaining the Korean War and discussing its meaning he
must discuss bombing campaigns and military tactics in concrete detail.
He cannot speak in abstractions. Likewise, in presenting this account to a
popular audience, he remains true to his journalistic roots as aims to con‐
vey the story as others saw it. He presents and describes what they experi‐
enced. In doing so, he must say something about how they saw their envi‐
ronment being changed by war. In sum, Halberstam enables us to think
more carefully about why Korea has taken its current form, a topic of no
small importance in thinking about current configurations of human life.
A few more words about Halberstam’s career fill out this claim. He re‐
ceived a Pulitzer Prize for his war reporting in 1964.8 For the rest of his
career his prolific writing kept him in the public eye, gaining him a status
one of the US’s most prominent journalists. Yet, perhaps because journal‐
ism is somehow derogated in academic eyes, Halberstam is little-studied.
Apart from a few scholarly essays concerned US media and the Vietnam
War,9 to the best of my knowledge there is no academic work that analyses
7 See such works as Halberstam, David (1973): The Best and the Brightest. Green‐
wich. Halberstam, David (1986): The Reckoning. New York.
8 For US journalistic descriptions of Vietnam during the time of conflict, see Halber‐
stam, David (1998): Reporting Vietnam. New York.
9 See Seyb, Ronald (2012): When Objectivity Works: David Halberstam’s Vietnam
Reporting. In: Media History Monographs. 1–24.
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his achievement, or treats him as a thinker in his own right. This is a
shame because Halberstam’s writing is anything but a mere passing on of
information. He has a story to tell, as a brief encyclopaedia entry on him
intentionally or not reveals:
While his reporting on Vietnam initially supported US involvement there, The
Making of a Quagmire (1965) reflected a growing disillusionment with the
war, and its title became a byword for intractable military operations.10
This point could be put even more bluntly: Halberstam devoted his talents
not simply to asserting, but to demonstrating why the US Vietnam inter‐
vention should be considered a quagmire. The ample details he provided
made that notion viable in his readers’ minds. Thus, if we now turn to his
work on the Korean War we are prepared for his approach to describing
warfare. Halberstam will provide telling details, both about the principal
decision makers and about the actual experience of combat and diplomacy.
By relating these details – and not by positioning himself with an ideo‐
logical school or academic party – Halberstam’s own point of view
emerges. In the case of Korea, it is not exactly a quagmire, but something
more relevant to our own wider theme. It is a war that was not under the
control of those who claimed they were controlling it. As a consequence,
the way it spread was particularly destructive and required an ongoing ex‐
tension to new arenas and a more and more drastic reshaping of life on the
peninsula as a whole. In describing one battle toward the start of the US
intervention, Halberstam recounts the predicament of an American regi‐
ment that was ordered to cross a river (invariably dangerous in battle con‐
ditions of the time) in order to test North Korean strength, Halberstam re‐
counts the experiences of a lieutenant named Lee Beahler who was “wary”
of this plan “from the start.”11 In Halberstam’s summary “The entire busi‐
ness had only confirmed something he had suspected almost since he ar‐
rived in country: that he was working with superiors who in all too many
instances did not know as much as they were supposed to about com‐
bat.”12 As it turned out, several US soldiers were killed in their exposed
position, leading to a series of recriminations among commanders “as the
10 Britannica Academic online, “David Halberstam.”
11 Halberstam (2007), 272.
12 Halberstam (2007), 272.
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top echelon of a large American unit experienced something akin to a ner‐
vous breakdown.”13
Singling out this one point needs more explanation to clarify what is at
stake in using Halberstam’s work to think further about the relationship
between war and environment. Castigating incompetence at the top is a
commonplace in much war literature, especially in reportage on wars that
are not remembered with a high degree of patriotic reverence. Yet, a look
at the context in which Halberstam placed this story shows that he is not
simply reproducing a familiar trope. He was describing a moment in the
war in early September 1950, after US troops had been driven back by an
energetic offensive to the south-east corner of the peninsula, and before
MacArthur led an invasion at Inchon outflanked the North Koreans and
drove them again above the thirty eighth parallel. During this period there
some indecisive, but violent fighting occurred around an area known as
the Naktong Bulge.14 These battles could not be resolved without a further
intensification of combat, and this, in its turn, required a “colder” logic,
one that would require ever greater planning and the unleashing of more
extensive violence. Yet, this accelerating rationalism, as it were, remain
fully compatible with a world of illusion, blunders and what was called in
the Vietnam context the “arrogance of power.”
The contribution of a work like Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter is that
it provides the detail to make this realization vivid to a larger audience.
The consequences of the Korean War are not the business of specialists
alone. As historian Joshua B. Freeman reminds us, at the time of the
armistice of July 27, 1953 “fifty-four thousand US troops had died in the
fighting, and nearly twice that number had been wounded. For Koreans,
the war took a staggering toll: nearly three million people – about 10 per‐
cent of the population – were killed, wounded or missing. Another five
million became refugees.”15 While the exact statistics will require further
examination, the extent that war fully changed this environment is enor‐
mous. Freeman’s next comment is also germane:
“The Korean War has not loomed large in American memory or culture, in
spite of its heavy cost. Yet the war had a profound impact on the way the
United States developed. It locked the country into an unprecedented mili‐
13 Halberstam (2007), 273.
14 For a further account, see Catchpole, Brian (2000): The Korean War. London.
15 Freeman, Joshua B. (2012): American Empire: 1945–2000. The Rise of a Global
Power, the Democratic Revolution at Home. New York. 79.
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tarism, which continued after the war and included the long-term deployment
of troops in Europe and Asia.”16
Yet, a consensus among historians is that the war began with, and was es‐
calated by, ongoing political miscalculations. Indeed, a good case could be
made that the miscalculations did not cease throughout a war which essen‐
tially ended at the same point it began. The Chinese offensive across the
Yalu in October 1950 took the US command by surprise, and left them re‐
sponding to events. Likewise, the dreams of Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong
that their military offensives would spark spreading popular uprisings in
favour of the communists also revealed themselves to be products of wish‐
ful thinking. Thus, in the end, the Korean conflict culminated in a war of
attrition that was settled not in a peace treaty, but in a patched-up return to
the status quo ante, and a renewal of preparations for future conflicts.
To return to the main question, does this information belong in a discus‐
sion of the Anthropocene? Let us recall that, if we wish to think of our‐
selves as living in a new, “human dominated,” natural era the start date
typically given is the mid twentieth-century, corresponding with the his‐
torical era of the Korean War. Thus, the question could be rephrased as
whether or not the details of the Korean War, including the record of mis‐
calculations and blunders that comprise its record rise to the point that it
should be incorporated into the larger, macro history of a transition to a
new epoch in the organization of life on our planet. From this perspective,
it is clear that we need to ascertain which details of the Korean War should
be singled out for emphasis. Hence, we must return to writers like Halber‐
stam and the choices they made in showing why the Korean War deserves
a prominent place in our historical memory.
Lest it be objected that the link between this war and the dawn of the
Anthropocene is too far-flung or abstract, consider that nature was irre‐
versibly altered by the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Two military de‐
cisions should be kept in mind. First, the North Korean invasion that be‐
gan the war was done with the aid of Soviet tanks, particularly the T-34,
which Halberstam noted “had an unusually wide tread that kept it from
getting stalled in mud and ice, and possessed an unusually large fuel tank
od one hundred gallons that allowed it to go up to 150 miles without refu‐
elling.”17 A war deploying increasing numbers of these tanks cannot leave
16 Freeman (2012), 80.
17 Halberstam (2007), 85.
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land-use patterns the same. Second, and more devastatingly, was also an
air war, one that cannot be described as limited, even though US worries
about an escalation of the war with China and the Soviet Union inhibited
even more extreme bombing. Still, the American command’s belief in the
“vital necessity of destruction of North Korean objectives north of the
38th parallel,”18 resulted in a massive bombardment campaign whose de‐
structive impact is so large as to be incalculable. We can only rely on gen‐
eral estimations. Thus, the US Air Force’s Far East Bomber Command:
“calculated the destruction of North Korean cities in these percentages:
Manp’ochin, 95 percent; Kointong, 90 percent; Sakchu, 75 percent; Ch’osan,
85 percent; Sinæichu, 60 percent; Kanggye, 75 percent; Hæich’ýn, 75 per‐
cent; Namsi, 90 percent; Æichu, 20 percent; and Hoeryýng, 90 percent.”19
In sum, we must keep in mind the connection between these political and
military decisions, and the permanent reshaping of Korean life. Halber‐
stam’s analysis indeed provides a link between this micro and macro pic‐
ture, and we should turn to the ways that he stitches together his overall
narrative. Most prominently, Halberstam “cuts” between portraits of polit‐
ical leaders and tales told by average people, ones who bear witness to the
consequences of these decisions. To this journalistic method Halberstam
adds a focus on American power, and a conviction – one which remains
implicit that it must be exercised in the proper way. For instance, in his
account of what he called the “terrible days” of America’s initial defeats,
he noted that:
“Of the many American illusions that dies in the first few weeks of the Kore‐
an War, perhaps the most important was the belief in the atomic bomb as the
ultimate weapon, in effect the only weapon we needed.”20
The “we” in this sentence is genuine. Halberstam was writing as an Amer‐
ican, and explaining to a broader public in the twenty-first century, when
felt should have been realized by political elites in the years 1945–50,
namely that the
18 Kim, Taewoo (2012): Limited War, Unlimited Targets. In: Critical Asian Studies
44. 467–492. 474.
19 Kim, Taewoo (2012), 483.
20 Freeman, Joshua B. (2012): American Empire. 1945–2000: The Rise of a Global





“Early American monopoly of it [atomic bomb], the quick instantaneous way
it had seemed to end the Pacific War, had created an illusion when it came to
America’s defense budget: that it could develop a military arsenal on the
cheap, with only one kind of arrow in it. If the bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki had seemed to inaugurate a brand new chapter in the history of
human warfare, supposedly making all other weapons obsolete and creating a
world where military power rested only with the richest, most technologically
advanced nations, then the Korean battlefield defeats of early July 1950 shat‐
tered that belief.”21
Though perhaps not so directly, another belief that was shattered was that
US predominance could be maintained without engaging in such messy
ground wars, or devoting considerable resources to military build-up and
deployment. Therefore, the accounts Halberstam provides of Korean War
battles demonstrate in detail how significant an effort governments made
in fighting this war, and why its impact could not be temporary or minor.
Such considerations give Halberstam a critical distance on US foreign
policy as a whole. His principal target is those who refuse to acknowledge
the fact that the world-wide the USA entered were neither simple to un‐
derstand, nor easy to resolve. A primary example, and a point he elaborat‐
ed at length in his The Best and the Brightest were those who maintained
that Vietnamese communists were entirely directed by Moscow, and that
the fighting in Vietnam had no roots in an anti-colonial struggle. In the
case of Korea, he devotes meticulous attention to showing how political
groups within the US, particularly elements within the Republican Party
gained political power for themselves by using the communist victory in
China in 1949 to accuse the Democrats of weakness. As he described it,
this not only goaded the Truman administration into taking a more hard-
line stance in East Asia, but it made US politicians across the board afraid
of dissenting on foreign policy for fear of appearing “soft.”22 This is not a
hypothetical issue. If US politicians had not been so wary of being
charged with some form of softness on communism than MacArthur from
bringing US troops up to the Yalu River on the Chinese border. It was
Mao’s offensive there that led to even more bloody fighting, prolonging
the war for another two years, and intensifying the air war and bombing
campaigns.
21 Halberstam (2007), 149.
22 Halberstam (2007), 149.
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This last example can be fleshed out further. Halberstam proposed that
the politically motivated willingness to remain allied with Chiang Kai-
shek even after the consequences for future relations with the People’s Re‐
public of China became clear. In Halberstam’s words:
“Did we really owe more to a fallen leader who had systematically failed his
own people, treated American military, political and economic advice with
contempt, and served as the major source of weapons for his sworn oppo‐
nents? Was it worth taking the risk of driving this formidable nation, obvious‐
ly an ascending power and a potentially dangerous one, and surely one day a
great power, into the arms of a sworn enemy? Was it worth reinforcing Mao
Zedong in his belief that the United States was but the newest imperial power
with designs on his country?...There were the real questions of the moment,
and the answers to all of them were almost all surely no. But they were also
national security questions that were muffled at the time, outweighed as they
were by domestic political forces and emotions.”23
It can be said that, despite Halberstam’s certainty, one can still debate
these questions of the moment. The Taiwan issue is complex and it is part
of a larger and even more difficult matter of the meaning of the Cold War
in general. But Halberstam’s wider claim is that the fact that Taiwan poli‐
cy could not be debated fairly and rationally in the US political establish‐
ment contributed to the hardening of the antagonism between the USA and
the PRC and fanned the flames of the Korean War even further. Thus, we
return to the point that to understand any question of war and environment
in relationship to Korea – for instance, the use of napalm in bombing cam‐
paigns, or the targeting of irrigation canals – requires a familiarity with the
kind of story that Halberstam tells.
This point can be spelled out in more detail if we reflect on the long-
term consequences of the Korean War. Historian Michael J. Seth spells out
a series of significant changes introduced by the war. One of them is so
evident that it sometimes escapes attention; its very ubiquity giving it an
air of normality. This is the militarization of the peninsula. Speaking of
South Korea, Seth writes that, “The three-year conflict created a huge mil‐
itary force, which grew from 100,000 troops on the eve of the conflict to
600,000 at the end. After the war, the military forces were kept at this lev‐
el, well-equipped by the United States and increasingly well-trained. In
was, in fact, one of the ten largest armed forces in the world.”24 Today,
23 Halberstam (2007), 318–19.




even a cursory glance at maps of the Republic of Korea show significantly
land and resource use is shaped by military deployment, and the publically
available information is certainly incomplete. If we add to this the even
more extreme impact of militarization and mass mobilization in North Ko‐
rea, we begin to appreciate the extent that the Korean environment is made
by war.
Beyond this, Seth points out how intertwined the Korean War was with
the subsequent globalization of some parts of East Asia, saying that the
“emergence of an effectively independent, prosperous and democratic Tai‐
wan and the ongoing two-Chinas issue was very much a product of the
Korean War.”25 Moreover:
“The United States responded to the war by building a defensive wall around
the country, with military bases in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, The Philip‐
pines, and Thailand, and with the ships of the Seventh Fleet of the coast. This
led to isolation and a siege mentality that contributed to the path of China’s
development for more than a quarter century.”26
The environmental implications of the last statement can be stated more
strongly. The attitude toward nature taken by the Mao’s regime, especially
the aggressive disregard for questions of natural balance and long-term
stewardship of land, air and water resources, emerged from the same polit‐
ical isolation that followed the Korean War. In addition, the globalization
of East Asian economies began with US war-related investment in Japan.
Speaking of the large orders placed with Japanese companies, Seth quotes,
the president of Toyota saying “These orders were Toyota’s salvation, I
felt a mighty joy for my company and a sense of guilt that I was rejoicing
over another country’s war.”27 In the wake of the Korean War, South Ko‐
rea followed Japan’s lead, and the peninsula’s environment diverged ever
further. The 1950–53 war in Korea was a launching pad for the globalized
world we have today. This includes the natural environment shaped by
globalization.
This point, if stated in broad terms, is uncontroversial. It has become a
commonplace to start indices of this take off toward a human-transformed
world at the mid-twentieth century. For instance, when in 2011 the Philo‐
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society debated the question, The An‐
25 Seth (2011), 335.
26 Seth (2011), 335.
27 Seth (2011), 335.
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thropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?28 they chose the year 1950
to mark start of sharp, sometimes exponential, increases in all manner of
significant indicators, ranging from terrestrial biosphere degradation to
fertilizer consumption. Does the fact that the Korean War also started in
1950 mean much in this context? Is this too small a detail to include in
such a macro history?
A look at the kind of history that Halberstam relates gives us reason to
think that the knowing the story of the Korean War is helpful for thinking
about the larger questions more carefully. In particular, Halberstam’s nar‐
rative can explain why decision makers locked themselves into a full-scale
conflict, and why such a conflict would result in both the massive devasta‐
tion of the environment, as well as the post-war reconstruction in East
Asia apart from North Korea that led to our current world economy. Al‐
though this story is indeed known, particularly among Cold War special‐
ists, it is not typically integrated into a wider account of the creation of the
Anthropocene. Yet, this wider discussion of how current human activity
shapes the earth’s stratigraphy would only gain from particular knowledge
of the wars that literally set the boundaries for where this activity would
take place. Consider a few lines from a passage quoted by journalist
Thomas Friedman about a geological definition on the Anthropocene:
“Recent anthropogenic deposits contain new minerals and rock types, reflect‐
ing rapid global dissemination of novel materials including elemental alu‐
minium, concrete and plastics that form abundant, rapidly evolving techno
fossils. Fossil fuel combustion has disseminated black carbon, inorganic ask
spheres, and spherical carbonaceous particles worldwide, with a near syn‐
chronous increase around 1950.”29
This increase describes a world shaped by the wars of the twentieth-centu‐
ry, particularly the ones that laid the foundation for the East-West division
that dominated the world until 1989. Understanding what happened in
East Asia is a central part of this, and hence, histories like the one Halber‐
stam recounts are necessary to show how inextricably this world-changing
transformation was bound up with war. At the same time, books like The
Coldest Winter are incomplete if they are only thought of as a war story.
28 See the charts listed in Steffen W./Broadgate, W./Deutsch, L./Ludwig C. (2015):
The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration. In: The Anthro‐
pocene Review, 2,1, following a 2011 version of the paper by Steffen, et. al. This
is reprinted in Grinspoon (2016), 131–32.
29 Quoted in Friedman, Thomas (2016): Thank you for Being Late. London. 173.
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We need to place it in the context of an ecological transformation. This
leads to a final consideration: a recurring motif in Halberstam’s is the
power of the military to transform. More often than not these transforma‐
tions are negative, such as the hubris first of MacArthur then of Mao and
Peng Dehuai as they moved their human wave campaigns south of the
thirty-eighth parallel. Yet, despite Halberstam’s well-grounded scepticism
of military self-promotion and bombast, militaries can change things This
is his description of the effect of good leadership on battle troops:
“Commanders were first and foremost in the fear-suppression business; great
ones could take the undertow of fear, the knowledge that it was always there,
and make it an asset; weaker commanders tended to let it fester. The very
same men who will fight bravely under one commander will cut and run un‐
der another who projects his own fear. Great commanders are not just men
gifted in making wise tactical moves, they are men who give out a sense of
confidence, that it can be done, that it is their duty and their privilege to fight
on that given day. Thus does the strength of any unit ideally feed down, from
top to bottom. The commander generates strength in the officers immediately
underneath him, and it works all the way down the chain of command.”30
As a consequence, The Coldest Winter shows that troops in the Korean
War could sometimes fight with great effectiveness, overcoming severe
obstacles. At other times, the opposite took place and much of the macro
story of the war’s impact depended on the nature of these everyday exer‐
cises in organization.
To be sure, in dealing with the enormous transformation of the start of
the Anthropocene, with all the severe challenges inherent in it, it may
seem like this story is too small or somehow too conventional for inclu‐
sion in this larger narrative. However, the historiography of the new hu‐
man determined age in which we are living is intertwined with the story of
war. This means we need authors who make vivid the details of war, while
allowing us to use these details to add coherence to the larger story.
Specifically, a general intuition that life on planet earth began a fundamen‐
tal transformation circa 1950 has more explanatory power and intellectual
gravity if we grasp the full nature and impact of the wars of the period,
especially a fateful one like the Korean War. For this reason, it is worth‐
while to renew the attention paid to a careful writer like David Halber‐
stam’s. His is not mere journalism. It is the detailed account we need to
30 Halberstam (2007), 422.
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begin showing why the story of the environment and that of war are one
and the same.
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Impact of American Large Scale Destruction of Forests on
Natural Environment and Ethnic Minorities in South Vietnam
during the Vietnam War (1954-1975)
Dam Thi Phuong Thuy / Nguyen Van Bac
Introduction
This article aims at investigating the US defoliant warfare in South Viet‐
nam (SVN) during the Vietnam War and its utter devastation over the en‐
vironment and people in sprayed areas.
Through the American War in Vietnam, the United States (US) Army
launched many new technologies. Of those, some contributed to Vietnam’s
ecosystem change from a once-pristine habitat to an almost apocalyptic af‐
ter the war. These techniques included toxic chemical deforestation, Rome
plows1 and napalm bombs. Among large-scale destruction of forests, an
herbicide spraying program named Ranch Hand lasting between 1962 and
1971 is popularly supposed to be the most destructive. Within the nine
years of Operation Ranch Hand, the US Air Force was supposed to spray
about 19 million gallons of defoliants2 over 20 percent tropical forests and
36 percent mangrove-forests in southern Vietnam. The spraying density
1.
1 Rome plows were large, armoured, specially modified bulldozers used in SVN by
the US Military during the Vietnam War. The machine was made by the Rome Plow
Company of Cedartown, Georgia. It was simple in design with an eleven-foot wide,
two and a half ton blade attached to a 20-ton tractor, but caused massive destruc‐
tion. A fleet of 150 tractors could remove up to 1,000 acres of land per day. West‐
ing, Arthur H. (1972): Herbicides in War: Current Status and Future Doubt. In: Bio‐
logical Conservation 4, 5. 322–27.
2 Those included several types of defoliants such as Agent Orange, Agent White,
Agent Blue, Agent Purple, Agent Pink, etc. In fact, all these chemicals were colour‐
less. People named them after the colour bands on the drums in which each catego‐
ry of chemicals was stored. Letter from Department of Army to John J Carhey Re‐
garding Herbicide Status Report and Maps. In: Texas Tech University, Vietnam
Center, Virtual Archive (TTU, VC, VA) 13520101003. 1–2, 11. Effects of Herbi‐
cides in Vietnam and Their Relation to Herbicide Use in the United States. In: TTU,
VC, VA 2520313001. 7.
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reached approximately 37 kg/ha which was equivalent to 17 times the
dose used in agriculture according to the guidance of the High Command
of the US Army in 1969.3 Of the sprayed chemicals, Agent Orange ac‐
counted for approximately 60 percent (11/19 million gallons).4 It is evi‐
dent that Agent Orange contained in herbicides shared a common deadly
characteristic, especially a significant amount of an extremely toxic chem‐
ical, dioxin. Dioxin can destroy forests, cause exposed people and animals
to give birth to offspring with many defects as well as diseases such as
lung cancer, blood cancer, diabetes type 2, etc. which can be inherited
from parents to children.5 So far, at least three Vietnamese generations
have suffered the tremendous impact of dioxin reflected by sequelae of
physical and psychological health.6
3 Buckingham, William A. (1982): Operation Ranch Hand-The Air Force and Herbi‐
cides in Southeast Asia, 1961–1971. Washington. Hong, Phan Nguyen (2001): Re‐
forestation of Mangroves after Severe Impacts of Herbicides during the Viet Nam
War: the Case of Can Gio. Unasylva. Schuck, Peter H. (1987): Agent Orange on
Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts. Harvard. Thắng, Vũ Chiến (2008): Tác
động của chất độc hóa học của Mỹ sử dụng trong chiến tranh đối với môi trường và
con người ở Việt Nam (The Impacts of US Toxic Chemicals Used in the Vietnam
War on the Environment and Humans in Vietnam). Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment. Hanoi. 19.
4 According to the US Academy of Science, 90 percent of the Agent Orange was uti‐
lized for forest defoliation; 8 percent was for crop destruction missions; and the last
2 percent was sprayed nearby base perimeters, waterways, cache sites, and commu‐
nication lines. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States- US Ground
Troops in South Vietnam was in Areas Sprayed with Herbicide Orange. In: TTU,
VC, VA 6150205010. 5. Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam and Their Relation to
Herbicide Use in the United States. In: TTU, VC, VA 2520313001. 6. Project
CHECO Southeast Asia Report # 171 – Ranch Hand Herbicide Operations in
Southeast Asia – 01 July 1961 to 31 May 1971. In: TTU, VC, VA F031100030169.
16.
5 Young, Alvin Lee (2009): The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of
Agent Orange. Springer Science & Business Media. 4. Lê Thị Hòe. Nỗi ám ảnh
chất độc màu da cam (Obsession of Agent Orange). Hội Khoa học lịch sử Bình
Dương. Http://www.sugia.vn/news/detail/2/noi-am-anh-chat-doc-mau-da-cam.html.
(Accessed 4th February 2017).
6 Hảo, Lê Văn/Larsen, Knud S. (2010): Chất độc da cam và stress liên quan đến
chiến tranh: những rối loạn thể chất và tâm lý (Agent Orange and Stress Related to
Warfare: the Physical and Psychological Disorders). University of Social Sciences
and Humanities-Vietnam National University. Hanoi. 3.
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There was the fact that majority of ethnic minorities in SVN dwelled in
the Central Highlands7 which the American strategists considered a strate‐
gically important region for the whole of Southeast Asia. As the Vietnam
War intensified in the early 1960s, the Central Highlands became one of
the main battlefields because the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet‐
cong8 were able to lead a guerrilla war in the rain forests there. For this
reason, many villages of the minorities accidentally became targets of the
US herbicidal spraying missions.
The Ranch Hand Program
As previously mentioned, Ranch Hand is the codename of a defoliant pro‐
gram conducted by the US Military in SVN for almost a decade, since the
early 1960s. To prepare for the Ranch Hand project, since 1959, a research
agency located in Fort Dietrick held a defoliant rehearsal in Fort Drum
(New York). In this practice session, aircraft sprayed the compound of
Butyl esters 2,4-D (Dichlorophenoxy acetic acid) and 2, 4, 5-T
(Trichlorophenoxy acetic acid) on an area covering 4 square miles. Mili‐
tary scientists found out that a certain amount of chemical 2,4-D could
cause sudden, uncontrolled developments in vegetation which quickly led
to defoliation. And, a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4, 5-T was able to defoliate
almost immediately.9 Based on results of the drill, the US Department of
Defence ordered that research institute to set up scheme spraying herbi‐
cides in South Vietnam. After the first time, this organization continued to
hold 18 other defoliant spraying tests.10
Before the project got the approval of US President, a fierce debate be‐
tween the Defence Ministry and the US State Department had been trig‐
2.
7 During the existence of SVN (1954–1975), the Central Highlands was a north-
western territory of this country. The region consisted of seven provinces of Kon‐
tum, Pleiku, Darlac, Phu Bon, Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc, and Lam Dong. With a
central-Indochinese location and an exceptional altitude, the Central Highlands
was considered as "the roof of Indochina" which played a strategic role in control‐
ling not only Vietnam but the whole Southeast Asian region.
8 The term used by the government of SVN to refer to members of the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF).
9 TTU, VC, VA 6150205010. 5. The Story of Agent Orange. Http://www.usvet‐
sp.com/agentorange.htm. (Accessed 9th February 2017).
10 TTU, VC, VA 13520101003. 2. Thắng (2008), 119.
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gered in the White House. A representative of the Pentagon supported the
plan of destruction of crops and trees, which benefited the Northern Viet‐
namese Army and the Vietcong, by using herbicides. This agency argued
that use of defoliants was the most efficient and economic war tactic to de‐
ny food and shelter to the communists. Meanwhile, some of the influential
figures in the US State Department, notably Roger Hilsman and Averell
Harriman firmly opposed to that intention. They doubted the effectiveness
of the defoliation tactic, and simultaneously concerned that the campaign
could adversely affect relations between the people of Vietnam and the
US.11 According to these statesmen, the usage of toxic chemicals could
make the US of being accused of conducting a form of war against the
ecosystem and humanity. There is no doubt that during the process of
spraying herbicides, crops and water sources used by the non-combatant
peasants could also be hit.12 Nevertheless, finally, the arguments of diplo‐
matic representatives fell on deaf ears. The US Defense Department had
no hesitation when decided to spray Agent Orange/Dioxin, over 25 per‐
cent of SVN’s territory.13
To justify the use of chemical weapons, in 1961 Washington announced
to the world that President Ngo Dinh Diem had requested the US to con‐
duct aerial herbicide spraying in critical areas over SVN.14 The first flight
which sprayed defoliants along the Route 14 in the north of Kontum town
was carried out by helicopter H-34 from August 10, 1961, but until early
1962, President John F. Kennedy officially green-lighted the use of herbi‐
11 TTU, VC, VA 13520101003. 2. Đình Chính (2005). Bí mật chiến dịch rải chất diệt
lá của Mỹ tại Việt Nam (Defoliant campaign of the US in Vietnam). Vnexpress.
March 13. Https://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/the-gioi/tu-lieu/bi-mat-chien-dich-rai-chat-
diet-la-cua-my-tai-viet-nam-2-1979715.html. (Accessed February 2nd, 2017).
12 Tucker, Spencer (2011): The Encyclopaedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, So‐
cial, and Military History. Santa Barbara. 480. In fact, not only civilians became
victims, but spraying did occur even over US troop positions. TTU, VC, VA
13520101003. 2.
13 We should not forget that during the World War II, when the US Military proposed
to be entitled to use herbicides against the Japanese on some islands in the Pacific,
the Supreme Chief Justice at that time was entirely correct to use his veto power
for this proposal. According to his view, it was a war crime. Ironically, not long
after, that act of evil was put into practice in the Vietnam battlefield.
14 Buckingham (1982), iii.
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cidal chemicals in SVN battlefield.15 Triggered the herbicidal sprayings in
the SVN, the Americans sought to achieve three following objectives:
• Removing dense forests which had been used as a natural camouflage
layer of Vietcong guerrillas and the Northern Vietnamese Army;
• Creating no man’s lands of hundreds of meters wide around military
bases. Those vacant zones were to enhance observation of communist
guerrillas’ activities and to lessen the potential for ambush;
• Destroying crops to cut off food supplies of the enemy forces.16
After spraying herbicides, US forces continued to drop napalm17 to burn
down wherever they deemed necessary to be destroyed. This brutal war
tactic devastated many dense jungles in SVN. Furthermore, the high tem‐
perature of napalm also created secondary dioxins in areas sprayed with
defoliant substance containing 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T.18
On the battlefield of Laos, US defoliants were also used to devastate all
forests in which transport networks, as well as the communist forces, were
hiding.19 It was thought that burning forests would make the Liberation
Army lose their hideouts and quickly be attacked from the air. Therefore,
all suspected bases of Northern Vietnamese troops and the Vietcong were
sprayed with herbicides densely and repeatedly.
Because the use of Agent Orange was inhuman, this tactic also could be
considered illegal in the US and was hardly accepted by any American al‐
15 King, Pamela S. (2010): The Use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War and Its Ef‐
fects on the Vietnamese People. Washington. 12.
16 Together with using herbicides, since early 1962 Diem government began deploy‐
ing the Strategic Hamlet Program with the tactic of slapping the water to catch
fish. With these efforts, Saigon wished to isolate the communists and pacify SVN
within 18 months according to the Staley-Taylor operational plan. Young (2009),
98. TU, VC, VA 13520101003. 2. TTU, VC, VA 2520313001. 4. Department of
Defense (DOD) Herbicide Orange Status Report. In: TTU, VC, VA 2520210005.
1.
17 This adhesive material was dispersed onto plants and ignited quickly. It burned as
potent as gasoline and destroyed all nearby vegetation in a while. It is calculated
that Napalm-B used in the Vietnam War could heat at about 850 degrees centi‐
grade and burn up to 15 minutes. Victims of napalm attacks usually had little de‐
fense and died not only by burning but also from asphyxiation caused by carbon
monoxide poisoning. This new type of bomb was responsible for the destruction
of much of the landscape. Tucker (2011), 788–789.
18 Thắng (2008), 120.
19 Buckingham (1982), iv.
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lies. The base of the Ranch Hand Program was secretly built next to Unit
62 of SVN Air Force at Nha Trang Air Base and was given a disguised
name, Air Force Unit 14. At first, to avoid responsibility, aircraft of the
US Air Force, those conducted chemical spraying missions always painted
the flag of the Republic of Vietnam; pilots got the order to wear plain
clothes when flying.20
The White House also pushed responsibility to the government of SVN
by asking President Diem to declare that “herbicide usage is harmless to
human health.” And, “Herbicides spraying was the most effective mea‐
sures” to cut off the food supply to the Northern troops and the Vietcong;
then to gain control of mountainous areas and countryside.21 The SVN
government disclaimed all information related to congenital disabilities
appeared in the Saigon presses. Authors of those articles were alleged to
be communist sympathizers. Complaints about dangerous diseases from
peasants were also disregarded. Soldiers reported to doctors about symp‐
toms of skin burns, headache, vomiting, and many other signs of exposure
to toxic substances, but they all got the same answer that their illness was
unrelated to the sprayings of herbicides.
To conduct defoliated missions, US Air Force used aircraft as C-47,
T-28, B-26, and C-123. The 12th Air Commando Squadron, which was es‐
tablished with six planes, was assigned to implement defoliant sprayings.
At the peak of the Ranch Hand Project in 1969, the number of aircraft
equipped the special squadron increased to 25. In some cases, herbicides
were sprayed from motor vehicles and also hand sprayers by soldiers.
However, these methods only accounted a modest proportion of about
10-12 percent of defoliants.22 In terms of personnel and facilities, that pro‐
gram was a part of the US Air Force campaign in Southeast Asia named
Trail Dust.23
Chemical sprayings were mostly conducted in the early morning. At
that time, the air was usually quiet and in high humidity, so the toxic
20 Thắng (2008), 121.
21 Cecil, Paul Frederick (1986): Herbicidal Warfare: the Ranch Hand Project in Viet‐
nam. Santa Barbara. 13.
22 Declaration of Mr. Richard S. Christian (Re: Civil Action No. 90-1808 SSH and
90-1809 SSH- The American Legion against Derwinski and Vietnam Veterans of
America against Derwinski). In: TTU, VC, VA 6110209016. 5–6. Hảo/Larsen
(2010), 3.
23 TTU, VC, VA F031100030169. 12.
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chemicals often fell to predetermined coordinates correctly. By noon,
when the temperature of a day reached its peak, herbicides would culmi‐
nate with their most destructive power. A squadron sprayed toxic chemi‐
cals usually had 2-3 aircraft. To avoid fire from the ground, pilots often
flew very high before reaching targets. Once approaching objectives, the
planes suddenly descended, and within several minutes they discharged
entire of chemicals to ground through nozzles designed at side wings.
Aerial Herbicide Spraying in Southern Vietnam
Source: Agent Orange Record, Associated Press/Worldwide Photos24
Soon after the news about U.S aerial herbicide sprayings in SVN was dis‐
closed, a high wave of protests broke out and quickly spread worldwide.
The human right and environmental activists required the US administra‐
tion to halt the Operation Ranch Hand immediately. One article by jour‐
nalist Richard Dudman published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch accused
the US and Saigon government of using “a dirty war tactic” against North
Vietnam. The protest movement was considered reaching its peak in early
1967 when scientific advisors of the US President received a petition
signed by more than 5,000 scientists including 17 Nobel Prize winners and
129 members of the National Academy of Sciences. They urged President
Johnson to stop using toxic chemicals as lethal weapon and to destroy
crops in SVN.25 In the meantime, the US Senate was debating over the
adoption of the Geneva Convention on banning the use of chemical and
biological weapons in warfare.
24 Http://www.agentorangerecord.com/agent_orange_resources/photos/cateo ry/
collection_2/. (Accessed 20th February 2017).
25 Thắng (2008), 124.
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Under the pressure of international public opinion, since the end of
1969, the toxic chemical spraying squad was ordered to reduce 30 percent
of its activities despite the efforts of President Nixon.26 Not long later,
aerial spraying performed by C-123 aircraft on 07th January 1971 above
rice fields in Ninh Thuan province marked an end of the US herbicidal
warfare in Vietnam after a proximately one decade of operation.
Impact of the Operation Ranch Hand on the Minorities in SVN
According to the accurate statistics, together with Agent Orange, 15 other
herbicides were sprayed on approximately 25 percent of the land surface
of SVN in the Ranch Hand Programme. These chemicals destroyed
260,000 hectares (8 percent) of agricultural land in South Vietnam. The
defoliants sprayed on farmland also damaged immediately over 300,000
tons of food. Besides, about 30 percent of 135,000 hectares of rubber plan‐
tations were destroyed.27 In addition, it was estimated that 20 percent trop‐
ical forests and 36 percent mangrove forests together with hundreds of
plant species were among the victims of the defoliants; at least of 20 mil‐
lion cubic meters of timber were damaged.28 The destruction was so great
that environmental activists used the terms ecological warfare and, then,
ecocide to refer to it; or as commented by Arthur H. Westing, “the Viet‐
nam War of 1961-1975 stands out as the archetypal example of environ‐
mental war-related abuse.”29
Studies conducted on laboratory animals pointed out that dioxin were
extremely toxic even in tiny doses. Human exposed to the chemical could
associate with serious health issues such as muscular dysfunction, inflam‐
mation, congenital disabilities, nervous system disorders and even the de‐
velopment of various cancers. To plants, within two to three weeks of
3.
26 President Nixon supported the ratification of the Geneva Convention but wanted
to ensure that it would not apply to the defoliants and other “chemicals counterin‐
surgency.” Chính (2005).
27 Thắng (2008), 128. & TTU, VC, VA 2520313001. 12.
28 TTU, VC, VA 2520313001. 4.
29 Westing, Arthur H. (ed.) (2002): Long-Term Consequences of the Vietnam War,
Ecosystems, Report to the Environmental Conference on Cambodia-Laos-Viet‐
nam. Stockholm. 2–4.
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spraying, the leaves should drop down, and the trees themselves would re‐
main bare until the following rainy season.30
With dense forests in SVN, about 10-20 percent of plants belonged the
top floor (representing 40-60 percent of forest biomass) died shortly after
a single spray run. In order to defoliate the lower stories, one or more fol‐
low-up sprayings would be needed. The defoliated top floor led to chang‐
ing the climate in lower storeys. When humidity reduced, the light intensi‐
ty increased, young trees might survive but were difficult to develop well
and could be burned during the dry seasons by fire generated by bombs or
slash-and-burn cultivation method. Once the rainy season came, soil ero‐
sion was leading to gradual degradation. Only a few light‐demanding
species or plants with developed strong roots withstood the arid environ‐
ment could grow in sprayed areas.
In the US, since 1963, i.e., only two years after President Kennedy ap‐
proved the use of Agent Orange in SVN, the US Army reported an in‐
creased risk of skin conditions (chloracne) and respiratory infections. In
the same year, the President's Science Advisory Committee reported to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the possible health dangers of using these chemi‐
cal compounds.31 It is believed that these toxins could cause up to 28 dif‐
ferent diseases to humans. However, it took decades since veterans from
both sides made their first claims, the US government half-heartedly ac‐
knowledged responsibility; though, only for US veterans, so far.32.
In Vietnam, doctors began recognizing unusual symptoms while treat‐
ing for veterans who had been exposed to toxic chemicals on battlefields.
In this group, diseases such as hepatitis, kidney failure, various kinds of
cancer, diseases caused by declining immunity, and severe diarrhoea occur
in much higher frequency than other patient groups. Veterans’ wives also
claim that they miscarried repeatedly. Their children were born premature‐
ly or born with defects. And, a significant increase in infant mortality rate
has also reported.33 In contaminated areas, doctors reported that the rate of
30 Hảo/Larsen (2010), 5.
31 King (2010), 15.
32 US veterans made the first compensation claim in late 1977. Until the end of
September 1979, about 4,800 people requested treatment for herbicide-related
health problems. TTU, VC, VA 6150205010. 5–6. See also Bruce Falconer (2009):
Agent Orange: Treatment for Vets still lagging. In: Mother Jones. Monday, June 1.
Https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/06/agent-orange-diagnosis-and-treat
ment-badly-lagging-says-report/.(Accessed February 2nd, 2017).
33 Dreyfuss, Robert (2000): Apocalypse Still. Mother Jones. San Francisco. 2.
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defects was 2.4 percent compared with 0.6 percent of the reasonable rate
in other regions.34
In 2008 Vietnam’s Ministry of Health compiled a list of 17 diseases and
deformities related to dioxin exposure including Soft tissue sarcoma, Non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, Lung and Bronchus cancer, Tra‐
cheal cancer, Larynx cancer, Prostate cancer, Primary liver cancer,
Kahler’s disease, Acute and sub-acute peripheral neuropathy, Spina Bifi‐
da, Chloracne, Type 2 Diabetes, Porphyria cutanea tarda, Unusual births,
Birth defects, Mental disorders.35 Vietnam also reported that about 4.8
million people affected by Agent Orange, some 500,000 children with
birth defects, and 2 million others with cancer and other illnesses related
to defoliants used during the wartime.36
Although ethnic minorities in SVN were not interested in the war
spread in their traditional territory, they have suffered considerable im‐
pacts of herbicide spraying. According to the environmental activists, of
the upland forests sprayed, the hardest hit were dense forests of Ma Da
(Dong Nai), Phu Binh (Binh Phuoc), Sa Thay (Kontum), A Luoi (Thua
Thien Hue), along Route 19, and localities settled along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail where weapons and other supplies from the North were supposed to
be transferred to the South. Besides were rainforests surrounding War
Zones D and Boi Loi (Tay Ninh) of the NLF.37
Habitat destroyed by herbicides and the war in general also affected
wild animals profoundly. Many individual animals died of starvation, lack
of refuge or drinking contaminated water. The results of ethnographic sur‐
veys carried out by Gerald Hickey reveal that after each single aerial
chemical spraying many tribesmen living in Kontum found a lot of wild
dead animals in the woods near their home. The remaining natural beings
had to flee to other places; even the living conditions there were not utter‐
ly favourable to them.38
34 Hảo/ Larsen (2010), 12.
35 Martin, Michael F. (2008): Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and US-Vietnam
Relations. Congressional Research Report RL34761, November 21. Washington.
Sơn, Lê Kế (ed.) (2011): 50 câu hỏi & đáp về chất độc màu da cam/dioxin (50
Questions & Answers on Agent Orange/Dioxin). Office of the Steering Committee
No. 33 – Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. Hanoi. 10–11.
36 Dreyfuss (2000), 2. Hảo/Larsen (2010), 8.
37 Sơn (2011), 8–9.
38 Hickey, Gerald Cannon (1982): Free in the Forest: Ethno History of the Viet‐
namese Central Highlands, 1954–1976. New Haven. 255, 314.
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The fact is after the Operation Ranch Hand, a ragged, impoverished
ecosystem entirely replaced the previous vibrant rainforest ecosystem in
SVN. In new re-growing forests, shrubs and bamboos became excellent
hiding places for rats and mice, earlier rare to these forested areas. The
popularity of these rodents in the post-war period caused damage to crops
and spread diseases out. Natural enemies of rats as civets, and foxes exist‐
ed with a low number over sprayed areas. Their fecundity, on the other
hand, could not compare with which of the rodents. Overall, herbicides
caused the severe ecological imbalance in many forested regions over
South Vietnam.
According to Hickey, most victims exposed to toxic chemicals reported
abdominal pains and diarrhea, with vomiting, respiratory symptoms and
rashes also developing. A few said that they experienced dizziness. Some
witnesses confirmed that there were many unusual deaths, especially
among children following sprayings. Children who exposed to dioxin of‐
ten covered in rashes and died shortly after the onset of illness. Addition‐
ally, significant of respondents reported about the abnormal increase of
deaths among domestic species, especially chickens and pigs.39
After being sprayed, dioxin not only directly caused the destruction of
trees, animals, and humans but penetrated into the soil and groundwater
resources. It then somehow became part of the food chain. Agent Orange
devastated local agriculture and the harmonious relation between people
and the environment within contaminated regions. Once humans ate plants
or animals infected with dioxin, this toxic chemical would begin accumu‐
lating in fatty tissues. According to the scientists, at low concentration,
some of the dioxins have the short half-life and can be degradable in 5 to
10 years. However, at more significant levels, it needs much more time for
dioxin to decompose. When this chemical was absorbed into the earth, the
time required for it to be detoxified increase significantly, up to decades.40
Local people also revealed that in contaminated regions, trees withered
and died after being sprayed defoliants a few weeks; fish also died and
floated on the stream. All Montagnards ate the dead fish getting diarrhoea.
Most of the crops were destroyed. Some remaining paddy fields though
were not burned but could not produce rice effectively as pre-war periods.
Similar to poisoned fish, vegetables survived following spray missions
39 Hickey (1982), 255.
40 TTU, VC, VA 13520101003. 3.
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caused diarrhoea, respiratory failure, or some other strange diseases for
consumers. Many victims died after a few days of being infected, most of
them were children.41 Deforestation, thus, directly led to the shortage of
traditional food sources which came from hunting and gathering methods.
Besides, some of the watershed forests along Annam Cordillera (Viet‐
namese: Trường Sơn-Tây Nguyên) destroyed by herbicides resulting in
the decline in their functions of water retention and flood protection. This
not only made the soil dry out in sprayed areas but indirectly caused flood‐
ing for downstream regions during the rainy season. All of those conse‐
quences somehow contributed to the minorities’ poverty during and after
the war.
Together with causing environmental destruction, defoliant sprayings
and bombings also destroyed many villages and cultivated lands belonging
to the minorities. To avoid harm inflicted by American lethal weapons,
Highlanders in contaminated zones had to evacuate to the border between
SVN and Laos or to less dangerous zones. Their old villages then were de‐
serted, and the land would no longer be cultivated. Also, the fire tradition‐
ally used for slash-and-burn cultivation, even to cook now was limited to
avoid being located and targeted by the US and SVN Air Forces. This sit‐
uation worsened the uncertain and insecure living condition of the ethnic
minorities.42
Along with the physical damage, Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange
and their families also have been suffering psychological pain. Those fam‐
ilies, from their cultural beliefs, have been subjected to torment. Parents
blame themselves that they might do something sinful in the previous
lives and now their offspring receive punishment instead of them. In mi‐
nority regions, it is commonly believed that children in a community born
with defects because someone in their village had insulted the gods. The
pain would be much more significant when the next children, to whom the
exposed parents try to give birth, also suffered deformities like their older
siblings. Many parents gave birth several times, but none of their children
survived at all. This means they will have no one to continue the family
line, worship ancestors, and care for their old age. Thus, besides physical
41 Hickey (1982), 255, 313–14.
42 Robert, Amélie (2016): At the Heart of the Vietnam War: Herbicides, Napalm, and
Bulldozers against the A Lưới Mountains. Journal of Alpine Research/Revue de
géographie alpine, 104–1. 13.
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damage, the pressure from culture also contributed to the refractory pain
of Vietnamese Agent Orange victims.43
Conclusion
It is over a half-century since chemical warfare in SVN was carried out
but the wounds it left for the Vietnamese environment and people still un‐
healed. Or, as a French environmental activist commented: the usage of
herbicidal compounds containing the high level of dioxin in SVN was a
grave violation of human rights, a war crime, a crime against the environ‐
ment and people, even a gradual genocide. It has become one of the
biggest forgotten tragedies of the (20th) century.44
In the effort to overcome war consequences, for years the government
of Vietnam has issued many national action plans to remediate of Agent
Orange/Dioxin over the particular periods. Accordingly, some wide-rang‐
ing investigations have been conducted. The authorities also deployed pro‐
grams aiming at handling contaminated lands or preventing the toxic
chemicals from spreading. This country has been attempting to mobilize
various domestic resources as well as collaborate with many international
organizations to assist victims of Agent Orange in improving their liveli‐
hood, medical care, education, etc.
Despite the abundant evidence relating harmful effects of herbicides
provided by scientists and veterans, the US National Academy of Sciences
President, Philip Handler, concluded that there was no cause and effect re‐
lationship here.45 According to him, the investigation committee had been
“unable to gather any definitive indication of direct damage by herbicides
to human health.” And, though declared that the information on the de‐
struction of herbicides should be re-verified, the National Academy of Sci‐
ences has not shown any attempt to visit Vietnam to reappraise the words
of the Montagnards recorded in researchers’ reports.46
4.
43 Hảo/Larsen (2010), 9–10.
44 Bouny, André (2007): The effects of Agent Orange and its consequences. Global
Research. Http://www.globalresearch.ca/the effects-of-agent-orange-and-its-conse‐
quences/4490. (Accessed 10th February 2017).
45 Hickey (1982), 308–319. Pentagon ignored Agent Orange warnings. Http://
www.vavadanang.org.vn/index.php/en/ archives/item/61-pentagon-ignored-agent-
orange-warnings. (Accessed 16th February 2017).
46 Hickey (1982), 256.
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On 31st January 2004, the Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Or‐
ange/Dioxin (VAVA) sued the manufacturers whose toxic chemicals were
used in the Vietnam War at the First Instance Law Court of American Fed‐
eral Justice. After the case had been vetoed, VAVA continued filing the ap‐
peal to the Court of Appeal on 30th September 2005. There, the defense
lawyers for 37 American chemical companies argued that Agent Orange
was produced to protect US troops. Since then, not any judgment of the
court about an official apology or compensations for victims of Agent Or‐
ange in Vietnam has been given. The story of the journey to find justice
for those victims, therefore, has not come to an end yet.
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The system of Dykes and Water Resources of North Vietnam
under the Impact of the American Air and Naval Attacks
(1965 - 1972)
Dao Duc Thuan / Nguyen Van Ngoc
Introduction
Although the Vietnam War (1954 - 1975) ended more than 40 years ago,
its historical factors still remain an interesting theme for scholars, how‐
ever. Added to its political, military and diplomatic issues that have been
researched for years, the other impacts of that war on social life and envi‐
ronment of both North and South Vietnam can be also seen as one of the
central problems. Even during the warfare, public opinion and peace-lov‐
ing forces around the world strongly opposed the use of dioxin and other
defoliants scattered over South Vietnam to destroy enemy’s refuges. This
has seriously affected the ecological and human environment in those ar‐
eas as well.
However, on the other hand, the American employment of air and naval
forces expanded the war to North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin inci‐
dent (August 1964) to suppress the massive backing in both material and
spirit to the South quickly become a matter of international interest. In ad‐
dition to attacking military targets, the US air and naval forces also at‐
tacked transportation systems, irrigation facilities and sometimes public
facilities such as hospitals. This was a serious threat to the economy, the
life and safety of the people of North Vietnam at that time. Within the li‐
mited scope of this study, we can only attempt to analyse the effects of US
air and naval attacks on dykes and water resource systems in North Viet‐
nam, mainly in the Red River delta during the most intense period of the
war from 1965 to 1972.
Our research results are derived from the exploitation of the archives
and other holdings currently stored at the National Archives Centre III
(Hanoi), and the newspapers published in North Vietnam during that time.
Based on the arrangement, collation and statistics we will try to give a sys‐
tematic and comprehensive view of the research issue. Besides, it is also
1.
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interesting to refer to the work of previous scholars as well as give us a
complete and objective view on this interesting subject.
The Role of Water Resource Systems in Eco-Social Life of North
Vietnam
The Irrigation Situation of North Vietnam Prior to 1945
For the ancient Eastern nations in general, the need for water has become
an important precondition for promoting state formation. Born mainly in
the river basins, the selection of wet rice cultivation as the main economic
sector has required these countries to be particularly interested in irriga‐
tion. The first primitive state in the Vietnamese territory - the Van Lang
state was formed on that basis. From the very early days, Van Lang resi‐
dents have learned to take advantage of the tide’s rise and fall to regulate
the water supply for agricultural production.
Falling under the Northern domination period, the experiences of water
management in the North has been gradually introduced into the country.
By the 9th century, history books recorded the Cao Bien ordered people to
embank dykes surrounding the city of Dai La to fight against floods. By
the independence period, monarchies in Vietnam have been always aware
of the role of irrigation for the survival and development of the country. In
the official historical records of the dynasties, it is very common to see the
reports of the flood situation, natural disasters as well as the response of
the monarchies in each historical period. Under the Ly dynasty, when the
capital was moved to Thang Long, the court paid particular attention to the
construction of dykes to protect the capital. Because Thang Long is the
place of confluence between the rivers, at the same time, the terrain sur‐
face is slightly low and flat so it is easy to accumulate water when floods
occur. Experiencing the variation of history, subsequent monarchical dy‐
nasties were regularly interested in irrigation works, especially the em‐
bankment to prevent floods. With the expansion of the country’s territory
to the East and South, coastal embankments are also concerned to prevent
saline intrusion affecting crops. Along with that, the regulations on flood
prevention and dyke protection have gradually been documented in the
laws of the state as well as the regulations in village conventions. The sto‐
ry of the embankment of water in the Red River delta took place until the
Nguyen Dynasty ascended the throne and unified the country in 1802.
2.
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Originated in Tonkin, but after a long ruling and construction of the
Southern part from a landless, deserted land into fertile plains, the
Nguyen’s Kings seemed too familiar with the method of water manage‐
ment by streams, and flood drainage of the South. Water management in
the South concentrated on open canals to drain the floods, while in the
North of Vietnam embankment is used as a major weapon to combat natu‐
ral disasters. Therefore, during the early rule of the country, the Nguyen
was embarrassed in the problem of water management in the Northern
Delta. Keeping or maintaining dykes became a hotly debated topic that at‐
tracted the attention of imperial officials and localities. After a period of
trial of both options, the Nguyen eventually returned to embankment to
prevent floods.1 However, the lack of unity and assertiveness of the
Nguyen in the work of water management left a significant impact on the
socio-economic life of North Vietnam and partly weakened the internal
forces of the country in the course of resistance against the threat of
French colonialism in the mid-19thcentury.
The Vietnamese economy and society changed dramatically following
the policies of two French colonial exploitations in the early 20th century.
At the same time, irrigation systems are also of particular interest in estab‐
lishing infrastructure that attracts French capitalists to invest in the agri‐
cultural sector. This includes macro-level policies such as planting water‐
sheds to prevent floods, establishing reservoirs, and embankments. Even
so, floods have still become a serious and permanent threat to the social
life of North Vietnam at that time. According to researcher Pierre Gourou
in his study entitled Farmers in Tonkin Delta in the first 30 years of the
20th century, dyke breakdowns occurred regularly around every two or
three years.2 The strenuous conditions of the farmers who protected the
dykes and the attitudes of local authorities have been partly reflected in
some novels also. Until 1945, the experience of water management of the
Vietnamese people has a tradition of thousands of years, but that does not
mean the advancement of technical level or the proud achievements of wa‐
ter management in this country. People still feel that dyke breakage and
the risk of floods are still stalking, threatening the lives of people in the
1 See also: Do Duc Hung (1997): The Problem of Water Management in the Northern
Delta in the 19th Century under the Nguyen Dynasty. Hanoi.
2 Pierre Gourou (2003): Farmers in Tonkin Delta, Vietnamese Association of Histori‐
cal Sciences, École française d'Extrême-Orient. Hanoi. 79.
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Red River delta. Additionally, it should be noted that this is not the main
cause of the famine in Vietnam in 1945.
Water Management in the North of Vietnam from 1945 to 1965
The days of August 1945 not only left a mark on the hearts of the Viet‐
namese people because of the boom of August revolution but also unfor‐
gettable memories of the historic flood in Northern Vietnam.3 And we also
need to take note of the fact that, due to this flood, the orders of the Upris‐
ing Committee did not reach some localities and Vietnamese people in
some places have actively acted according to the previous order named
Japan - France Shooting and our actions issued by the Standing Commit‐
tee of the Central Indochinese Communist Party to rise up the insurrection
and seize power. The floods severely affected the dyke system that para‐
lyzed the intersection system, causing the revolutionary leadership of the
revolutionary headquarters in the Northern mountainous midland
provinces to face many difficulties:
“After Japan declared surrender, due to rising floodwaters, the dyke system in
Red River delta was ruptured in many places causing flooding in many
provinces in the delta. Due to the interruption of communication, most of the
provinces in this area did not receive the order of general uprising from Tan
Trao.”4
Right after the success of the August Revolution, the revolutionary authori‐
ties were built up in different provinces. One of the central problems of
the revolutionary government at the time was to overcome the aftermath
of the historic flood and to consolidate the dyke system. On October the
11th, the provisional government held a plenary session discussing on dyke
reinforcement by spending its treasury and calling for contribution and
labour to mend the dykes before the flood season of 1946 came.5
As we can see, right after from the very beginning of the newly estab‐
lished government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the state leader
Ho Chi Minh quickly embarked on overcoming the aftermath of the his‐
toric flood, at the same time, developed the dyke system in the Red River
2.2
3 Phan Khanh/Tu Mao/Nguyen Gia Quang (1995): Dykes of Vietnam. Hanoi. 147.
4 Phạm Hồng Tung (2014): The history of the August Revolution 1945 in Vietnam.
Hanoi. 199.
5 Phan Khanh (et al.) (2014): History of Vietnam’s Water Resources. Hanoi. 249.
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delta. However, until the end of 1946, when the nation entered the new re‐
sistance, the results of that water management course were not clear
enough. The Ho Chi Minh government returned to the Viet Bac to lead the
country’s resistance. Therefore, water management in general and in the
Red River delta was not in favourable conditions to be concerned.
In 1954, the signing of the Geneva agreement marked an end of the
French War. The country was divided into two regions, and the 17th paral‐
lel was selected as the temporary boundary. In that situation, from 1955,
North Vietnam carried out a three-year plan to heal the wounds of war
(1955-1958) in which the prevention of floods and storms was paid special
attention, for instance, “in 1956, the amount of embankment reached
17.735.000 m3.”6 However, the breakdown of Mai Lam dyke (Hanoi) still
showed serious limitations of water management in North Vietnam at that
time.
The 8th session of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam in 1958 decided to split the Ministry of Water Resources and
Architecture into two separate organs, the Ministry of Water Resources
and the Ministry of Agriculture. Since then, the irrigation works in the
North Vietnam have been upgraded. Preliminary many meetings on flood
and storm prevention were regularly held. However, the work of dykes in
the years 1958-1960 in North Vietnam has not really had countably break‐
through developments. In the first five years of the economic development
plan of North Vietnam (1961-1965), the irrigation works were considered
in the direction of more modernization and larger scale. Nevertheless, due
to the fact that the state policies on irrigation have not been thoroughly
grasped, the whole irrigation work in the North encountered severe prob‐
lems.
Thus, it can be seen that, throughout the long history of the nation, wa‐
ter control has become an everlasting necessity of direct and substantial
influence on the survival and development of the country, especially of the
Red River delta. Governments that might differ in institutional terms, but
they all regard irrigation as a key and frequently-cited task. However, the
reality is that the water management in North Vietnam until the onset of
US air and naval assaults was not systematically built up. Safety was guar‐
anteed only in the narrow margin and quickly impotent to the abnormal
6 Phan Khanh/Tu Mao/Nguyen Gia Quang (1995), 160.
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nature. The problem of fighting floods seems to have been ingrained in the
subconscious mind of the people in the Red River delta.
The American Air and Naval Attacks in North Vietnam (1965-1972)
Regarding the conspiracy of mass murder of the American imperialists, it
is important to emphasize in particular the US’s strategy to destroy the
dyke system during the rainy season, in order to make millions of people
die of floods and hunger. One American journalist, I.F. Stone criticized in
his own independent newsletter called I.F. Stone’s Weekly on July 12,
1965:
“bombing the huge dykes in the North of Hanoi would produce the same re‐
sult as a hydro bomb; the entire area of the delta would be flooded, summer
rice crops therefore would be destroyed, and then, from 2 to 3 million people
would be drown by the breakage of the dyke.”7
From March 1966, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, E.G. Wheeler
and top generals in the council made an appeal to expand an “open air war
against North Vietnam” and directly mentioned the intention of destruct‐
ing the dyke system that, as a result, would destroy the grain production.8
In fact, US air and naval attacks in the years 1965-1972 severely affected
the irrigation system of North Vietnam, which was originally vulnerable.
In the economic term, the damage of dykes actually caused the abnormal
agricultural production and affected the distribution of labor resources for
production in many parts of the Red River delta.
From around February 1965 onwards, the US air force and naval at‐
tacks began with bombing operations near the demilitarized zone. The ini‐
tial attack was limited to the south of the 20th parallel, which rapidly esca‐
lated to attack targets in all parts of Northern Vietnam. In 1966, the attacks
gradually turned into targets of major cities and by 1967, the US air force
attacked targets near the Vietnam-China border. The US focused on de‐
stroying the industrial and transportation facilities in the hope of destroy‐
ing the economic and defence potential of the North, preventing the
3.
7 Cited accordingly to the Report on the Genocide of the American imperialists in
North Vietnam by the Investigation Commission for the American Imperial War
Crimes in Vietnam, October 1967. Records in the National Library of Vietnam,
VL68. 00001. 7.
8 The Unforgettable American Crimes (1966). Hanoi. 148a.
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North’s relief road for the resistance of the people in the South. According
to statistics from 1965 to 1968, US air and naval forces threw and dropped
over 700.000 tons of bombs and more than 740.000 artillery shells in
Northern Vietnam. In those bombings, the transportation system was hit
the most with 94.561 arrivals, accounting for 52.3 percent of the total
number of targets.9
Right from the first raids, dykes and irrigation systems soon became
targets for the US air force. According to statistics, in 1965, US aircraft
attacked irrigation works more than 500 times10 and bombarded on the im‐
portant dyke sections 78 times.11 The pace of US air and naval raids con‐
tinued to rise constantly. In 1966, the bombardment to destroy the dyke
system was intensified and focused on the months of July, August and
September when floodwaters rose. As of 1967, the US air and naval force
had set more 368 additional targets, including 177 dykes, 48 dams, 18
pumping stations, 116 drains, 15 water troughs and 4 water reservoirs.12
US air and naval forces targeting North Vietnam ended only when the Tet
Offensive and some uprisings in the South Vietnam (1968) intensified and
gained enormous results, forcing the US to sit at the Paris negotiating table
to find a peaceful solution for Vietnam.
The attacks of the US air and the naval forces have severely affected the
situation of irrigation in particular and the development of agriculture of
the North in general. As mentioned above, despite efforts but in the con‐
text of economic difficulties and striving for unification of the country, ir‐
rigation works in North Vietnam did not significantly develop. The main
water management measures are incidental, dealing with the incidents but
9 The Steering Committee on Reviewing War under Political Bureau (2000): Viet‐
nam’s Revolutionary War 1945 – 1975: Victory and Lessons. Hanoi. 514 – 518.
10 National Archives Center III, Investigation Commission for the American Imperial
War Crimes in Vietnam: A Criminal Investigation of the American Imperialists
that Destroyed Irrigation Works and Dykes in Northern Vietnam from March 1965
to December 1966, Dossier No. 45, sheet 3.
11 National Archives Center III, Investigation Commission for the American Imperial
War Crimes in Vietnam: A Criminal Investigation of the American Imperialists
that Destroyed Irrigation Works and Dykes in Northern Vietnam from March 1965
to December 1966, Dossier No. 45, sheet 5.
12 National Archives Center III, Investigation Commission for the American Imperial
War Crimes in Vietnam: Announcement No. 110 / UBDT of the Investigation
Commission for the American Imperial War Crimes in Vietnam on the American
Crimes in North Vietnam in 1967, Dossier No. 63, sheet 73.
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not really a remote prevention solution. Therefore, the flood risk in the
North is permanent, especially because of the complicated happenings of
weather in North Vietnam during this period. As a result, the US air at‐
tacks on irrigation and dyke systems have made the problems of water
management more difficult. A series of irrigation works and dyke sections
must be repaired after each raid. As time went on, the US air force con‐
centrated more on the focused targets, the recovery work thus required
more efforts.
To a larger extent, agricultural activities in the North Viet Nam directly
influenced by irrigation became more complex. It is historically reported
that the farmer’s yearly fruits were blown away after a major flood and
this was still a topical event in Northern Vietnam in the 1960s. Therefore,
during the period from 1965 to 1968, paddy production of North Vietnam
had a certain decline from 5562 thousand tons in 1965 to 4628.6 thousand
tons in 1968.13 The area of rice cultivation in the North also declined from
2397.6 thousand hectares in 1965 to 2079.5 thousand hectares in 1968.14
And then the yield of rice also dropped from 18.96 quintals per hectare in
1965 to 17.82 quintals per hectare in 1968.15 This consequence is un‐
doubtedly rooted in the weakness of the dyke system, which was heavily
damaged during US air raids.
More seriously, the American bombings had a very serious impact on
the daily life of the population of North Vietnam at that time. The number
of casualties was constantly reported by the Investigation Commission for
the American Imperial War Crimes in Vietnam. However, the cause of
these casualties is not primarily from the direct bombardment of dykes and
irrigation systems because of the following reasons: firstly, in the history
of land exploitation, the people in the Red River delta have had less con‐
gregation, and formed the villages that cling to dykes and canals as com‐
monly seen in the Mekong River delta. Villages are often located inside
and relatively isolated from the dyke system to ensure the safety needed
when an incident occurs. So, the effects of the American bombardment on
the population and the daily life of people are relatively faint. Human ca‐
sualties were mainly the people working with the maintenance and opera‐
tion of irrigation works. Secondly, it proved true of course that urban ar‐
13 General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004): Statistical data of Vietnam in the 20th
century. Hanoi. 284.
14 General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), 286.
15 General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), 287.
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eas, hospitals and schools, which are populated places, have been identi‐
fied as early targets for air and naval bombardment in the North of Viet‐
nam. Many evidences related to the US imperialist massacre of innocent
civilians in the North of Vietnam were publicly noticed. However, this is a
very interesting topic that will be discussed in detail in another study in
the near future.
However, the attacks of American imperialists in North Vietnam in gen‐
eral had a certain impact on the lives of the people of the North at that
time. A large number of educational institutions, hospitals and residents
were forced to leave the urban areas and densely populated areas to evacu‐
ate to the countryside in order to live, learn and continuously fight. People
in the areas where the dyke systems and irrigation works were attacked
were mobilized to take part in dykes recovery work after the bombings
ended and, in certain cases, there are human casualties when US air forces
repeatedly attack critical dykes as a records proves:
“throw bombs to destroy dykes and irrigation works, then continue to raid to
prevent them from being prepared repairs and killed the workers are tricks
that the American imperialists often use… For example, on March the 23rd,
1967 they threw 52 bombs destroying three dyke sections, killing and injuring
30 civilians.”16
The Fierce Bombardments in 1972
North Vietnam gradually returned to normal socio-economic activities af‐
ter the US declared a cease-fire in 1968. The people of Northern Vietnam
made continuous efforts to restore and develop production in the follow‐
ing years. However, the historic flood in 1971 swept away previous
achievements and posed a big question for the irrigation work in North
Vietnam that year. The entire North was flooded; disaster recovery work
took several months. This led to a decline in paddy output in the North in
1971 reaching 4920.9 thousand tons compared to 5275.9 thousand tons in
1970.
And when the battle on the diplomatic table became tense and went into
a standstill, the military triumphs on the battlefield will help the party
4.
16 Report on the Genocide of the American Imperialists in North Vietnam by the In‐
vestigation Commission for the American Imperial War Crimes in Vietnam, Octo‐
ber 1967. Records in the National Library of Vietnam, VL68. 00001. 8.
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prove its true power. Parallel to the South Vietnamese Liberation Army’s
assault on Quang Tri, the US began to restart its escalation of attacks in
North Vietnam in early 1972. However, the intensity and scale are noted to
be much more intense. It seems that recognizing the heavy losses of the
historic flood in 1971, the US air force focused primarily on the rapid at‐
tack on irrigation works and the newly constructed dyke system in particu‐
lar. Between April and August 1972, the US air force carried out 198
times of attacks damaging 72 dykes and 35 irrigation works in Northern
Vietnam.17 Particularly, many dyke sections were attacked several times in
a short period. It should be noted that, however, during the US air and
naval attacks on North Vietnam, the irrigation system was not the only
military target but destruction of the Northern economy also. In the last
days of 1972, in the final game, President Nixon decided to select large
populated cities as central targets in order to destroy the spirit and
willpower of both the leaders and people of North Vietnam. Fortunately,
the results were not what he had expected. In 1972 alone, the US air force
and its navy threw about 210.000 tons of bombs in North Vietnam. Be‐
tween 1969 and 1972, the US threw more than 650.000 shells and mines
over this region. Consequently, the dyke systems were affected by these
military activities.
It can be said that the impact on the dyke system in the 1972 offensive
caused great consequences to the social life of the North at that time.
Overcoming the aftermath of the war took place rapidly with the mobiliza‐
tion of great human resources. However, due to the mid-year attack, the
yield of paddy in North Vietnam in 1972 still increased to 5742.2 thousand
tons and it was not until 1973 did the new signs of decline appear. The
output only reached 5190.4 thousand tons.
In total, between 1965 and 1972, US air and naval forces threw about 1
million tons of bombs in Northern Vietnam with about 872 471 artillery
shells and mines. On average, each km2 suffered about 6 tons of bombs,
each person in the North at that time suffered 45.5 kg of bombs. The at‐
tacks killed and wounded 200.000 people, leaving behind 70.000 orphans.
Additionally, 100 percent of power plants, 1500/1600 irrigation works in
the North were attacked, more than 1 thousand critical dykes, 6 railroad
tracks with most of the sluices collapsed leaving much damage to other
17 People Newspaper, 25 August 1972. 2.
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civil works. This left a huge impact on the people of North Vietnam in
overcoming the consequences of the war.
Seen from a broader perspective, the American bombings targeting the
dykes and irrigation systems severely affected the ecological environment
of North Vietnam, especially agricultural eco-systems. As we might know,
for traditional Vietnamese, water is a key element of agricultural produc‐
tion. Water control has become an especially important task in deciding
the fruits of agricultural production. The US air force bombarded the dyke
system, especially during the flood season, in fact, disrupted the irrigation
system, which caused floods in many agricultural areas. Consequently,
that caused also great damage not only to the economy but also to ecologi‐
cal environment. Many varieties of drought-resistant rice cannot grow
when dykes break. In addition, flooding areas led to pollution of habitats
and this was the direct cause of epidemic diseases such as cholera, and
dengue fever. The American air force even took advantage of dry weather
to destroy the environment as the case in Quang Binh province in 1966
when napalm and phosphorus bombs were thrown into rice fields that had
been dried by American bombardments before.18
The Attitude of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam took a great deal
of action in responding to US air and naval attacks. The first move was to
mobilize the entire population in bombed localities at all costs quickly
overcome the difficulties and losses to resume production and fight
against other possible attacks. In parallel with those drastic actions, au‐
thorities at all levels collaborated closely with the armed forces to build
defensive battalions that protect the major irrigation and dyke systems.
This was very practical in the legitimate defence of the Democratic Re‐
public of Vietnam but invisible in general created the opportunity for US
air forces to quickly defuse their misconduct by claiming that attacks on
the dyke system and irrigation facilities are due to technical inaccuracies
and that the irrigation and dyke system were too close to military targets.
At a certain limit these defense are logic because due to the fact that at the
5.
18 Report on the Genocide of the American imperialists in North Vietnam by the In‐
vestigation Commission for the American Imperial War Crimes in Vietnam, Octo‐
ber 1967. Records in the National Library of Vietnam, VL68. 00001. 9.
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end of the winter of 1972, many US pilots chose to drop bombs at high
altitudes, despite their inaccurate targets, but could avoid the multi-layered
air defense network in Northern Vietnam. However, it cannot be denied
that the destruction of the dyke and irrigation facilities was part of the US
air strike plans at certain times.
The second move of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam government
was to vehemently condemn and protest American criminal actions
against North Vietnam in international forums. On July the 22nd, 1966,
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on behalf of the Government Council of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed a decree to set up a commis‐
sion to investigate the war crimes of American imperialism in Vietnam.
The Commission was responsible to:
• Investigate, collect, verify and compile documents as well as records
on all aspects of the invasion of the US in Vietnam;
• Denounce the crimes of the American imperialism in Vietnam to pub‐
lic opinion in Vietnam and to the people in the world;
• Provide all necessary documents on war crimes of the US imperialists
in Vietnam to agencies and organizations at home and abroad;
• Guide and coordinate activities with various state and social organs at
all levels in investigating, compiling and preserving documents, ex‐
hibits on war crimes committed by the US imperialists in Vietnam.
During the course of its activities, the commission provided the interna‐
tional community with important images and evidences that proved the
crimes of American imperialism in Vietnam. Of course, there are many
valuable documents related to the US air force attacking the dyke system
and irrigation works in North Vietnam.
Besides, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has
been very successful in calling on the international community to con‐
demn US air and naval bombardment actions in North Vietnam in general
and destruction of the irrigation system in particular. International organi‐
zations investigating American war crimes in Vietnam were established
and came to Vietnam to investigate and collect evidences. Many activists
have voiced opposition to US war crimes in Vietnam. An English philoso‐
pher and pacifist, Bertrand Russel, for example, raised his voice about the
American war crimes in Vietnam. In late 1966, followed by his initiative,
the International Tribunal for the Trial of American War Crimes in Viet‐
nam was established and two important sessions were held the following
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year in Sweden and Denmark to condemn American crimes in Vietnam in‐
cluding the activities to destroy the dykes and irrigation systems.
In the conclusion of the first meeting held in Stockholm from 2 to 10
May 1967, air attacks directing towards civilian targets such as hospitals,
nursing homes dams became one of the two focus points. Accordingly,
“the court finds that dykes and other irrigation works were vital to the
Vietnamese people and that there is a great risk of famine for the Viet‐
namese people by the armed forces of the US that plot to destroy those
works.”19 The court then came to conclude that
“the US government and armed forces are the culprits of systematic and large
scale bombing of civil targets, including civilians, houses, villages, dams,
dykes, medical facilities, leprosy nursing homes, schools, churches, pagodas,
historical and cultural buildings.”20
Another activist, Professor Saburo Kugai, a Japanese intellectual, gave a
speech on his field trip to Vietnam at the first session of the court in Stock‐
holm “dams, ditches, irrigation works and coastal dams are bombarded
systematically, especially during the rainy season from June to October.”21
Another report by a French geographer of the University of Paris VIII,
Professor Yves Lacoste noted his comments on the spot when he came to
North Vietnam in July 1972 for a field trip as a commissioner of the Third
Corps of the International Commission for the Investigation of American
War Crimes in Indochina in which he exposed the genocide crimes of the
American imperialists and their actions in North Vietnam. What he report‐
ed were the bombardments targeted towards the dyke network that was of
vital importance to the Vietnamese people. Not satisfied with the destruc‐
tion of factories, bridges, schools, residential areas, the US military forces
also attacking the dykes in a hope to threaten the Vietnamese people or
cause such great destruction that the Vietnamese people will have to kneel.
Since April 1972, the bombardments were mostly located in lower areas
like Hai Duong, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh, meaning not only
the most densely populated areas and most productive in agricultural pro‐
duction but also where villages are clearly below river level. These vil‐
19 The world denounces and condemns the American war crimes in Vietnam (1975).
Hanoi. 184.
20 The world denounces and condemns the American war crimes in Vietnam (1975),
187–188.
21 The world denounces and condemns the American war crimes in Vietnam (1975),
73.
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lages will be submerged under water if the dyke breaks. He went further
by showing the international public the maps mentioning destroyed dyke
system and confirmed that the US air attacks must be precisely analyzed
and well calculated. He concluded that those American war crimes marked
a new phase of the American war in Vietnam: the destruction of vital geo‐
graphical conditions of a country.22 At the 10th World Festival of Youth
and Students held at Humboldt University (East Germany) in 1973, the
Free German Youth released a declaration at the forum condemning the
crimes of imperialism, especially the condemnation of war crimes com‐
mitted by the American imperialists in Vietnam. It concluded that the
American war crimes in Vietnam including bombing civilians, demolition
of dykes, dams, genocide by chemical toxins must be punished exactly the
same with what the Nuremberg trial in 1946 did with the war crimes under
the Hitler regime.23
In Vietnam, calling for international support to side with Vietnam’s pos‐
ition and strongly condemn the American acts were accelerated and
brought more efficiency. The People Newspaper, the voice of the Workers
Party of North Vietnam, was used as an effective tool in propaganda on
this issue. Numerous articles strongly condemning the activities of the US
air force’s attacked on dyke systems were published. Some other countries
like Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary continuously issued statements
denouncing the activities of the American dyke offensive in North Viet‐
nam, and organized demonstrations in support of the heroic struggle of the
Vietnamese people.
Conclusions
Water management in the North of Viet Nam with the characteristic of
dyke embankment has a long history and a great impact on social life.
However, until the mid of the 20thcentury, the achievements of irrigation
work in North Vietnam were not really prominent and thoroughly resolved
the risk of flooding. In the strategic assessment and planning of war objec‐
tives, the US early saw the important role of the dykes and irrigation sys‐
6.
22 The world denounces and condemns the American war crimes in Vietnam (1975),
158–160.
23 The world denounces and condemns the American war crimes in Vietnam (1975),
250–251.
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tems in the economic and social life of Northern Vietnam and the focused
to destroy them in the years from 1965 to 1972. The Americans soon real‐
ized that the economy of North Vietnam was mainly based on agriculture,
of which irrigation is always a key issue. So, to hit the irrigation system is
to respectively hit the agricultural economy of North Vietnam.
In addition, the urban formation alongside the rivers in Northern Viet‐
nam has made it to be frequently exposed to the risk of flooding. Mean‐
while, the dyke system in this area was only able to maintain the level of
water stability, but not always safe enough when the incident occurs. So,
attacking the main dyke system is to force the North permanently to face
the risk of flooding. At a certain limit, the American military activities did
not only aim at suppressing the economic potential of North Vietnam and
hindered its assistance to South Vietnam but also really targeted at the
spirit and will of Northern people, thereby to reduce the prestige of the
Vietnamese Labor Party in the population.
To sum up, the attacks of US air and naval forces on irrigation and dyke
systems in North Vietnam caused serious consequences. These conse‐
quences made the task of water management in the North Vietnam more
and more difficult. The risk of floods and natural disasters become a fre‐
quent threat, and the agricultural production in the North was severely af‐
fected, resulting in a significant decline in production, area and productivi‐
ty. This created a certain impact on the spirit of the Northern people, but
could not sweep the will to combat spirit and production for the purpose of
unification of the two regions of Vietnam.
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Effects of Warfare on Social Environments:
The Exposure of Vietnamese Veterans to Agent Orange and
Other Herbicides
Nguyễn Thị Thúy Hằng
Introduction
The concern about the post-warfare environmental effects began already
during the American war in Vietnam, during which the U.S military
sprayed 79 million litres of herbicides and defoliants over a large area of
South Vietnam. The Committee on the Assessment of Wartime Exposure to
Herbicides in Vietnam, National Academy of Science’ Institute of
Medicine (IOM), issued some reports on the exposure of American veter‐
ans to Agent Orange and other herbicides used in Vietnam. However,
there have been only a few researchers working on the environmental ef‐
fects caused by these chemicals. Vietnam's media had debates on the ef‐
fects of the war for the environment, especially by the already mentioned
chemical weapons. Based on collecting articles about this topic on Viet‐
nam’s media, especially articles and documentary films by Minh Chuyên,
a well-known Vietnamese journalist and writer, this paper shows that
chemical weapons like Agent Orange and other herbicides not only de‐
stroyed and intoxicated environment and rural population in the South but
also damaged the health and future of an entire generation of Vietnamese
combatants.
What are the environmental effects of chemical warfare? What harm
Agent Orange and other herbicides like Agent White and Agent Blue in‐
flicted on American and Vietnamese soldiers and on the rural and urban
population? Ironically, this important issue had until recently mainly be re‐
searched for the natural environment and for American soldiers. Already
in 1974, the National Research Council had conducted a study about the
effects of herbicides in South Vietnam. In 1982, the Office of Air Force
History also studied the involvement of the American Air Force in the
spraying from 1961 until 1971. In the same year, 1982, Paul Frederick Ce‐
cil published Herbicidal Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in Vietnam.
The History Institute of Medicine had also evaluated the exposure of
1.
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American veterans to Agent Orange and other herbicides in 1997 and
2003.1 The usage extent and patterns of toxic agents as well as the expo‐
sures of ground troops was researched by some authors as Stellman and
Young et al.2 The problem however is: Not only American veterans, both
Air Force and ground troops, but also Vietnamese people, including veter‐
ans and non-combatants, were effected by spraying, even to a far higher
degree than American soldiers. However, their interests were advocated
not sufficiently in the beginning, and there was not enough research to
base their claims on scientific evidence. Therefore, this paper tries to fill a
gap: it focuses on the effects of chemical warfare on Vietnamese veterans,
combatants who originated from Northern Vietnam, specifically through
analysing Minh Chuyên’s stories.
This paper mainly uses text analysis and participant observation meth‐
ods as well as in-depth interviews. Most of the materials and data were
collated from reports or articles appearing in Vietnamese journals and
newspapers, especially articles and books written by Minh Chuyên. One
in-depth interview was conducted with the writer, Minh Chuyên himself
who focused in his journalistic work on the fate of combatants during the
post-war times.
My paper depicts how the effects of the Vietnam War were discussed in
Vietnam’s media, and analyses the influence of the American war on the
further lives of veterans through the works of Minh Chuyên. The war
greatly impacted Vietnam’s natural and social environments. The toxins
sprayed during the war destroyed the forests, and destroyed health and
lives of those soldiers who fought often for years on the Southern battle‐
fields.
1 Institute of Medicine (1997): Characterizing Exposure of Veterans to Agent Orange
and Other Herbicides Used in Vietnam: Scientific Considerations Regarding a Re‐
quest for Proposals for Research. Washington. Institute of Medicine (2003): Char‐
acterizing Exposure of Veterans to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides Used in
Vietnam. Washington.
2 Stellman, J. M./Stellman, S. D./ Christian, R./Weber, R./Tomasallo, C. (2003): The
Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam. In:
Nature 422. 681–687. Young, A. L./Giesy, J. P./Jones, P. D. (2004): Environmental
Fate and Bioavailability of Agent Orange and its Associated Dioxin during the
Vietnam War. In: Environmental Science & Pollution Research 11. 359.
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Theoretical background
This section aims to provide the readers with the theoretical background
that this paper based on – agenda setting theory. This theory describes a
very important function of media – the ability to tell us what issues are im‐
portant. As far back as 1922, the newspaper columnist Walter Lippman
was concerned that the media had the power to present images to the pub‐
lic. The theory was further developed when McCombs and Shaw investi‐
gated the American presidential campaigns in 1968, 1972 and 1976.3 In
their research conducted in 1968 they focused on two elements: awareness
and information. They concluded that mass media exerted a significant in‐
fluence on what voters considered to be the major issues of the election
campaign. The core assumption of agenda setting is the creation of public
awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media. According to
this theory, media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the
public to perceive those issues as more important than other ones. One of
the most critical aspects in the concept of an agenda setting role of mass
communication is the time frame for this phenomenon. In addition, differ‐
ent media have a different agenda setting potential. Bernard Cohen stated
“The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think
about.”4
Agenda setting occurs through a cognitive process known as “accessibili‐
ty.”5 Accessibility implies that the more frequently and prominently the
news media cover an issue, the more the issue becomes accessible in audi‐
ences’ memories. When respondents are asked to rate the most important
problems facing a country, they answer by repeating those news issue
which are the most accessible in their memories typically the same issue
the news media focused on the most. The agenda setting effect is not the
result of receiving one or a few messages but is due to the aggregate im‐
pact of a very large number of messages, each of which have a different
2.
3 McCombs, M. E./Shaw, D. L. (1972): The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Me‐
dia. In: Public Opinion Quarterly 36. 176–187. Shaw, D. L./McCombs, M. (1977):
The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the
Press. St. Paul.
4 Cohen, B. (1963): The Press and Foreign Policy. New York.
5 Iyengar, S. (1990): The Accessibility Bias in Politics: Television News and Public
Opinion. In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research 2. 1–15.
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content but all of which deal with the same general issue.6 Mass-media
coverage in general and agenda setting also has a powerful impact on what
individuals think that other people are thinking,7 and hence they tend to
allocate more importance to issues that have been extensively covered by
mass media. In addition, media also influence policymakers as govern‐
ment officials and politicians take the amount of media attention given to
an issue as an indirect expression of public interest in the issue.8 As agen‐
da setting theory has been further developed, scholars recently point out so
called second-level and third-level agenda setting. The most recent agenda
setting studies explore “the extent to which the news media can transfer
the salience of relationships among a set of elements to the public.”9 That
is, researchers assume that the media can not only influence the salience of
certain topics in public agenda, but they can also influence how the public
relate these topics to one another. Based on that, Guo, Vu and McCombs
bring up a new theoretical model called network agenda setting which
they also refer to as the third-level agenda setting. This model shows that
“the news media can bundle sets of objects or attributes and make these
bundles of elements salient in the public's mind simultaneously.”10
Hence, the most import point of this theory is that it describes a very
powerful influence of mass media – the ability to inform the audience
which issues are important. The effects of herbicidal warfare on the natu‐
ral environment and on Vietnamese combatants and non-combatants are
mainly known because of their appearance in Vietnamese newspapers, and
dependence on the emphasis with which the media report about the effects
Agent Orange on veterans and civilians and the entire environment.
6 Rogers, E. M./Dearing, J. W. (1988): Agenda-Setting Research: Where has it
been? Where is it going? In: Anderson, J. A. (Ed.): Communication Yearbook 11.
555–594.
7 Noelle-Neumann, E. (1977): Turbulences in the Climate of Opinion: Methodologi‐
cal Applications of the Spiral of Silence Theory. In: Public Opinion Quarterly 41.
143–158.
8 Rogers/Dearing (1988).
9 McCombs, Maxwell E./Shaw, Donald L./Weaver, David H. (2014): New Direc‐
tions in Agenda-Setting Theory and Research. In: Mass Communication & Society
17. 781–802.
10 Guo, Lei/Vu, Hong Tien/McCombs, Maxwell E. (2012): An Expanded Perspective
on Agenda-Setting Effects. Exploring the Third Level of Agenda Setting.Una ex‐
tensión de la perspectiva de los efectos de la Agenda Setting . Explorando el tercer
nivel de la Agenda setting. In: Revista de Comunicación 11. 51–68.
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The Environmental Effects of Herbicidal Warfare
“For ten years (1961 to 1971), the US military sprayed about 80 million litres
of toxic chemicals; 61 percent of which were Agent Orange (containing 366
kg of dioxin) down to 26,000 villages, with an area of over 3.06 million ha
(86 percent of area sprayed more than 2 times, 11 percent of area sprayed
more than 10 times). Nearly a quarter of South Vietnam’s area was sprayed
with Agent Orange /dioxin; about 86 percent of the toxic spray sprayed in the
dense forest, the remaining 14 percent went down to the orchard farms.”11
The US military conducted in Vietnam the largest chemical war in world
history so far and gave rise to the concept of ecocide, the deliberate de‐
struction of the environment as a military strategy. The US Army used
Agent Orange during the Vietnam War to defoliate the forests and to “neu‐
tralize the camouflage of the Viet Cong;” it contained one of the most tox‐
ic substances at all, a dioxin (TCCD) in a concentration of 3 to 4 mg/l. As
large quantities of TCCD and other toxic chemicals were sprayed in high
concentration and repeatedly, the damage had not only the short-term ef‐
fect of killing plants and animals; the environment in Vietnam’s South was
polluted for a long time, the entire natural ecosystem was severely devas‐
tated. According to The Bertrand Russel Tribunal, as well as the 1970
Paris Conference, both accused the US of chemical warfare in Vietnam
with disastrous results: “the war destroyed the environment, destroyed the
ecosystems and the people.”
Before 1956, forest land in South Vietnam was 10.3 million ha, ac‐
counting for 60 percent of its total area. Especially the Mid-Central region,
the Central Highlands, the Southeast, and coastal mangrove areas were
densely wooded. During the Ranch Hand campaign, the Southern inland
forests were targeted the heaviest, accounting for 86 percent of the total
number of spray missions. The mission focused on the forests from the
high mountains to the coastal lowlands, from wet areas to dry areas,
stretching from the 17th parallel to Cà Mau.
The dioxin in Agent Orange contaminated a large area of South Viet‐
nam. 73,000 cubic meters of soil and sediment were polluted with dioxin
at Đà Nẵng Airport alone. Traces of dioxin can still found in the soil of the
most heavily contaminated areas – in the so called 25 hot spots where
dioxin has a terrible impact on the environment and the local population in
particular. Research conducted at some hot spots such as A Sho airport
3.
11 National People's Defense Review (2011).
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(Thừa Thiên – Huế), Đà Nẵng, and Biên Hòa shows that dioxin continues
to affect the health of people living in these areas.
As a preliminary result, more than 3.3 million ha of natural land was
sprayed with toxic substances (with a width of about 1,000 m), in which
domestic forests were severely impacted at varying degrees, resulting in a
loss of an estimate 100 million m3 of wood, especially in the South East
region where over 50 percent of the natural area was damaged. However,
War Zone D, War Zone C, Bời Lời Forest, Củ Chi Forest etc. were not on‐
ly sprayed with millions of litres of poisonous substance; they were also
attacked with millions of tons of bombs and ammunition, leading to the de
facto annihilation of areas such as Mã Đà district (Đồng Nai province),
Phú Bình, and Bù Gia Mập district (BÌnh Phước province).12
The consequences of American chemical warfare have also led to other
environmental damage and biodiversity losses. The process of piling
leaves has resulted in nutrient overflows, and 10 to 15 million bomb crates
accounted for about 1 percent of South Vietnam's forest area, causing top‐
soil to overturn and promote soil washing. The consequence directly hin‐
ders forest restoration and causes negative impacts on watershed protec‐
tion forests for 28 river basins, including:
• 16 basins with 30 percent of the basin area sprayed with poison;
• 10 basins have 30–50 percent of the basin area sprayed with poison;
• Two basins have over 50 percent of the basin area sprayed with poison.
Most of these watersheds have short rivers, complex terrain, many slopes,
with direct currents flowing downstream. Typically, basins of Hương Riv‐
er, Thạch Hãn River, Hàn River, Thu Bồn River, Trà Khúc River, Cồn
River, Vệ River, Cầu River, and Ba River have been devastated by floods
for years.13
Map 1 below gives an overview about the density of spraying of Agent
Orange in South Vietnam. Toxic chemicals were utilized for warfare all
over South Vietnam, from the 17th parallel to the Cà Mau cape, but the op‐
eration concentrated in areas of high military relevance such as McNama‐
ra fence area (Quảng Trị province), A Lưới (Thừa Thiên Huế province) Sa
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Nai, Cà Mau. Herbicides sprayed in high concentrations not only de‐
stroyed the nutrients in the soil, making the soil barren, but under the con‐
ditions of tropical monsoon climate like in South Central Vietnam, the for‐
est was very difficult to recover.
Map 1: Density of Agent Orange Sprayed in South Vietnam
Source: The Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin (VAVA)
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Millions of inland forests hectares and coastal mangroves were sprayed
with Agent Orange many times. Immediately after the herbicides deployed
in high concentrations for the first time, 10–20 percent of the plants be‐
longing to the top floor (accounting for 40–50 percent of forest biomass)
died. Consequently, the low-altitude climate was altered, as the humidity
decreased, and the intensity of solar radiation increased, so that surviving
young trees were also difficult to grow.
Warfare Impact on the Social Environment
The destruction done by the U.S military's spraying of deadly chemical
herbicides containing the poison dioxin to the Vietnamese natural environ‐
ment was disastrous. However, the social environmental effects of dioxin,
the most common of which was Agent Orange, was another tragic legacy
of the war.
“These chemicals exposed almost 5 million people, mostly civilians, to dead‐
ly consequences… The Vietnamese exposed to the chemical suffer from can‐
cer, liver damage, pulmonary and heart diseases, defects to reproductive ca‐
pacity, and skin and nervous disorders. Their children and grandchildren have
severe physical deformities, mental and physical disabilities, diseases, and
shortened life spans.”14
Therefore, this paper also deals with two social environmental effects of
herbicidal warfare as there were depicted by Minh Chuyên in his articles:
Firstly, Agent Orange deprived women who were young volunteers during
the war of their motherhood. Secondly, it inflicted combatants with persis‐
tent suffering from the long-term consequences of exposure, chronic pain
and horrific birth defects for children and grandchildren.
Firstly, Agent Orange denied many women who volunteered during the
war the opportunity to give birth to children. The end of the war and the
liberation of the South very often also terminated their youth. Back to their
villages, partly because of the same age boyfriends became martyrs, partly
due to sickness, injuries, malaria, and the effects of Agent Orange and oth‐
er chemicals, affected women often became nuns in pagodas. Minh
Chuyên has come up with his famous article Vào chùa gặp lại (Come to
4.
14 Mirer, Jeanne/Cohn, Marjorie (2018): US Chemical Warfare: Agent Orange in
Vietnam, Global Research. http://vava.org.vn/us-chemical-warfare-agent-orange-i
n-vietnam.html.
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the Pagoda to Meet again) in which the fact that two districts (Kiến
Xương and Tiền Hải in Thái Bình province) alone have more than 37
women who were female youth volunteers during wartime. During the in‐
terviews with him the question was raised to Minh Chuyên: “For Viet‐
namese women, family and children play an important role in their life,
why did they come to the pagoda?” He replied:
“They entered the pagoda for some reason: (1) the war ended, they survived.
However, most of their boyfriends were martyrs or passed away; (2) many
people were infected with poison and did not want to give birth to children
with disabilities, for example teratogenicity. (3) Because of their illnesses,
they wanted to stay at the pagoda, praying for themselves, for their old team‐
mates, friends, and to do charitable work. Many pagodas nowadays nourish
children suffering from Agent Orange and old people who no one is taking
refuge, such as the pagodas of the Minh and Thàm Thân nuns which nourish
10–15 children.”15
The article Vào chùa gặp lại (Come to the Pagoda to Meet again) tells the
story of the nun Đàm Thân, who returned from the war severely disabled
(62 percent disability). Đàm Thân thinks that her boyfriend is dead. She
has a dream one night: hundreds of soldiers, youth volunteers, and other
people without heads, legs, or arms are sitting like statues, listening to Su‐
tras and occasionally bow down the head as if expecting people to pray for
them, so she decides to become a nun to pray for her teammates.
But her boyfriend did not die, and one day he comes to the pagoda to
find her, and begs her to leave the pagoda and go back to her family. Đàm
Thân must tell her lover the secret that she has not revealed to anyone: due
to sequelae of war, she cannot deliver babies. However, the story of Đàm
Thân is not the only one about the misery of one women after the war.
Many nuns among the more than 37 nuns in the two districts of Thái Bình
share the same suffering, such as Ngọc Hân, Đàm Lộc, Nguyễn Thị
Chiêm, Thích Đàm Nhuần and so on. Injured, infected with toxic chemi‐
cals, they are deprived of the right to be wife and mother. Minh Chuyên is
the first journalist who has written stories about women who have suffered
from the late effects of war and have become nuns. In the pagoda, they
look for relief, pray for health and do good deeds.
The poet Phạm Tiến Duật writes:
“Reading the article ‘Come to the pagoda to meet again’ written by Minh
Chuyên on newspaper Văn nghệ no. 1/1997 made me be sleeplessness. I
15 Interview with Minh Chuyên, 4th October 2017.
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couldn’t believe in my eyes. Less than two pages, Minh Chuyên has revived
in me many flame years with so many lively personal circumstances, the great
sacrifice of the youth generation for the independent cause and the reunion of
the country. Only one of these writings has shown our writers that the topic of
war is not old but also hot with great social significance.”16
More than 20 years later, on Vnexpress, the Vietnamese electronic newspa‐
per with the largest readership, the article The young volunteers who find
peace in the door of the Buddha refers to Minh Chuyên’s writing.17
Secondly, another horrible late effect of the deployed toxic chemicals is
that victims exposed to dioxin pass their health problems to the following
generations. Very often, those exposed to Agent Orange have children and
grandchildren born seriously ill and disabled. Minh Chuyên had a series of
articles on the sequelae of Agent Orange for Vietnamese veterans, pub‐
lished in newspapers and collected in the books.18
He writes:
“The war is over, but the human suffering, the pain caused by the conse‐
quences of war in their body, remains forever. Only in Thái Bình, a small
countryside in the lower delta of the Red River, there are 50,000 martyrs, and
hundreds of thousands of people suffering from war consequences. There are
consequences for three generations. This is the result of people who were in‐
fected with dioxin poisoning by the United States to the Southern battlefield.
A kind of wound, without shrapnel, without bleeding, but persistent, painful
and quietly has devastated their children's lives for several decades.”19
The family of Đặng Văn Minh in Tiền Hải district has two daughters, in
their 20s but appearing as women in their 70s. Their eyes bulge out, the
lips are torn, the skin is wrinkled, the head is big, the head is bold, and the
tongue is always sticking out; people call them aliens. Mr. Minh has been
raising his children for twenty years, but he has never heard them call‐
ing ’Daddy, Mummy’ because they cannot speak. During the war, Đặng
Văn Minh was in Quang Tri, Khe Sanh over 7 years, and poisoned there.
Sometimes he wishes if he died there, his children weren’t like that.
16 Minh Chuyên (1998), Di họa chiến tranh (War Sequelae), 288.
17 VnExpress (2017).
18 Di họa chiến tranh (War Sequelae), quyển 1 (vol. 1, 1997), quyển 2 (vol. 2, 1999),
Hậu chiến Việt Nam (Post-war Vietnam), quyển 1 (vol. 1, 2005), quyển 2 (vol. 2,
2006), Những linh hồn da cam (Souls of Orange) quyển 1 (vol. 1, 2009), quyển 2
(vol. 2, 2010), etc
19 Minh Chuyên (1997), Di họa chiến tranh (War Sequelae), 21–22.
Nguyễn Thị Thúy Hằng
132
Đỗ Đức Thoát, a veteran in Thái Thụy district, was in the Quảng
Nam/Đà Nẵng battlefield during the resistance against the Americans, and
was heavily poisoned. “I couldn’t imagine that the American poison was
so horrible”, he said: “if it only destroyed my body, I could suffer. But it
infected my children; it was so hard for them.”20 All four of his children
suffered from his exposition to Agent Orange, of which two died at age 5,
the youngest has four legs. Đỗ Đức Thoát passed away because of his in‐
toxication.
Nguyễn Văn Thắng’s family in Thai Binh town has two children, the
girl with black and bristly hair, like the fur of an animal. The son was born
handicapped and died at the age of 7. Thắng fought on the battlefields of
South Vietnam and Cambodia, where the United States sprayed toxic
chemicals.
Nguyễn Văn Bâu in Tiền Hải district left the army after 10 years as a
soldier on the Ninth road, Khe Sanh, but the war still followed him to the
countryside that very far from the front. His first child died at birth. 3
more children died at the age 7, 9 and 10. After 10 years, he and his wife
continued to have three children, and all of them were blind and deaf and
passed away soon. He became crazy and begged everyone he met to help
him to find his children.21
The family of veteran Lại Văn Hằng in Vũ Thư district has only one
child but raise it in a cage. Minh Chuyên describes:
“When I stepped into the yard, I was amazed: the first scene caught my
eye, a naked 20-year-old ‘girl’, clinging to the cage, buckling, shaking hands,
pushing legs, screaming, like the gibbons swinging in the shed in the park.
Sitting outside, a skinny woman, dry eyes, was waving hands to motion the
girl to be quiet. That woman was Hoàng Thị Ngoãn, her mother.”22
In response to the author's question: Why do you raise her in a cage, the
mother cries and says otherwise she would have died a long time ago al‐
ready. When Hà was young, they discovered that she had unusual signs.
Hospital examination found that Hà’s blood had a concentration of dioxin,
exceeding the limits by more than 80 times. At the age of eight, she be‐
came ’wild’. Hà did not lie in bed, but crawled around everywhere. She
crawled to the yard, to the lane, into the pond to drink water. At night, Hà
20 Minh Chuyên (1997), Di họa chiến tranh (War Sequelae), 26.
21 Minh Chuyên (1997), Di họa chiến tranh (War Sequelae). (“Nước mắt làng” (Tears
of village)).
22 Minh Chuyên (2005),113. (”Chiếc cũi trần gian” (The Cage on the earth)).
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crawled out into the yard under the rain, even into the water tank. Hà ate
anything that she could grasp: locusts, grasshoppers, worms, crickets,
leaves, weeds, even green potato worms and caterpillars. “There wasn’t
another way, my wife and I discussed and decided to make a sturdy bam‐
boo cage and feed her there, so I could keep her and she could live until
now,” Hà’s father says. He was a soldier who participated in the historic
Ho Chi Minh Campaign, then went to help Laos, living in the forests of
Muong Phin, Xieng Khouang and Chum fields. The Americans spread
toxic chemicals by aircraft there. Four of the 9 members of his squad suf‐
fer from contamination by Agent Orange too. The ‘ghost’ of Agent Or‐
ange haunts their blood, pursues them to the villages, gnaws their bodies,
and eats the ’soul’ of their children. Some of them are insane, they live
like sleepwalkers, some are afraid of the sunlight, all day long just laugh
or cry in the dark, some have tumors in their whole body. It is even more
tragic because innocent children are born from their blood.
Mr. Lê Văn Lớp from Hưng Hà district, a veteran of the Tiên Phước
battlefield in Quảng Nam, had felt fortunate to return to his homeland after
the war, as many his comrades died. But he did not foresee the after ef‐
fects of the war waiting ahead. His wife, a beautiful girl from the village,
gave birth to his first child in 1977, a headless figure, with no legs but
eyes. Seeing her baby, she screamed and fainted. She delivered another
baby, but again gave birth to a monstrous shape. Each time when his wife
delivered, Lê Văn Lớp quietly buried the child. After his wife’s sixth de‐
livery, he became completely blind. They still hoped to have a healthy ba‐
by, and 7th, 8th, and 9th were born. He couldn’t see the newborn, but he
heard his wife screaming, so he could imagine the freakish shape of the
fetus. He cried, groped the corpse sack and has someone buried the chil‐
dren. The pain of losing 9 children drove his wife crazy. Meeting every‐
one, she asked “where are my children, give my children to me” and
screamed to find children in the cemetery. After 2 years of treatment, she
recovered from illness, and thought that the nine stillbirths were her fault.
She decided to find him a healthy wife in 1995. Six months later, Lê Văn
Lớp’s second wife became pregnant. The wife cried when giving birth,
and the midwife said to him:
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“The baby was like a cat, hairs wrapped around him, no eyes, nose or any‐
thing. Just born, it was not breathing then. It is said that you were genetically
infected for the baby, it must be true.”23
The second wife left him, and he intended to commit suicide because he
thought he had lost everything. But his first wife returned, taking care of
him. Even, to make him see again, she suggested to the hospital to donate
one of her eyes to him. Of course the hospital could not do that, but he
was deeply impressed by his wife's heart. He says:
“The image of 10 children could not be human, and my eyes have been sub‐
merged in the dark, many times I want to leave the world, but then love and
faithfulness of my wife, the feeling of my comrades and neighbors are cling‐
ing to me, it warmed my life.”24
Because of Agent Orange, many veterans have no children or disabled
ones. Even more harrowing, the generation of the grandchildren is affect‐
ed too. In some of his articles, Minh Chuyen writes about families which
are poisoned for three consecutive generations, such as the families of
Trần Ngọc Nghê, and Đỗ Văn Cử in Thái Bình. The soldiers did not cry
on the battlefield, but now they cry for the disabled grandchildren.
”I’m sorry my dear grandson. Because of me, you must suffer the pain. Please
sympathize for me. Grandpa went to fight the enemy, when the war over,
grandparents gave birth to your father. Because I was infected with Agent Or‐
ange on the battlefield, your father was also mentally ill. I just thought that
only grandpa and your father bear the consequences. I did not expect you to
suffer as well,”25
says Trần Ngọc Nghê to his grandson and cries. I raise the question to
Minh Chuyên:
“As witness to the pain of Vietnamese veterans’ families, to whom three gen‐
erations have suffered from Agent Orange, do you see how can they tolerate
and adapt to that situation?”
He replies:
“At first I thought how they could overcome. A father in my article said: Al‐
though peace was already there, but in my house there wasn’t a night without
war. Perhaps because of their fate, they have to suffer. There are families of
three writhing children, they still have to raise, have to live up. Children live
23 Minh Chuyên (1997), 73. (“Mười lần sinh tử” (Ten births and deaths)).
24 Minh Chuyên (1997), 78. (“Mười lần sinh tử” (Ten births and deaths)).
25 Minh Chuyên (2005), 136. (“Ba đời nhiễm độc” (Three poisoned generation)).
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in poverty, without medicine, and slowly die. So far, according to the statis‐
tics of the Association of Agent Orange, more than 200,000 children born in
the first and the second generation died, and the characters in my articles,
mostly died. For example, all children in Tears of the village are dead, and
Hằng's daughter in The cage on the earth is still living in a cage.”26
One consolation for veterans exposed to Agent Orange is that relatives and
villagers have absolutely no discrimination against them, but always are
close and support them. In the article Ten births and deaths, the first wife
of the veteran after 9 stillbirths even decides to find a new wife for her
husband to deliver healthy children. When the second wife leaves him af‐
ter another stillbirth with severe defects, the first wife returns to him, tak‐
ing care of the blind husband, even offering him one her eyes. The Agent-
Orange victim in the article Tears of the village can survive due to blood
donations from the villagers and their day and night care. It did not save
his seven children, but soothed the pain of his heart.
Conclusion
It is not easy to return from such heart-breaking narratives to a theory like
agenda setting again. But even in this case, the theory gives valuable ex‐
planations for importance and impact of communication on public and
policy makers, because Minh Chuyên’s articles on Agent Orange victims
set a new agenda for the discourse on the American War in Vietnam’s so‐
ciety and politics.
Minh Chuyên published his first articles about the exposure of Viet‐
namese veterans to Agent Orange between 1975 and 1985. Prior to his
publications, neither society nor government paid attention to this issue, or
even cared for victims of Agent Orange. This changed with his articles:
for example, after the publication of War sequelae, delegates told the Na‐
tional Assembly that some writers have addressed the issue. This affected
social policy as well as public concern. Nowadays, almost all members of
the Vietnamese society have joined activities to support victims of Agent
Orange. Up to 2004, Association of Victims of Agent Orange was just es‐
tablished at national, provincial, district and wards level, deploying pol‐
icies to support Agent Orange victims, then Vietnam Association for Vic‐
5.
26 . Interview with Minh Chuyên, 4th October 2017.
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tims of Agent Orange/dioxin Foundation was founded in 2009. The poet
Vũ Quần Phương told Minh Chuyên:
“Maybe you are one of the first to discover the Agent Orange victims, be‐
cause after 20 years, your findings are just socially recognized.”
Answering the question why he just focuses on the post-war topic in his
writing, Minh Chuyên says:
“My obsession is the fate of many unfortunate soldiers, although they
have fought to defend the Fatherland. That motivated me throughout my
life to write almost no topic other than the post-war, which includes chem‐
ical toxicity, war invalids, martyrs, disabled people, suffering people. I
think it is the responsibility of the writer. If we do not reflect, how can so‐
ciety know the facts which remain in the reality of a part of the soldiers
after the war Millions of people are suffering so much.”27
Nowadays many policies to overcome the consequences of the war are
promulgated by the Government of Vietnam.28 The basic objective is to
tackle the effects of toxic chemicals on environment and people by:
• decontamination of particularly hard-hit areas;
• social policy for poisoned persons and their relatives in so far as they
participated in the resistance against the USA;
• a program of afforestation of 300,000 ha of fallow land and hilly areas,
which are particularly contaminated.
The war is over, but its after effects persist and become social problems
which require be resolved. The damage by chemical warfare on Vietnam’s
natural environment will take a very long time to overcome. But the im‐
pact on the social environment which the paper points out through analyz‐
ing the effects of toxic chemicals on veterans in Minh Chuyên’s articles,
27 Interview with Minh Chuyên, 4th October 2017.
28 Decision No. 16 dated February 5, 2004 on Supporting for households with two or
more people who unable to serve by themselves because of toxic chemicals; Deci‐
sion No. 120 dated July 5, 2004 on Number of policies for resistance participants
and their offspring affected by toxic chemicals used by the United States during
the war; Decree No. 54 dated May 25, 2006 on Guiding conditions to serve as ba‐
sis for considering and settling policies for resistance war participants infected
with toxic chemicals and their offspring ... Especially, on June 1, 2012, the Prime
Minister issued Decision 651 on The plan of action to overcome basically the con‐
sequences of toxic chemicals used by the US in the war in Vietnam until 2015 and
orientations to 2020.
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are another big issue that is demanding multi-faceted involvement to be
surmounted.
Firstly, the participation of the Party and the State of Vietnam in order
to adopt policies and monitor the implementation of social policies for vet‐
erans and their children should be further promoted.
Secondly, the United States, which sprayed toxic chemicals in Vietnam,
should be held responsible for these actions. In the recent years, the US
has donated some funding to overcome the consequences of Agent Or‐
ange/dioxin in Vietnam already. The aid has been increasing since 2007: 3
million USD per year (2007, 2009), 15 million USD (2010), 34 million
USD for the detoxification of Đà Nẵng airport, which used to be the distri‐
bution center for Agent Orange during the war in Vietnam; 44 million
USD to continue the handling of Agent Orange/Dioxin Hotspots (2012,
2013).29 However, the funding is too small compared to the huge damage
that the US military inflicted on the people of Vietnam. Moreover, the
American supports focuses so far on solving environmental problems,
while financial compensation, or provision of health care and social bene‐
fits for victims of Agent Orange are still extremely limited. Victims of
dioxin-affected households have not received any direct assistance from
the US so far. Millions of people are still living with pain and enormous
emotional suffering.
Thirdly, the attention to the issue by the international community must
further be attracted. Developed countries such as Germany can assist in
the implementation of environmental surveys in Vietnam, and help to de‐
tect landmines and clear affected areas, to finance and organize natural re‐
generation as well as to support community health care and further policy
implementation for Agent Orange victims.
Finally, the involvement of the entire society in overcoming the conse‐
quences of the war, both for the natural and the social environment is very
crucial. As indicated above, Minh Chuyên’s writings on the fate of veter‐
ans in Vietnam have affected the perception of the society and forced poli‐
cymakers to issue social policies for Agent Orange victims. To overcome
the consequences of Agent Orange/Dioxin in Vietnam nowadays, there are
still many big problems to be solved – such as continuing investigation
and evaluation of the consequences, searching for appropriate technolo‐
29 http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/The-gioi-van-de-su-kien/2013/23031/Nuo
c-My-voi-viec-giai-quyet-hau-qua-chat-doc-da-camdioxin.
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gies for decontamination especially in hard-hit areas, and reducing the
number of new exposures. Another important issue is how sequelae for
following generations can be dealt with, how aid programs for Agent Or‐
ange victims can be improved, and how compensation can be called for.
All these tasks require more participation from Vietnam’s to fulfil their
important function of communicating this issue and thereby set an agenda.
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Between Destruction and Reconstruction:
The Development of Vinh City’s Built Environment in the
Second Half of the 20th Century
Tim Kaiser
Introduction
The impact of war is not only felt in the natural environment, but does also
affect the human made environment. This impact is made dramatically
visible in the built environment of urban areas that are affected by large
scale destruction. In the 20th century, aerial bombing of urban areas has re‐
sulted in such large scale destruction. During World War II, aerial bomb‐
ing and the destructions it caused to the urban built environment rose to
unprecedented levels. The countries most effected during WWII were
Japan and Germany.1 During the 1960s and 1970s, the cities of the Demo‐
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) were subject to the most intensive
bombing campaigns of urban areas the world had experienced until then.
The 20th century also saw the development and large scale application
of modern urban planning. Such modern urban planning aimed at employ‐
ing scientific methods and knowledge to design an urban environment that
would contribute to the implementation of visions of social change. New
ideals of the urban environment that promised the creation of more just
and equal societies were developed. While some of these approaches
aimed at incremental development, others saw the (re-) design of complete
cities as the solution to problems inherited from the past.2
In this paper, I trace the history of the built environment of Vinh City in
North-Central Vietnam’s Nghệ An province through a period that was
1.
1 Davis, Donald/Weinstein, David (2002): Bones, Bombs and Break Points: The Ge‐
ography of Economic Activity. In: American Economic Review 92. 1269–1289.
Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004): The Strategic Bombing of German
cities during World War II and its Impact on City Growth. In: Journal of Economic
Geography 4, 2. 201–218.
2 Hall, Peter (2002): Cities of Tomorrow. An Intellectual History of Urban Planning
and Design in the Twentieth Century. Oxford.
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marked by the two above mentioned aspects: destruction by aerial bomb‐
ing and reconstruction through modern urban planning. Since the 1940s,
the built environment of Vinh was repeatedly destroyed by wars. In the
1960s and 1970s, the city was totally devastated twice by bombing by the
United States (US). Both times, its reconstruction was to be achieved
through centralized planning that aimed at the creation of a socialist urban
environment. However, the modes and results of reconstruction differed
markedly. While the first reconstruction attempt produced little results and
was short-lived because of the second destruction by bombing, the second
attempt was carried out with assistance of the German Democratic Repub‐
lic (GDR) and its impacts remain visible in Vinh’s contemporary urban en‐
vironment. The history of Vinh’s urban environment in the 20th century
presented here is thus a distinctly international history, as it concentrates
on foreign impacts and influences of destruction and creation.
The history of Vinh provides an example of how a North Vietnamese
city was impacted by war, and especially by bomb war, during the 1960s
and 1970s. As Diefendorf has shown, a study of the impact of war on the
urban environment cannot be reduced to an evaluation of the amount of
explosives dropped on a city and the immediate destruction caused by
bombing.3 To grasp the full picture, such a study has to include both the
pre-war history of a city, as well as its reconstruction and post-war devel‐
opment. This also makes necessary to look at decisions and plans for ur‐
ban development and reconstruction prior to the end of the war. This com‐
plexity creates difficulties in isolating the impact of destruction by bomb‐
ing on the urban environment from that of other processes. However, as
the history of Vinh shows, urban development, destruction, and recon‐
struction are intertwined processes and neither can be analysed in isola‐
tion.
The Impact of Bomb War on Cities
The impact of war, and specifically bomb war, on cities and their develop‐
ment has received growing scholarly attention. Several studies have fo‐
cused on the impact of bombing, regarded as a specific form of “shocks”4,
2.
3 Diefendorf, Jeffry M. (1993): In the Wake of War. The Reconstruction of German
Cities after World War II. New York.
4 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1271.
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on the distribution and growth of urban centres. In one of these studies,
Davis and Weinstein have investigated the impact of Allied bombing of
Japanese cities during World War II, “one of the most powerful shocks to
relative city sized that the world has ever experienced.”5 The scale of Al‐
lied bombing on the targeted Japanese cities was devastating. In total, 2.2
million buildings were destroyed, nearly half of all structures in the target‐
ed cities. 300,000 inhabitants were killed and 40 percent of the population
lost their homes.6 The impact of bombing varied between the Japanese
cities. About 80 percent of the 300 cities in Davis’ and Weinstein’s sample
remained “virtually untouched by the bombings”, including large cities
like Kyoto.7 There was also great variation in the impact of bombing on
those cities that were actually bombed.8 Regarding the mid- to long-term
effects of bombing on these cities relative size, in general the US bombing
had no impact on the relative population numbers of a typical Japanese
city in 1960. Despite the devastation caused by the bombing, the typical
city had recovered its relative size within 15 years after the end of the war.
By 1965, 20 years after the war, the Japanese cities had completely recov‐
ered from the bombing-shocks and returned to their pre-war trajectories.9
Davis and Weinstein concluded that “even the spectacular destruction in‐
flicted on Japanese cities by the US strategic bombing of Japanese cities in
WWII had virtually no long-run impact on the relative size of Japanese
cities. Within the space of just 20 year, they recovered from the devasta‐
tion to return to their former place in the constellation of cities.”10
Brakman et al.11 have followed a similar approach as Davis and Wein‐
stein in their study of the impact of strategic bombing during World War II
on German cities’ growth and development. Similarly to destruction in
Japan, an average of 40 percent of the dwellings of the larger German
cities were destroyed during WWII, estimated deaths due to air raids reach
410,000, and the homes of seven million urban dwellers were destroyed.12
In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), bombing had a temporary im‐
5 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1271.
6 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1277.
7 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1278.
8 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1278–79.
9 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1280–82.
10 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1283.
11 Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004).
12 Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004), 205.
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pact on city size. Its cities showed a tendency to revert to their pre-war rel‐
ative city size, but until 1963 this reversion remained incomplete. This re‐
covery is less pronounced than the Japanese cities that had recovered com‐
pletely by 1960. In contrast to the development in the FRG, bombing had
both a short- and long-term effect in the GDR, where cities had not recov‐
ered from the destruction by bombing by 1964.13
These studies were able to show that even the heaviest destructions in‐
flicted by aerial bombing on urban centres have had little impact on the
mid- to long-term population growth and distribution of cities and towns.
Doing so, they have mainly focused on quantitative data to examine the
impact of bombing on urban centres. They also recognize the role recon‐
struction policies play for the post-war recovery and development of
cities. In Japan, reconstruction subsidies had a positive impact on the re‐
covery of cities. This impact, however, remained relatively small, account‐
ing for less than one percentage of the cumulative 1947-1960 growth of
the four cities that were most heavily destroyed.14 One reason for this
small contribution of reconstruction funds to urban recovery was the focus
of reconstruction policies on rural areas.15 As the study by Brakman et al
takes into account the post-war development of cities in both the FRG and
the GDR, it is able to identify the impact of very different policies for ur‐
ban reconstruction on the post-war urban development in both countries.
The FRG built many more new houses between 1950 and 1961 than the
GDR (3.1 million in comparison to 0.5 million, or nearly three times as
many per capita). The FRG focused on the rebuilding of its large cities
and those that had large post-war populations but where not necessarily
the most destroyed ones. The GDR, in contrast, focused on the develop‐
ment of new industrial centres.16 The permanency of the bombing shock
on the GDR’s cities also resulted from that country becoming a centrally
planned economy, as market mechanisms that furthered the recovery in the
FRG were “no longer or at least less relevant for East German city
growth.”17
These studies on the impact of bombing on urban centres have provided
valuable findings on general urbanization trends and the impact of bomb‐
13 Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004), 207–210.
14 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1281.
15 Davis/Weinstein (2002), 1277–1281.
16 Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004), 212–213.
17 Brakman, S./Garretsen, H./Schramm, M. (2004), 215.
Tim Kaiser
144
ing on these. Thus, we do know that destruction, as temporary shocks, has
often little impact on the long-term quantitative growth of cities, and that
reconstruction policies play a role in their recovery. However, the impact
of bombing does not translate only to quantitative data and studies of the
impact of war and bombing on the urban environment remain scarce.
Diefendorf’s study on destruction and reconstruction of cities in the FRG
after World War II has provided a very detailed examination of reconstruc‐
tion policies and how they impacted the urban built environment.18
Glaeser and Shapiro’s work on the impact of warfare and terrorism on ur‐
ban areas takes a more detailed view at selected cities, chiefly New York
City after the attacks of 9/11, than the previously mentioned studies.19
This view is able to identify the importance of individual urban centres’
particular settings, modes and intensities of destruction, as well as post-
war reconstruction policies for a detailed understanding of the impact of
war on an individual city.
In the following, such a detailed approach is employed to show how the
specifics of destruction and reconstruction of Vinh in North-Central Viet‐
nam have impacted the urban built environment of that city, focusing on
the period between the 1940s and the 1980s. This timespan covers a peri‐
od that was marked by repeated destructions and attempts at reconstruc‐
tion of Vinh according to the model of a socialist city, one of the ideals
modern urban planning has produced in the 20th century. The study is
based on archival research in Vietnam (at the National Archives Centre 3,
Hanoi and the Archives of the People’s Committee of Nghệ An Province,
Vinh) and Germany (at the Federal Archives, Berlin) carried out in
2010-2012.20 The following sections first present the general picture of the
impact of the American War on cities in Vietnam, afterwards, the paper
turns to the reconstruction efforts that aimed at creating a socialist urban
environment in Vinh. Finally, the paper argues that because of the very di‐
verse war-time experience of Vietnamese cities, a comparative approach is
necessary for a complete understanding of the impact of the war on Viet‐
nam’s urban centres.
18 Diefendorf (1993).
19 Glaeser, Edward/Shapiro, Jesse (2001): Cities and Warfare. The Impact of Terror‐
ism on Urban Form. Discussion Paper Number 1942. Cambridge.
20 Archival sources are cited here as they appear in the original. Therefore, where the
original document is written without diacritics, these are also lacking in the cita‐
tion provided here.
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The Bomb War in North Vietnam
The US dropped about 2,000,000 tons of all kind of air ordnance during
WWII, and about 1,000,000 tons during the Korean War. Yet, in Indochi‐
na, they had dropped a total of about 6,300,000 by the year 1971 alone.21
Already by 1969, the amount of explosives dropped in Indochina had
reached an average of “70 tons of bombs for every square mile of Vietnam
and about 500 pounds of explosives for every man, woman and child in
the country.”22 In total, during the 10 years of air war (1964-1973) US
forces dropped a total of 7,662,000 tons of ordnance in Southeast Asia.23
However, bombing was very unequally distributed, with the largest
amount dropped over the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) in the South, and a
much smaller percentage dropped on the DRV in the North, where the city
of Vinh was located.24
In the whole period of US involvement in Vietnam, only 22 percent of
air war sorties were flown over the DRV while 45 percent took place over
the RoV.25 During 1968 and 1969, nearly 1,000,000 tons of ordnance was
dropped in the RoV annually, five times the maximum annual amount
dropped on the DRV until then. Bombing in the DRV and the RoV did not
only differ regarding the amount of explosives dropped, but also in the
strategies, tactics, and targets. In contrast to the bombing of the DRV,
which will be described in more detail below, bombing in the RoV did not
focus on industrial targets or urban areas,26 but was concentrated on “in‐
terdiction, harassment, and sometimes reprisal” with “area saturation
bombing” common in sparsely populated rural areas used by the NLF/
NVA,27 as well as close air support during ground battles.28 Consequently,
the impact of the war on cities was different in the RoV. While in the DRV,
3.
21 Littauer, Raphael/Uphoff, Norman Thomas (eds.) (1972): The Air War in Indochi‐
na. Boston. 9.
22 Thayer, Thomas C. (1985): War without Fronts. The American Experience in Viet‐
nam. Boulder. 79.
23 Clodfelter, Micheal (1995): Vietnam in Military Statistics. A History of the In‐
dochina Wars, 1772–1991. Jefferson. 21.
24 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 168.
25 Thayer (1985), 81.
26 However, “During the fighting which followed the Tet offensive of 1968, tactical
air strikes extended even into the cities themselves“.Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 11.
27 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 10.
28 Thayer (1985), 83–86.
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cities were evacuated during the times of most intense bombing, the urban
population in the RoV rose, partly because people fled from the war in the
countryside. As a result, the urban population of the South increased two-
to threefold. By 1968, it was estimated, 6,800,000 out of the 17,200,000
South Vietnamese lived in urban centres, amounting to 40 percent of the
total population.29 By the end of the war, nearly 43 percent of the RoV
population was living in urban areas. Large numbers of the urban popula‐
tion were refugees from the countryside (between 1965 and 1975 perhaps
as many as 10 million people were displaced, representing about 47 per‐
cent of the population of the RoV). In an extreme case, the population of
Đà Ne p (the RoV’s second largest city) rose by 21.1 percent (58,300) in
only one year (1967-1968) as a result of the Tet offensive. In addition to
many war-displaced refugees, urban growths was to a large extend due to
regular rural-urban migration.30
Bombing of the DRV: The Rolling Thunder, 1965-68, and Linebacker,
1972, Campaigns
From early 1964 on, the US government had sped up planning for air op‐
erations against the DRV.31 In August that year the two first air strikes on
the DRV were carried out as a reprisal for the “Tonkin incident”.32 Yet, as
retaliatory strikes did not deter the DRV from its goal to achieve unifica‐
tion of Vietnam by military means, planning by the US turned to a sus‐
tained, gradually increasing air war campaign against the DRV.33 This
campaign, named Rolling Thunder, began in early 1965 and lasted until
November 1968. It was thus the “longest sustained strategic air bombard‐
ment in history”.34 The campaign aimed at a number of goals:
“In keeping with the thinking that Hanoi was not only providing men and lo‐
gistic support for the NLF but was also effectively directing their operations,
it was assumed that this air attack would help to win the war in the South. The
4.
29 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 63.
30 Thrift, Nigel/Forbes, Dean (1986): The Price of War. Urbanization in Vietnam
1954–85. London. 123.
31 Clodfelter, Mark (1989): The limits of air power. The American Bombing of North
Vietnam. New York. 45.
32 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 36–37.
33 Clodfelter (1989), 53–57.
34 Clodfelter (1989), 218.
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direct aims were to pressure Hanoi into withdrawing its support of the NLF,
to cripple the strategic industries within North Vietnam (of which there were
few), and to interrupt the lines of communication along which supplies were
moving south. Another aim was to strengthen the morale of pro-government
forces in South Vietnam by demonstrating the depths of the US commitment
to the struggle.”35
These goals translated into different targets: military targets; the trans‐
portation system; petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage facilities;
power plants; production facilities.36 The Rolling Thunder campaign was
severely constricted by political considerations, including fear of drawing
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the war and escalating the con‐
flict to a global scale. Initially, a 30 mile radius around Hanoi and a 10
mile radius around Haiphong were specifically excluded from bombing.
Targets were selected in Washington and had to be approved by the Office
of the Secretary of Defence, the Department of State, and the White
House. Washington also insisted that the numbers of civilian casualties be
kept as low as possible. These considerations prevented actions that might
have been undertaken if only military considerations were followed, for
example the bombing of dikes, air strikes close to the Chinese border, or
the mining of Haiphong harbour.37
In total, 643,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the DRV during
Rolling Thunder, it was estimated that the campaign destroyed 77 percent
of the DRV’s ammunition depots, 65 percent of its POL storage, 59 per‐
cent of its power plants, 55 percent of the major bridges, 39 percent of the
railroad shops, 12,521 vessels, 9,821 motor vehicles, as well as 1,966 rail‐
road cars and engines.38 Even though the major urban centres Hanoi and
Haiphong were initially excluded from bombing and later on only relative‐
ly few targets were attacked in these areas, other cities suffered large scale
destruction: “Reports indicate that the cities of Dong Hoi, Ninh Binh, Phu
Ly, Bac Giang, Yen Bai, and Son La were virtually levelled. Serious dam‐
age was sustained in the larger cities such as Nam Dinh, Thai Nguyen, Vi‐
et Tri and Vinh.”39 Despite the intention to limit civilian casualties, 80 per‐
cent of the 36,000 casualties of 1965-66 alone were civilians.40 In total,
35 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 12.
36 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 39–43.
37 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 37–40. Clodfelter (1989), 43–44.
38 Clodfelter (1989), 221–222.
39 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 47.
40 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 48.
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“about 52,000 North Vietnamese civilians were slain by Rolling Thun‐
der.”41
Despite this massive destruction and the human and economic costs it
inflicted, it was judged that this had had no impact on the DRV’s resolve
and capabilities to continue the war, since “the damage […] was more
than offset by military and economic aid from China and the USSR, […]
even a small portion of the transportation and trail system to the South was
sufficient to maintain an adequate flow of men and material, and […] the
North Vietnamese possessed a more than adequate supply of manpower
for repair, reconstruction and work on the [Ho Chi Minh, added by author]
Trail”.42 Furthermore, the population of the DRV was quick to rebuild the
damage caused by bombing in its urban centres. By 1971, many houses
had been rebuilt by private initiative.43
In October 1968, US President Johnson ordered the end of Rolling
Thunder to turn to negotiations with the DRV government.44 Yet, after the
Rolling Thunder campaign officially ended in November that year, the US
continued bombing of the DRV on a smaller scale, “mostly near the De‐
militarized Zone and at the entrances to the Ho Chi Minh trail.”45 This li‐
mited air campaign continued until April 1972. Negotiations between the
US and the DRV, however, came to a stop in late 1971. By then, the US’s
goals under the new President Nixon were much more limited than in the
1960s under Johnson and now focused on a peace with honour that would
entail a withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam without immediate
victory of the DRV and the National Liberation Front (NLF).46 According‐
ly, Nixon’s’ “Vietnamization”47 policy had included the withdrawal of per‐
sonnel and equipment necessary for air war. However, the DRV’s offen‐
sive beginning on March 30th 1972 prompted a return of large numbers of
aircraft and personnel that contributed to the failure of the offensive. In
addition to attacking DRV/NLF forces in the South, air strikes, were also
41 Clodfelter (1995), 222.
42 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 46–48.
43 Smith, John T. (1998): The Linebacker Raids. The Bombing of North Vietnam,
1972. London. 156.
44 Clodfelter (1989), 147.
45 Littauer/Uphoff (1972), 42–43.
46 Clodfelter (1989), 147–149.
47 Between 1968 and 1972, “Vietnamization” of the war led to an increase of sorties
flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force from 4 percent to 13 percent. Thayer
(1985), 80.
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again carried out over the DRV and the Haiphong harbour was mined on
May 8th.48
In retaliation for the North Vietnamese offensive, Linebacker I (May –
October 1972) subjected the DRV to “extremely heavy bombing in an at‐
tempt to change the North’s policy towards South Vietnam.”49 Nixon pub‐
licly described the goals of the new campaign as “(a) to reduce the sup‐
plies being imported into North Vietnam; (b) to destroy the existing mili‐
tary supplies in North Vietnam: and (c) to stop or interdict the flow of
troops and material from the North to the battlefields in the South.”50 In
general, the Linebacker I campaign was very similar to the Rolling Thun‐
der campaign in terms of overall strategy and targets attacked.51 As a con‐
sequence of the campaign’s goals, attacks focused on the transport sys‐
tem52 and military targets. Similar to the earlier campaign, bombing was
initially prohibited within a 30 mile strip next to the Chinese border as
well as within a 10 mile radius around both Hanoi and Haiphong. How‐
ever, political control was much lessened. Washington was much less in‐
volved in the selection of targets; responsibility and decision making pow‐
er of local commanders was much greater than during Rolling Thunder.53
The Linebacker I campaign led to bombing even more intense than
Rolling Thunder. In the seven month April to October 1972, 155,548 tons
of bombs were dropped on the DRV. This was one-fourth of the amount
dropped during the more than three years of Rolling Thunder. Additional‐
ly, new weapon systems made bombing more effective and damaging and
the turn to conventional warfare by the DRV made it more vulnerable to
air attacks.54 In addition to Haiphong harbour other northern harbours
were mined, therefore “between May and December no merchant ships
were able to use any North Vietnamese port.”55 The Linebacker I attacks
destroyed most of the electric power capacities, so that in Hanoi only mili‐
tary facilities could receive power. Between 20 and 40 percent of the city’s
48 Smith (1998).
49 Smith (1998), 7.
50 Smith (1998), 60.
51 Clodfelter (1989), 148. The same targets were attacked because “by 1971 most of
the damage had been repaired and industry was working again with the help of aid
from the Soviet Union and China.” Smith (1998), 47.
52 Smith (1998), 77.
53 Clodfelter (1989), 163–164.
54 Clodfelter (1989), 166–173.
55 Smith (1998), 76.
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inhabitants were evacuated.56 The damage caused by bombing as well as
the failed 1972 offensive and the unfavourable conditions in the ground
war in the RoV compelled the DRV leadership to return to negotiations.
The DRV and the US agreed on a settlement in October 1972 and Nixon
stopped the Linebacker I campaign on the 23rd of that month. However,
the RoV government did not agree to the agreement’s terms. The DRV, in
turn, did not agree to changes demanded by the RoV.57 Convinced of the
Linebacker campaign’s contribution to force the DRV to compromise, the
US again turned to bombing to force the North Vietnamese to a settlement.
The new bombing campaign was named Linebacker II.
“The December 1972 Linebacker campaign, however, differed from its name‐
sake in how it was to attain ‘peace with honour.’ Nixon had intended
Linebacker I to accomplish his objective by wrecking North Vietnam’s war-
making capacity; he intended Linebacker II to destroy the North’s will to fight
while demonstrating to [RoV president] Thieu that America would remain
committed to Southern independence.”58
Between the 18th and the 29th December, 36,452 tons of ordnance was
dropped on the DRV in the Linebacker II campaign.59 It was thus the
“most concentrated bombing campaign inflicted on any country up until
that time.”60 Targets included air defence installations and oil storage fa‐
cilities, as well as the electricity and transport networks. Destruction was
so heavy that for example in Haiphong, no targets remained to be attacked
on the December 27th. Because of the location of many targets in the ur‐
ban centres of Hanoi and Haiphong, 1,318 civilians were killed in Hanoi
and 305 in Haiphong despite evacuations. In contrast to earlier bombing,
the psychological impact on the urban populations was intense.61
On December 26th, the heaviest Linebacker II attack was carried out.
On the morning of the next day, the DRV leadership agreed to resume
talks with the US in January 1973. Nixon, in turn, ordered a stop to all
bombing north of the 20th parallel on the 29th. In late January 1973, the
DRV and the US signed the Paris Peace Accords. According to Clodfelter,
the Linebacker II campaign had contributed to the settlement, but other
56 Clodfelter (1989), 167.
57 Clodfelter (1989), 170–176.
58 Clodfelter (1989), 176. See also Smith (1998), 118.
59 Clodfelter (1989), 224.
60 Smith (1998), 7.
61 Clodfelter (1989), 189–195.
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factors also impacted the decision by both the DRV and the RoV to agree
to its provisions.62
Mid- to Long-Term Effects of Bombing in Vietnam
The bombing campaigns over the DRV resulted in the heaviest bombing
the world had seen until then. In this light, surprisingly few studies of the
mid- to long-term effects of the war in general and bombing in particular
on Vietnam’s urban centres have so far been carried out. The study by
Miguel and Roland63 on the long-term impact of bombing in Vietnam fo‐
cusses on a wide set of variables: physical capital, human capital, popula‐
tion, poverty rates, and consumption. It found that for urban districts in
North Vietnam, the effect of bombing on poverty (measured in 1999) was
negative, possibly because of government policies assisting heavily
bombed areas.64 They further found that by 2002 “living standards in the
provinces that bore the brunt of the US assault are largely indistinguish‐
able from other areas.”65 Regarding physical infrastructure, they found a
positive relationship between bombing intensity and 1999 access to elec‐
tricity, which they also explain by post-war policy choices.66 Bombing in‐
tensity is also not related to post-war district population densities, reveal‐
ing that bombing had, if any, only a very short-term impact on district
population densities. The study’s interpretation is that most displaced
households simply returned to their home areas once the conflict had end‐
ed. This was possible because of the “elaborate responses” to intense
bombing, “including hiding for extended periods in […] bomb shelters
and in underground tunnels.”67
In sum, the study by Miguel and Roland found no robust long-run im‐
pacts of US bombing on local poverty rates, consumption levels, or popu‐
lation density in Vietnam over 25 years after the end of the American
War.68 Opening their study with the assumption that institutions that influ‐
5.
62 Clodfelter (1989), 188–201.
63 Miguel, Edward/Roland, Gérard (2011): The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Viet‐
nam. In: Journal of Development Economics 96, 1. 1–15.
64 Miguel/Roland (2011), 9.
65 Miguel/Roland (2011), 10.
66 Miguel/Roland (2011), 10.
67 Miguel/Roland (2011), 12.
68 Miguel/Roland (2011), 14.
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ence the long-term impact of bombing are very country specific, they con‐
sequently attribute the absence of long-term impact of bombing on inter-
regional economic divergence partly to “ingenious strategies employed by
the North Vietnamese to limit the damage to physical infrastructure […]
especially in urban areas;” and to the “major Vietnamese government re‐
construction effort after the war.”69
Thrift and Forbes have studied the patterns of Vietnamese urbanization
between 1954 and 1985. They found that “between 1954 and 1976, allow‐
ing for the very unusual circumstances pertaining during the period of the
Second Indochina War, overall percentage urban population growth was
very slow. However, […] this slow percentage rate of growth conceals a
quite significant absolute increase. In absolute terms, the urban population
all but doubled.”70 They attribute this development to the „particular his‐
torical combination of the state, the economy and civil society in the
Democratic Republic“, as well as the “particular form and style of man‐
agement of the North Vietnamese urban system”.71 Looking at this period
in more detail, they found that heavy bombing during the war led to a de‐
cline of the urban population between 1965 and 1973. This was due to di‐
rect and indirect effects of bombing. The major direct effect was the de‐
struction caused by bombing. Targets included the major cities Hanoi and
Haiphong as well as the main industrial centres of the DRV. Of the 28
bombed provincial capitals, 12 “were razed to the ground.” As an indirect
effect, over 500,000 people were evacuated from urban areas and indus‐
tries were dispersed to the countryside. Despite the devastation caused by
bombing in urban centres, the urban system quickly re-adjusted once
bombing stopped. The overall urban population of the DRV in 1974 was
larger than that in 1965.72 Because bombing had destroyed living space
(one source claims that almost one quarter of all living space in Hanoi was
destroyed), the return of evacuees caused severe overcrowding. The hous‐
ing shortage continued well into the 1980s.73
Miguel and Roland’s argument for the importance of country specific
institutions for an understanding of long-term war impact can be extended
to argue that regarding the long-term impact of bombing on individual
69 Miguel/Roland (2011), 10–11.
70 Thrift/Forbes (1986), 88.
71 Thrift/Forbes (1986), 87.
72 Thrift/Forbes (1986), 96–97.
73 Thrift/Forbes (1986), 148–151.
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cities, institutions and policies impacting post-war urban development are
not only country-specific, but city-specific. Similarly, their argument for
“the accumulation of evidence across many settings” to “create a convinc‐
ing picture of war’s long-run economic effects” can be modified to pro‐
pose that to paint a detailed picture of the impact of war on the urban envi‐
ronment of a particular city, a localized investigation of the destruction
caused by bombing as well as of the policies and processes of post-war ur‐
ban development is necessary. Taking up these arguments, the following
section provides the case study of Vinh City as a detailed example of the
impacts of destruction and reconstruction on the built environment of a
Vietnamese city.
The Urban Environment of Vinh City between Destruction and
Reconstruction74
Today, Vinh is the capital of Nghệ An province covering an area of
105km² and with a population of 480,000 in 2013. It is also the economic,
administrative, and cultural centre of North-Central Vietnam.75 The city’s
rise to this position began with the construction of a new site for imperial
examinations in the area of today’s city and the relocation of the provin‐
cial administrative centre to Vinh in 1803 and 1804, respectively.76 As the
provincial centre of administration and examinations, Vinh came to form
an administrative unit combining different functions and the place through
which the surrounding region was integrated into wider networks of pow‐
er, trade, and information. As the seat of the provincial mandarin, the city
linked the region to a centralized system of rule.77 Regarding trade net‐
6.
74 This section is based on chapter 3 of my dissertation Kaiser, Tim (2016): Transna‐
tional Impact on Urban Change. Modern Projects in Vinh, Vietnam. University of
Passau. Passau.
75 Quyết định 270/QĐ-TTg của Thủ Tướng Chính Phủ về việc phê duyệt nhiêm vụ
điều chính quy hoạch chung thành phố Vinh, tỉnh Nghệ An đến năm 203, tầm nhìn
2050. 31.03.2013. Cục Thống kê Nghệ An (2011): Niên giám thống kê Nghệ An
2010. Statistical Yearbook 2010. Vinh. 29.
76 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003): Thành Phố Vinh. Quá Trình Hình Thành Và Phát
Triển (1804–1945). [Vinh City: The Process of Establishment and Development].
Vinh. 22–24. Chu Trọng Huyến (1998): Lịch Sử Thành Phố Vinh. Tập 1. [History
of Vinh City, Part 1.] Vinh. 21–22.
77 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 24–27, 68–71. Chu Trọng Huyến (1998), 23.
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works, Vinh becoming the provincial centre elevated the status of its exist‐
ing market to that of the main trading place in the region. Additionally,
members of the administration and the military located in the citadel pro‐
vided new and growing markets for surrounding villages.78 With little pro‐
duction taking place in Vinh itself, its economic role was mainly that of a
regional trading place. Through its strategic location at the intersection of
the Mandarin Road and a road linking land-locked Laos and the Mekong
with the North Vietnamese coast, Vinh connected its surroundings also to
inter-regional and international trade.79 Increased integration into wider
networks of information and technology expressed itself for example in
the design of Vinh’s citadel that combined a Vauban-style design with tra‐
ditional local elements and materials.80 The only available population
number for pre-colonial Vinh is provided by Del Testa who puts it at “per‐
haps 3,000 inhabitants.”81
The French military forces captured Vinh’s citadel on 20 July 1885 and
established a residency in Vinh in the same year.82 After the first years of
colonial rule saw little change in Vinh, from around 1900 on Vinh and the
nearby located centres of Truong Thi and Ben Thuy became a major focus
of investments by the colonial state and private enterprises.83 Of particular
importance was Vinh’s location along new railroad lines that strengthened
the city’s role as a transport hub, as well as the location of railroad indus‐
78 Del Testa, David W. (2007): Vinh, the Seed that would Grow Red. Colonial Pre‐
lude, Revolutionary City. In: Historical Reflections 33, 2). 305–325. 313.
79 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 52. Chu Trọng Huyến (1998), 35.
80 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 28–29. Mantienne, Frédéric (2003): The Transfer of
Western Military Technology to Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nine‐
teenth Centuries. The Case of the Nguyên. In: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
34, 3. 519–534.
81 Del Testa (2007), 313.
82 Del Testa (2007), 314. Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 61. Chu Trọng Huyến (1998),
39–40.
83 Del Testa (2007), 315. Del Testa, David W. (1999): Imperial Corridor. Associa‐
tion, Transportation and Power in French Colonial Indochina 1. In: Science Tech‐
nology & Society 4, 2. 319–354. Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 82–87, 101–102.
Nguyễn Quốc Hồng/Nguyễn Văn Huệ/Bùi Văn Quế (2004): Lịch Sử Phong Trào
Công Nhân Và Công Đoàn Thành Phố Vinh (1929–2002). [History of Workers'
and Trade Unions' Movement in Vinh City (1929–2002)]. Vinh. 18.
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tries in Truong Thi.84 Public investments up to the First World War mainly
consisted of infrastructure projects such as streets connecting the three ar‐
eas, other works focused on the citadel area where most French residents
lived.85
As the importance of industries and trade located in Trường Thi and
Bến Thủy grew relative to the administrative function of Vinh, both were
elevated to the rank of separate urban centres in 1916 (Bến Thủy) and
1917 (Trường Thi).86 In 1927, the three centres were merged into the ur‐
ban centre Vinh-Bến Thủy with a population of about 20,000.87 Thus, an
administrative unit had been formed that incorporated the administrative,
educational, and trade centre in Vinh, the harbour and industries in Bến
Thủy, and the railroad atelier in Trường Thi. Yet, the economic develop‐
ment that had led to growth in Vinh in the early 20th century was short-
lived. Due to the Great Depression and the unstable political situation cre‐
ated by the anti-colonial movement that was particularly strong in Vinh
and its surrounding area, nearly no new investments were carried out by
the French in Vinh during the 1930s.88
During WWII, when the French colonial regime initially cooperated
with the Japanese and was disposed by it during the last months of the
war, most of Vinh’s industries were relocated or abandoned. When the
Việt Minh took power in Vinh in August 1945, only the railway atelier in
Trường Thi and the depot by the train station were operational, all private
factories had been closed.89 Throughout 1946, tensions between the re‐
turning French and the newly established DRV mounted and open hostili‐
ties broke out in the last month of that year.90 Hồ Chí Minh had called for
84 Del Testa (1999), 319–354. Wright, Gwendolyn (1991): The Politics of Design in
French Colonial Urbanism. Chicago, 181–182. Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 95,
102.
85 Del Testa (2007), 315. Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 91, 104–105.
86 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 107–109.
87 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 152.
88 Nguyễn Quang Hồng (2003), 196, 201.
89 Hoàng Ngọc Anh/Hà Văn Tải/Nguyễn Bá Dũng/Nguyễn Quang Vinh (2003): Lịch
Sử Thành Phố Vinh. Tập II (1945–1975). [History of Vinh City, Part II (1945–
1975)]. Vinh. 9.
90 Duiker, William J. (2000): Ho Chi Minh: A Life. New York. 346–398. Nguyễn
Quang Vinh/Dương Thanh Bình (2007): Lịch sử Phường Cửa Nam – Thành phố




a scorched earth policy in case war with France broke out; it was carried
out in Vinh over a five-month period starting in early 1947. The city’s
population and facilities were dispersed throughout the countryside. In to‐
tal 20,000 tons of materials were dismantled; what could not be transport‐
ed was destroyed, including the citadel, 1,335 houses, 300 train coaches,
and twelve locomotives.91 In addition to destruction carried out by the Việt
Minh in 1947, the French bombarded and destroyed remaining infrastruc‐
ture such as bridges during the war. Thus, when the war ended and the
Việt Minh returned to power in Vinh in 1954, the city had been nearly to‐
tally destroyed.92
The early history of Vinh in the independent DRV shows little marks of
large scale development projects or the formulation of comprehensive pol‐
icies for social reorganisation of the city through urban planning or design
until the early 1960s. In general, policies focused on the transformation of
the economy and the establishment of a functioning state. Collectivisation
of agriculture in the countryside was mirrored by expropriation of en‐
trepreneurs and the establishment of collective ownership and state man‐
agement of their enterprises in the late 1950s.93 By 1960, 40 factories and
enterprises had been established by central and local agencies in Vinh, the
industrial workforce had grown to 10,000 workers.94 The creation of an
electricity network, including a new power plant, was assisted by the
91 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 48–55. Bùi Thiết (1984), Vinh – Bến Thủy. Hà
Nội. 52.
92 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 103.
93 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 120–122. Nguyễn Quang Hồng/Hoàng Kim
Oanh (2005): Lịch Sử Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc Việt Nam Thành Phố Vinh (1930–2005).
[History of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front of Vinh City (1930–2005)]. Vinh.
159. Chuong trinh va noi dung cong tac thang 09 nam 1961. Uy ban hanh chinh
(UBHC) Nghe An, UBHC Thi xa Vinh. 08.09.1961. Archive Ủy ban nhân dân
(UBND) Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 38, paginated 117–120. Bao-Cao thinh hinh
thuc hien ke hoach nam 1960 va 3 nam. Uy ban hanh chanh Nghê-an, Uy ban hanh
chang Thi-xa Vinh. 09.03.1961. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 38, pag‐
inated 110–116.
94 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 125. Nguyễn Quốc Hồng (et al.) (2004), 127.
Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị/Hội hữu nghị Việt – Đức tỉnh Nghệ An/Ủy Ban
Nhân Dân Thành Phố Vinh (eds.) (2011): Những dấu ấn lịch sử về tình hữu nghị
Việt – Đức thời kỳ đầu xây dựng lại thành phố Vinh 1973–1980. [Some historical
imprints of the Vietnamese-German friendship in the early period of rebuilding
Vinh City 1973–1980]. Vinh. Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị; Hội hữu nghị Việt –
Đức tỉnh Nghệ An; Ủy Ban Nhân Dân Thành Phố Vinh. Vinh. 12–13.
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USSR with experts and 400,000 Roubles.95 The state also invested in the
social infrastructure focusing on re-establishing Vinh as an educational
centre, including a university and two colleges, as well as a primary
school in each of the 5 urban areas (khu phố) and secondary schools. Ad‐
ditionally, hospitals (one built with assistance of the People’s Republic of
Poland), cinemas, a theatre, a library, and a museum commemorating the
Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets were constructed.96 Up until the 1960s, Vinh’s inhabi‐
tants largely constructed their own housing, using mainly wood and bam‐
boo. Such buildings were repeatedly destroyed by fires, storms and
floods.97 As a result of the separation of the country into two zones and
the subsequent creation of two states (the DRV in the North and the RoV
in the South) Vinh became the most important centre of industry and
transportation as well as of education and other administrative functions in
the south of the DRV.
The early 1960s saw the first important decisions for planning and de‐
velopment of Vinh in the DRV. A resolution of the Vietnamese Workers’
Party’s (VWP) Politburo called for Vinh to become a “Socialist City, to
serve well industrial development, for production and material as well as
cultural life of the urban working population.”98 While this quote puts em‐
phasis on the socioeconomic role the city was to play, the call for a social‐
ist city also implied the creation of a socialist urban environment. As part
of implementation of this goal, a first public housing program was to re‐
place dwellings that were destroyed by a fire in August 1961.99 In 1961
95 Bùi Thiết (1984), 152–157.
96 Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị (et al.) (2011), 13. Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.)
(2003), 129–133. Letter sent by the Administrative Committee of Nghe An
Province to the Prime Minister, the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of
Health, and the Ministry of Finance: Trích yếu yêu câu xây dựng Bênh viên Vinh.
28.11.1961. Archiv UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 484, paginated 19–21. Letter
of the State Planning Committee sent to the Ministry of Finance, the Administra‐
tive Committee of Nghe An Province, the Planning Committee of Nghe An
Province, the Office of the Prime Minister: Trich-yêu Câp vôn xây dưng bênh viên
tam thơi. 27.04.1962. Archiv UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 484, paginated 38.
97 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 105–109. Ban thuyet minh nhiem vu xay dung
nha cua trong nam 1963. UBHC Nghe An. n.d. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01
ML02 HS 484, paginated 57–58.
98 Nghi quyet cua bo chinh tri ve quy hoach cây dưng thành phô Vinh. Dang Lao
dong Viet Nam Ban chap hanh trung uong. 28.12.1961. Archiv UBND Nghe An,
P01 ML02 HS 484, paginated 1–4.
99 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 110, 145.
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and 1962, a small number of simple three-storey apartment buildings were
constructed close to the city centre.100 Designs, plans, and funds were sup‐
plied by central agencies, while construction materials were sourced local‐
ly.101
In 1963, Vinh’s status was elevated from town to city, after it had been
designated to become one of five industrial centres of the DRV in 1961.102
By 1964, the city covered an area of 26km² and its population had grown
to 72,000.103 At the same time, authorities aimed at creating a socialist ur‐
ban environment in Vinh. However, this general goal was not translated
into concrete plans for the city’s development before the Rolling Thunder
bombing campaign started and Vinh became one of its targets. On 5 Au‐
gust 1964, the US bombed Vinh for the first time. In May and June 1965,
most inhabitants as well as goods, machines and institutions were evacuat‐
ed.104 As Vinh and nearby harbours were important nodes in the transport
of supplies and troops to the war in South Vietnam, US bombing especial‐
ly targeted transport infrastructure.105 While a number of workshops as
well as the power plant remained in Vinh, intensified bombing in 1968
prompted the evacuation of nearly all remaining facilities and inhabi‐
tants.106
100 Ban thuyet minh nhiem vu xay dung nha cua trong nam 1963. UBHC Nghe An.
n.d. Ban bao cao ve tinh hinh va xac đinh muc đo hoan thanh nhien vu cau c.t 62
thi xa Vinh. Bo Kien truc, Cong ty kien truc Vinh Công trương 62 Thi xa Vinh.
16.12.1961. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 484, paginated 17–18.
101 Bien ban cuoc hop ban don gia cong truong thi xa Vinh. Bo kien truc, Cong ty
Kien truc Vinh. 27.10.1961. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 484, pagi‐
nated 8–9. Letter of the State Planning Committee to the Administrative Commit‐
tee of Nghe An Province: Duyêt khai toan kinh fí xây dưng khu nhà ơ Thị xã
Vinh. 20.09.1961. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML02 HS 484, paginated 5.
102 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 138, 144–146. Quyết định 148-CP về việc thành
lập thành phố Vinh trực thuộc tỉnh Nghệ An. Hội Đồng Chính phủ. 10.10.1963.
103 Nguyễn Quốc Hồng (et al.) (2004), 147.
104 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 167–175.
105 Bùi Thiết (1984), 143. For targets in and around Vinh see for example Southeast
Asia Team Project CHECO (28.03.1966): Rolling Thunder: March – June 1965.
Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Tactical Evalua‐
tion Center. Project Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations
Report. Christiansburg. Overton, James B. (n.d.): Rolling Thunder: January 1967
– November 1968. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces,
Directorate, Tactical Evaluation CHECO Division. Project Contemporary Histor‐
ical Examination of Current Operations Report. Christiansburg.
106 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 187.
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As shown above, even prior to the destructions caused by Rolling
Thunder, the DRV aimed at creating a socialist urban environment in
Vinh. While initially what socialist meant in this context remained ob‐
scure, subsequent planning for the city picked up the most characteristic
features of the ideal socialist city and put them into concrete projects.
These features of the Socialist City had been developed initially in the So‐
viet Union and became influential in the DRV from the mid-1950s on,
mainly through Soviet advisors and Vietnamese planners and architects
trained in the USSR or other socialist countries.107 In the following, the
main elements of socialist urban planning will be introduced briefly.
Many of the differences to cities in capitalist countries result from the
state-monopoly of the means of production and central planning. “The na‐
tionalization of all resources, and the substitution of centralized planning
for the market to develop and allocate them, has obvious consequences for
the city.”108 Standardized state-owned apartments were seen as the ideal
housing form, although due to economic difficulties privately and cooper‐
atively owned housing was accepted. Still, land for the construction of
these was allocated by the state, as were state-owned apartments. Stan‐
dardisation and norms were supposed to attain equality of living condi‐
tions. As the market was abolished, ideal allocation and distribution were
to be achieved by centralized planning. In contrast to a capitalist city, in
which land use and allocation is largely determined by the market, the so‐
cialized ownership of all means of production and the pre-dominant role
of the state in the economy of socialist states ideally allowed for “active
planning, that is the active projection of economic activities (allocation of
resources, distribution of income) as opposed to the passive forecasting of
spontaneous development. […] this is the universal characteristic of so‐
cialist planning.”109 Socialist theory of urban transformation regarded the
plan as the means to achieve politically defined ideals of a Socialist City.
The planner’s job was to organize the built environment in such a way as
to balance different types of land use by scientific means. The city was to
be planned as one, creating no distinction or division between different ar‐
107 Đặng Thái Hoàng (1999): Kiến trúc Hà Nội. Thế kỷ XIX – Thế kỷ XX. Architec‐
ture of Hà Nội, 19th to 20th century. Hanoi. Logan, William Stewart (2000):
Hanoi, Biography of a City. Sydney.
108 Bater, James H. (1980): The Soviet City. Ideal and Reality. London. 3–4.
109 Fisher, Jack C. (1962): Planning the City of Socialist Man. In: Journal of the
American Institute of Planners 28, 4. 251–265. 251–252.
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eas of the city in terms of access to services or the quality of residential
areas.
Among those elements that form part of the ideally planned socialist ur‐
ban environment, the city centre took a special place, because it was func‐
tionally different from residential and productive areas.110 Contrary to cen‐
tres of capitalist cities, where commerce and finance dominate, the social‐
ist centre was to be the “political-cultural-administrative centre” of the
city, the region or the nation corresponding to the respective city’s position
in the urban hierarchy.111 The centre therefore served as the place for im‐
portant public buildings and monuments; main roads and squares were to
provide avenues and place for the staging of large scale demonstrations
and parades.112
The socialist housing complex has been described as the most indicative
element of socialist urban planning.113 As a residential complex complete
with infrastructure the socialist housing complex was intended as a unit
that structured the living environment in cities. The complex’ size was cal‐
culated based on reasonable walking distances, the number of its inhabi‐
tants was calculated on the capacity of a primary school, usually number‐
ing between 3,000 to 4,000, sometimes rising to 7,000.114 The housing
complex served as the lowest unit for provisions with public goods and
collective consumption; the next higher order of residential planning and
administration was the mikrorayon, consisting of several housing com‐
plexes and providing housing for about 8,000-12,000 inhabitants. These
were to include relatively large areas of open and green space, institutions
for child care, education, and health as well as shops and other services
catering to daily needs.115 The next higher unit was the residential com‐
plex of 30,000-50,000 inhabitants, followed by the urban district of
110 Bater (1980), 27–30.
111 Fisher (1962), 255.
112 Bater (1980), 27–30.
113 Smith, David M. (1996): The Socialist City. In: Andrusz, Gregory D. (ed.): Cities
after Socialism. Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Soci‐
eties. Oxford. 70–99. 76. French, R. A. (1995): Plans, Pragmatism and People.
The Legacy of Soviet Planning for Today’s Cities. London. 81.
114 Richter, P. (2006): Der Plattenbau als Krisengebiet: Die architektonische und
politische Transformation industriell errichteter Wohngebäude aus der DDR am
Beispiel der Stadt Leinefelde. Hamburg. Online available at http://ediss.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/volltexte/2006/3041/pdf/Text.pdf [accessed 02.05.2013]. 34.
115 Bater (1980), 102.
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100,000-300,000 inhabitants and the urban zone of about 1 Mio inhabi‐
tants.116 This hierarchy was supposed to provide each urban resident with
equal access to public services.
As part of planning for the creation of socialist urban environments in
the DRV’s cities in general, planning for Vinh started in the second half of
the 1960s. Guidelines issued by the National Reconstruction Committee in
July 1968 formulated strategies for new and re-constructed cities through‐
out the DRV. These posited industrialisation and production as a city’s
most important functions, but also lay out orientations for the design of
the urban environment. Important elements of an ideal Socialist City are
exemplified in these guidelines: centralized and hierarchical planning, the
city as a centre of socialized production and egalitarian consumption, the
city centre as a symbol of a new society and its achievements, the impor‐
tance of the Central Place, housing complexes as structuring urban units,
standardized housing conditions. The general concept for the urban design
was the compact city, in which the widespread construction of multi-
storey buildings would make economic use of space and resources, as well
as provide an urban appearance. Housing complexes were supposed to hi‐
erarchically structure the urban area. A target of 6m² living space per per‐
son was supposed to be achieved 15 years after the end of the war. The
city centre was regarded as expressing the cultural and political function
of the city, incorporating local natural conditions, as well as symbols of
revolution, history, and technological progress, to be achieved by the con‐
struction of impressive high-rise buildings and monuments. While difficult
economic conditions after the war were acknowledged, the guidelines em‐
phasised the communicative effect of the city centre; therefore the con‐
struction of several permanent high-rise buildings in the city centre was
projected for the immediate time after the war. The city centre was also
intended to be highlighted by the envisioned Central Place surrounded by
administrative and cultural buildings. In addition to ideological symbol‐
ism, reconstruction priority was mostly placed on the restoration of pre-
war buildings and structures. Reconstruction would thus focus on indus‐
tries and public buildings; self-supplied temporary shelter was regarded as
sufficient for the urban population.117
116 Smith (1996), 75.
117 Circular of the State General Reconstruction Committee sent to Administrative
Committees of provinces and centrally adminstered cities, Administrative Com‐
mittees of Autonomous Regions, Ministries, General Offices: Trích thông tư
Tim Kaiser
162
By 1968, with the bomb war still ongoing, these countrywide guidelines
had been incorporated into a draft plan for the reconstruction of Vinh by
the Institute for Urban Planning of the Ministry of Architecture (MoA).118
This plan set out most important aspects for the creation of a socialist ur‐
ban environment in Vinh, although following plans would make slight
changes in the urban design and adjust technical aspects, for example on
the water supply and sewerage systems, or increase the percentage of five-
storey houses to be built.119
The 1968 plan stipulated the reduction of countrywide standards for
housing space and the built environment (including space used for hous‐
ing, public buildings, greenery and public space) per person in Vinh’s spe‐
cific conditions. Housing was to be provided mainly in three to five-storey
buildings (65 percent) and two-storey buildings. The city’s population was
planned to be 50,000 five years after the war, rising to 100,000 inhabitants
15 years after the war. For the first two years, its population would be re‐
stricted to 20,000 persons essential for reconstruction and the functioning
of factories and public institutions. As Vinh’s future was seen as that of an
industrial city, all destroyed factories were to return and expand in
Vinh.120
The urban layout of Vinh would adhere to the principle of a compact
city, moving agriculture out of the city centre. The plan divided the city
into four zones: administrative buildings would be clustered in Trường Thi
and along Nguyễn Thái Học road; the area of Quang Trung Street and the
huong dan cong tac nghien cuu va lap van kien Phuong huong nhiem vu quy
hoach kien thiet do thi va lap van kien Phuong Huong nhiem vu quy hoach kien
thiet đo thi 15 nam sau chien thang va 5 nam đau. 01.07.1968. Archiv UB‐
ND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 48, paginated 9–22.
118 Thanh pho Vinh, Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach 15 nam, 5 nam va 2 nam sau
khi hoa binh lạp lai, Danh sách cán bộ nghiên cứu và thiết kê. Vien qui hoach
thanh pho. 01.02.1968. Archiv UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 48, paginated 8.
119 Dư thảo Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh sau khi hoa
binh lap lai. Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành phố. 1968. Archiv UBND Nghe
An, P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated 67–82. Du thao, Bao Cao du kien quy hoach
xay dung lai thanh pho Vinh sau khi hoa binh lap lai. Đảng bộ Nghệ An. 1970.
Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated 51–62. Dư thảo, Nhiem
vu va Phuong huong xay dung thanh pho Vinh sau ngay chien thang giac Mỹ
xam luoc (1970). Bo kien truc. 1970. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS
50, paginated 41–43.
120 Dư thảo Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh. Bộ Kiến trúc,
Viện quy hoạch thành phố. 1968.
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market would serve as the seat for state owned enterprises and banks. The
industrial area would be split in two zones: one close to the harbour in Bến
Thủy would consist of heavy and sea-related industries; the North-Western
Industrial Zone to the north of the former citadel would mainly cater to
transport-related businesses. Each of these functional zones would be ac‐
companied by a designated housing area and zoning was intended to result
in a clear separation of working and housing areas. At the same time spa‐
tial segregation according to employing enterprise or institution would
take place. To create an “urban face”, construction of multi-storey housing
was to take place first along the major roads, such as the road leading from
the train station to the city centre.121
In the initial years, only housing groups would be constructed, these
would later be upgraded to form housing complexes. A mixture of collec‐
tive housing and family based apartments was planned for these complex‐
es. The number of apartments, schools, nurseries, hospitals, etc. to be built
was calculated from standardised figures for the provision of housing
space and public services per person. The number of persons, in turn, was
derived from the planned number of employees of the factories, enterpris‐
es, and institutions to be located in Vinh, plus “dependents.”122
In addition to industrial, administrative, economic and residential areas,
symbols representative of socialist victory would be part of the urban
landscape. At the central square a Victory Monument would be erected; a
Monument to the Martyrs was planned to be placed at the southern entry
to the city centre. Vinh’s revolutionary history would be represented by a
monument to the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets in Bến Thủy. Other historical sites
would be reconstructed buildings previously destroyed during US bom‐
bardments or museums telling of the history and revolutionary past of
Vinh and Nghệ An.123
By 1969 the Institute for Urban Planning of the MoA had prepared de‐
tailed projects (for electricity, roads, water, wastewater etc.) for the recon‐
struction of the city. The provincial Party and state authorities pressed for
buildings such as an international guesthouse, the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet Mu‐
121 Dư thảo Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh. Bộ Kiến trúc,
Viện quy hoạch thành phố. 1968.
122 Dư thảo Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh. Bộ Kiến trúc,
Viện quy hoạch thành phố. 1968.
123 Dư thảo Thuyet minh tom tat quy hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh. Bộ Kiến trúc,
Viện quy hoạch thành phố. 1968.
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seum, a cinema and stadium, as well as the road, electricity and water net‐
works, to be finished in late 1969 to serve the 1970 New Year festivities.
The Department of Architecture was to prevent the private construction of
wooden housing that did not conform to design.124 The system of housing
complexes was further elaborated in a 1970 draft plan by the MoA’s Insti‐
tute for Urban Planning. The timeframe for reconstruction in this draft was
15 years (1970-1985). By that time Vinh’s population would rise to
150,000, these inhabitants would live in six to eight housing areas. Each
housing area would consist of three to five sub-areas with 4,000 to 6,000
inhabitants and a size of 16 to 42ha each. Thus, all housing in Vinh would
be located in an urban environment structured by housing complexes spa‐
tially separated according to their occupation and employer.125
As the above cited documents show, detailed preparations for the recon‐
struction of Vinh had begun during the Rolling Thunder campaign of the
1960s. Actual reconstruction of Vinh started after the US stopped bombing
the DRV as part of their negotiations strategy in late 1968.126 Enterprises
began to return to Vinh in the following year.127 However, as by then no
final reconstruction plan had been approved, reconstruction proceeded in
piecemeal fashion. Efforts focused on the return of enterprises and public
institutions (such as schools or the provincial hospital) to their former lo‐
cation in the city where they were housed in temporary wooden buildings.
Reconstruction of enterprises focused especially on the production of con‐
struction materials. Efforts were undertaken to increase the local produc‐
tion of bricks, as construction continued to rely on traditional techniques.
Another priority was the reconstruction of enterprises supplying foodstuff
to returning residents. Additionally, roads were repaired, focusing on Na‐
tional Highway 1 and regional roads.128
124 Bien ban hoi nghi duyet thiet ke so bo cac cong trinh thi chinh cua thanh pho
Vinh xd trong hai nam. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe An. 22.09.1969. Archive UB‐
ND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 51, paginated 3–5.
125 Dư Thao, nhiem vu thiet ke va cơ sơ kinh te ky thuat cua quy hoach thanh pho
Vinh-Cua Hoi. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe-an, Ban kien thiet cơ ban Tinh. 1970.
Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 51, paginated 17–68.
126 Turley, William S. (1993): Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism. Boulder. 94.
127 Nguyễn Quốc Hồng (et al.) (2004), 181–182. Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003),
198.
128 Du kien ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh nam 1974–1975. Bo Xay dung, Vien
thiet ke Quy hoach thanh pho và Nong thon. August 1973. Archiv UBND Nghe
An, P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated 104–110. Tinh hinh thuc hien ke hoach xay
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In general, reconstruction was much slower than envisioned. Among
the most important shortcomings was a shortage in experienced and
skilled cadres; those present lacked the capacity to comply with too com‐
plicated administrative procedures. Planning, implementation, and admin‐
istration took place uncoordinated, resulting in time-lags and the waste of
funds despite a sufficient number of workers. Although a draft plan had
warned that it was based on experiences from the peace period of the
1950s and 1960s, and not on actually available economic data, overly opti‐
mistic estimates about the DRV’s economic situation resulted in a lack of
construction material.129 Such difficulties seem to have resulted as much
from unrealistic and overly ambitious planning as from actual shortcom‐
ings in the implementation of plans. It became increasingly clear that
many of the structures-to-be-built were poorly designed and not adapted to
local conditions.130
While these problems affected the whole province of Nghệ An, the situ‐
ation in Vinh was particularly serious.131 By 1971 Vinh’s population had
already grown to nearly 54,000 registered inhabitants (despite plans to
dung co ban quy I nam 1970 va ke hoach quy II nam 1970. Uy ban hanh chinh
Nghe An. 23.03.1970. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 19, paginated
32–42.
129 Dư Thao, nhiem vu thiet ke va cơ sơ kinh te ky thuat cua quy hoach thanh pho
Vinh-Cua Hoi. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe-an, Ban kien thiet cơ ban Tinh. 1970.
Tinh hinh thuc hien xay dung co ban 9 tháng, nhiệm vụ quý 4/1971 và chuẩn bị
cho quý 1 năm 1972. UBHC Nghe An. 23.10.1971. Archive UBND Nghe An,
P01 ML03 HS 18, paginated 186–201. Thuyet Minh tinh hinh thuc hien vốn đâu
tư xdcb 9 tháng đầu năm 1971. UBHC Nghệ An, Ty Kiến trúc. 17.10.1971.
Archiv UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 22, paginated 75–76.
130 Letter of the Planning Committee of Nghe An Province to the Department of Ar‐
chitecture of Nghe An Province, the Department of Finance, the Bank for Recon‐
struction, the Committee for Reonstuction: Trich yeu: v/v duyêt nhiêm xu xây
dung dương Quang Trung Trung Thanh Vinh. 12.08.1970. Archive UBND Nghe
An, P01 ML03 HS 50, pagination unkown. Thuyet Minh tình hình thuc hien von
dau tu xay dung co ban 6 thang đâu nam 1971 toan Ngành. UBHC tinh Nghe An,
Ty Kien truc. 23.07.1971. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 33, 296, pag‐
inated 17–20. Báo cáo, Sô kết, Tình hình xây dựng cơ bản 6 tháng đầu năm 1971,
biện pháp thực hiện 6 tháng cuối năm và chuẩn bị cho vài năm tới. UBHC Nghe
An. 24.06.1971. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 18, paginated 152–
185.
131 Dự thảo, Phuong an khoi phuc thanh pho (nội thành), từ năm 1971 đến năm
1973. Uy ban hanh chinh thanh pho Vinh. 21.09.1971. Archive UBND Nghe An,
P01 ML03 HS 52, paginated 30–43.
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limit its population to 20,000 in the first two years of reconstruction and to
50,000 in the first five years), of which more than half were engaged in
agriculture. This diluted the envisioned clear separation of urban from ru‐
ral areas.132 Clearly, construction and administration could not keep up
with the influx of people. Little had by then been achieved regarding the
supply with state-owned housing. People constructed their own wooden
housing, most enterprises and offices also erected wooden buildings, lead‐
ing to the danger of destruction by fires. Because these buildings were
usually only one storey high, space for the construction of housing in the
city was soon in short supply. At the same time, agricultural land in the
city’s surroundings was reserved for the much needed production of food.
While the lack of state-supplied housing could be alleviated by private ef‐
forts, shortages in the supply with food, services, and consumer goods
could only to some part be lessened by the market.133
In light of these shortcomings, the urban environment that emerged in
Vinh between 1968 and 1972 bore little resemblance to the plans formulat‐
ed for the city’s reconstruction. As offices, public services, as well as fac‐
tories and enterprises returned to the city, its population grew much faster
than had been imagined. All of the principles of the plan had been com‐
promised. Construction of housing took place individually; separation of
housing and work place as well as between rural and urban areas was not
enforced. The city’s authorities did neither have the capacity nor authority
to steer urban growth. At the same time, centralized authority at the
provincial level was not able to effectively coordinate the efforts of differ‐
ent actors for reconstruction of the city. While planning had failed as an
instrument projecting urban development, the structures of government
and administration struggled with even reacting to unplanned urban
growth. Hence, a first attempt at creating a socialist urban environment in
Vinh had failed.
As described above the US resumed to bombing the DRV in April
1972,134 and Vinh again was one of the most affected urban centres during
the Linebacker campaigns. Already in late 1971 preparations had begun
132 Even worse, it was estimated that because of returning administrative offices, the
number of inhabitants would rise to 80,000 by the end of 1973. Planning had esti‐
mated this number to be reached about five years later.
133 Dự thảo, Phuong an khoi phuc thanh pho (nội thành), từ năm 1971 đến năm
1973. Uy ban hanh chinh thanh pho Vinh. 21.09.1971.
134 Turley (1993), 141.
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for renewed defence of Vinh against air strikes; from early 1972 on enter‐
prises and offices were again evacuated to the countryside. Only about
3,000 people remained in Vinh to ensure air-defence and the protection of
remaining facilities, as well as to carry out repairs on the vital transport
network.135 Bombing of Vinh resumed in the early hours of 10 April 1972
with an air strike bombing an area of 6km² and during 1972, the city was
repeatedly bombed while the harbour in Bến Thủy and the Lam River
were mined. As during the 1960s, bombing mainly targeted transport in‐
frastructure.136 When bombing stopped as the Paris Peace Agreement took
effect in January 1973, nearly all efforts for reconstruction carried out in
1968-1972 had literally been reduced to nothing.137
In late December 1972, planning for the reconstruction of Vinh had be‐
gun anew with a meeting of municipal and provincial leaders.138 Recon‐
struction was planned to again follow the same plans and directions as
during the period of reconstruction 1968 to 1972. Compared to earlier
plans, the population would increase to around 60,000 people during the
first three years (formerly 50,000 after five years). During the first years,
66 percent of housing would be in temporary one-storey houses, the rest in
blocks of four to five-stories.139 For the second time, reconstruction of
Vinh would follow the ideal of the Socialist City. But contrary to the years
around 1970, the second attempt of creating a socialist urban environment
was carried out with assistance of the German Democratic Republic.
After the Paris Peace Agreement of January 1973 reconstruction of the
DRV and its urban centres came into focus of international cooperation. In
March that year, a delegation of high ranking GDR officials travelled to
Hanoi to assure the DRV leadership of their government’s willingness to
135 Nguyễn Quốc Hồng (et al.) (2004), 187.
136 Hoàng Ngọc Anh (et al.) (2003), 206–212. Smith (1998).
137 Nguyễn Quang Vinh/Dương Thanh Bình (2007), 89. Schwenkel, Christina
(2014): Traveling Architecture. In: International Journal for History, Culture and
Modernity 2 2. 155–174. 162.
138 Thong bao cua Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe An v/v duyệt quy hoạch xây dựng thành
phố Vinh. 29.01.1973. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated
99–103.
139 Du kien ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh nam 1974–1975. Bo Xay dung, Vien
thiet ke Quy hoach thanh pho và Nong thon. August 1973.
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assist in the reconstruction of the country.140 During the delegation’s visit
DRV Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng revealed a plan to assign each of the
DRV’s large cities to one socialist country for help in its reconstruction
and requested the GDR’s help in the reconstruction of Vinh.141 In May, a
formal request was made by the VWP and the Government of the DRV in
a letter to Willi Stoph, expressing “deep trust that […] our people will
continue to receive valuable assistance from the brotherly German Demo‐
cratic Republic.”142 On the same day, similar letters were delivered to the
ambassadors of other socialist countries requesting help in the reconstruc‐
tion of one city or province each.143 On 20 June 1973, Willi Stoph in‐
formed Phạm Văn Đồng of the decision of the SED Central Committee
and the GDR government to aid and assist in the planning and reconstruc‐
tion of Vinh.144
This decision was soon followed by the first visit of a GDR delegation
to Vinh consisting of high ranking representatives of GDR planning and
140 Beschluß des Präsidiums des Ministerrates der DDR über die Reise einer Partei-
und Regierungsdelegation der DDR in die DRV vom 7. März 1973. 07.03.1973.
Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DC 20/4418, not paginated.
141 Stenographische Niederschrift der offiziellen Gespräche zwischen den Partei-
und Regierungsdelegationen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der
Demokratischen Republik Vietnam unter Leitung der Genossen Willi Stoph und
Pham Van Dong im Präsidentenpalast zu Hanoi (1. Tag, 16.3.1973). Bericht über
den Besuch einer Partei- und Regierungsdelegation der DDR unter Leitung des
Mitglieds des Politbüros des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der
DDR, Genossen Willi Stoph, in der Demokratischen Republik Vietnam vom
14.3. bis 19.3.1973. 16.03.1973. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DC 20/4419, not
paginated
142 Letter number 14/Ng-CP of the Office of the Government of the DRV to Chair‐
man of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, Willi Stoph. 19.05.1973. National
Archives Centre III, Phong Phu Thu Tuong, HS 11167.
143 Telegramm des Botschafters der DDR in der DRV: Information über Bitte der
DRV um Wiederaufbau seiner Städte. 19.05.1973. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch
DC 20-I/4/2875, not paginated.
144 Brief des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrats der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
an Ministerpräsidenten der DRV Pham Van Dong. 20.06.1973. National Archives
Centre III, Phu Thu tuong, HS 5590, not paginated. While the reasons to partner
Vinh with the GDR are not entirely clear, Vinh’s role as the most important in‐
dustrial centre in the southern DRV before its destruction on one hand as well as
the reconstruction experiences and the economic strength of the GDR on the oth‐
er seem to have played a role in the decision. Kaiser (2016): 71–72.
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construction institutions.145 A bilateral agreement was signed by Phạm
Văn Đồng and Willi Stoph on 22 October 1973, stipulating that the GDR
would assist in
• preparing the General Development Plan as well as in planning hous‐
ing areas, including individual buildings by sending GDR experts to
Vinh,
• equipping a planning office and construction enterprises,
• training of cadres,
• and rationalizing production of building materials, by providing ex‐
perts, machinery, and equipment.146
After a second GDR delegation’s visit in November/December 1973, plan‐
ning for reconstruction was revised. The city’s population was estimated
to reach 80,000 in 1975, calculated from the workforce necessary for the
operation of the city and its industries, plus the number of dependents.
However, in contrast to previous plans, permanent housing would only be
supplied by the state to those who had to be relocated from designated
construction sites, amounting to 12,000 people who would be housed in
five-storey communal housing blocks (60 percent) and family-apartment
buildings (40 percent).147 The city’s population was planned to rise to
120,000-150,000 during the first 20 years of reconstruction, at which point
the housing stock would mainly (85 percent) consist of four to five-storey
buildings, with a much lower percentage of one and two-storey buildings
(10 percent) and high-rises above five stories (5 percent).148
For the year 1974, reconstruction was supposed to focus on housing,
public services, and transport infrastructure, with the Quang Trung Hous‐
145 Báo-cáo cua Bo Xay Dung ve ket qua lam viec voi doan chuyen vien cong hoa
Dan chu Đức ve xay dung sang giup ta quy hoach va xay dung thanh pho Vinh.
18.07.1973. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 51, paginated 128–132.
146 Hiệp định giữa Chính phủ nước Cộng hòa Dân chủ Đức và Chính phủ nước Việt
nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa về việc Cộng hòa Dân chủ Đức giúp thiết kế và xây dựng
thành phố Vinh. 22.10.1973. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 51, pagi‐
nated 133–135.
147 Ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh 1974–1975. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe An.
17.01.1974. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated 114–130.
148 Tờ trình ve phuong huong nhiem vu lam qui hoach va ke hoach xay dung nam
1974 cua thanh pho Vinh (Nghe An). Uy ban Hanh chinh tinh Nghe An. February




ing Complex designated as the most important construction project.149
During 1974 to 1975, 40,000m² of housing were to be constructed in the
Quang Trung Housing Complex, with 10,000m² in 1974.150 The types of
buildings were chosen from Vietnamese catalogues, allowing for detailed
planning of the required materials and funds. The GDR delegation had
proposed to start construction in Quang Trung with Vietnamese building
designs to ensure an early start of construction and to raise the confidence
of the Vietnamese partners, and the delegation itself had participated in
choosing the building types. Public buildings to be built in the first two
years were to provide services and entertainment; plans for the construc‐
tion of the city centre were abandoned.151
Construction activities began in 1974 based on preliminary guidelines.
Planners were particularly concerned with balancing the immediate needs
of post-war reconstruction and the long-term goals of creating a socialist
urban environment. The GDR experts therefore refused to participate in
the construction of provisional projects, emphasising the need for early
implementation of long-term goals. On the other hand, German planners
tried not to restrict future developments by hasty decisions that would
have long-term negative effects. The way pursued to achieve such a bal‐
ance was seen in “complex planning” that allowed for the start of impor‐
tant projects, such as the Quang Trung Housing Complex, before the over‐
all General Development Plan was completed.152
Building on the above cited plans, mutual planning by Vietnamese and
Germans began in February 1974 after the first members of the German
expert group had arrived in Vinh. Vietnamese-German cooperation in the
149 Tờ trình ve phuong huong nhiem vu lam qui hoach va ke hoach xay dung nam
1974 cua thanh pho Vinh (Nghe An). Uy ban Hanh chinh tinh Nghe An. February
1974. Ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh 1974–1975. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe
An. 17.01.1974.
150 Ke hoach xay dung duong pho Quang Trung nam 1974. Uy ban Hanh chinh tinh
Nghe An. February 1974. National Archives Centre III, Phong Phu Thu Tuong,
HS 5590, paginated 37–42.
151 Ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh 1974–1975. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe An.
17.01.1974.
152 Mönnig, Hans-Ulrich (1987): Industrialisierung ländlicher Gebiete und Erfüllung
von Grundbedürfnissen in Entwicklungsländern. In: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift
der Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen Weimar 33, 3. 126–131. Bericht
des Verwaltungskomitees Nghe An über die Generalbebauungsplanung der Stadt
Vinh und über die Vorbereitung einiger ausgewählter Vorhaben. 30.05.1975.
Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/228287, not paginated. P. 6.
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planning of Vinh focused on two projects: the General Development Plan
and the Quang Trung Housing Complex.
In May 1975, the Administrative Committee of Nghệ An presented the
result of cooperation on the General Development Plan to the Ministry of
Construction (MoC) for approval. It is the most comprehensive summary
of the project to create a socialist urban environment in Vinh.153
In the plan, the central area was described as the “highlight of urban de‐
sign.” It was to be located along the southern west-east axis, forming a se‐
ries of three functionally differentiated zones. The first (arriving from the
west) would serve as a service and trade centre, including the market that
would be reconstructed at its former location. The second zone would be
located in the area of the Trần Phú, Trung Tâm (today Trường Thi Street)
and Phan Bội Châu (today Lê Duẩn Street) streets intersection. As the city
centre, this area would incorporate political, administrative, and cultural
institutions for leading and planning of society. In a third zone, stretching
along Phan Bội Châu street south towards the banks of Lam River, educa‐
tional institutions would be located. In combination with the street layout,
these three zones would form three axes that were intended to structure the
city. The first, stretching along Phan Đình Phùng and Trần Phú streets
from west to east, would highlight entry to the city close to the citadel by a
group of high-rise buildings; its northern side would be lined by represen‐
tative housing buildings. The second axis would connect the “places of the
heroic fight against the US-aggressors” in the Bến Thủy-Quyết Mountain
area with the Central Square The southern entry to the city would be
marked by Quyết Mountain and a recreational park in Bến Thủy; the street
leading into the city would create vistas over the city centre and Quang
Trung Street towards high-rise buildings marking the northern city entry.
The third axis would follow Trung Tâm Street and connect the city to Cửa
Lò and Cửa Hội. In the city centre, a central park would be located to the
west of Trung Tâm Street. The layout of this axis would allow views to‐
wards the Trường Sơn mountain range bordering on Laos. All three axes
would converge on a central monumental square, with the Square of Vic‐
tors at its centre. Designs for the Square of Victors proposed a monumen‐
tal Hồ Chí Minh statue to be placed in its centre. The city silhouette would
be highlighted by high-rise buildings marking the entries to the city, while
153 Bericht des Verwaltungskomitees Nghe An über die Generalbebauungsplanung




an even higher group of buildings would mark the city centre. In addition
to industrial and residential areas as well as the above described three cen‐
tral zones, three large recreational parks where planned: one in the former
citadel, a central park, and a park in the Bến Thủy area.154
The creation of this urban environment was envisioned to take about 20
years. While the first phase of reconstruction had lasted for two years
(1974 to 1975), the second phase would last for a five year period from
1976 to 1980. More detailed planning for this period was part of the Gen‐
eral Development Plan of 1975 and was carried out in cooperation with
the GDR group. This early phase was seen as particularly important, as it
would crucially influence later development of the city. Thus, it focused
on projects and measures that would ensure later implementation of the
General Development Plan. Steering construction activities was regarded
as the most important measure, the whole city area had by then been put to
use by returning inhabitants, enterprises, and institutions. The plan differ‐
entiated between areas in which construction would be forbidden, those
which had to be cleared for construction activities, and areas for provisory
bamboo buildings. Industries were to be located in the designated industri‐
al areas. Focus during the years 1975-1980 would be on the construction
of housing, with the Quang Trung Housing Complex regarded as a model
and experimental project.155
The focus on housing construction during the first phase and the post‐
ponement of the city centre to a later period reflect GDR construction pol‐
icies that focused on housing construction on urban fringes. This strategy
proved controversial. As described above, former plans had called for con‐
struction activities to focus on the city centre, while housing would be left
to private initiative. However, even after the decision to focus on housing
was jointly made by Vietnamese and German planners in Vinh, this focus
was repeatedly criticized. Lê Duẩn, General Secretary of the Central Com‐
mittee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), proved to be the high‐
est ranking critic of the focus on housing. Visiting Vinh in April 1979, he
underlined the role of Vinh as the country’s third most important city. Ac‐
154 Bericht des Verwaltungskomitees Nghe An über die Generalbebauungsplanung
der Stadt Vinh und über die Vorbereitung einiger ausgewählter Vorhaben.
30.05.1975.
155 Bericht des Verwaltungskomitees Nghe An über die Generalbebauungsplanung
der Stadt Vinh und über die Vorbereitung einiger ausgewählter Vorhaben.
30.05.1975.
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cording to him, the city centre would have to clearly reflect Vinh’s politi‐
cal and economic importance symbolized by public buildings, on the ex‐
pense of housing construction.156 Differing views on the strategy for
Vinh’s reconstruction also surfaced when Deputy Chairman of the State
Planning Committee Phạm Hào called for a reduction of housing construc‐
tion during talks in Berlin, without the agreement of authorities in Vinh or
Hanoi.157
The General Development Plan expresses the planning and design ide‐
als serving as guidelines for the reconstruction of Vinh as a Socialist City.
However, it was not approved by the DRV or later the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam (SRV) government because it provided only outlines and no
detailed planning of infrastructure.158 Furthermore, work on the General
Development Plan was complicated by a central decision to unite Nghệ
An Province with its southern neighbour Hà Tĩnh, forming Nghệ Tĩnh
Province in 1976. Thereby Vinh became the centre of a much larger area,
and planning would now have to incorporate the southern bank of the Lam
River, the former provincial border.159 In 1977, a revised General Devel‐
opment Plan was presented to the MoC and submitted to the Council of
Ministers for approval.160 It complemented the 1975-plan with planning
156 Aktenvermerk über ein freundschaftliches Gespräch mit der Leitung der Provinz
und dem Provinzbauamt anläßlich des Besuches des stellv. Leiters des Ar‐
beitsstabes Vietnam beim Ministerium für Bauwesen der DDR, Genosse Gradl.
Angelegt vom Leiter der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialistengruppe in Vinh,
Brambach. 06.07.1979. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28517, not paginated.
157 Information des Wirtschaftsrates der Botschaft Hanoi über den Arbeitsbesuch des
Botschafters, Genossen Doering, in Vinh – vom 28.12. bis 30.12.1976.
03.01.1977. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/26638, not paginated.
158 Information des Wirtschaftsrates. 03.01.1977.
159 Jahresabschlußbericht 1975 der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/DRV.
27.02.1976. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28672, not paginated. Mönnig,
Hans-Ulrich (1989): Industrialization of Rural Areas. A Concept for the Infras‐
tructural Development and Satisfaction of Basis Needs in the Developing Coun‐
tries. In: Schriften der Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen Weimar 75. 3–
29.
160 Brief des Stellvertreters des Ministers für Bauwesen an den Stellvertreter des
Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates Genossen, Dr. Weiss: Zusammengefasste Ein‐
schätzung zur Mitwirkung bei der Projektierung und beim Aufbau der Stadt Vinh
und zum Plattenwerk Dao tu. 12.08.1977. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH
1/26638, not paginated. Jahresabschlußbericht 1976 der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-




for a larger area south of the Lam River and detailed infrastructure
projects, leaving intact the above described general orientation for the ur‐
ban environment.161 However, by 1979 the Council of Ministers had still
not occupied itself with the General Development Plan, prompting the
then head of the GDR expert group in Vinh to complain: “obviously the
partner, especially the Ministry of Construction, still underestimates the
importance of a General Development Plan for the overall development of
a city”.162 In the end, the first Development Plan for Vinh would be ap‐
proved only in the early 1990s, long after Vietnamese-German coopera‐
tion in Vinh had ended and after the Vietnamese government abandoned
the goal to create socialist urban environments.
The second major project that was mutually planned and designed, the
Quang Trung Housing Complex, was to provide an example of socialist
housing, planning and construction techniques, as well as the institutions
and structures necessary for its administration. Its basic design was pre‐
sented to the Vietnamese MoC in May 1974.163 After a number of changes
requested by the Ministry were incorporated in the plan, it stipulated that
the Quang Trung Housing Complex would provide housing for 15,600 in‐
habitants in 2,480 apartments with a total floor space of 65,800m² (ca.
four m² per person). 164 30 percent of the inhabitants would occupy collec‐
tive accommodation, while the remaining 70 percent would be provided
161 Brief des Volkskomitees der Provinz Nghe An an das Politbüro des ZK der KPV
und an Ministerpräsidenten der SRV: Kurzfasssung der Entwicklungstendenzen
und Aufgaben bei der Planung und beim Aufbau der Stadt Vinh. 08.11.1977.
Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28287, not paginated.
162 Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV und Informa‐
tion über die Erfüllung des Regierungsabkommens zur Unterstützung bei der
Projektierung und dem Aufbau der Stadt Vinh /SRV. February 1979. Bunde‐
sarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/29712, not paginated.P. 3.
163 Zusammenfassende Information des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezial‐
isten Vinh/DRV über den Stand der Tätigkeit der DDR-Arbeitsgruppe in Vinh.
25.05.1974. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668, not paginated.
164 Letter of the Ministry of Construction sent to the Chairman of the Administrative
Committee of Nghe An Province: v/v qui hoach đường phố Quang Trung và đơn
vị nhà ở. Bo Xay dung. 28.06.1974. Archive UBND Nghe An, P01 ML03 HS 50,
paginated 163–164. Quyết định về đồ án thiết kế qui hoạch chi tiết khu phố
Quang Trung tành phố Vinh. Bo Xay dung. 13.11.1974. Archiv UBND Nghe An,
P01 ML03 HS 50, paginated 161–162.
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with family apartments.165 In contrast, previous planning by provincial au‐
thorities had envisaged a much larger percentage of the population to be
housed in collective housing blocks (60 percent).166 The layout and the fa‐
cilities of the Quang Trung Housing Complex followed the typical ideals
of a socialist housing complex. According to its plan, it was divided into
five groups (A-E), each inhabited by 2,180 to 4,410 people in six to nine
blocks. Public buildings would include crèches, kindergartens, schools, a
hotel, and a cinema, as well as a neighbourhood centre including facilities
for shopping, services, cultural activities, as well as communications.167
The German expert group estimated the housing complex on both sides of
Quang Trung Street to be completed by 1976 or 1977.168
Intended as a prototype that would fully express the advantages of a
housing complex in bringing about a socialist lifestyle, its function as a
model for the development of Vinh went beyond its physical structures
and layout. The housing complex was to provide an example for Viet‐
namese authorities on how to design, create, and manage an urban envi‐
ronment that supplied the city’s inhabitants with housing and public facili‐
ties in one all-encompassing project. Its buildings were intended to serve
as model designs suitable to the conditions of their time but adaptable to
future developments.169 Furthermore, Quang Trung would serve as a test‐
ing field for management instruments such as the allocation of apartments,
collection of rents, legal status of apartments and buildings, as well as the
administration of the complex. Mutual planning and construction activities
were seen as providing a practical training ground for Vietnamese cadres
and workers, who would later on apply the experiences of Quang Trung in
other housing complexes. As such, Quang Trung was supposed to be the
165 Quyết định về đồ án thiết kế qui hoạch chi tiết khu phố Quang Trung tành phố
Vinh. Bo Xay dung. 13.11.1974.
166 Ke hoach xay dung thanh pho Vinh 1974–1975. Uy ban hanh chinh Nghe An.
17.01.1974.
167 Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị et al. (2011). Erläuterungsbericht Entwurf
Wohngebietszentrum Quang Trung in der Stadt Vinh. 19.09.1977. Bundesarchiv
Berlin, BArch DH 1/28294, not paginated.
168 Zusammenfassende Information des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezial‐
isten Vinh/DRV. 25.05.1974.




first step in a large scale housing program. The General Development Plan
envisioned the construction of 6 additional housing complexes.170
Contrary to Vietnamese expectations, GDR experts did not immediately
assist in the design of completely new housing blocks. To ensure that con‐
struction of Quang Trung would soon begin and the targeted 10,000m² of
housing space would be completed in 1974 the GDR expert group con‐
vinced their Vietnamese colleagues to construct the first four housing
blocks according to existing Vietnamese designs.171 The jointly developed
building concept was planned to be applied beginning with the fifth hous‐
ing block and was continuously modified according to experiences gath‐
ered during application.172 Its design provided those living in family apart‐
ments with electricity, private sanitary and cooking facilities, as well as
running water piped into the apartments by a centralized water supply.
Balconies provided private open space, while the first floor, half under‐
ground, provided storage space.173 The Quang Trung series allowed for
considerable diversity in the combination of different building sections,174
and was recommended by the MoC for further use in Vietnam.175
170 Bericht des Verwaltungskomitees Nghe An über die Generalbebauungsplanung
der Stadt Vinh und über die Vorbereitung einiger ausgewählter Vorhaben.
30.05.1975.
171 Information des Stellvertreters des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe Vinh über Tätigkeit
und Ergebnisse der Arbeitsgruppe in Vinh in der Zeit vom 15.2. bis 31.3.1974.
25.03.1974. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668, not paginated.
172 Berichterstattung des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe über die Tätigkeit der Gruppe im
Zeitraum vom 1.8. bis 2.9.1974. 04.09.1974. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch
DH 1/28668, not paginated. Schwenkel (2014).
173 For floor plans see appendix 2 in Purtak, Udo (1982): Voraussetzungen und En‐
twicklung des Wohnungsbaus unter humiden tropischen Bedingungen dargestellt
am Beispiel des Aufbaus der Stadt Vinh in der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam.
Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor eines Wissenschaft‐
szweiges (Dr.-Ing.). Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden. Fakultät für Bau-,
Wasser- und Forstwesen des Wissenschaftlichen Rates.
174 Appendix 2 in Purtak (1982). Jahresabschlußbericht 1975 der Arbeitsgruppe der
DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/DRV. 27.02.1976.
175 Information des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/SRV zum
Stand der Realisierung des "Abkommens zwischen der Regierung der DDR und
der Regierung der SRV über die Hilfe und Unterstützung bei der Projektierung
und dem Wiederaufbau der Stadt Vinh" zum 30.9.1977. 03.10.1977. Bunde‐
sarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/27193, not paginated.
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On 1 May 1974, the ground-breaking ceremony of the Quang Trung
Housing Complex took place at block A1.176 Over the following years,
shortages in materials and workers, often due to the ongoing war, as well
as poor coordination between different agencies continuously delayed
construction in Vinh, especially of housing in the Quang Trung Complex.
The end of the war in 1975 diverted even more resources as the focus of
reconstruction shifted to the south.177 This situation was compounded by
tensions between the SRV on one side and the PRC and Democratic Kam‐
puchea on the other that escalated into open conflict in the late 1970s.178
China’s closing of the border and war increased the overreliance on Viet‐
nam’s underdeveloped ports, further prolonging shipping of essential
goods to Vietnam.179 Projects carried out with assistance of the PRC were
abandoned or continued relying on other resources. Most importantly, mo‐
bilisation diverted workers and resources from the reconstruction of Vinh
to the armed forces.180
Furthermore, according to a report by the expert group leader from
February 1976, housing construction had never been a priority for Viet‐
namese decision makers.181 From mid-1976 on, SRV officials called for
cooperation to shift to public buildings on the expense of housing con‐
struction. The GDR continued to insist on focusing on the construction of
176 3. Information über die Tätigkeit und Ergebnisse der AG Vinh für den Zeitraum
vom 5.4.–5.5. 09.05.1974. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668, not pagina‐
ted.
177 Kaiser (2016), 100–120.
178 Westad, Odd-Arne/Quinn-Judge, Sophie (eds.) (2006): The Third Indochina War:
Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979. London.
179 Einschätzung des Zentrums für Information und Dokumentation der Außen‐
wirtschaft zu den Importbeziehungen der sozialistischen Länder zur sozialistis‐
chen Republik Vietnam. 1979. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BARCH SAPMO DY 30
17828. Nr. 15/79, Reihe C.
180 Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV. February
1979. Pp. 2, 18. Brief des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten
Vinh/SRV an den Leiter des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam: 1. Besuch der Partei- und
Staatsdelegation, 2. Kongreß über Stadtplanung und Wohnungsbau, 3. Wohngebi‐
et Quang Trung, 2. Ziele für das Planjahr 1978 im Wohnungsb., 5. Film – Filipov,
6. Weihnachten und Jahreswechsel in der AG. (05.01.1978): Bundesarchiv
Berlin, DH 1/28514.
181 Brief des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/Vietnam an den
Leiter des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam des Ministeriums für Bauwesen: Fertigstellung
bzw. Übergabe nutzungsfähiger Wohnungen im Wohngebiet Quang Trung.
16.02.1976. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28510, not paginated.
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Quang Trung to create a completed and functioning example of a socialist
housing complex as an expression of GDR solidarity. Still, by late 1976
GDR experts concluded that the Quang Trung Housing Complex would
not be completed in the agreement’s timeframe.182
By the end of the original cooperation period in 1978, all housing
blocks in groups A and B (planned for 4,490 inhabitants), as well as two
blocks in group C had been completed. Structural works of three addi‐
tional group C blocks were completed, as were foundations of one block
in group D. Only one kindergarten in group A had been completed, struc‐
tural works of one nursery were nearly finished. Works on the school had
not yet begun.183 In total, far less than 50 percent of the housing complex
had been completed during the original agreement’s duration. These de‐
lays (as well as delays at other joint projects) prompted the SRV and the
GDR to extend the agreement for two further years until 1980.184 How‐
ever, during 1979 and 1980, the number of workers at the housing com‐
plex continued to drop, while construction material shortages became even
more severe. Problems of poor construction quality and lacking mainte‐
nance persisted until the end of cooperation. Additionally, electricity
shortages heavily impacted housing conditions and water supply.185
Over the seven years of 1974 to 1980, 21 blocks providing 35,533 m² of
housing in 1,712 units were completed in the eastern part of Quang Trung,
182 Briefe des Stellvertreters des Ministers für Bauwesen an den Stellvertreter des
Vorsitzenden des Ministerrats der DDR, und den Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden
der Staatlichen Plankommission: Vorbereitung der VIII. Tagung des Wirtschaft‐
sausschusses DDR/SRV. 18.11.1976. Bundesarchiv Berlin. BArch DH 1/26638,
not paginated. Information des Wirtschaftsrates. 03.01.1977.
183 Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV. February
1979.
184 Biên bản về sự sửa đôi hiệp định ngày 22-10-1973 giữa chính phủ nước Cộng
Hòa Dân Chủ Đức và chính phủ nước Cộng Hòa Xã Hội Chủ Nghĩa Việt Nam về
việc nước Cộng Hòa Dân Chủ Đức giúp đỡ trong việc thiết kế và xây dựng thành
phố Vinh. 04.07.1978. National Archives Centre III, Phong Phu Thu Tuong, HS
11167, paginated 13–14.
185 Jahresabschlußbericht 1980 der DDR-Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SR Vietnam und
Information über die Erfüllung des Regierungsabkommens zur Hilfe und Unter‐
stützung bei der Projektierung und dem Aufbau der Stadt Vinh/ SR Vietnam.
31.12.1980. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/29712, not paginated. Bericht der
Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam: Stand der Realisierung
des Abkommens und der Protokolle zur Unterstützung bei der Projektierung und
beim Aufbau der Stadt Vinh durch die DDR per 15.01.1979. 25.01.1979. Bunde‐
sarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668, not paginated.
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intended for 8,360 inhabitants (including 1,650 in dormitories). Two
kindergartens, two nurseries, one school, and one element of the centre
were completed. However, mainly due to power and water shortages the
housing complex did not become completely operational and could not
fully demonstrate the advantages of a socialist housing complex.186
While in many cases completed buildings were of relatively low quali‐
ty, they were regarded as an improvement to the overall situation in the
SRV. Nevertheless, GDR experts were highly critical of the results in
Quang Trung, attributing shortcomings mainly to poor oversight and man‐
agement.187 While the quality of work by Vietnamese construction work‐
ers improved over the years, diligence and precision remained below the
Germans’ expectations. Initially, concrete produced in Vinh was of poor
quality, affecting the buildings’ quality. Many installations and appliances
did not fit or were not working well. In addition, once the blocks were
handed over to be inhabited, their state deteriorated quickly as repairs and
maintenance works were not carried out.188
Yet, in light of the described difficulties, the results of cooperation were
regarded as important achievements by both the Vietnamese and the Ger‐
mans.189 Also compared to assistance by other socialist countries in the re‐
construction of Vietnam’s cities, GDR efforts were regarded as exemplary
186 Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV. February
1979. P. 6. Kaiser (2016), 114–120. Kaiser, Tim (2012): International Influences
and Local Adaptation in Urban Development. A Research Note from Vinh City,
Central Vietnam. In: Pacific News 37. 18–22. 20.
187 Abschlussbericht anläßlich der Leitungssitzung der SED Grundorganisation
AG Vinh, Notizen zu Problemen des komplexen Wohnungsbaues Wohngebiet
Quang Trung – Vinh. 30.08.1978. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668. Not
paginated.
188 Brief des Leiters der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/Vietnam.
16.02.1976. Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV.
February 1979. Abschlußbericht des kommissarischen Leiters der Abteilung Pro‐
jektierung und komplexer Wohnungsbau und Bauleiter Quang Trung.
20.03.1979. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28668. Not paginated. Jahresab‐
schlußbericht 1976 der Arbeitsgruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/SRV.
10.02.1977.
189 Báo Cáo Tông kết 7 năm thực hiện Hiệp định về việc nước Cộng hòa Dân chủ
Đức gíup đỡ quy hoạch thiết kế và xây dựng lại thành phố Vinh 1974–1980. UB‐
ND Nghệ Tĩnh. 26.05.1981. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1981, Tập lưu công văn,
not paginated. Jahresabschlussbericht 1980 des Leiters des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam
über die Tätigkeit und die Arbeitsergebnisse des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam. February
1981. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/28517. Not paginated. Jahresab‐
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by both the GDR and the SRV.190 Yet it was not so much the creation of a
socialist urban environment that was held in highest esteem, but the cre‐
ation of modern and effective construction industries191 which were re‐
schlußbericht 1980 der DDR-Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SR Vietnam. 31.12.1980.
Protokoll über die Erfüllung des zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der
Regierung der SRV abgeschlossenen Abkommens über die Unterstützung bei der
Projektierung und beim Aufbau der Stadt Vinh durch die DDR vom 22.10.1973.
05.12.1980. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/29710, not paginated.
190 Jahresabschlußbericht 1979 der DDR-Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV und Infor‐
mation über die Erfüllung des Regierungsabkommens zur Unterstützung bei der
Projektierung und dem Aufbau der Stadt Vinh/SRV. February 1980. Bunde‐
sarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/29712, not paginated. Bericht des Arbeitsstabes
Vietnam beim Ministerium für Bauwesen: Jahresabschlussbericht 1976 über die
Tätigkeit und die Arbeitsergebnisse des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam. March 1977.
Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/26638, nicht paginiert. According to a GDR
MoC report, only the USSR had assisted on a comparable scale in the develop‐
ment of Hanoi. Cuba had contributed to reconstruction by planning and supply‐
ing material for a number of projects. Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Poland, and North Korea had assisted in planning and designing, but not provid‐
ed material aid for respective projects. (Übersicht über die Realisierung des
Abkommens zur Unterstützung der SRV bei der Projektierung und beim Aufbau
der Stadt Vinh. December 1977. Bundesarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/26638). The
expert group judged in 1979 that due to GDR assistance Nghệ Tĩnh’s construc‐
tion industry was most advanced compared to other provinces of the SRV.
(Jahresabschlußbericht 1978 der DDR Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SRV. February
1979. Acknowledging the comprehensive aid program and its progress, Minister
of Construction Đỗ Mười relocated a national conference on housing and urban
planning from Hanoi to Vinh and promoted application of Quang Trung housing
designs in other provinces.(Jahresabschlußbericht 1977 des Leiters der Arbeits‐
gruppe der DDR-Spezialisten Vinh/SRV und Information über die Erfüllung des
Regierungsabkommens über die Unterstützung bei der Projektierung und dem
Aufbau der Stadt Vinh durch die DDR. January 1978 Bundesarchiv Berlin,
BArch DH 1/28672)
191 A further part of cooperation, the creation and upgrading of construction material
industries in Vinh and Nghe An province, in general fared better than the housing
complex, although these projects were plagued by many of the same problems.
By the end of 1980, the following industrial projects had been completed, but
productivity and production quality varied considerably: cement factory with a
capacity of 12,000 t per year; sand and gravel extraction; quarry Rú Mượu; mar‐
ble quarry Quỳ Hợp; brick factories with capacities of 30,000 bricks and 2,000
tiles per year; stoneware production facilities; carpentry workshop; vehicle, ma‐
chinery, and equipment repair workshops; transport enterprise to serve construc‐
tion industries; warehouse enterprise for construction material, machinery and
equipment; equipment of construction enterprises; air separation unit for the pro‐
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garded as providing an important basis for future development of Vinh and
Nghệ Tĩnh Province.192 In addition to physical projects, provincial author‐
ities highly valued the experience of cadres, planners, and workers to work
with GDR experts. This was seen as having considerably improved their
abilities and working styles, preparing them for future challenges.193
While Quang Trung exemplified the best available housing for some,
this modern built environment proved ill adapted to the lifestyle of others.
For many who returned to Vinh after years of war it was the first instance
of living in a concrete home, let alone in an apartment in a multi-storey
building. This resulted in improper behaviour in the eyes of planners and
authorities. The additions and modifications of the apartments, buildings,
and layout of the housing complex, like extensions to balconies or veg‐
etable gardens in open areas, are indicative of the shortcomings that were
overcome by private initiative.194 The assumptions underlying the plan‐
ning of the housing complex had not been realized, such as water and
electricity provision or equal access to apartments. Especially the last
point led to misuse of power in the allocation, administration, and use of
duction of oxygen; ice production facility with a capacity of 3,650 t per year.
Jahresabschlußbericht 1980 der DDR-Spezialistengruppe Vinh/SR Vietnam.
31.12.1980. Jahresabschlussbericht 1980 des Leiters des Arbeitsstabes Vietnam.
February 1981. Báo Cáo Tông kết 7 năm. UBND Nghệ Tĩnh. 26.05.1981.
192 Báo Cáo Tông kết 7 năm. UBND Nghệ Tĩnh. 26.05.1981. Bericht des stellvertre‐
tenden Ministers für Bauwesen Werner Kohl über die vom 1. bis 9.12.1980
geführten Abschlußberatungen in der SR Vietnam zum Auslaufen des Abkom‐
mens über die Unterstützung der SR Vietnam bei der Projektierung und beim
Aufbau der Stadt Vinh durch die DDR vom 22.10.1973. 10.12.1980. Bunde‐
sarchiv Berlin, BArch DH 1/29710, not paginated.
193 Báo Cáo Tông kết 7 năm. UBND Nghệ Tĩnh. 26.05.1981.
194 Schwenkel, Christina (2012): Civilizing the City. Socialist Ruins and Urban Re‐
newal in Central Vietnam. In: Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 20, 2. 37–
470. Schwenkel, Christina (2013): POST/SOCIALIST AFFECT. Ruination and
Reconstruction of the Nation in Urban Vietnam. In: Cultural Anthropology 28, 2.
252–277. 264. Schwenkel (2014), 168–170. Vandenpoel, Erik (2011): Khu tap
the Housing. Hanoi and Vinh. Thesis voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad
van Master in de ingenieurswetenschappen: architectuur. Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, Leuven. Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the
People's Committee of Vinh City: Đình chí xây dựng bể nước trong nhà cao tầng




apartments.195 Furthermore, contrary to its intended function as a model
housing complex Quang Trung remained the only of its kind in Vinh. The
SRV shifted its housing policies in the 1980s, giving up the ideal of pro‐
viding equal living conditions through state supplied housing to all its citi‐
zens (see below).
Today, the general spatial zoning of the draft development plan pre‐
pared with participation of experts from the GDR is upheld. The city can
roughly be divided into an economic (along and around Quang Trung
Street), an administrative (in the Trường Thi area) and an educational cen‐
tre (around the university in Bến Thủy). Industries are clustered in the
north-west and close to Bến Thủy harbour. However, the envisaged sepa‐
ration of residential and recreational areas from work places has not been
achieved.196 Additionally, the basic spatial division into three centres is as
much reflective of the above described pre-colonial and colonial urban de‐
velopment as of the planning of a socialist urban environment
Reminders of the Past: Remains of the Socialist City in the
Contemporary Urban Environment
The ambitions to create a socialist urban environment resulted from the
political orientations of the 1950s to 1970s. However, these orientations
have shifted in Vietnam from the 1980s on towards the promotion of a
“market economy with socialist characteristics.”197 In the official vision
promoted today for Vinh’s development, the most prominent reminder of
the Socialist City, the Quang Trung Housing Complex, is now rather re‐
7.
195 See for example Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the
People's Committee of Vinh City: Trích yếu Giải quyết trường hợp đổi căn hộ
312 nhà C2 Quang Trung. 21.04.1986. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1986, Tập lưu
công văn, 1.–6., not paginated. Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh
Province to the Commander of the Provincial Military Headquarters: v/v xử lý vụ
tranh chấp nhà ở tại căn hộ 222 C8 Khu Quang Trung. 28.08.1985. Archive UB‐
ND Nghe An, 1985, Tập lưu công văn, June–December, not paginated.
196 Mönnig (1989).
197 Masina, Pietro P. (2006): Vietnam's Development Strategies. London: Routledge.
39. Elliott, David W. P. (2012): Changing worlds. Vietnam's Transition from the
Cold War to Globalization. New York. 204, 228.
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garded as a problem inhibiting the creation of a “Modern and Civilised
City.”198
The goal of equal housing conditions provided by the state had been
given up in Vinh by the late 1980s, planning did not refer to a Socialist
City anymore and the socialist housing complex had lost its role as a phys‐
ical planning unit as well as politically and socially desirable living envi‐
ronment.199 As mentioned above, the eastern part of Quang Trung re‐
mained the only such complex in Vinh. Housing supplied by the state ac‐
counted for only 10 to 20 percent of the city’s housing stock in 1991, of
which 75 percent were in one-storey buildings.200 From 1988 on, housing
owned by state agencies and companies in Vinh was sold to inhabitants.201
198 Another reminder of GDR assistance in Vinh, the Thälmann Club, is now re‐
named the Vietnamese – German Cultural House.
199 Report of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the Prime Minister,
the Ministry of Construction, the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Fi‐
nance: Xin phe duyet quy hoach phat trien thanh pho Vinh (1992–2010).
09.01.1993. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1993, Tập lưu Thông báo, Báo cáo, Tò
trình, not paginated. Lương Bá Quảng (n.d.): Thành phố Vinh. Xu hướng tổ chức
và mở rộng không gian qua các thời kì.
200 Tò trình tốm tắt quy hoạch xây dựng thành phố Vinh. UBND Nghe An.
13.06.1991. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1991, Tập lưu Chỉ Thị, Thông báo, Sao
Lục, 57.VP.UB, not paginated.
201 See for example Letter of the People’s Committee of Nghe An Province to the
Deputy Chairman of the People’s Committee of Vinh City. 26.08.1993. Archive
UBND Nghe An, 1993, Tập lưu Công văn, 8–12., not paginated. Letter of the
People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the Electricity Company I: V/v hóa
giá nhà ở. 16.10.1990. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1990, Tập lưu công văn 6.–12.,
not paginated. Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the
Factory for Construction Mechanics: V/v hóa giá nhà ở. 15.10.1990. Archive
UBND Nghe An, 1990, Tập lưu công văn 6.–12., not paginated. Letter of the
People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the Department of Finance: V/v
hóa giá nhà ở. 15.09.1990. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1990, Tập lưu công văn 6.–
12., not paginated. Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the
Scientific technological Committee, the Department of Finance, the People's
Committee of Vinh City, the Department of Construction, the Institute for Gener‐
al Planning, Control and Design, the People's Committee of Hung Binh Ward:
V/v hóa giá nhà ở: V/v hóa giá nhà ở. 12.07.1990. Archive UBND Nghe An,
1990, Tập lưu công văn 6.–12., not paginated. The earliest document referring to
this process permits the sale of apartments in Quang Trung blocks: Letter of the
People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the Departments ò Construction
and Finance, to the People's Committee ò Vinh City, and the Committee for Gen‐
eral Construction: v/v hóa giá nhà ở tập thể. 30.04.1988. Archiv UBND Nghe
An, 1988, Tập lưu công văn, 1.–7., not paginated.
Tim Kaiser
184
The power of a “market economy with socialist characteristics” is rep‐
resented in the “modern and civilized” urban environment by high-rise
buildings combining retail, housing, and office space as well as hotel
rooms, constructed by state-owned enterprises and private investors.202
These buildings and New Urban Areas on the outskirts are depicted by ad‐
vertisement and brochures as “new residential communities that show the
middle classes enjoying prosperous, orderly, and moral lives. […] images
depict a disciplined, largely unpeopled world free from the disorder of
haphazard construction, informal markets, and swarming motorbikes, with
expensive new cars, law-abiding pedestrians, and well-cared-for
homes.”203
In addition to leaving new housing development to the market, Vinh’s
authorities have followed the policy to sell state owned housing to resi‐
dents. Due to its complete destruction during the American War, Vinh’s
housing stock consists of a considerable number of collective housing ar‐
eas204 constructed in the 1970s. When residents bought housing units in
these areas from the late 1980s on, they often acquired only the housing
structures, not land use rights. This created legal uncertainties preventing
many from carrying out costly repairs and investments. As a step towards
the development of a civilised and modern city, demolishing these housing
areas until 2015 became official policy in September 2007.205
Another form of housing that is regarded as being in the way of modern
and civilised development is the Quang Trung Housing Complex. As de‐
scribed above, the Quang Trung Housing Complex did not become fully
functional during the period of assistance by the GDR and long thereafter.
202 Thu Huyền (18.03.2011): Dấu ấn của thành phố năng động. Nghệ An Online.
Online available at http://baonghean.vn/news_detail.asp?
newsid=72528&CatID=3, last accessed 20.05.2011. Thanh Loan (23.11.2010):
Tòa tháp đôi dầu khí. Điểm nhấn kiến trúc thành phố quê hương Bác. Trang
thông tin điện tử thành phố Vinh. Online available at http://www.vinhci‐
ty.gov.vn/?url=detail&id=30383&language=1, last accessed 03.12.2010.
203 Schwenkel (2012), 460.
204 These were usually one-storey buildings of very poor standard intended only for
much shorter use. Kaiser (2016), 159ff.
205 Quyết định V/v phê duyệt Chương trình phát triển nhà ở trên địa bàn tỉnh Nghệ
An đến năm 2010, định hướng đến năm 2020. 110/2007/QĐ-UBND. Uỷ Ban
Nhân Dân Tỉnh Nghệ An. 21.09.2007. Nghị quyết về đế án giải quyết nhà ở tập
thể cũ trên địa bàn thành phố Vinh. 189/2007/NQ-HĐND. Hội Đồng Nhân Dân
tỉnh Nghệ An. 25.07.2007.
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In 1984, open air wells had to be constructed as provisory water supply.206
Already by 1986, only five years after cooperation ended, the deteriorating
quality of many buildings created unsafe living conditions for residents.207
However, due to a lack of funds resulting from economic difficulties and
low rents, maintenance continued to be kept to a minimum over the next
decades and repairs were carried out in piecemeal fashion.208 A central
water supply and a wastewater system became finally operational due to
official development assistance from the Federal German Republic in the
1990s.209 However, unsafe conditions persist, during Vinh’s frequent
storms and heavy rain many of Quang Trung’s inhabitants have to be
evacuated.210
From 1988 on, several attempts were undertaken to sell a number of
Quang Trung’s apartments to inhabitants.211 From 1992 provincial authori‐
206 Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe Tinh Province to the Department of
Construction, the People's Committee of Vinh City, the Department of Finance,
and the Bank for Investment and Construction: v/v xây dựng giếng nước tai khu
Q. Trung. 13.08.1984. Archive UBND Nghe An, 1984, Tập lưu công văn, July to
December, not paginated.
207 Thông báo của UBND Nghệ Tĩnh về cuộc họp bàn về công tác sửa chũa khu nhà
cao tầng Quang trung Thành phố Vinh. 22.03.1986. Archive UBND Nghe An,
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208 Letter of the People's Committee of Nghe An Province to the Ministry of Con‐
struction, the Ministry of Planning and Investment: V/v xin lập dự án ĐT sửa
chữa thi điểm chống sụp đổ nhà Quang Trung. 16.10.1997. Archiv UBND Nghe
An, 1997, Tập lưu Công văn 10–11, not paginated. Letter of the People's Com‐
mittee of Nghe An Province to the Department of Construction, the Department
of Planning and Investment, the Department for Finance and Pricing, the People's
Committee of Vinh City, the People's Committee of Quang Tung Ward: V/v tổ
chức kiểm tra về quản lý, sử dụng khu nhà cao tầng Quang Trung-Vinh.
29.06.1996. Archiv UBND Nghe An, 1996, Tập lưu Công văn 6–8, not paginat‐
ed.
209 Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị et al. (2011): 120–125.
210 Thân Cương (02.08.2011): “Sống trong sợ hãi” tại chung cư xuống cấp. In:
Nguoiduatin.vn. Online available at http://www.nguoiduatin.vn/song-trong-so-
hai-tai-chung-cu-xuong-cap-a9544.html, last accessed 06.08.2013. Lê Thanh
(24.08.2012): Đẩy nhanh tiến độ xóa nhà ở tập thể cũ. In: Nghệ An Online. On‐
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ties unsuccessfully tried to sell all of Quang Trung’s apartments. Finally,
in 2001 the MoC proposed a plan to rehabilitate the housing complex ac‐
cording to market mechanisms as a national example for the conversion of
housing estates. Inhabitants would be given first-buyer priority, but market
value-prices and the absence of special consideration other than law-re‐
quired compensation would put the new apartments out of reach of
many.212 The project would involve demolition of a number of Quang
Trung’s buildings and the relocation of inhabitants to resettlement apart‐
ments in the northern part of the city.213 In 2002, the provincial People’s
Committee agreed to a proposition by the TECCO construction company
from Hồ Chí Minh City to plan the redevelopment of the first block to be
demolished (C1) as a complex including housing, office, and retail
space.214 Schwenkel calls the construction of this project, including two
high-rise towers, “the most striking visual changes to the cityscape” until
then.215
However, as with previous attempts at repair or rehabilitation of the
housing complex, the 2001 MoC plan was not implemented. Instead, it
was decided that the whole complex would be redeveloped according to
guidelines set out in 34/2007/NQ-CP, including the demolition of all
buildings.216 This resolution prescribes the improvement and reconstruc‐
tion of housing complexes as integrated projects including housing as well
as technical and social infrastructure. Again, the goal is to contribute to
212 Shannon, Kelly/Loeckx, André (2004): Rising from the Ashes. Vinh. In: Localis‐
ing Agenda 21: Action Planning for Sustainable Urban Development und United
Nations Human Settlements Programme. (ed.): Urban Trialogues. Visions,
Projects, Co-productions. Nairobi. 122–155. 145.
213 Notification of the People's Committee of Nghe An Province: Ý kiến kết luận của
Chủ tịch UBND tỉnh tại buổi làm việc với Sở Xây dựng. 09.11.2001. Archive
UBND Nghe An, 2001, Tập lưu Thông báo, báo cáo 8–12, not paginated. Letter
of the People's Committee of Nghe An Province to the People's Committee of
Vinh City, and the Department of Construction: Về việc giải quyết tình trạng
xuống câp Khu chung cư Quang Trung. 22.10.2001. Archiv UBND Nghe An,
2001, Tập lưu Công văn 9–10, not paginated.
214 Letter of the People's Committee fo Nghe An Province to the Tecco Construc‐
tion Company: V/v đầu tư của công ty Cổ phần xây dựng và ứng dụng công nghệ
mới (TECCO). 22.07.2002. Archive UBND Nghe An, 2002, Tập lưu Công văn
7–8, not paginated.
215 Schwenkel (2012), 457.
216 Nghị quyết về đế án giải quyết nhà ở tập thể cũ trên địa bàn thành phố Vinh.
189/2007/NQ-HĐND. Hội Đồng Nhân Dân tỉnh Nghệ An. 25.07.2007.
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the development of a civilised and modern city.217 Meanwhile, the three
zones of Quang Trung have been assigned to three developers for this
project. However, in addition to the buildings constructed by TECCO that
replaced the C1 block so far only one new apartment block has been con‐
structed on the former site of a sports field in the north-western corner of
the housing complex.218 Thus, the Quang Trung Housing Complex re‐
mains as a reminder destruction and reconstruction of Vinh’s built envi‐
ronment during the American War.
Conclusion
The study of the long-term impacts of bombing on the urban environment
in Vinh cannot be reduced to an investigation of only statistical data such
as population numbers or economic growth. Picking up on the ways of in‐
vestigation laid out by the above cited works of Diefendorf as well as
Glaeser and Shapiro, this study on the destruction and reconstruction of
Vinh has shown that much of the long-term impact of the war results can
only be understood when taking into account developments and decisions
that were made even before the air-war over North Vietnam began. The
destruction caused by this air war, however, created the conditions under
which large scale implementation of decisions to rebuild the urban envi‐
ronment according to the ideal of the Socialist City could be attempted.
The implementation of plans for reconstruction was also heavily impacted
by the ongoing war, even though the urban environment of Vinh itself did
not become the target of destruction anymore. The ongoing war diverted
resources and the overall destruction caused by it did not allow reconstruc‐
tion policies to focus on Vinh even after the war ended. While this case
study has focused on the impact of the war on the built urban environment
of one particular city, it has shown that a look at wider contexts, such as
the national political and economic situation and international relations, is
necessary for a detailed understanding of the long-term impacts of de‐
struction caused by the bomb war in Vinh.
This multi-level complexity is also reflected in the importance of glob‐
al- and national-level political developments that led to a re-evaluation of
8.
217 Nghị Quyết Về một số giải pháp để thực hiện việc cải tạo, xây dựng lại các chung
cư cũ bị hư hỏng, xuống cấp. 34/2007/NQ-CP. Chính phủ. 03.07.2007.
218 Kaiser (2016), 140.
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the strategy to create a socialist urban environment. As the move from a
socialist development path to a market economy with socialist orientation
was reflected in the embrace of the ideal of a modern and civilized urban
environment, the Quang Trung Housing Complex was turned from the op‐
timistic nucleus of an envisioned socialist urban environment into an im‐
pediment to the newly embraced vision of a modern and civilized city.
Thereby, one of the core elements of the project to create a socialist urban
environment has become an obstacle to urban development in light of a
changing political, economic, and ideological context.
While general aspects of urban development in the DRV during the war
are reflected in Vinh’s war-and post-war experience, such as evacuation of
the population, a quick return to pre-war population size and subsequent
urban growth, other aspects are very particular to the city. For example,
bombing and destruction were much heavier than in other cities because of
Vinh’s strategic role as a hub for war-time transportation routes that re‐
flects its location at the intersection of historic transport routes. During the
separation of the country into the DRV and the RoV, Vinh was the most
important city in the southern DRV, an importance that was reflected in
the decision to assign its reconstruction to the GDR. When the war ended,
this importance diminished and so did the attention and resources Vinh’s
reconstruction received from central authorities of the SRV. Another par‐
ticularity is the extent of support provided by the GDR to Vinh’s recon‐
struction that was in no terms representative of support provided by social‐
ist countries to the reconstruction of the DRV’s cities in general. Further‐
more, as was also indicated above and is well presented by Thrift and
Forbes, the experiences of cities in the North and the South of Vietnam
differed markedly both during and after the war. To account for a full pic‐
ture of the impact of war and urban planning on the built environment of
Vietnam’s city, a comparative research agenda that is able to incorporate
both general trends as well as the particularities of individual city’s histo‐
ries is necessary.
The introduction raised the question of how to isolate the impact of
bomb war on the urban environment. I have addressed this issue by focus‐
ing on projects and developments that have their origins in decisions and
actions taken in direct response to the destruction caused by aerial bomb‐
ing of Vinh in the 1960s and 70s, and which changed the urban environ‐
ment of Vinh in the immediate aftermath of the war. However, as the title
of this paper indicates, and as was mentioned in the introduction, the his‐
tory of Vinh in the second half of the 20th century presented here was
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marked by intertwined processes of development, destruction, and recon‐
struction, and to strictly isolate the impact of one single aspect would arbi‐
trarily reduce the complexity of the interplay of these processes.
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We Will not Leave the Forest. We Will not Leave the Land.
Internally Displaced Persons from Chhattisgarh to Khammam
District: Inhuman Living Conditions in a Degraded Environment
Brigitte Sebastia
The deprivation of tribes of lands and forest resources, started in colonial
period and continuing today, has opened the way to the Maoist activism
which uses repressive methods with extremely controversial impacts on
tribal populations. On the one hand, Maoists help them to defend or to re‐
gain their lands, and to compensate the government failures in terms of de‐
velopment and social welfare.1 On the other hand, they abuse the tribal
people, forcing them to join their battle and support their activities. The
extensive activity of the Maoists, called Naxalites or Naxals in the North-
Eastern and Central part of India, has led this region to be dubbed the Red
corridor. It includes the state of Chhattisgarh, the southern part of which,
extensively inhabited by tribes, has experienced, in June 2005, the emer‐
gence of a counter-insurgency movement, called Salwa Judum, which has
benefitted from the support of the Chhattisgarh and central governments.
This anti-Naxalite movement has not only been unable to protect the tribal
populations, but it has seriously endangered their life. Caught between the
1 Sundar quotes an extract of the Maoist’s book New People's Power in Dan‐
dakaranya (Kolkata: Biplabi Yug, 2000) which claims that in South Bastar and
Gadchiroli, “they have established 135 people's clinics, started six primary schools,
10 night schools, built 25 huts for government teachers to persuade them to come,
set up 10 village libraries, etc.” Sundar, Nandini (2006): Bastar, Maoism and Salwa
Judum. In: Economic and Political Weekly 41, 29. 3187–3192. 3189. The report
Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas by an expert group set up by
the Planning Commission analysed by Sumanta Banerjee mentions that the Naxalite
movement works as “surrogate state”. It has been able to help tribes to regain their
old rights on lands, to increase the wages of tribal people in agriculture and to fight
the practice of forced labour obliging the low caste and tribal people “to provide
free labour to upper castes” which it was “abolished by the government under Arti‐
cles 14 to 17 of the Constitution.” Banerjee, Sumanta (2008): On the Naxalite
Movement: A Report with a Difference. Economic and Political Weekly, 43, 21.
10–12. 11.
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cross-fires of Naxalites and anti-Naxalites, tribal people have been forced
to flee to another state, or to join the relief camps founded by Salwa
Judum. It is estimated by various humanitarian organizations that tens
thousands of them have been displaced since 2005.2 Many of those who
lived in southern part of Chhattisgarh have fled to Andhra Pradesh (now
Telangana),3 mainly to Khammam district, the neighbouring region of
South Chhattisgarh.
These migrants are called Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), a termi‐
nology defined by the United Nations guiding principles as: “Persons or
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in or‐
der to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized vio‐
lence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” The
United Nation guidelines of 2008 emphasise that: ‘‘Becoming displaced
within one’s own country of origin or country of habitual residence does
not confer special legal status in the same sense as does, say, becoming a
2 The report of Ramachandra Guha points out that “apart from the official figure of
45,958 villagers displaced and living in camps by the main roads, media reports
also mentioned that some 40,000 people from the southern part of the district had
fled to Andhra Pradesh and other neighbouring areas.” Guha, Ramachandra (et al.)
(2006a): War in the Heart of India: An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dande‐
wara District, Chhattisgarh. http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/
doc_387.pdf. 8. Since this report published 20 July 2006, displacement and migra‐
tion to Andhra Pradesh have continued. The website of Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre based on various sources informs that: “As of 2013, it was esti‐
mated that 50,000 IDPs remained living in 23 relief camps in Bastar (Aljazeera,
2013). As of 2014, there were 20,000 IDPs living in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana
(which was carved out of Andhra Pradesh in 2014) states (Action Aid-report on file
with IDMC, April 2014).” http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-
east-asia/india/figures-analysis.
3 The boundary change of Andhra Pradesh which led to the creation of the state of
Telangana was approved by the union cabinet 3 October 2013. This present study
having been conducted in June 2013, I will use Andhra Pradesh rather than Telan‐
gana to designate this state which Khammam district belongs to. Regarding the cre‐
ation of Telangana, which terminated a long period of political debates and violent
protests, see Pingle, Gautam (2014): The Fall and Rise of Telangana. New Delhi.
This author traces the history of Telangana region, and the relentless agitations de‐
manding a separate Telangana state that emerged from annexation of this region to
Andhra Pradesh at the Indian Independence.
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refugee.”4 The living condition of the IDPs is thus dependent on the good
will of the state government where they are settled. In India, while the dis‐
placed people who are victim of development projects or natural disasters
are eligible for benefitting from resettlement and rehabilitation measures
such as housing, lands, ration and identity cards, social welfare, etc., at
least in principle,5 the condition of IDPs who fled armed conflicts is
worse. Although Indian citizens, they are ignored in the state where they
seek refuge and deprived from any help. Considered illegal in Andhra
Pradesh, many Chhattisgarhi IDPs have been obliged to build a new live
inside the forest, in areas situated sometimes more than eight km from a
road.
The present chapter is based on the ethnography of settlements founded
by Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) inside the forest of Khamman dis‐
trict, Andhra Pradesh. The IDPs belong to Dorla and Maria/Muria tribes,
and come from the southern part of Bastar comprising the Konta and Suk‐
ma blocks, a region severely affected by an armed conflict opposing
Maoists and anti-Maoist movement.
The study, conducted in June 2013, was commissioned by the French
NGO Médecins du Monde (MdM).6 With the objective to be financially
supported by ECHO (European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil
Protection) in order to implement a program of mobile clinics in IDP set‐
4 Kälin, Walter (2008): Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Annotations.
The American Society of International Law. Studies in Transnational Legal Policy
38. Washington.
5 While the government approved the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Poli‐
cy 2007 (see http://www.dolr.nic.in/nrrp2007.pdf), many articles denounce its poor
implementation. Sharma, R.N. (2010): Changing Facets of Involuntary Displace‐
ment and Resettlement in India. In: Social Change 40, 4. 503–524. Sharma, R.N./
Singh, Shashi (2009): Displacement in Singrauli Region: Entitlements and Rehabil‐
itation. In: Economic & Political Weekly 44, 51. 62–69.
6 MdM was created in 1980 following the ideological dissensions within the French
NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), notably about the involvement of media
during its medical interventions in Vietnam for denouncing human right violations.
MSF and MdM intervene in emergency situations, such as armed conflicts and nat‐
ural disasters, but MdM privileges long term interventions in order to constrain
governments to strengthen their health policy. MdM’s objectives are clearly speci‐
fied in the proposal they submitted to ECHO for funding, to which I had access:
“MdM (…) want to build a progressive intervention scheme in the three coming
years. The roadmap aims to reinforce the Indian national NRHM [Nation Rural
Health Mission] plan – instead of developing a parallel health system –, and to si‐
multaneously advocate for IDP rights.”
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tlements, MdM had inscribed in its project an anthropological for which I
was appointed. A preliminary survey carried out by MdM had revealed
that the IDPs consulted rarely the government medical services. My mis‐
sion was to document the health conditions of the IDPs and their be‐
haviour regarding care and hygiene including their perception of health
and diseases and interpretation of symptoms, and to identify if the IDP’s
scarce recourse to medical services was due to them, the tribal people be‐
ing often regarded as ignorant and superstitious,7 or to the discriminative
attitude of the medical staff towards them.
In this article, I wish to draw a picture of the squalid living conditions
of the IDPs in their new environment which endangers not only their live,
but also weakens the forest environment of the Bhadrachalam region, al‐
ready very damaged by coal mines and encroachments by communities
living nearby the forest. The Dorla and Maria/Muria tribes are familiar
with, and attached to, the forest, as the title drawn from an IDP quotation
emphasises. However, in Andhra Pradesh, they are constrained to take
refuge inside the forest and are obliged to use strategies to keep going
there. These strategies on the one hand, mitigate the reason of migration as
strictly intrinsic to the violent climax in Chhattisgarh, and on the other
hand, accentuate the forest’s degradation. The history of settlements’ foun‐
dation inside the forest and the health and living conditions in these sites
will form the core of this chapter which aims at analysing the impact of
armed conflict on humans and their environment. In preamble, I will pro‐
vide perspectives on the legislation on the forest and its dwellers, and in‐
sights into the armed conflict opposing Naxalites to anti-Naxalites, as
these two subjects, tightly linked, form the background of the IDP settle‐
ments in Andhra Pradesh.
7 In India, like in numerous countries, tribal people are perceived by the non-tribal as
the others, those who are uneducated and ignorant, and consult traditional healers
(seen as quacks) rather than to turn to biomedicine. In the case of IDPs, the recourse
to traditional healers, who use both plant-based medication and magical rituals, is
the most common. It is justified not only by the belief in bad evil as agent of dis‐
eases, but also by several factors such as healer’ accessibility inside the settlements;
his ability to understand the patient’s language (sharing of idioms and representa‐
tion of the disease); gratuity of his treatment; and relation of power in the cases
when, in absence of an expert, the settlement’s head occupies the function of the
healer, the patient’s recourse to the medical centre might be interpreted by the head
as a lack of confidence and recognition.
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A Long Story of Alienation of Lands and Violation of Rights of Forest
Dwellers
The displacement of tribes in India has a long story, but the control over
wide forest tracts and their resources by the British Empire is held ac‐
countable for their massive displacement as well as for significant trans‐
formations of the ecosystems. As pointed out by Gupta/Gadgil: “It has
been suggested that British rule marks an important watershed in the eco‐
logical history of India.”8
Legislation on the forest was enacted late, not before the second mid-
nineteenth century. But when it came in force, it was detrimental for both
forest and forest dwellers. In order to ensure the control over high valued
forest resources, notably timbers as commodities essential for implement‐
ing developmental projects of the Empire (railway line, wagons and sleep‐
ers, ships, etc.) and for their commercial value at exportation, the British
created the first Forest Act in 1868. A decade later, after the establishment
of the Forest Department, they enacted the Indian Forest Act, 1878. This
act, reinforcing the first one, divided the forest areas into reserved, pro‐
tected, and village forests. Forest dwellers were forbidden in reserved
forests; those living in protected forests were restricted to collect only for‐
est minor produce and were banned from practising pasture and hunt in
the forest and selling forest produce;9 and those living in villages forests
were constrained to pay dues on forest produce including crops cultivated
inside the forest, and on grazing.10 Regarding Bastar region, from where
the IDPs come from, Sundar mentions that the reserved forests constituted
two-third of the total forest area of the state, excluding the area under the
1.
8 Guha, Ramachandra/Gadgil, Madhav (1989): State Forestry and Social Conflict in
British India. In: The Past and Present Society 123. 141–177. 142.
9 Guha/Gadgil (1989). Prasad, Archana (2003): Against Ecological Romanticism.
Verrier Elwin and the Making of an Anti-Modern Tribal Identity. New Delhi.
10 Sundar defines the three categories as: “reserved forest which are generally com‐
pletely closed off to the local public, protected forests in which people had privi‐
leges liable to be changed at state discretion, and in some provinces, village or
nistari forests from which people could draw their basic needs, usually on the pay‐
ment of commutation dues.” Sundar, Nandini (1997): Subalterns and Sovereigns.
An Anthropological History of Bastar 1854–1996. Delhi. 106.
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zamindari authority.11 The classification of forest areas was based on their
resource in commercially valuable tree species such as the sal (Shorea ro‐
busta) or the teak, and on the intensity of shifting cultivation. Shifting cul‐
tivation was deemed by the British as destructive and in conflict with their
need of wood and timbers; the classification of areas under intense shifting
cultivation as protected forests, allowed them to eliminate such a competi‐
tion.12 Moreover control over, and classification of, forest areas by the
colonial power, tribal people had to share their territory with outsiders,
whose the venue was facilitated by the development of transport, attracted
by employs in projects or by availability of lands. They bought lands from
tribal people against a meagre compensation in consumable products, or
fraudulently appropriated lands leased from tribal people.13 Such abusive
transactions continued after independence,14 until the recent Forest Rights
Act, 2006, banned the transfer of lands from tribes to non-tribal people.
Dispossessed from lands, or jeopardised by the restrictions and degra‐
dation of the ecosystem resulting from deforestation and plantation of
highly valued trees, or by taxes, the tribes were forced to reconstruct their
life in other places, sometimes conflicting with other forest dwellers. Such
a situation entailed revolts of forest dwellers against the British regime,
outsiders and British-allied local rulers, forcing the British to compose
with them. Bastar region knew such rebellions, notably in 1910, when the
tribes and lower castes reacted violently against the policy of forest reser‐
vation, restriction on shifting cultivation on hilly slopes and taxes on gaz‐
ing and land, instituted by the colonial power allied to the rulers.
11 Introduced in 1793 by Cornwallis in eastern parts of British India, the zamindari
system accorded full ownership on lands to the landowners, and rights to rent the
lands to peasants and to fix the rent amount, the 10/11 being handed down to the
British Empire. Meena, Hareet Kumar (2015): Land Tenure Systems in the Late
18th and 19th Century in Colonial India. In: American International Journal of Re‐
search in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences 9, 1. 66–71.
12 The justifications of the British for condemning shifting cultivation were that this
technique deprived them of timbers, and that, after cultivation, the growth of sal
trees was hindered by the transformation of the undergrowth, and the presence of
ash and of grass which grown back. Prasad (2003).
13 Rupavath, Ramdas (2015): The Persistence of Land Alienation. The Experience of





The second important Indian Forest Act 1927, largely based on that of
1878, consolidated the control on areas covered by forest, or having sig‐
nificant wildlife, and regulated movement of forest produce, notably of the
timbers, on which duties were levied. This act, amended in 2010 to take
into account the seventy-year changes in terms of money value, is now
called Indian Forest (Amendment) Act, 2012. As this act does not address
the forest dwellers, a new law, based on the periodical guidelines defined
by the Ministry of Environment and Forests since 1990, has been enacted
in 2006 to fill the void. Called the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (full name:
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of
Forest Rights) Act, 2006), it aims to recognise the rights to the forest of
tribal people and other traditional forest dwellers (OTFD) which are es‐
sential to ensure their livelihood, as well as to give back the rights of these
communities which were despoiled during the classification of forest areas
by the colonial and post-colonial policies. Kundan Kumar et al. argue that
this law “represents a political, demand-based effort to reform forest gov‐
ernance through recognition of rights of forest-dependent people.”15 But
despite its relevance to improve the conditions of forest dwellers, the law
is denounced as been badly implemented,16 and grossly violated in all the
regions possessing significant forest communities. According to the sites,
the livelihood of forest dwellers is jeopardised by the priority given to the
projects, governmental as well as private, which generate amount of mon‐
ey.17 It is estimated that the development-related projects (dams, roads,
special economic zones, industrial sites, mines, electricity plants, etc.)
have provoked the displacement of fifty millions of people comprising
15 Kumar, Kundan/Singh, Neera M./Kerr, John M. (2015): Decentralisation and
Democratic Forest Reforms in India: Moving to a Rights-Based Approach. In:
Forest Policy and Economics 51. 1–8. 2.
16 Social Change 41, 1 (2011). Implementing Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006. A
Seminar Report and Recommendations. 121–154. Saxena, K.B. (2011): Militant
Left Radicalism, State and Civil Society. The Centrality of Tribal Land Rights.
Recommendations of a National Seminar. In: Social Change 41, 3. 473–4832.
17 Regarding Bastar, Ilina Sen mentions the conflict in 2001 which opposed the gram
sabha of the village Nagarnar to the National Mineral Development Corporation,
following the falsification of its registers by district authorities to acquire lands for
starting the project. Sen, Ilina (2011): Distorted Development and Possibilities of
Alternatives in Chhattisgarh. In: Berthet, S./Kumar, G. (eds.): New States for a
New India. Federalism and Decentralization in the States of Jharkhand and Chhat‐
tisgarh. Delhi. 147–166. 156.
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more than forty percent of tribal people.18 The live of tribes may be also
jeopardised by armed conflicts. Quantifying the volume of IDPs resulting
from armed and communal conflicts is difficult; the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) evaluates that, at the end of 2013, there were
at least 526,000 persons. According to its website, “in central India, more
than 148,000 Adivasi people remained displaced as a result of recurring
conflict over land and mineral resources. The fighting pitted government
forces and allied militias against Maoist insurgents claiming to fight on
behalf of the Adivasis. Clashes in May [2013] displaced another 10,000
people.”19 This refers to the southern region of Chhattisgarh.
Overview of the Cause of Displacement: the Armed Conflict in
Chhattisgarh
The ex-Dandewada or southern Bastar district of the Chhattisgarh state is
the seat of Maoist activities the most violent in India. This region is a part
of the Bastar district which formed with the Dantewada district, the
princely state of Bastar founded in the early 14th century. After the inde‐
pendence in 1947, the princely state of Bastar merged with that of Kanker
to form Bastar District of Madhya Pradesh state, which was then divided
in three districts in 1999, Kanker, Bastar and Dandewada. These districts,
situated in the eastern part of Madhya Pradesh, compose the southern part
of Chhattisgarh, state created in 2000 from the division with the former.20
The Dandewada district was redrawn in 2007 with the creation of the Bi‐
2.
18 See, the Reference Note of the Lok Sabha Secretary (December 2013) “Displace‐
ment and Rehabilitation of People due to Developmental Projects” http://
164.100.47.134/intranet/DisplacementandRehabilitation.pdf; the report of world‐
press.com: https://socialissuesindia.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/tribal-displace‐
ment-in-india.pdf (retrieved on 09.11.2015) as well as Meher, Rajkishor (2009):
Globalization, Displacement and the Livelihood Issues of Tribal and Agriculture
Dependent Poor People. The Case of Mineral-based Industries in India. In: Journal
of Developing Societies 25, 4. 457-480. Negi, Nalin Singh/Ganguly, Sujata
(2011): Development Projects vs. Internally Displaced Populations in India. A Lit‐
erature Based Appraisal. In: COMCAD Arbeitspapiere, Working Papers No. 103.
Bielefeld. Sharma (2011).
19 http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/india/summary.
20 The creation of Chhattisgarh was enacted at the same period than that of the states
of Jharkhand and Uttaranchal. It results from the request of “big landowners and
traders turned industrialists” (Sen 2011, 151) and from the great potential of
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japur district, and again in 2012, with the formation of Sukma district.
This district was then subdivided into three blocks or tenshil-s, among
them those of Sukma and Konta, located in the South, which form the area
where the most IDPs settled in Khammam district come from. These
blocks, widely covered by forest and hills, and seldom urbanised, are in‐
habited by tribes, mostly the Dorla and the Muria/Maria communities. Ac‐
cording to the statistics of the Census of India 2001, quoted by Berthet,21
Bastar is the region with the highest percentage of tribal people: 66.31 per‐
cent with 71.60 percent living in non-urban areas.
Belonging to the Gond group, Dorla and the Muria/Maria tribes have
been well documented during the colonial period, especially by Grigson
(1938), and Elwin (1937, 1947), and after Independence, by von Fürer-
Haimendorf (1948, 1979), Mehta (1984) and Sarkar/Dasgupta (1996).22
On the website of the District Administration23 of Sukma district, they are
presented as “(…) innocent Tribes [who] are totally happy and content
with whatever little facilities they are provided,” the website, however,
adds: “(…) in the greater interest of the area and the country it is neces‐
sary to bring the tribes in the main stream of development where from
Chhattisgarh in natural resources rather than from identity demands or a willing‐
ness to improve the situation of tribes, See also Lefèbvre, Bertrand (2011): Map‐
ping the Scheduled Tribes. Questioning the Creation of New States in India. In:
Berthet, S./Kumar, G. (eds.): New States for a New India. Federalism and Decen‐
tralization in the States of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Delhi. 191-208. Due to
this, on contrast to the formation of the previous states, it was supported by the
national political parties and the ruling government of this epoch, the National
Democratic Alliance. Chhattisgarh has been considered as a tribal state, but
Berthet argues that the tribal represent 31.8 percent of the population, confined es‐
pecially in the North, South and in Central-West. Berthet, Samuel (2011): Chhat‐
tisgarh. Redefining the Role of the State? In: Berthet, S./Kumar, G. (eds.): New
States for a New India. Federalism and Decentralization in the States of Jharkhand
and Chhattisgarh. Delhi. 87-115.
21 Berthet (2011), 102.
22 Grigson, W.V. (1938): The Maria Gonds of Bastar. London. Elwin, Verrier (1936):
Leaves from the Jungle: Life in a Gond Village. London. Elwin, Verrier (1947):
The Muria and their Ghotul. London. Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von (1948):
The Raj Gonds of Adilabad: A Peasant Culture of the Deccan - Myth and Ritual.
London. Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von (1979): The Gonds of Andhra Pradesh
Tradition and Change in an Indian Tribe. New Delhi. Mehta, Behram H. (1984):
Gonds of the Central Indian Highlands. Two volumes. New Delhi. Satkar, Amitab‐
ha/Samira, Dasgupta (1996): Spectrum of Tribal Bastar. Delhi.
23 See: http://www.sukma.in/profile.php (retrieved on 13.09.2015).
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they will start thinking of new necessities and strive to achieve them
which will set a greater revolution of changes for the betterment of this
area.” This message takes over the rhetorical figure used by the colonial
government of Madras in 1874 quoted by Kumar: “[a] happy and content‐
ed population is better than flourishing forests.”24 Like in the colonial
time, the post-independent governments of India have to jungle between
the management of tribal in a manner efficiently satisfactory to avoid re‐
bellions, today their affiliation to the Maoists, and the exploitation of for‐
est resources in tribal areas, today those of the underground. The website
is silent on the hard reality of tribal people. Not only they have not bene‐
fited from the development in terms of employment and implementation
of social welfare schemes,25 but also are trapped in cross-fire between the
Naxalites and anti-Naxalites militia: the former charge the tribal with be‐
trayal of trust, and the later accuse them to help Maoists. Using the same
means, both Naxalites and anti-Naxalites are composed of tribal people,
quite often forced to join either the battle of Naxalites against the develop‐
ment’s evils, the state and private companies, or the battle of anti-Nax‐
alites against the development’s enemies (anti-Naxalites/Salwa Judum).26
24 Kumar, V.M. Ravi (2012): Community Forest Management in Colonial and Post‐
colonial South India. Policy and Practice. In: South Asia Research 32, 3. 257–277.
257.
25 Asian Centre for Human Rights (2006): The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh. Victims of
the Naxalite Movement and Salwa Judum. Delhi.
26 The literature denouncing the exactions caused by Naxalites and Salwa Judum is
abundant, especially that reports violation of human rights by Salwa Judum and
police force. For articles reporting violence by Naxalite Prasad, Archana (2010):
The Political Economy of Maoist Violence in Chhattisgarh. In: Social Scientist 38,
3-4. 3-24. For those reporting violence by Salwa Judum and Reserved Police: Bal‐
agopal, K. (2006): Physiognomy of the violence. In: Economic and Political
Weekly. 10-14. Guha, Ramachandra (et al.) (2006b): Salwa Judum: War in the
Heart of India: Excerpts from the Report by the Independent Citizens Initiative. In:
Social Scientist 34, 7-8. 47-61. Kumar, Himanshu (2009): Who is the Problem, the
CPI(Maoist) or the Indian State? In: Economic and Political Weekly 44, 47. 8-12.
Miklian, Jason (2009): The Purification Hunt: the Salwa Judum Counterinsurgen‐
cy in Chhattisgarh, India. In: Dialectical Anthropology 33. 441–459. For those de‐
scribing escalating exactions by both Naxalites and anti-Naxalites caused since the
formation of Salwa Judum: Bahree, Megha (2010): The Forever War: Inside In‐
dia's Maoist Conflict. In: World Policy Journal 27, 2. 83–89. Gupta (2006a).http://
www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_387.pdf. Human Right Watch
(ed.) (2012): Between Two Sets of Guns. Attacks on Civil Society. Activists in In‐
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Naxalite or Naxal is a term which originates from the Naxalbari move‐
ment which emerged in May 1967 in the Naxalbari area of northern West
Bengal and expanded in districts with a significant tribal and lower castes
population.27 The movement resulted from the confrontation of the police
with armed villagers, mostly tribal, which caused the death of a police in‐
spector, and in reprisal, the killing of six women, one man and two chil‐
dren. The revolt of peasants was spurred by their determination to eradi‐
cate the jotedari, a feudal agrarian system imposing that the labourers pay
heavy taxes on the crops to the landowner. The attack of young tribal who
reclaimed his rights on a land served as a pretext to the dissidents of the
CPI(M) to fight the jotedari system. The dissidents of the CPI(M), led by
Charu Mazundar and Kanu Sanyal, promoted the power of the weapons as
a means more efficient to defend the poor (tribe and lowest caste), than the
parliamentary representation. Allying to revolutionary groups, the dissi‐
dents formed the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revo‐
lutionaries in 1967, and then, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist ML) in 1969. Reconsolidated after a period of decline due to loss
of leadership, this party formed, in 2005, the CPI (Maoist) or Naxalism in
association with the Maoist Communist Centre India. The term Naxalism
is used more specifically in tribal areas, reinforcing thus the link between
tribes and alienation of lands. Compare to the Naxalbari movement which
“was an organised peasant attack against peculiar feudal land relations,”
the Naxalites in Chhattisgarh “draw on displacement of the local people
due to zealous support of the state for quick development through forced
industrialization.”28
According to Berthet29, from the creation of the state of Chhattisgarh,
its diverse governments have relied on the private investment for develop‐
ing infrastructures (transports, education) and have encouraged the venue
of private companies, both national and international, to develop industrial
dia’s Maoist Conflict. USA: Human Right Watch. Navlakha, Gautam (2006):
Maoists in India. In: Economic and Political Weekly 41, 22. 2186–2189.
27 This area, located at the border of Nepal and Bangladesh (ex-East Pakistan), is
dominated by tribal population working in tea plantation.
28 Chakrabarty, Bidyut (2014): Maoism, a Recalcitrant Citizenry and Counterinsur‐
gency Measures in India. In: Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1,
3. 289–317. 294.
29 Berthet (2011).
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and mining plants necessary to increase the state economy.30 Sen mentions
that the ecological zone of Bastar, rich in forest produces (sal trees, amla
or India gooseberry, tamarind pods, chironji nuts, mahua seeds and flow‐
ers, etc.) is also rich in ores such as mica, manganese, iron and bauxite.
The government policy to attract investors by “selling off the natural re‐
sources of the state,”31 and its failure to provide basic public amenities,
notably in tribal areas, has offered a fecund battlefield to the Maoists,
present in the Telangana region (Andhra Pradesh) who entered Chhattis‐
garh in 1980s.32 The penetration of Naxalites into Chhattisgarh and inten‐
sification of their activities are interpreted as a response of the government
failure to implement the 5th and the 9th Schedules of the Indian constitu‐
tion. Despite of the 5th Schedule, little tribal advisory councils of sched‐
uled tribes living in the reserved forests or in scheduled areas of the states
have been formed so that the state governments continue to administer the
reserved forests and are prone to lease some areas to private mining and
industrial companies, entailing the eviction of tribes; the redistribution of
lands from upper castes to landless peasantry stipulated in the 9th Schedule
is poorly observed.
In reprisal to the intensification of Naxalites’ activities, a counter-insur‐
gency movement called Salwa Judum, signifying in Koya Peace Marc’ or
Purification hunt, was formed in June 2005 under the leadership of Ma‐
hendra Karma, a tribal leader, Member of the Indian National Congress,
Minister of Industry and Commerce of Chhattisgarh from 2000 to 2004.
This movement, supported by the state and central governments which de‐
ployed paramilitary troops (National Security Guard commandos, Naga‐
land Armed Police, Central Industrial Security Forces and Central Reserve
Police Forces), caused a civil war situation endangering the tribes. Ac‐
cused by either Naxalites or Salwa Judum, tribal people have had been re‐
peatedly the target of attacks destroying the infrastructures symbolising
the development such as school, roads, electricity, etc. (Naxalite side), or
creating a climate of fear by using arson, abductions, rapes, murders, etc.
(Salwa Judum side). The terror atmosphere forced the tribes to flee their
30 Navlakha, Gautam/Gupta, Asish (2009): The Real Divide in Bastar. In: Economic
and Political Weekly 44, 33. 20–21. Sen (2011).
31 Sen (2001), 153.
32 Pingle (2014) and Asian Centre for Human Rights (2006). In her conclusion, Sun‐




village for seeking protection in another state. In addition to this migra‐
tion, numerous villages have been abandoned by their dwellers to join
what it is called relief camps or Salwa Judum camps, either voluntarily for
protection against Naxalites or for advantages promised by Salwa Judum,
or forcedly displaced by the militia in order to weaken the relationships
between tribal and Naxalites.33 These camps, under the control of the
CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), Indian reserve battalions, and SPOs
(Special Police Officers), served as base for forcedly enrolling tribal, no‐
tably youths and women. The authors of the report of Asian Centre for
Human Rights argue that “the temporary relief camps have been turned in‐
to centres for military training and anti-Naxalite indoctrination education.
As on 4 March 2006, 3,200 Adivasi boys and girls have been recruited as
Special Police Officers (SPO) in Dantewada district alone at a fixed hono‐
rarium of Rs. 1500 to each per month. Many SPOs have not been paid any
honorarium. Many have joined in the SPO with the promise of regulariza‐
tion in the State Police Force.”34
While in the first years of their creation, these camps were covered by a
food programme, food distribution was suddenly stopped, leaving the
tribes deprived of their lands without any resources,35 except to join the
Salwa Judum movement, or to escape secretly during the night. The pres‐
sure applied to tribal by these two opposite armed groups is not only de‐
structive for the livelihood of individuals, but also for the tribal relation‐
ship as many families and village communities are divided between those
adhering or supposed adhering to Naxalites and to Salwa Judum. Such a
33 The report of Asian Centre for Human Rights quotes a camp dweller who ex‐
plains: “We have shifted to the Arrabore relief camp just about 15 days ago. We
have been told that my husband will be employed as Special Police officer if we
shift to the relief camps started by the Salwa Judum and that he will get a monthly
salary of Rs. 1500/ plus free ration.” Asian Centre for Human Rights (2006), 16.
34 Asian Centre for Human Rights (2006), 4.
35 Information of the person who housed me during my short stay in Chhattisgarh
(July 2013). He took me on a tour of five camps, among which, he intervenes as a
Registered Medical Practitioner for delivering free medical services. In all these
camps, I noticed the numerous abandoned huts or houses, their dwellers having
succeeded to escape according to information provided by neighbours. During my
period of fieldwork corresponding to the collect of, many tribal of these camps
were engaged in the collection of mahua seeds that they sold and partly transform
in oil used for cooking.
We Will not Leave the Forest. We Will not Leave the Land
207
situation leads to suspicion. As a chief of an IDP settlement replied when I
asked him to explain the history of his displacement from Chhattisgarh:
“I am here because my village has been destroyed by Naxalites. I succeeded
to escape into the forest where I hid. After two days, I returned to the village.
There had some died people who were laid; there had no longer anything, my
house was burnt and my cattle had disappeared. I have never related this sto‐
ry. Here, nobody speaks about this; we don’t know who is Naxalite or who is
against Naxalite. This is better to never speak about that, we have to live to‐
gether…”
The denunciation by the academic and activist milieu of the Human right
violations perpetrated by Salwa Jundum to the Supreme Court,36 resulted
on 5 July 2011 by the order declaring Salwa Judum illegal and unconstitu‐
tional and demanding the disbanding of the special police officers.37 The
condemnation of Salwa Judum, however, does not put an end to the armed
conflict, nor to the violence, as the CRPF and Indian battalions continue to
control the roads and ex-Salwa Judum camps and intervene in Naxalite-
affected zones, and SPOs are still active.38
The Survey of IDPs Settlements
The anthropological study commissioned by MdM was conducted in ten
settlements located in the three revenue divisions of the Khammam dis‐
3.
36 See Open Letters to Government and Maoists (2006). In: Economic and Political
Weekly 41, 27–28. 2977–2979. It appeals the government to stop the violations of
human rights perpetrated by Salwa Judum and police force. See also criticism by
Balagopal on the results of the National Human Right Commission (NHRC), com‐
missioned by the Supreme Court to write a report on allegation of violations of hu‐
man rights by both Naxalites and Salwa Judum, which condemned mostly Nax‐
alites. The appointment of police by the NHRC for examining allegations and con‐
ducting enquiries is denounced by the author as an “unfortunate choice (…) The
report makes no pretence of neutrality or objectivity. It has a 13-page introduction
which is mostly a harsh comment on the Naxalites, described at the very outset as
a menace, followed by a five page chapter titled Human Rights Violations by the
Naxalites. The third chapter of just one and a half pages is on Human Rights Viola‐
tions by Salwa Judum and another one and a half pages on the Role of the Local
Police, Security Forces and SPOs.”Balagopal, K. (2008): The NHRC on Salwa
Judum. A Most Friendly Inquiry. In: Economic and Political Weekly. 2183–2186.
37 See: http://www.countercurrents.org/Supreme_Court_judgm_679794a.pdf.
38 See: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-24/news/32827923_1_
spos-salwa-judum-contempt-petition (retrieved on 26.11.2015).
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trict, Bhadrachalam, Palwancha and Kothaguten, among them seven are
situated inside the forest (see the map). For carrying out the study, I bene‐
fited from the help of a local NGO selected by MdM as partner in its
project of mobile clinics which selected the settlements, organised the
transport, and food when I requested to stay the night in the settlement,
and provided the translators. In each settlement, I conducted the survey in
two steps: at the arrival, with the pedda (settlement chef), and then with all
the IDPs of the settlements. In the situation of displacement where the
chef’s function is very unlikely be hereditary, the pedda is either the per‐
son who founded the settlement, or was selected by a group of IDPs who
founded the settlement for his ability to speak Telugu and/or his educa‐
tional level necessary for dialoguing with, and obtaining support from, lo‐
cal administration. The door-to-door survey has collected information
from 116 persons (forty two families) residing in six settlements, and from
two focus groups of eight to ten persons in the two remaining settlements
due to lack of time.39 Although my mission was to investigate the IDP’s
health and their perception on health care, it appeared essential to enlarge
the study on their living conditions in the settlements, as these conditions
impact significantly their health. In addition to open discussions with the
pedda-s and IDPs to investigate their migratory trajectory and their diffi‐
culties and needs in the settlement, an exploration of the surrounding mi‐
lieu was conducted. It comprised the water bodies used by the IDPs, lands
for cultivation, kitchen gardens and the forest from where they collect
food, medicinal plants, and some commercial products such as mahua
flowers and seeds, resins, wood, etc. Several medical centres mentioned
by IDPs during the discussions were visited: two primary health centres
(PHC), four community health centres (CHC) and the government hospital
39 Three week fieldwork to conduct such a survey was definitively too short, notably
in taking into account the time necessary to reach the settlements. That obliged to
work intensively in each settlement in order to visit all the residents; a task far
from being easy as the interviews required two language translators English/
Telugu and Telugu/Koya, and at my request, a male and a female for Koya lan‐
guage. After around ten interviews, it was often difficult to capture translators’ at‐
tention. These conditions to carry out the survey have obviously hindered the col‐
lect of information, notably, regarding the IDPs’ behaviours related to hygiene and
health including pregnancy and delivery that MdM expected amazingly to obtain.
To compensate the short duration, I requested that several nights were spent in set‐
tlements.
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of Bhadrachalam. Interviews with a register medical practitioner (RMP),40
two auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs) in charge of IPD settlements,41 and
the staff of the department of nutrition of the Integrated Tribal Develop‐
ment Agency located at Bhadrachalam were also carried out.
To get a better estimation of the IDPs’ living conditions in the settle‐
ments, it needed to have an insight into those of the tribal people residing
in the region from where the IDPs came. This comparison was all the
more relevant so as a large part of IDPs, as it will be shown later, pointed
out Andhra Pradesh as a state more developed than Chhattisgarh. Wel‐
come and supported by a colleague of the local NGO’s responsible; I spent
a week in Chhattisgarh to visit several villages and Salwa Judum camps,
situated around Konta and along the road Konta-Sukma. It was not possi‐
ble, however, to reach the villages situated inside the forest that some
IDPs had mentioned as their native place. According to my host, the tracks
to go to the villages were impracticable because of rain, but I think that it
was consequent to an order from the police who visited him the second
day of my stay. The previous day, on my host’s recommendation, I was
gone to Sukma, with a document attesting that I conducted a comparative
study on food pattern of Koya tribes in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and
Odisha, to be registered by the police station and collector.
40 The category ‘rural medical practitioner’ or RMP was established by the Govern‐
ment of Andhra Pradesh the 26.09.2008. The registration in the AP Para medical
Board demands a full process of training, examination and certification. The
RMPs use biomedical tools, but they are authorised to prescribe or use the
medicines only sold over the counter. They are classified as paramedics and can‐
not use the title of Doctor. See: http://cm.ap.gov.in/excmysr/26sep08press2.asp
(relieved on 24.07.2013).
41 The name of the IDP settlement is quite often the name of the closest village.
When the settlement is established for several years and easily reachable, it may
be recognised by the PHC and visited by the ANMs. However, the IDPs mention
that the visits of ANMs who are in charge of monitoring the IDPs’ health and im‐
plementing food scheme to pregnant and delivered women, are very irregular, and
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Map drawn by MdM
Foundation of the Settlements: Impact on the Forest
The approach of IDP settlements is far from an enchantment. After a more
or less long (2 to 8 km) and difficult way in 4X4 vehicle and by foot,
through the forest, one enters a wide area, from where emerged from place
to place burned trunks, a few trees and small patches of grass and shrubs
which have survived cutting or fire. Then, one reaches fallow and
4.
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ploughed lands that indicate the proximity of the settlements. The settle‐
ments are composed of twenty-five to forty huts of diverse sizes, organ‐
ised in several groups of habitations ordered according to the relationship
of the inhabitants and to their arrival in the settlements. Huts’ walls are
built, according to the sites, with branches or bamboo sticks plastered with
mud, and topped by a roof made of grass or leaves of the palm tree. In the
oldest settlements, the huts are more elaborated with a roof of tiles bought
from Koya villagers living nearby, and walls well plastered and, for Dorla
huts in particular, decorated with white drawings. The groups of huts, in‐
cluding some shelters for cattle and goats and a kitchen garden are some‐
times enclosed by a barrier of bamboo or branches closely stuck into the
soil for protecting the inhabitants from wide animals (snakes, tigers, bears
etc.). If such a habitat inside the forest corresponds to the ecological uni‐
verse of tribes, in Andhra Pradesh, it results from the impossibility of
these displaced tribal people to find another environment to live.
The migratory stories of the pedda-s, which present numerous similari‐
ties, reveal how they were constrained to found the settlement inside the
forest. Forced by Naxalites or anti-Naxalites to quit their villages or Salwa
Judum camps, they fled to Andhra Pradesh in the hope of finding help
from the Koya families which employed them for seasonal labour in agri‐
culture. The Koya-s constitutes an important tribal community in Kham‐
mam district, and especially in the region concerned by this study. They
live essentially from settled agriculture on lands more and less close to, or
encroached on, the forest, from which they draw some food produces.42
The Dorla and Maria/Muria IDPs consider them as relative,43 and rely on
this to obtain the solidarity of Koya sarpanch-s.44 In two cases, the pedda-
s obtained, a piece of land to erect their huts, but in general, they were
42 Mis'ra, Kamal K./Bondla, D.J. Narendra (2010): Cultural Dimension of Biodiver‐
sity. Conservation among the Tribes of the Eastern Ghats. In: Indian Anthropolo‐
gist 40, 1. 1-20. This tribal community conducted several rebellions against the
colonial power and the Nizam rulers to defend their rights on the forest. Organised
under the banner of the Communist Party of India, they obtained from the
landowners, in the 1950s, the redistribution of a part of their lands, notably paddy
fields, and of their cattle. Rupavath (2015).
43 This relationship is confirmed by several authors such as Mis'ra/Bondla (2010),
and Mukherjee, Sonali (2014): Mining and Women. The Case of the Maria of
Chhattisgarh. In: Social Change 44, 2. 229–247.
44 The sarpanch (H) is an elected member of a village who is at the head of the
pañcāyat, the administration of the village. His function concerns the management
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badly received. On the one hand, the Koya-s fear that the IDPs’ presence
intensifies Naxalites’ activity in this region, and on the other hand, they
are not willing to share their lands and resources with the IDPs. In the first
step, the pedda-s tried to stay close to the Koya village they knew, but
they were pulled out by the Forest Department staff. Obliged to remain
hidden during the day for avoiding to be discovered by the police, they re‐
count that forest became the only means to survive. However, it did not
prevent them from harassment by the Forest Department. The pedda-s of
settlements located deeply in the forest mention that, before succeeding,
they were displaced several times, by the Forest Department staff who
burnt their hut. The strategy they found to thwart a new displacement was
to identify IDPs in quest of living place in order to form a community suf‐
ficiently large to be able to clear a large area of the forest and to construct
a good number of huts in a short time. This strategy echoes the attitude of
the Forest Department when new IDP settlement is discovered. The officer
of this department at Kothagudem I interviewed told me: “If we imprison
or send a case to court, the human rights members intervene immediately
and the people [IDPs] are released. We can do nothing, except to burn the
huts when we discover a new settlement under construction. But when a
large part of the forest has been already clear, it is too late. If we burn the
huts, they will go to another place, and another area will be devastated.”
In this region, the forest bears the traces of the numerous attempts to
establish a settlement. On the way that led to settlements, it was common
to go through two or three areas more or less wide clear of trees. The agri‐
cultural system used by tribal people in Chhattisgarh is shifting cultivation
which has survived despite its condemnation by the colonial rulers and by
Indians after Independence. The change this agricultural method has expe‐
rience has been the use of wooden plough. But in Andhra Pradesh shifting
cultivation is seldom possible. The shift of lands, after three-five years of
cultivation, will generate inevitably conflicts with the Forest Department.
In this context, the IDPs privilege permanent agriculture. It prevents from
displacements by the Forest Department, and the surface of land gained
from the forest allows for compensating the feeble yield during the first
years of cultivation. But in counterpart, it accentuates the degradation of
of the village infrastructure (road, electricity, water, school, etc.) and the develop‐
ment of the villagers (cards for various social schemes, schooling etc.) He acts as
an intermediary between the state government and the villagers.
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the forest milieu of this region as tens of hectares are deforested to fit the
requirement of the settlements’ dwellers.
In the objective to establish their settlement, the pedda-s used two
means for finding IDPs: they visit the tribal weekly markets, places of
transaction for commodities as well as of meeting between tribal people,
and call their relatives and acquaintances living in Chhattisgarh. The num‐
ber of families residing in these settlements during the ethnography who
declared to be come on the invitation of the pedda was high, certainly
more than fifty percent in certain sites. This questions the identity of these
persons: are they IDPs? Indeed, discussions revealed that their venue was
not motivated by insecurity and violence issues, but by attraction to a bet‐
ter life: the state of Andhra Pradesh was perceived as more developed than
Chhattisgarh; they expected to benefit from its socio-economic advantages
and social schemes. Such motivations, however, do not deprive them to be
classified IDPs as the definition of United Nation (1998) includes also per‐
sons who leave their residence “in order to avoid the effects of armed con‐
flict.” The venue of this population, not directly affected by the conflict,
increases obviously pressure on the forest milieu. Such a damaged envi‐
ronment raises important ethical issues about two realities which cannot
match: that of the degradation of the forest while the preservation of envi‐
ronment has become a world priority; that of populations which, to sur‐
vive, are obliged to live in the forest and to clear the trees for insuring
partly their food security. The conditions in which they have to live are in‐
human. Their life is constantly at risk, as much by diseases related to their
living conditions as by those inherent to the environment in which they are
forced to live.
Living Conditions as Precarious as Inhuman
After opening the discussion with the pedda-s and the IDPs on their mi‐
gratory history, my first question to evaluate their living conditions was to
ask them to list their needs according to the priority. This question allowed
for investigating if health was perceived by IDPs as an issue, and what
were the main obstacles they met in this new environment. Although the
IDPs knew that my venue was related to the project of mobile clinics, no
one of the 116 interviewed persons mentioned health services. The two





In all the settlements targeted by the study, access to water and avail‐
ability of drinking water was a major issue. The water was drawn from
steams located often far from the settlement (one to two km). The quantity
of the water depends on the season, and its quality is dubious. At the peri‐
od of study which coincided with the beginning of rainy season, the
streams were well supplied, but the water was muddy, even when drawn
from some wells dug along the water bodies. Moreover to be mixed which
mud which, according to the areas, is charged in particles coming from
mining activity, the water was contaminated by faecal matters coming
from cattle and sites of defecation used by the IDPs. The water conditions
have important consequences on IDPs’ health. When they were questioned
on their health conditions, skin diseases and diarrhoea that they attributed
to the quality of water were mostly mentioned. The lack of immediate ac‐
cess to the water affects also the general state of health, notably that of
women in charge to go to the stream, twice a day, the morning and after‐
noon, for bathing, washing dishes and clothes, and bringing water back for
cooking and drinking. This task adding to the intensive daily activities
concerning land (deforestation, agriculture, cattle care, kitchen gardening),
construction of huts, house work (pounding cereals, cooking, children
care, etc.), requires energy which that the food is not really able to pro‐
vide.
Except for the settlements established in 2006, most of those covered
by the study were too recent to have lands capable to feed the communi‐
ties. The lack of cattle to plough the land and of seeds was mentioned as
hindrances. In the most of new settlements, some huts, with only a few
furnishing, were closed. Requesting the reason, I heard quite often that the
families were returned in Chhattisgarh to obtain cattle and seeds from their
relatives.45 The IDPs were constrained to buy rice, pulses and spices from
45 These families concerned those who had migrated for socio-economic reasons. In
order to convince their relatives to give cattle, they are forced to stay two months
and more in Chhattisgarh. The interest to get seeds from Chhattisgarh is not with
regard to the symbolic attachment to the native place (nostalgia, identity con‐
struct), as mentioned in numerous studies of migration in which ‘ethnic’ foods
serve to maintain the link with the culture of origin. Holtzman, J.D. (2006): Food
and Memory. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 35. 261–278. Mannur, Anita
(2007): Culinary Nostalgia: Authenticity, Nationalism, and Diaspora. In: MELUS
32, 4. 11–31. Nyman, Jopi (2009): Cultural Contact and the Contemporary Culi‐
nary Memoir: Home, Memory and Identity. In: Madhur, Jaffrey/Abu-Jaber, Diana
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the Kirana stores (governmental low cost shop)46 and, when they had a lit‐
tle of money, vegetables from the tribal market. The way they got money
was limited. Some got seasonal work in Koya or Lambada lands for a
meagre salary, 80 to 100 INR per day according to the task; women were
less paid, and the number of work days rarely more than ten per season.
IDPs living close to a paper factory might be employed, but the hard work
conditions prevented them to be regular: they worked 24 hours (8AM to
8AM) with two breaks for meals, for which they were paid 200 INR. In
order to save the 40 INR requested for the rickshaw, they left the settle‐
ment at 4.30 AM and returned the next day around noon. Low wages and
work conditions testify their exploitation by the population of the region.
Moreover, the milieu in which they were living, due to its high degrada‐
tion, offered little possibilities to complement their revenues. According to
the location of settlements, IDPs might collect flowers and seeds of mahua
tree, resin of sal tree, honey or timber, but the amount they got mirrors
again their exploitation by brokers. In one of the settlements where men
were squaring off some trunks, the pedda explained that, for each timber
resold between 2000 to 3000 INR, they were paid between 600 and 800
INR.47 In contrast, the IDPs installed since 2006, had more opportunity to
get money, notably by selling cattle, pigs and goats.
The food pattern of Dorla-s and Muria-s/Maria-s is based on two meals
a day, one between 9 and 11 AM and the second after 7 PM. IDPs’ eating
pattern follows this rule, but some families complained to be obliged to
skip one meal, and sometimes, to beg rice from hut to hut. “If we have
money, we buy a few onions, tomatoes, potatoes, aubergines, lady fingers,
(eds.): Auto/Biography Studies 24, 2. 282–298. Srinivas, Tulasi (2006): As Mother
Made It. The Cosmopolitan Indian Family. Authentic Food and the Construction of
Cultural Utopia. In: International Journal of Sociology of the Family 32, 2. 191–
221. Sutton, David E. (2001): Remembrance of Repasts. An Anthropology of
Food and Memory. Oxford. In this context, it was related to the adaptation of seed
varieties to cultivation in the forest milieu (soil poor in micronutrients, rain-fed
cultivation) and, regarding rice, to its higher nutritional quality.
46 In June 2013, they bought rice at 15 INR per kg and tur dhal (pigeon peas) at 45
INR per kg. In a settlement whose the IDPs had benefited from the help of the
sarpanch of a village to establish temporary themselves, they bought rice and
grains from the Koya farmers of this village, who employed them seasonally.
47 This transaction is entirely illegal. When we left the settlement, we crossed some
rickshaws at top speed which transported several pieces of wood destined to house
building. The severe regulation on the tree cutting which causes high wood cost,
has favoured mafia networks which use tribal or forest dwellers.
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and rice, but if we haven’t, we have to look for bamboo stem, boddu kora
(wild green leave), tubers, and wild animals (deer, rabbit, rat, varan, and
red ants).” The kitchen gardens, present in all the settlements, provide
some green leaves and vegetables. However, during the survey, conducted
at the end of summer, no vegetables were available. The visit of huts con‐
firmed the scarcity of food storage and the poor diet, quite often composed
of rice and boddu kora.
The main food-related issue is much more scarcity than unbalance, no‐
tably for IDPs established in 2006 as the cereals they cultivated from their
traditional seeds are more nutritional than the rice bought in Kirana shop.
On the one hand, the cereals are more varied, and on the other hand, they
are de-husked manually so that they retain a large part of their nutritive
quality. They attributed to the rice from Chhattisgarh nutritive values: “If
we eat this rice in the morning, we are not hungry for the whole day, but if
we eat PDS rice, we have no energy to work.” However, the cereals and
grains they cultivate in Andhra Pradesh’ forest are only red rice, maize,
and thur dhal, while in Chhattisgarh, they grew a large range of varieties:
red rice, maize, sorghum, small millet, pigeon peas, black gram, red lentils
and green gram dhal. The abandonment of cereal and pulse varieties, for
which I did not succeed to know the reasons, is obviously detrimental to
their diet, as it deprives them from diversified micronutrients and amino-
acids. Such a diet, poor in proteins and micronutrients, is not compensated
by animal proteins: milk, considered the food of the calves, is not drunk
and used by these tribal people, and meat from domesticated animals
(beef, pig, hens) is consumed only occasionally at biographical and reli‐
gious celebrations. The hunting, essentially practised at periods corre‐
sponding to the sowing of lands, provides some protein resources, but in
such a degraded environment, the availability of animals remains very fee‐
ble. Interestingly, when I questioned a group of ANMs in a CHC about
IDPs’ hygiene, all their responses revolved around the food habits that
they qualified as unclean, and denounced as responsible in diarrhoea. The
foodstuffs they mentioned were dried fishes and meat of wild animal.
These food items, when they were present in the huts, were preserved
hung above the stove and exposed to the smoke fire. While these nurses
have also the role to educate the people on health including nutrition, their
perception on tribal food, obviously, questions their knowledge of nutri‐
tion. Their representation of the IDPs as Others, those who hold “a non-
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normative and socially subordinate status,”48 was decipherable in their re‐
marks, not only on food, but also on health-related subject and delivery.
Although food was mentioned as a main need, conditions such as
scrawny bodies and children’s swollen bellies weakness were never ut‐
tered. Symptoms of weakness, headache and dizziness, as well as com‐
plaints of low blood pressure were never related to a state of undernour‐
ishment. According to the literature on these tribes, these symptoms are
perceived as caused by evil spirit attacks.49 Interviews of doctors and the
lab technicians of CHCs and Bhadrachalam hospital revealed that the
haemoglobin concentration in the blood of the IDPs who consult with
complaints of weakness, headache, dizziness, etc. is on average half of the
normal level (in India), i.e., 5 to 6g/l. It is worth mentioning that these
tribal populations are identified as being subjected to have genetic disor‐
ders favouring anemia, such as to be bearer of the Dully-negative pheno‐
type, a condition which does not protect from the infection of Plasmodium
falciparum,50 or to have sickle cell trait, a genetic abnormally of
haemoglobin resulting by curved shape red cells, more prevalent in Maria-
s than in Dorla-s.51 Food scarcity, in such conditions aggravates anaemia,
and consequently, favours infections and mortality, notably of infants and
children.52
Among the sample, the main infections which were identified, except
for wounds sometimes seriously infected, are tuberculosis (two cases, both
treated by CHCs’ medical staff) and respiratory infections. As the rainy
season was begun, many people complained on fever, that they related to
malaria, a disease that they feared due to its high mortality. The mortality
caused by malaria is all the more high so as the people are weakened by
undernutrition coupled with hard work, and may have genetic blood ab‐
48 Seidman, Steven (2013): Defilement and Disgust: Theorizing the Other. In: Amer‐
ican Journal of Cultural Sociology 1. 3–25.
49 Grigson (1938).
50 Varma, Ishwar C./Archna, Thakur (1993): Duffy Blood Group Determinants and
Malaria in India. In: Journal of Genetics 72, 1. 15–19.
51 Negi, R.S. (1962): The Incidence of Sickle-Cell Trait in Two Bastar Tribes. In:
Man 62. 84–86. Negi, R.S. (1964): New Incidence of Sickle-Cell Trait in Bastar.
In: Man 64. 171–174.
52 Arnold, Fred /Parasuraman, Sulabha/Arokiasamy, P./Kothari, Monica (2009): Nu‐
trition in India. National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) India, 2005–06. Mum‐




normality. Two IDP deaths caused by malaria were mentioned during the
survey. While the number of deaths mentioned by IDPs was of four adults,
that of infants and children were higher. Two families declared having lost
a baby, four a child, and one, three children among them, two in Andhra
Pradesh. It was difficult to know the cause of the death. The mothers men‐
tioned fits, fevers or respiratory distress, symptoms they related to evil
spirit attacks for which they consulted only the traditional practitioner. The
traditional practitioner (wadde), when he is available in, or close to, the
settlement, is always consulted. Only if the treatment fails and the disease
is too debilitating for working, they turn to medical centres. But IDPs
were reluctant to visit them. They complained that the medical staff was
little attentive to them and have to wait hours before being treated. Some
mentioned that they were obliged to be accompanied by an IDP who
speaks Telugu, and other emphasised that they had to go to another centre,
because the centre had not the means (doctor, exploratory tools, medica‐
ments, etc.) to treat them. This last point was confirmed while I was in a
CHC: an IDP youth with a leg seriously inflamed up to the groin caused
by a snake bite, arrived from a PHC where he was refused and, without
the intervention of the president of the NGO partner of MdM, would have
to go to Bhadrachalam Hospital (20 km away) under the pretext that the
centre did not have anti-venom serum. The local NGO’s responsible, final‐
ly, succeeded to convince the CHC’s staff to hospitalise the young patient
who was put on a drip containing anti-venom. If I did not get any response
about the reason the CHC’s staff attempted to refuse the young patient, it
seems to me that it was to avoid the occupation of a bed which would have
necessitated more care and surveillance, notably during the night.
As I could experience in the PHC and CHC I visited, I was never invit‐
ed to see the wards, simply because they were empty. Such medical atti‐
tude and limitation is not only detrimental to the patient’s health, but it
also increases the transportation expenditure. The cost of transportation, in
a situation of total deprivation, is an obstacle to visit medical centres. In
addition to these difficulties, their illegal presence in Andhra Pradesh,
even though they never mentioned this criterion, might be also a reason
that thwarts the recourse to medical centres. The medical staff of the di‐
verse visited centres did not show any empathy to the IDPs, and seemed
ignored their living conditions. They considered IDPs as bad patients:
“They come only at the last stage of the disease, so that they complain that
our medicines are not working. They are not confident in our medicines and
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they do not take them properly. As soon as they leave the PHC, they throw
them away and go to their traditional practitioner.”
The medical staff perceived them as “not civilized” people:
“they want to live as they always lived, inside the forest, far from our word.”
Conclusion
Despite the multiple difficulties to survive in such a hostile environment,
the pedda-s were optimist on the improvement of the living conditions of
their settlements. The fact that NGOs (MdM, ECO and NGO partner of
MdM) helped them, even though their programme does not cover their
need in food and water, allowed them to feel protected from the repressive
attitude of the Andhra Pradesh government, and to expect some social ad‐
vantages attributed to the people of Andhra Pradesh. IDPs consider
Andhra Pradesh as a living place better than Chhattisgarh. This is not only
that they feel more in security, but especially, as commonly pointed out
during the interviews with those who came on the invitation of the pedda,
for its development and its social welfare policy. Although dwelling inside
the forest, the IDPs are not isolated. They maintain the contact with the
outside world through cell phones recharged in the village close to their
settlement or, in some cases, thanks to a solar panel they brought from
Chhattisgarh, or through weekly tribal markets. In these markets, they
come in contact with IDPs, installed in Andhra Pradesh since several
years, who have benefited from governmental advantages (bore well, ra‐
tion cards, anganvadi,53 integration in schools, etc.), through the NGOs’
plea. The IDPs do not call themselves Dorla or Muria/Maria, they adopt
the name of Guttikoya. This name, supposedly stemmed from human right
defenders (NGO, academic or lawer),54 defines a scheduled tribe refer‐
6.
53 An anganvadi is a crèche for pre-school children until five year old. Launched by
the Indian government in 1975, it is a part of the ICDS (Integrated Child Develop‐
ment Services) scheme aiming to combat child hunger and malnutrition. The pro‐
gramme, in principle, provides nutritious food to children as well as to girl adoles‐
cents, and pregnant and lactating women.
54 Despite my attempts, I did not succeed to know how the change of name was
done. Remarkably, these IDPs are called in Khammam district, Guttikoya, not on‐




enced in the list of notified tribes of Andhra Pradesh and, in principle,
covered by welfare schemes. By this way, they expect not only to get so‐
cial and economic advantages, but also the right to live in the forest and
cultivate the land they cleared out. However, in waiting to get recognition
from the Andhra Pradesh government, they have to survive in a harsh en‐
vironment which deprives them from essentials such drinking water and
food, and for the children, from schooling, and affects their health weak‐
ened by hard work, and notably for some women, by psychological dis‐
tress resulting from traumatic events experienced in Chhattisgarh (mur‐
ders, rape, beating, etc.), during the migration (repetitive displacement,
police’s enquiry, rejection, disease and death) and in the new settlement
(death and disease, difficulties to find food, family separation).
The Andhra Pradesh/Telangana government is not willing to provide
assistance to the recent settlements as IDPs represent a source of problems
in terms of security due to the spectre of Naxalite activity and of environ‐
ment degradation. Its solution is to control the frontiers with Chhattisgarh
and to ignore the IDPs’ living conditions. Facilitating their integration into
the welfare programmes would definitively attract more migrants from
Chhattisgarh, due to the fact that the state of Andhra Pradesh is perceived
as more economically and socially developed. Such afflux of population
would endanger the stability of the region, Khammam is not only one of
the most backward districts of the state with around 20 percent of tribal
and 80 percent of rural populations, but also a region which was the siege
of many political dissentions around rights to land, and is today in the
heart of a debate about the Polavaram irrigation project, several times
stopped by financial constraints, and disagreement between the three con‐
cerned states or by activists (Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh/
Telangana). The dam on the Godaveri River at Polavaram, once complet‐
ed, is expected to displace 276 villages with a population of 300,000 per‐
sons among them half are tribal people. While 56% of the project is com‐
pleted, activists and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes are al‐
ready fighting the Telangana government against its failures to compen‐
sate displaced people which contravene the the Forest Rights Act, 2006,
and the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Act, 2013. They renounce the
low quality of lands when they are distributed and the localisation of tribal
people which deprive them to access to the forest produces. Such a dis‐
placement of population belonging mostly to the tribes as well as its ex‐
ploitation by government officials and decision makers leads obviously to
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the development of activist movement and Naxalite reprisals, and thus, to
a tribal people's future ever more precarious and insecure.55
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Conflict and Environment in Sri Lanka, a Complex Nexus
Anthony Goreau-Ponceaud1
Introduction: a New Type of War
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, a new type of war has engulfed the
global South, threatening the security of the rest of the world. The new
wars, which are mostly internal and regional forms of conflicts, have
threatened progressively the lives of civilians more than those of combat‐
ants. Moreover, these new wars are frequently described as a complex hu‐
manitarian emergency. Regularly depicted as a post-Cold War phe‐
nomenon, complex humanitarian emergencies are characterized by a mul‐
tiplicity of man-made causes, often infused with political dissent and pro‐
longed violence.2 The Sri Lankan case study is an example among many
others of these new wars. For the best part of three decades (from 1983 to
2009), Sri Lankan society was torn apart by a war between successive
governments and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil
insurgent group fighting for a separate homeland for the Tamil minority.3
The conflict generated large-scale refugee flight over several decades,
contributing to the formation of a substantial Tamil diaspora4 of around a
1.
1 Geographer, senior lecturer at the University of Bordeaux, UMR LAM 5115 “Sci‐
ences Po” Bordeaux.
2 Duffield, M. (1994): Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism.
In: IDS Bulletin 25, 4. 37–45. Duffield, M. (2001): Global Governance and the
New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London. Duffield, M.
(2007): Development, Security and Unending War. Cambridge.
3 McDowell, C. (1996): A Tamil Asylum Diaspora. Sri Lankan Migration Settlement
and Politics in Switzerland. New York. Fuglerud, Ø. (1999): Life on the Outside.
The Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism. London.
4 In this paper the term diaspora is used as an analytical category to describe the mi‐
gration processes and transnational connections of the approximately one million
Sri Lankan Tamils displaced all over the world. The usage of the term diaspora im‐
plies that Tamil migrants refer back to a homeland. Diasporas are not static entities
but heterogeneous and dynamic formations. As Brubaker writes: “In sum, rather
than speak of ‘a diaspora’ or ‘the diaspora’ as an entity, a bounded group, an ethno
demographic or ethno cultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and certainly more pre‐
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million people.5 Like other diasporas from conflict-ridden societies, this
transnational population has kept close contact with relatives and commu‐
nities left behind and with political developments in the erstwhile home‐
land. This sizeable Tamil diaspora usually funded the insurgency driven
by guilt about those they had left behind. This millions strong diaspora is a
reservoir for separatists aspirations and has been willing to fund violence
in the past. A new generation has been politicized by the final months of
the conflict. This new war is also a good example to study the relation‐
ships between war and environment. Academic researchers, environmental
organisations and advocacy movements in Sri Lanka, while working and
campaigning on problems and issues pertaining to the South, appear to
have been either ignorant or silent on the ecological consequences of the
war. The paucity of data also means that we will not be able to present
quantitative information; we will, however, attempt to paint a qualitative
picture of the consequences of the war on the environment.
During the Eelam Wars6, there was considerable concern about the use
of unconventional weapons and specifically chemical weapons (such as
the utilization of acid, thermobaric bomb, cluster bomb munitions or white
phosphorous), bombs and mines. At the same time deforestation took
place during the 1980s and early 1990s when Government soldiers cleared
cise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on.”
Brubaker, R. (2005): The Diaspora Diaspora. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies 28. 1–
19. 13.
5 Fuglerud (1999). Goreau-Ponceaud, A. (2014): Ganesha Chaturthi and the Sri
Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Paris: Inventing Strategies of Visibility and Legitimacy
in a Plural Mono-Cultural Society. In: Gallo, E. (ed.): Migration and Religion in
Europe. Comparative Perspectives on South Asian Experiences. Farnham. 211–231.
6 Eelam Wars are the 4 stages of the Sri Lankan civil War that took place from July
1983 to May 2009. Nobody knows how many thousands died in the final week of
the war. As mention by Frances Harrison, “the world turn a blind eye to the tens of
thousands civilian deaths that took place in the north-east Sri Lanka in the space of
just five months in 2009” (2012:6). The winning strategy used by the government
of Sri Lanka involved scorched-earth tactics, blurring the distinction between civil‐
ians and combatants, and enforcing a media blackout. The human cost of the “Sri
Lankan option” as this winning strategy is referred in the academic circle is terrible.
Since the defeat of the Tigers there’s been no attempt to address the underlying
causes of the conflict. Sri Lanka is a small country but according to some accounts
there are more than 200,000 internally displaced Tamils, 40,000 war widows in the
northern town of Jaffna alone, according to the UN population figures there would
appear to be well over 100,000 people missing as a result of the final five months
stage of the war (Harrison, 2012).
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the rainforests because they served as refuges for rebel forces. This also
displaced small-scale farmers. Between 1990 and 2005 Sri Lanka had one
of the highest deforestation rates of primary forest in the world with more
than 18 percent of the remaining forest cover lost in that period.7 Recon‐
struction efforts in the wake of the 2004 tsunami also increased the pres‐
sure on the country’s forests. All these warfare practices are not only at‐
tacked but also weaponized environment. In a Kantian framework, the nat‐
ural world is deserving of respect and the natural world and its contents
have inherent worth, thus meriting an attitude of respect from human be‐
ings.8 From this affirmation of biocentrism,9 human beings ought not di‐
rectly and deliberately destroy the natural world in pursuit of political, so‐
cial or military objectives. In a biocentric pattern, how to immunize envi‐
ronment from warfare activity? War inevitably distorts the ways in which
humans are dependent on the natural world. With the Sri Lankan case
study I will show that war undermines the context of conditions for live‐
able life, delivering destruction to the natural world.10 This destruction oc‐
curs as the result of a failure to recognize not only the way humans are
dependent on the environment but the way humans are inserted into a web
of interdependences with all other life forms.
Recently, environmental historians have shown an interest in war and
its effects on the natural environment, but their work essentially focuses
on World War II and the nuclear era.11 These studies often highlight the
links between the conduct of war and industrial and agricultural practices
in a society. The vast majority of work on the relationship between war
and environment focuses on military, political and economic aspects, but
largely neglects ecological upheavals – that is, changes in the interactions
between organisms and their environment – and the long-term environ‐
mental changes caused by the evolution of social and natural relations be‐
tween humans and ecosystems, which accompanied the conflict. Studying
7 Lindström (2011).
8 Taylor, P.-W. (1986): Respects of Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics.
Princeton.
9 Biocentrism is the belief that the Earth not only has a value beyond its use value to
humans (intrinsic value) but also that humans ought not to act in such a way as to
interfere in natural processes.
10 Butler, J. (2009): Frames of War: When is Life Givable? New York.
11 Tucker, R.-P./Russell, E. (eds.): (2004): Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an
Environmental History of War. Corvallis. Closmann, C.-E. (ed.) (2009): War and
the Environment: Military Destruction in the Modern Age. College Station.
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the relationships between war and environment in Sri Lanka is also inter‐
esting regarding the role of religion in the production of ethical principles
(Buddhism and Hinduism). One theme within contemporary environmen‐
talist discourse concerns the idea that the way in which people treat their
natural environment can be related to their religious beliefs and practices.
We have to compare the moral status of the environment and how it is pro‐
duced by these two major religions of the island and interpreted in a con‐
text of war.12 My paper will be divided into three parts.
After describing why Sri Lanka is particularly suitable for dealing with
the subject, I will analyse in my second part the impacts of war on human
and natural environment. In this part, I will show that in a process of in‐
flicting damage on an enemy whose survival depended on rural natural re‐
source based economy (the Jaffna peninsula), the natural world became a
direct object of attack. The destruction directed at the paddy fields, forests
and jungles of Vanni (Northern Province) treated the environment as a
mere means to an even more destructive end. Furthermore, the use of
landmines transformed the nature itself into a weapon. Step by step, dur‐
ing the Sri Lankan civil war, nature is transformed from a relational part‐
ner into a weapon. Large-scale population displacement linked to the war
also leads to environmental change, disrupting local ecosystems and liveli‐
hoods. The conflict had detrimental impacts on the environment. The bio‐
diversity, natural resource base and wealth of the State have been signifi‐
cantly harmed by bombings, planting of landmines and aerial attacks. Ele‐
phants and their terrain, one of the most fiercely guarded wildlife reserves
of Sri Lanka (such in Wilpattu national park) of Sri Lanka, have been ad‐
versely affected. Human habitation has also been through dreadful ruins
and degradation and has been a cause of serious concern to the govern‐
ment and people.
The civil war in Sri Lanka (1983–2009) saw massive migrations
amongst the civilian population and widespread damage to villages and
towns. The events of the war changed the cultural landscape and, in the
12 The Hindu tradition has received much attention within religious environmentalist
literature with commentators arguing for its innate sensitivity towards the natural
world. For many scholars, Hinduism and Buddhism have great promise as a basis
for an environmental ethic, because it teaches a concern for the other animals and
nature as well as our fellow humans. Both Buddhist and Hinduist world view is
holistic and seeks harmony at all levels: within each person, among persons in so‐
ciety, and within the universe, of which humans are but a part.
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same time, the cultural landscape influenced the course of the war. By cul‐
tural landscape, I am referring to everything from settlement patterns,
house types, transportation networks, land use patterns, and urban mor‐
phology to less tangible elements of iconography and perceived meaning.
The variable character of this landscape played an important role in struc‐
turing the course of the war. Fieldworks for this study were conducted dur‐
ing the summer of 2015 in the Eastern Province of the Island and between
2010 and 2015 both in France and in India among the refugees from Sri
Lanka (Sri Lankan Tamil links to the sixty million fellow-Tamils who live
just across the water in the southern tip in the Indian mainland made the
Sinhalese insecure. A majority with a minority complex is how many have
described them). These fieldworks included numerous semi-structured in‐
terviews regarding the landscape histories of villages, towns and patterns
of flights and displacement13. These findings revealed that a clear relation‐
ship existed between the civil war and the cultural landscape created what
we could name a warscape. As defined by Korf/Engeller/Tobias (2010),
warscapes are “landscapes characterized by brutal violence, political
volatility, physical insecurity and the disruptions and instabilities that exist
in many civil war zones that different social actors navigate through.”14
The Sri Lankan warscape was not confined to the territories of Sri Lanka,
but extended into a transnational space linked to a refugee diaspora. On
the one hand, the war caused dramatic changes in the morphology of the
cultural landscape, creating three distinct landscapes (pre-war, wartime,
and post-war), while on the other hand the cultural landscape went far to
structure the character of the war.15 In such context, the certainty of uncer‐
tainty has become a fundamental reality in the lives of social actors (for
those who made a political choice and were involved in the LTTE as com‐
batants and are now living abroad as refugees all they want is to find
somewhere quiet to live in obscurity – as far away from their fellow-
Tamils because of the fear of betrayal).
13 During these fieldworks, I conducted semi-structured interviews with refugees
both in India and France and former combatants in order to reconstruct the land‐
scape history and gain more detailed local knowledge about the history of the war
and its effects. I did this research with the assistance of a local guide and transla‐
tor.
14 Korf, B./Engeler, M./Tobias, H. (2010): The Geography of Warscape. In: Third
World Quaterly 31, 3. 385-399.
15 Korf/Engeller/Tobias (2010).
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In my third part, I will analyse the impacts of human and natural envi‐
ronments on war. The military victory achieved in the north over the Lib‐
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam has created an appearance of peace in the
country, but minority ethnic communities have a strong feeling of dissatis‐
faction since their control over their lands has been reduced. It is feared
that the continued military control of the area is set to provide opportuni‐
ties for businesses, including foreign investment that will take control of
the land and other natural resources. Sri Lanka’s military is dominating the
reconstruction of the Northern Province, weakening international humani‐
tarian efforts and worsening tensions with the ethnic Tamil majority. Since
the war ended in 2009, hundreds of millions of dollars have poured into
the province, but the local populations, mostly left destitute by the con‐
flict, have seen only slight improvements in their lives. Instead of giving
way to a process of inclusive, accountable development, the military is in‐
creasing its economic role, controlling land and seemingly establishing it‐
self as a permanent, occupying presence. In the North there is one Sri
Lankan soldier for every eleven citizens. According to Harrison, the Sri
Lankan military has actually expanded since the end of the war, adding
100,000 men to its ranks. Combined with what many Tamils see as an ef‐
fort to impose Sinhala and Buddhist culture across the whole of Sri Lanka
and a failure to address many social aspects of rebuilding a society after
conflict, these policies risk reviving the violence of past decades. Further‐
more, the tsunami that hit the island in December 2004 led to a death toll
of 35,322 and displaced 516,150 people. In 2005 plans for rebuilding the
country suggested the expulsion of all coastal fisher people. Their land
was to be used for the development of tourism zones and modernized
cities, designed for rich elite. It was also intended to switch into large-
scale industrial fishing that would replace the small-scale, beach-based
fishing on which people’s livelihoods depended. Labour protection laws
were to be revised to enable the free hiring and firing of workers, since it
was assumed that investors were unlikely to come to countries where
labour was protected by law. In Sri Lanka, the ethnic bias and identity po‐
litics embedded in land policies have a long history.
The last part will conclude that environment is a quasi-person in Sri
Lanka which has an agency. These human and natural disasters are a real
collapse of everyday life that can create the conditions for an unprecedent‐
ed explosion of different dynamics (social, political, environmental and
economic) dynamics. As Bruno Latour writes, it is even possible that in
such contexts, to experience the disturbing and electrifying feeling that
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things could turn differently: in this case, “we are no longer sure about
what we means.”16
The Sri Lanka Conflict
The conflict in Sri Lanka is neither a simple ethnic contest nor a mere
two-sided affair. Studies from the fields of political economy, geography,
anthropology, and sociology emphasize that the titanic military struggle
between the Government of Sri-Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the product of a continuing series of alienat‐
ing and isolating moves by GoSL and escalating responses from the
LTTE. Sri Lanka has remained in the global map of conflict for more than
two decades. Since 1983, displacement in Sri Lanka has been embedded in
intractable conflict which has produced an ongoing condition of insecuri‐
ty.17 What began as a conflict between the Sinhala and the Tamil commu‐
nities gradually grew into a demand for the creation of separate homeland
for the Tamils. After almost three decades of brutal armed conflict, on 19
May 2009, the GoSL declared victory over the LTTE. The final stages of
the conflict saw numerous allegations of violations of international hu‐
manitarian law and international human rights law. In May 2009, Sri
Lankan military forces finally declared victory over the Tamil Tigers. The
deadly conflict cost the lives of an estimated 80,000–100,000 people in‐
cluding Army soldiers, Tamil fighters and civilians. By 2007, the civil war
had displaced more than 460,000 people in the North-East region of Sri
Lanka. The final stages of the war alone created an estimated 300,000 in‐
ternally displaced persons.
2.
16 Latour, B. (2005): Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor Network
Theory. Oxford. 6.
17 The 1983 pogrom – generally taken to mark the beginning of the war in the coun‐
try – was a major turning point in the conflict and it is considered by the Tamil
Diaspora as the beginning of the war and as the beginning of the life in exile.
Tamils call it “Black July”. In the capital, Sinhalese mobs used the killing of the
thirteen soldiers as the trigger for a pre-planned pogrom. They attacked Tamil
shops and homes, burning them and hacking people to death in the streets. The ri‐
oters came, armed with electoral lists as well as machetes, so they could distin‐
guish who was Tamil.
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Figure 1: Ecosystems and population in Sri Lanka18
18 Legend: The question of “who was here first” assumes prime importance in the is‐
land, and historical writings of the colonial masters and the local historians have
played a crucial role in defining the identity. As pointed out by Spencer, “both ‘of‐
ficial history’ and ‘opposition history’ agree on the basic terms of the argument:
present conflicts can only be explained by reference to the past. The war which
has been fought between the armed Tamil separatists and the Sinhala-dominated
government has been accompanied by rhetorical wars fought over archaeological
sites, place-name etymologies, and the interpretation of ancient inscription.”
(Spencer, J. (1990): Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict. London. 3.)
The Northern and Eastern Provinces are characterized by key distinctions in terms
of LTTE control, social organization, population composition, and conflict im‐
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pacts. The community of northern Tamils, particularly those from Jaffna, held pre-
eminence in terms of caste (vellalar), culture, and preference under British rule
(Bush 1993). The LTTE has always made its base in the Northern Province, first in
the largest population center, Jaffna, and then in the Wanni region, with their head‐
quarters in the Kilionchchi District just to the south. While Jaffna and the Wanni
once had substantial Muslim majorities, these populations were displaced by
LTTE fighters during the 1990s. The conflict in the north has always been charac‐
terized by clearly delineated lines of control. By contrast, Eastern Province has
been characterized by considerably greater population heterogeneity, a more com‐
plex system of overlapping political and military control, and a much less conven‐
tional and diffuse mode of conflict.
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According to the 2001 census, Sri Lanka‘s population composition by eth‐
nicity/nationality was 74 percent Sinhalese (primarily Buddhist), 18 per‐
cent Tamil (primarily Hindu)19, and 7 percent Muslim.20 Total population
was about 20 million. A substantial proportion of the country‘s population
19 There are two distinct groups of Tamils in Sri Lanka: the Sri Lankan Tamils and
the Up-country Tamils who are the descendants of bonded labourers brought from
southern India in the 19th century by the British colonial authorities to work on
plantations.
20 Muslim is considered an ethnic group in Sri Lanka. The Muslim population con‐
sists of two separate groups, descendants of pre-colonial Arab traders who speak
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lives within two compressed coastal ecosystems, a moist plain in the south
and a dry zone in the northeast (figure 1). In Sri Lanka, ethnicity some‐
times overlaps with and sometimes diverges from religion: Tamils can be
Christian or Hindu, and Christians can be Sinhala or Tamil. Moreover, as
mentioned by Goodhand/Klem/Korf ethno-nationalism holds an uneven
relationship with religion.21
The origins of the civil war have their roots in the power relations dur‐
ing the colonial era of the multi-ethnic state.22 The country has a long his‐
tory of communal politics operated along these ethnic divides, resulting in
several rounds of ethnic violence since 1915.23 The transformation pro‐
cesses after independence from the British Commonwealth cultivated the
tendency toward ethnic polarization between the Singhalese majority and
the Tamil minority in the east and northern parts of the former Ceylon.
The broad development leading to war in Sri Lanka can be traced to the
profound alteration of the demographic landscape after independence from
British colonial rule in 1948. As mentioned by Brun/Lund,24 in the Eastern
region in particular, the post-independence government’s settlement pol‐
icies and colonization schemes had involved moving large number of
peasant families from the largely Sinhalese Southern Province to areas
bordering the Tamil and Muslim dominated Northern and Eastern
provinces respectively. More precisely GoSL policies with respect to pop‐
ulation and development in Eastern Province have been characterized first
by a regime of ethnic transmigration of Sinhalese populations, and second
by an effort to segregate all three ethnic groups into segregated zones of
Tamil and live in the north and east of the island (particularly in Ampara and Trin‐
comalee, formerly in Jaffna) and descendants of colonial-era Malay migrants who
live on the south coast. Members of both groups also maintain a significant pres‐
ence in Colombo.
21 Goodhand, J./Klem, B./Korf, B. (2009): Religion, Conflict and Boundary Politics
in Sri Lanka. In: The European Journal of Development Research 21, 5. 679–698.
22 Spencer (1990).
23 While the ethnic divide traces back to the presence of two separate Sinhalese and
Tamil kingdoms at the time of colonization, the first grievances emerged with
British policies favouring Tamils in colonial schools and civil service jobs.
24 Brun, C./Lund, R. (2008): Making Home During Crisis: Post-Tsunami Recovery
in a Context of War, Sri Lanka. In: Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 29, 3.
274–287.
Conflict and Environment in Sri Lanka, a Complex Nexus
237
ethnic concentration.25 Upland areas of Eastern Province have always had
a Sinhalese majority population.
In the immediate post-colonial period GoSL engaged in a number of
major irrigation and flood control projects on the Maya Oya, Gal Oya, and
the Mahaveli Rivers.26 These projects provided preferential water access
to upland Sinhalese populations and served as a platform for programs en‐
couraging the systematic migration of Sinhalese populations into cleared
jungle and populated Tamil – or Muslim-majority areas.27 When the eco‐
nomic liberalization measures were introduced after 197728, especially
Mahaweli river development and settlement project29, the conflict as‐
sumed a new phase. The Mahaweli project, which covers about one-third
25 Routray, B.-P./Singh, A.-K. (2007): The Pawns of War. In: South Asia Intelligence
Review 5, 12.
26 Peebles, P. (1990): Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka.
In: Journal of Asian Studies 49, 1. 30–55.
27 Peebles (1990). Korf, B./Engel, S. (2006): On the Incentives of Violence: Greed
and Pride in Sri Lanka‘s Civil War. In: South Asia Economic Journal 7, 1. 99–116.
Korf, B. (2005): Rethinking the Greed–Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the
Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka. In: Journal of Peace Research 42, 3. 201–
217.
28 Economic liberalization – as a politico-economic phenomenon – has been a con‐
tributory factor in the escalation of the ethnic conflict since 1977. 1977 stands out
as a landmark year in Sri Lanka’s post-independence political and economic histo‐
ry. The newly elected government led by Jayewardene’s UNP created history by
changing the political system of the country toward a centralized power system
and introduced economic liberalization policies that were a contrast to import-sub‐
stitution policies of the Bandaranaike coalition that governed the country from
1970 to 1977. Actually, there are many links between economic liberalization,
changes in the governing structure and ethnic conflict. Another thesis to under‐
stand the escalation of the conflict is that the combined effect of economic and po‐
litical changes created grounds for a sense of alienation and counter-nationalism
among the Tamils in the north and east. A different position found in the literature
is that the conflict itself led to economic disparities between the northeast and the
rest of the country rather than economic liberalization per se creating the ethnic
conflict.
29 In 1963, the Government, with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organi‐
zation and United Nations Development Program, launched the first mapping of
the area in preparation for a huge development project in the Mahaweli river basin.
It was found that the area had enough water, land and space to cater successfully
for a resettlement program of vast magnitude. The economic liberalization policies
and programs of the post-1977 governments required an authoritarian regime,




of the country’s surface area, has played an important part in the country’s
development policies, as a strategy of solving some of Sri Lanka’s demo‐
graphic and economic problems. In fact, the aims of the Mahaweli Devel‐
opment Project were to achieve national sufficiency in rice, to stimulate
production of non-traditional crops, to create income generating activities
in agriculture, and to construct a power capacity large enough to enable in‐
tensive cultivation through trans-basin irrigation.30 The settlement pack‐
age was characterized by central planning, implementation, management,
and monitoring under the Mahaweli Board. Land in the Mahaweli project
was given to three different types of settlers. For several decades the
project has been marketed as a way to bring Singhalese civilization back
to the north-central of Sri Lanka. There is no doubt that the ulterior motive
behind the colonizing of Tamil areas with Sinhalese peasants was to even‐
tually transform a Tamil majority province into a Sinhala one. The transfer
of the Sinhalese population from the south to the predominantly Tamil dry
zones under this scheme increased Tamil fears. Of the 75,000 households
settled under the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project (AMDP),
only 1.9 percent were Hindu and 2.9 percent were Muslim. Some would
argue that the project was a direct cause of the intensified ethnic tensions
between the Singhalese and Tamils in 1983. A consequence of the settle‐
ment schemes and movement of people was major shifts in demographic
and ethnic composition, creating Singhalese majority in many constituen‐
cies which earlier had been dominated by Muslims or Tamils.31 Such pop‐
ulation shifts and the accompanying revision of administrative boundaries,
and consequently electoral representation, made the Tamils in the North‐
ern and Eastern provinces feel that the Sri Lankan state was treating them
as secondary citizens and diminishing their life chances.
The set of conflicts included socio-economic aspects (such as depriva‐
tions of land, income, employment and education) and, among other fields
related to cultural policies. Through policies related to language32 – most
30 Mahewely Authority Annual Report http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/
paperspresented/annual-report-mahaweli-authority-2014.pdf.
31 For a discussion on the dry zone colonization, see Brun, C./Lund, R. (2009): Un‐
packing the Narrative of a National Housing Policy in Sri Lanka. Norwegian Jour‐
nal of Geography 63, 1. 10-22. And Peebles (1990).
32 Bandarage, A. (2007): The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity,
Political Economy. New York.
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importantly the Sinhala Only Act of 195633 –, citizenship, university ad‐
mission and development, aimed at discarding the colonial heritage and
British/Christian domination, the minorities were gradually marginalized.
For many Tamil immigrants the destruction of the public library in Jaffna
in 1981 was a key moment.34 It was seen as a symbolic expression not on‐
ly of discrimination against the Tamil culture, but also as a will to erode
Tamil civilization. One of the implications of this perception is the impor‐
tance of Tamil language as a portable cultural asset and the maintenance
of Tamil art (such as Bharatanatyam35). This is shown in the establishment
of numerous Tamil schools and Tamil culture clubs in the diaspora such as
in France.36
The marginalization of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka led to a radical‐
ization of parts of the Tamil youth. Protests against the Sinhalesation of
the state were staged mainly by Tamils from the north and developed into
a LTTE-led militant struggle for Tamil self-determination. The LTTE
claimed a monopoly position in the field of the Tamil resistance move‐
ments to fight against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. The LTTE declares
itself a religiously neutral organization, fighting for a secular state. The
LTTE has gained a global reputation for its tactical success in overcoming
a significant resource and legitimacy gap, for narrowing this gap through a
highly globalized network, and for its ruthlessness in leveraging the re‐
sources of the Tamil populations and maintaining control. In addition to
governing, until recently, large stretches of northeast Sri Lanka, the LTTE
has maintained a standing army, intelligence agencies, an elite women‘s
battalion (the black tigers), the world‘s largest non-state navy (the sea
tigers), and more recently a rudimentary air force that staged a number of
audacious attacks on the Sri Lankan armed forces. The so-called Eelam
33 The newly elected government led by Bandaranaike initiated two major processes
in 1956: the de-secularization of the State and the statisation of the economy.
34 Knuth, R. (2006): Burning Books and Levelling Libraries: Extremist Violence and
Cultural Destruction. Westport.
35 Bharatanatyam is not only a means to express devotion but it is also an artistic
form enabling the Tamil people in diaspora to narrate the events of civil war.
Bharatanatyam is a means of affirming Hindu or Tamil identity and for many
Tamil girls, this dance (both in the diaspora as in the homeland) is regarded as an
important vehicle for becoming familiar with Hindu myths and traditional Hindu
social values. See Goreau-Ponceaud, A. (2011): Tamils in France. In: Rajan, I./




Wars were not only a local South Asian affair but particularly a transna‐
tional phenomenon with a strong international dimension. An attribute of
the Tamil Diaspora is the long-distance nationalism of the majority of
Tamil immigrants.37 The LTTE received a support from a majority of
Tamils in the Diaspora. One of the most significant consequences of Sri
Lanka’s civil war has been the moving of its Tamil population both inter‐
nally and internationally leading to the making of a refugee diaspora.38
Separated from northern Sri Lanka by the narrow Palk Straits, the south‐
ern Indian State of Tamil Nadu has been an important destination for
refugees fleeing the long civil conflict between the GoSL and the Libera‐
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Most arrived from Sri Lanka’s war-
torn Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamils form a local majority.
Ebbs and flows in numbers have reflected escalations and lulls in hostili‐
ties. The majority of Tamil Nadu’s 60 million-strong population share a
nominal ethnolinguistic identity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka.39 According
to Oberoi, “there is a strong bond of kinship between Indian Tamils and
their co-ethnics in Sri Lanka, which has been an important motivating fac‐
tor in India’s policy toward this group of refugees.”40 The common ethnic‐
ity between Tamils in India and Sri Lanka, and as such between the
37 Fuglerud (1999).
38 Van Hear, N. (2014): Refugees, Diasporas and Transnationalism. In: Fiddian-Qas‐
miyeh, E./Loescher, G./Long, K./Sigona, N. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of
Refugees and Forced Migration Studies. Oxford. 176-187.
39 As pointed by Demelza Jones, “Trans border ethnic kinship between the Tamils of
southern India and Sri Lanka has been evoked in both primordial terms of a com‐
mon linguistic and religious heritage, and historical mythology, and in the more in‐
strumental sense of a shared political imperative of safeguarding Tamil identity
from domineering external forces - in the case of Sri Lanka, from aggressive Sin‐
halese nationalism, and in Tamil Nadu through opposition to a perceived Hindi-
speaking national hegemony.” Jones, Demelza (2012): Our Kith and Kin? Sri
Lankan Tamil Refugees and the Ethno-Nationalist Parties of Tamil Nadu. In: Na‐
tionalism and Ethnic Politics 18, 4. 431-451.
40 Oberoi, P. (2006): Exile and Belonging. Refugees and State Policy in South Asia.
New Delhi. 201. If examples presented in the refugee studies literature lead to an
expectation that ethnic kinship between refugee and host results in favourable re‐
ception and assistance, we should specify in that case that the aftermath of the as‐
sassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide
bomber during a visit to Tamil Nadu in May 1991 is treated in this article as a crit‐
ical moment, resulting in a shift by Tamil Nadu’s political elite from sympathetic
consideration of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees as co-ethnics, towards a hostile, se‐
curity-focused response.
Conflict and Environment in Sri Lanka, a Complex Nexus
241
refugees and the Tamil Nadu host, is emblematic of a wider tendency
within the Indian context for refugees to share ethnic kinship with sections
of the host population. These refugees have experienced repeated dis‐
placement, returning to Sri Lanka during ceasefire periods only to be up‐
rooted again when violence re-escalated.
Impacts of War on Human and Natural Environment
In 1917, a German psychologist and artillery officer, Kurt Lewin, reflected
on the phenomenology of the battlefield. Originally posted on the Western
Front, he noticed that the soldiers had a peculiar perception of the land‐
scapes. Those who were engaged in combat saw space differently from
civilians who lived safe from danger. The landscapes of peace appeared
undulating and unlimited, extending as far as the eye could see. The war
landscapes were ordered and circumscribed, delineated by the signs of vi‐
olence and destruction.41 Landscapes take on special significance in times
of war, reflecting the mental constructions through which the soldiers ap‐
prehend the physical world and conceive the boundaries of belligerency.
In the case of the Sri Lankan, the warfare activities have directly or indi‐
rectly impacted and modified surrounding landscapes. A plethora of geog‐
raphers have conducted research on the war in Sri Lanka, the displacement
it generated during the conflict,42 the geopolitics of aid that shapes the po‐
litical landscape,43 and the geographies of conflict at the intersection of
the conflict and the 2004 tsunami,44 particularly in the North and East of
the country. Very little has been written about the effects of this war on the
environment of the northern and eastern part of the island. Intensification
3.
41 Lewin, K. (1917): Kriegslandschaft. In: Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie
12. 440-447.
42 Brun, C. (2008): Finding a Place. Local Integration and Protracted Displacement
in Sri Lanka. Colombo. Brun, C./Jazeel, T. (eds.) (2009): Spatialising Politics:
Culture and Geography in Postcolonial Sri Lanka. Thousand Oaks. Hasbullah, S.-
H./Korf, B. (2013): Muslim Geographies, Violence and the Politics of Community
in Eastern Sri Lanka. In: Geographical Journal 179, 1. 32–43.
43 Hyndman, J. (2007): The Securitization of Fear in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka. In:
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, 2. 361–372.
44 Blaikie, P.-M./Lund, R. (eds.) (2011): The Tsunami of 2004 in Sri Lanka: Impacts
and Policy in the Shadow of Civil War. London. Hyndman, J. (2011): Dual Disas‐
ters: Humanitarian Aid after the 2004 Tsunami. Sterling.
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of the war and large scale military operations of recent years initiated by
the Sri Lankan forces have taken place under a media blockade and press
censorship, so that the extent of destruction is not known to the wider
community nor reported in the media. Furthermore, as yet no analytic
framework or paradigm shapes the study of the environmental conse‐
quences of war and military operations. We could also add that the envi‐
ronmental effects are significantly different between the winner and the
loser. Indeed, despite the end of military conflict, war continues by other
means, and its representation encapsulates a nationalist politics of victory
that at once vilifies the defeated LTTE terrorists and excludes Northern
Tamils from the Sri Lankan polis. The LTTE’s former hideouts, training
facilities, weapons, and vehicles are now tourist sites on display for public
viewing.
The environment and its state of health is an essential component of
post-war recovery, going hand in hand with the recovery of human popu‐
lation. The 2004 tsunami unfortunately added to environmental destruc‐
tion, causing high levels of salinity in soils and making the well water in
many areas undrinkable. The coastline also changed, with some protective
coral barriers vanishing and landmines dangerously dislodged. As the war
in the Tamil areas of the island escalated through the mid 1980’s, the state
of balance that existed in the environmental systems throughout the Tamil
homeland began to be disrupted. The deterioration continued through the
1990’s as the causal factors aggravated and the adverse impacts led to
what we could consider as an environmental crisis in the Tamil homeland
today. In the Northern part of the island, much of the environment has be‐
come compromised due to the protracted fighting which has destroyed
both trees and soil. Landmines have prevented farmers from being able to
sow and manage their crops; the High Security Zones45 have also prevent‐
45 The high security zones were basically set-up to protect military camps, strategic
installations, and the lifelines of security forces in Jaffna - Kankesanthurai harbour
and Palaly airport - from LTTE attack. These zones comprise large chunks of terri‐
tory surrounding or encompassing strategic military installations. In the Jaffna
peninsula there were 18 high security zones (HSZs) covering about 190 km2.
While the HSZs have by and large served their purpose of securing military instal‐
lation, they have led to the displacement and economic deprivation of civilians.
The displaced persons have to live either with their relatives or at refugee camps.
This apart, there are large tracts of agricultural lands that fall under these zones
that have deprived many farmers of their livelihood. The HSZ have been progres‐
sively released in several stages since 2010.
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ed people from either inhabiting or farming their land – something that is a
huge stumbling block in the negotiations between the Tamils and the gov‐
ernment and causes aggravations for all those who have homes and land in
these areas. Soil erosion has also undermined centuries-old farming
practices and systems of land maintenance.
The Loss of Palmyra Trees and Forests
Ecological changes wrought on the landscape of the Jaffna peninsula are
widespread. The characteristic and dominating feature of the Jaffna land‐
scape is the Palmyra palm. Standing-up of twenty-five meters high, it is
dedicated to the god Pillaiyar (or Ganesh) and consequently considered
sacred. There used to be extensive Palmyra groves throughout the penin‐
sula and its islands – at the beginning of the war there were an estimated
five millions palms: these have been decimated.46 The tops of many of
these trees have been lopped off, either accidentally by multi-barrel rocket
launchers or deliberately to provide sights of the militants in the jungle.
The SLA, the militants and the local populace have also extensively cut
down the Palmyra, for a variety of reasons: to sell, to make shelters and
bunkers, or use as fuel. The making of bunkers, fencing and fortifications
and the clearance of landing strips have all led to the loss of a huge num‐
bers of these palms. Between 1956 and 1985, natural high forests de‐
creased from 44 percent to 27 percent of the total land area. Most of the
deforested area has been now converted into low productivity grasslands.
During the subsequent period of the conflict, both sides fortified them‐
selves by building bunkers, defence lines and camps for soldiers. Trees
were cut to build thousands of bunkers and for firewood.
More precisely in the early years of the militancy, a number of camps
were established by the militants in the forested area of Vanni (or Wan‐
ni).47 The Vanni was the centre of the LTTE’s de facto state from the
mid-1990s until 2009. The cadres of the early militant groups were mostly
from the urban area, especially from the Jaffna peninsula. They came to
the forests without the familiarity, understanding and knowledge of the
natural environment. A consequence of their presence in the forests was
4.
46 Derges, J. (2013): Ritual and Recovery in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka. Abingdon.
47 The Vanni is a large area of scrub jungle and forest.
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the incursion of domesticated species of plants, particularly food plants. In
many cases, they held an urban utilitarian view of the forest. In many ar‐
eas militant groups were also engaged in illegal logging and marketing of
timber as a source of revenue. The dense forests in remote areas, such as
Vanni, served as hideouts for insurgent groups, like the LTTE, but they
also provide safe haven for refugees fleeing from conflict. Both cases re‐
sult in over-exploitation of forest resources. The presence of the armed
militants in the forests created significant environmental consequences.
On the one hand the forest became the home of the militants; it provided
them with food, shelter and training ground.48 On the other the forest be‐
came a hunting ground for the Sri Lankan armed forces; they increasingly
mounted military-style operations within the forests in search of the mili‐
tants. The Sri Lankan army carried out a number of raids and later bomb‐
ing campaigns in this region. Both caused severe disruptions to the deli‐
cate balance that existed in the dry-zone forests and other areas of natural
vegetation of the Vanni and the East.49 There has also been large scale
clearing of mangroves in many areas of the north and the east to deny
shelter and protection for the Tamil resistance forces. The clearing of man‐
groves vegetation, for both firewood and for security reasons, also have an
indirect effect on the population sizes of many fish species, prawns and
migratory birds; these use the mangroves as breeding grounds.
The use of heavy explosives in aerial bombing, carpet-bombing, naval
cannon and shelling destroyed buildings, vegetation, trees, animals, birds.
48 We can also add that according to Saverimuttu: “Apart from the use of forests by
the militants, there was also an increase in the illegal logging in the peripheries of
the forests of the North and East. The virtual non-existence of forest wardens, the
collaboration of some elements of the Sri Lankan armed forces with illegal loggers
and the general lack of imposition of the law contributed to this increase. The
number of colonies of Sinhala settlers that were established in the forests in the
Tamil homeland also increased, especially in the Manal Aaru (Welioya) area, caus‐
ing further deterioration of forests.” Saverimuttu, T./Sriskanarajah, N./Jayapalan,
V.I.S. (1999): Ecological Consequences of the War in the Tamil Homeland in Sri
Lanka. In: Research Report. National Peace Council and Marga Institute. Colom‐
bo. 72-78.
49 The only positive impact of war on the environment is largely due to the fact that
it tends to keep people, including poachers, out of conflict areas. This is attested
by the spectacular bird diversity and numbers recorded from the Giant’s Tank in
the Vanni region of the northwest Sri Lanka, from where a large number of people
fled during the war. But this is an exception rather than the rule, for in most in‐
stances war tends to do more damage to wildlife and its habitat.
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The use of white phosphorus bombs, as described by the ex-serviceman of
the LTTE in my interview conducted both in France and in India,50 caused
severe injuries. The chemical weapons are characterized by their capacity
to affect humans, animals and plants through their toxic properties.
Killing, or producing casualties, is of course not the only utility of chemi‐
cal weapons. Their operational significance includes primary physiologi‐
cal effects of the agents, for example harassment, incapacitation, debilita‐
tion, and lethal effects. However, secondary effects of chemical weapons
use may include economic damage through for example contamination of
land, machinery, or crops, as well as psychological and social effects of
terrorizing. The psychological effects are of particular importance in the
context of new wars as these can avail a disproportionately greater strate‐
gic impact than the primary effects of the actual use. In that way the role
of chemical weapons as a propaganda tool is conspicuous in the thick fog
of war that engulfed Sri Lanka with claims and counter claims of the use
of chemical weapons. We can remarked that both sides (GoSL and LTTE)
were using the allegations to try and win political points, less certain is
whether either side is actually using agents. Following the utilization of
white phosphorus bombs, both sides pointed at each other, condemning
the use.
In the last three months of the fighting 5,000 people – including 2,000
children – had been killed. With the fall of Kilinochchi in January 2009,
which was the administrative capital of the LTTE’s de facto state in the
Vanni area, the LTTE retreated east; where most of the heaviest fighting
took place. The protracted civil war will finally come to its bloody conclu‐
sion on the shores of the Nandikadal Lagoon in mid-May 2009.
Damage to soil and wells and the residue of large craters have affected
agricultural productivity. The poisoning of the earth with anti-personnel
mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in combat territory, the
most extreme example of ecological violence, constrained supply routes.
Rice production had decreased by one-third, during the war, with 700
hectares left uncultivated for over a decade. For instance, according some
reports from GoSL, 11,200 hectares of low land were released from mili‐
tary occupation for rice cultivation in 2009. Diseases associated with stag‐
nant water such as malaria and dengue fever have increased, as has
50 Independent confirmation of the use of these chemical weapons is not possible be‐
cause journalists were barred from entering the area during the fighting.
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cholera and typhoid due to inadequate sanitation in the IDPs camps. Road
clearance by the army has been extensive: all the vegetation within a one
and a half-kilometer radius of all major roads was cut to prevent surprise
attacks. Another exacerbating feature has been the major military offen‐
sives that often took place at critical times in the farming cycle: before
harvesting or after sowing.
The Wildlife Issue
Landmines set with the intent to maim rather than kill in order to use up
more resource in the care of the injured, are an issue for both human and
non-human population that draw severely on the already depleted re‐
sources. Both the government forces and the LTTE used mines during the
conflict and it is estimated that approximatively 482 sq km is contaminat‐
ed by mines and UXO51 in the North52. Vast areas were mined by the
LTTE without any documentation. Finally, the severe flooding in 2011 un‐
covered landmines from the country’s decades long civil war. These unex‐
ploded mines are just another problem in a long list of difficulties for
some of the poorest people in a country that is still recovering from the
civil war.
The free availability of guns during the war and the use of wire snares
appear to have had a serious impact on wildlife. Government troops and
guerrillas have hunted wildlife for food. Their impact would have been
most severe on large mammals with slow reproductive rates, as these are
the ones that are likely to disappear first. The spotted deer used to be the
most common and numerically abundant large herbivore in the Wilpattu
National Park.53 But today, its numbers have declined significantly. Other
protected areas (like the Yala East National Park) were also affected by il‐
legal timber extraction and poaching and are still in danger of becoming
empty forests. Uncontrolled hunting of wildlife not only reduces the popu‐
5.
51 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) are explosive weapons (bombs, bullets, shells,
grenades, land mines, naval mines, etc.) that did not explode when they were em‐
ployed and still pose a risk of detonation.
52 For more details see Abhayagunawardena, V. (2011): Vicious killer. In: Frontline
28, 18. 27 August – 9 September.
53 After an interval of almost 18 years, the Wilpattu National Park, one of Sri Lan‐
ka’s oldest and scenic conservation areas was re-opened by the Minister for the
Environment and Natural Resources, Rukman Senanayake on 16 March 2003
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lation of the target species, but it caused serious landscapes level changes
in habitats and faunal assemblages. While the viewing of wildlife in na‐
tional parks has been a well-established and accepted form of non-con‐
sumptive exploitation, the consumptive use of non-endangered wildlife
even outside protected areas is a thorny issue that is bound to arouse con‐
troversy in such a predominantly Buddhist country as Sri Lanka. Unfortu‐
nately, the problem with wildlife is that the people who wish to preserve it
are rarely those who have to pay the cost. Wilpattu, on the west coast of
the island, was a rebel stronghold during the long 26-year civil war against
the Tamil Tigers. Today it is better known as Sri Lanka's largest park and
home to leopards, Asian elephants and sloth bears. Development is pro‐
hibited in national parks but after peace was declared in May 2009, the
government began work on a road right through Wilpattu, known as the
New Mannar Road. In addition, landmines have also either killed or
maimed an unknown number of large mammals including elephants. For
instance, according to wildlife veterinarians, as many as 10 elephants are
killed or injured each year by landmines. Frequently, the resettlement of
human populations results in further developments of land for housing and
agriculture, resulting in the displacement of many elephant populations.
This increases both the chance of human-elephant clashes and the chance
that elephants will be forced to scavenge for food in areas that have not
been cleared of landmines because they do not have the same value to hu‐
man populations as other areas. Resettlement efforts made by human pop‐
ulations must be cognisantly managed to leave enough safe land for ele‐
phants to forage, decreasing the tendency for them to wander into danger‐
ous territory or lash out against humans. Plans to circumvent human-ele‐
phant conflict in Sri Lanka include the protection and rehabilitation of sev‐
en areas for elephants to safely live with an abundance of food and water,
and the installation of electric fences by the Department of Wildlife Con‐
servation all of which will keep elephants from wandering into villages
and farmland. Further education of the general public as to how to deal
with elephants is another important step in human-elephant conflict reso‐
lution.
The Peace and its Short-Term Environmental Effects
The peace has different short-term environmental effects. Wars and their




conflict landscapes through new boundaries, population movements, and
conditions of access. Wars and their consequences alter land tenure and
uses, often in dramatic ways. People are displaced because of hostilities.
Dislocation can totally disrupt land tenure. Lands are also made inaccessi‐
ble by hostilities, sometimes over long periods due to land mines and un‐
exploded ordnance. As people resettle elsewhere, conflicts sometimes
emerge between uprooted and indigenous populations (like in Puttalam for
instance). Identities are frequently key to post-conflict entitlements.
Whether linked to nationality, ethnicity, political convictions, kinship, or
interpersonal relations, identities are based in part on historical memories.
In turn, the memories (and memorial elements) of cultural landscapes have
an important place in the politics of identity. I would like to highlight in
this fragment the importance of memories in post-conflict land issues.
Memories are actualized through an embodiment of places of belonging
that situate local identities within historicized national territory. Place-
based identities are, for example, mobilized through the political currency
of historicized national heroism. This transcalar claim, between local and
national historical narratives, involves spaces defining local identities
which are re-inscribed within the national territory and history for the pur‐
pose of resisting global land-based economic projects. In that way, in Sri
Lanka, since the war is ended, we can assist at new forms of mobility, new
forms of travel, distinct from the military manoeuvres and refugee dis‐
placements of the past. These new forms of mobility are encapsulated in
the expression warzone tourism. The opening up of transportation net‐
works after the war (like the A9 Highway) saw tourism extending geo‐
graphically and intensifying these attributes on ethnically differentiated
sites. There is a persistence of wartime hostilities within emergent post-
war dark tourism practices, which have provoked conflicts over heritage.
The tourists to warzones visit sites of religious pilgrimage as well as bat‐
tle-scared sites. Sites of pilgrimage in Sinhala culture are not only reli‐
gious sites, but are also infused with an attachment to location, permeated
with a religious and ethno-nationalist imagination. War sites attain a simi‐
lar significance in the imagination of the people, as sites around which
myths and legends about war and its aftermath are created, recreated and
imagined. The people who experience this warzone tourism carry a past
with them, emanate a certain emotions and have connections that are inter‐
nalized and reproduced in order to make sense of their worlds in the
present moment. This process of recreating or re-conceptualizing the past,
deleting or glossing over violence associated with war, as landscaping,
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implying a sense of transformation or displacement. Post-war efforts at
reconciliation are marred both by military triumphalism and top-down pol‐
icies criticized by Tamil lobbies and humanitarian groups. The continued
military presence in the island’s north and east, and economic penetration
by southern, Sinhalese investors, businesses and contractors, dilute the re‐
gion’s Tamil ethnic insularity. Wartime destruction, depopulation and indi‐
gence magnify social inequities giving majoritarian market reform an
ideological and political advantage. Tamil residents – displaced and im‐
poverished by war, and smarting from the triumphalism of the Sinhalese –
have been distanced from democratic discourses, internally due to militan‐
cy and externally due to Sinhala hegemony. They included IDPs and
refugees from camps in India returning home. Social fragmentation dimin‐
ished their capacity for collective civic responsibility. Wartime attrition of
democracy, militant and military administration has eroded frameworks of
civility. The Tamil community is consequently vulnerable to state hege‐
mony, marketization and tourism.
The decades-long protracted civil war has killed tens of thousands of
people and displaced an estimated one million Sri Lankan Tamils abroad.
The LTTE may have been officially defeated in Sri Lanka, but artefacts of
the LTTE’s legacy as a terrorist organization have become tourist sites ac‐
tively cultivated by the Sri Lankan government throughout the Vanni in
northern Sri Lanka. The Vanni was the centre of the LTTE’s de facto state
from the mid-1990s until 2009. This tourism in a recent war zone is a way
to militarize civilian space during peacetime. The ancestral home of LTTE
leader Prabhakaran at Valvettithurai, his bunker at Mullaitivu, and the
LTTE arsenal captured in that district attracted large numbers of Sinhala
visitors. The ancestral home and bunker were later demolished while the
arsenal has been gathered in an open-air museum for public viewing. This
war museum in Puthukkudiyiruppu,54 memories of the Tamil Tigers are
still publicly present in Sri Lanka, but they are produced by the victor in
54 With the fall of Kilinochchi in January 2009, the LTTE retreated east; along with
hundreds of thousands of civilians, to the towns of Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK), Put‐
tumatalan, and Mullaitivu where most of the heaviest fighting took place. The pro‐
tracted civil war would finally come to its bloody conclusion on the shores of the
Nandikadal Lagoon in mid-May 2009. While Kilinochchi was the administrative
capital of the LTTE’s de facto state in the Vanni area at the end of the war, Prab‐
hakaran lived in a series of houses closer to Visuvamadu and PTK. These bunkers
have been converted into army camps as well as tourist sites.
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particular ways: dehumanized and militarized, with the LTTE as a poten‐
tial and lurking threat that sustains the Sinhala nationalist project of ongo‐
ing militarization. Through its selective remembering of the Tigers and
dead Tamil civilians, the GoSL stokes a triumphalist Sinhala nationalism
that reproduces the Tamil Tigers as a future potential threat, and in so do‐
ing, provides grounds for ongoing militarization of civilian spaces by the
state and marginalization of Tamils and other minority groups in the coun‐
try who are represented as latent threats.
In the same time, several scholars have highlighted increasing state
hegemony via militarization and Sinhalisation during the final stages of
the war, and the resultant exacerbation of ethnic tensions.55 Six years after
the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war, Tamil lands, particularly in the north of
the island, remain under military occupation. This military occupation pro‐
cess is not about ensuring security. Sinhala army personnel and private in‐
vestors and contractors engaged in the reconstruction effort form a restless
backdrop to resettlement activities, their motivations often subservient to
the government. Rebuilding the roads, infrastructure and resettlement falls
under the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development which uses army
labour.
The army has expanded non-military activities and is engaged in large-
scale property development, construction projects, and business ventures
such as travel agencies, farming, holiday resorts, restaurants, and innumer‐
able cafes. The army officially runs luxury resorts and golf courses that
have been erected on land seized from now-internally displaced peoples.
Over the past six years, the process of Sinhalisation has intensified with an
aggressive government-led effort that systematically replaces Tamil cul‐
ture and history with victory monuments dedicated to Sinhalese hegemony
and Buddhist religion on the ruins of the Tamil homeland. A similar ethni‐
cisation process is occurring in the eastern region, with the building of
hostels and other construction work controlled by the dominant ethnic
group taking place in the buffer zone, while people who used to live there
are being displaced to new settlements in the far interior. This has created
increasing political and ethnic tension among the coastal population in a
55 For more information about this topic see Ismail, Q. (2005): Abiding by Sri Lan‐
ka: On Peace, Place and Postcoloniality. Minneapolis. Ismail, Q./Jeganathan, P.
(2009): Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri
Lanka. New York. De Mel, N. (2007): Militarising Sri Lanka: Popular Culture,
Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict. New Delhi.
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struggle for access to land in the densely populated Muslim and Tamil
dominated areas. Since the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka has seen a big
increase in tourists and marketed itself as an eco-tourism destination lead‐
ing to new ethnic tensions.
Impact of Natural Events on War: the Tsunami’s Case Study
When the Indian Ocean tsunami hit the coasts of Sri Lanka on 26 Decem‐
ber 2004, killing more than 36,000 people, and injured 21,000 in a matter
of minutes and, in the longer term displaced between 450,000 and
516,000, and destroyed or damaged nearly 100,000 houses and 200 educa‐
tional facilities (according to the GoSL), the country had already experi‐
enced more than two decades of violent conflict. The disasters of the
tsunami and civil war, although very different in their genesis and out‐
comes, also have similarities. They are both slow in unfolding. Even the
tsunami, a natural event of a few minutes, became a disaster only as a re‐
sult of the emergence and reproduction of vulnerability over a long period
before its initial devastating impact. Vulnerability is a much debated term
but a widely accepted definition is: “vulnerability is a set of characteristics
of a person or a group of persons in terms of their capacity to anticipate,
cope with, resist and recover from the impact of natural hazards.”56 The
term can be reworked to relate war where the impact is usually more spa‐
tially widespread, more long lasting and multivalent than a single environ‐
mental event such as a tsunami. Therefore, in long war, as in Sri Lanka,
people of different ethnicities, wealth, age, and gender are constantly try‐
ing to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of an
ebbing and flowing war. Recovery is defined as the broader process of
people deploying their capabilities in a post-crisis situation. Post-tsunami
reconstruction like the post-war reconstruction does not only concern
buildings, roads and infrastructure, but also rebuilding communities, com‐
munity networks and livelihoods, and re-enabling a huge number of dis‐
placed people suddenly made destitute.57
Vulnerability emerges through a number of socio-economic and politi‐
cal forces and often pushes economically and socially marginal people in‐
7.
56 Blaikie, P.-M./Cannon, T/Davis, I./Wisner, B (1994): At Risk: People’s Vulnera‐
bility and Disasters. London.
57 De Mel (2007).
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to marginal places, which may be hazardous in terms of environmental
conditions and discrete events. Thus the war and the tsunami as the threat
to come have intertwined social and political antecedents. On the one hand
the war has created vulnerabilities through death and disappearance of
breadwinners, displacement of agricultural activities, destruction of indus‐
trial plant, and thereby employment opportunities. All this in turn has ren‐
dered those in the coastal zone especially vulnerable to the effects of the
tsunami. Also, there has been a tendency for those with less access to
livelihood opportunities and political support during hostilities (typically
some Muslims and Tamils) to be displaced towards the poorer agricultural
land near the coast. On the other hand this Tsunami compounded the al‐
ready complicated sequence of political struggles and violent incidents in
the eastern Sri Lanka where Muslims and Tamils live in a jigsaw of
coastal settlements.
The tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004 is historically one of the
most extensive disasters to have affected Sri Lanka. But it was not the
first. There was a cyclone which affected Sri Lanka in 1978, and hit 20
percent of the country and affected 800,000 to 1 million people, causing
deaths, injuries and severe floods.58 However the impacts of the tsunami
were therefore enmeshed in a situation where land was already a bitter
contested and ethnically-charged issue. Due to the severe tsunami devasta‐
tion in coastal zone in Sri Lanka; considering future tsunami and disaster
risk, the GoSL declared a 100/200 meters strip of land as a no build zone
along the coastal belt. The Cabinet approved in January 2005 and issued a
notification of a Coastal conservation (buffer) zone established in order to
better safeguard the lives of the coastal population and to protect the
coastal environment from any future natural disaster. The dramatic dispos‐
session caused by the tsunami brought to light the endemic displacement
of so many members of the Tamil and Muslim communities who had been
forced to move to coastal locations to escape the war. Indeed, the buffer
zone declared by the GoSL disallowed rebuilding houses within a 200m
zone along the east coast and discriminated heavily against Tamils and
Muslims who had fled the war and settled in the less fertile and less
sought-after land close to the coast, which then bore the brunt of the tsuna‐
mi.
58 Lewis, J. (1981): The Sri Lanka Cyclone 1978: Socio-Economic Analysis of
Housing Destruction. In: Marga 6, 2. 1-33.
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There are some endemic problems in the recovery process after the De‐
cember 2004 tsunami. In particular the recovery work has been embedded
in the conflict and was unable to build back better. A massive reconstruc‐
tion and resettlement effort was begun and the slogan building back better
and rebuilt communities became prominent in the discourse on post-tsuna‐
mi.59 In this process, the inflow of foreign aid had important effects on po‐
litical relations and governance structures in the East. Furthermore we
could say that in the case of Sri Lanka, aid delivery cannot be made apolit‐
ical. As Uyangoda sums up: “the post-tsunami recovery has been inten‐
sively politicized in a context of the unresolved ethnic conflict and an in‐
complete, installed peace process.”60 Displacement has played a major
role in the discourse on the civil war in Sri Lanka. It is estimated that more
than one-tenth of Sri Lanka’s population has been displaced by the war.
The people of the north and the east have paid a particularly heavy price,
and many have experienced multiple and protracted displacements during
their lifetime. By linking the war and a natural disaster as the tsunami, we
foreground both disasters as political and make visible the work of milita‐
rization as the key paradigm of governance in present-day in Sri Lanka.
The pre-existing uneven power relations between ethnic groups and geo‐
graphical areas were clearly manifest in the politicized and very unevenly
distributed quantity and quality of assistance between the war-affected
communities in the predominantly Tamil and Muslim Northern and East‐
ern provinces of the country and the mostly Sinhalese South. The fact that
vulnerable and marginalized people formed the majority of those most
severely affected by the tsunami indicated that the disaster itself was not a
natural event.61
Consequently, reconstruction and longer-term development challenges
overlap with the dynamics of conflict in the Northern and Eastern
provinces. As mentioned by Brun/Lund “while we need to understand
and/or redress how disaster and war alter communities and people’s capac‐
ities to make changes themselves, we also need to recognize how recovery
from disasters and war reinforce power relations between communities
59 Benadusi, M. (2013): Cultiver des communautés après une catastrophe. Défer‐
lement de générosité sur les côtes du Sri Lanka. In: Revet, S./Langumier, J. (eds.):
Le gouvernement des catastrophes. Paris. 103-146.
60 Uyangoda, J. (2005): Ethnic Conflict, the State and the Tsunami Disaster in Sri
Lanka. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, 3. 341-352. 341.
61 De Mel, 2007).
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and differentially affect positionalities within the communities.”62 Al‐
though natural disasters are in a sense non-discriminatory, war-affected
countries have higher preexisting levels of vulnerability, whilst the distri‐
bution of vulnerability tends to be geographically concentrated in the areas
most affected by violence.
Conclusion: Environment as a Quasi-Personage?
The concept of new wars was useful in the context of this paper, as it cap‐
tures the changed nature of the conflict in its many facets. New wars are
conceptualized as conflicts of the globalized age in which organized vio‐
lence is perpetrated between networks of regular armed forces and orga‐
nized criminal or terrorist groups. In many aspects there have been pro‐
found changes in the nature of conflict and the conceptualization of securi‐
ty over the last decades. Whilst irregular warfare is not new and doctrines
of counterinsurgency and counter terrorism have deep historical roots,
there is a shift in nature and character of warfare from state centric con‐
flicts of the nineteenth and twentieth century, fought by regular armed
forces to the messier conflicts, asymmetrical wars, terrorism and intra-
state violence fought in the twenty-first century. This shift is articulated in
the concept of new wars developed by Kaldor.63 If in the old wars the ter‐
ritorial gain was achieved through military means, by contrast in new wars
violence is directed against civilians to establish control over territories for
purposes of access to state or political power for certain groups that are
defined by ethnic and religious identities rather than nationality per se. In
this new context of warfare the nature of organized violence has changed
and blurred previously clearer distinctions between war, terrorism, orga‐
nized crime and large-scale violation of human rights. The Sri Lankan
case study reveals that causes of conflict are multiple and interlinked, and
develops in a non-linear fashion over the course of conflict. Conflict dy‐
namics in Sri Lanka were increasingly found to be contingent upon con‐
textual factors, rather than on root causes. Furthermore during almost
three decades the war becomes the normal context for the unfolding of so‐
cial life. The Sri Lankan civil war was a protracted violent conflict which
8.
62 Brun/Lund (2008), 277.
63 Kaldor, M. (2012): New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cam‐
bridge.
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creates multiple trajectories of threat and opportunity over authorities
(GoSL, LTTE, caste system, religious affinities and so on) and makes
these highly malleable in space and time leading to the creation of
warscapes. Individuals in warscapes are often not just combatants, civil‐
ians, or victims, but each pursue different multi-dimensional agendas and
life projects which cannot be easily labeled as war or not war-related, as
participation or non-participation.
Aims and targets between old and new wars have changed. This change
has a significant impact on environment. In this paper we tried to conceive
the environment as a sum of relations and interactions. It refers to the
complex relationships of interdependence between man, societies and the
physical, chemical, and biotic components of an anthropomorphised or ar‐
tificialized nature. The environment is generally considered as an encom‐
passing entity on which the encompassed has a grip. It is therefore radical‐
ly distinguished from the other two fundamental components of the social
world: the actor and the object. Yet, the environment can be interpreted as
almost a character with potential for action. That’s what I’ve tried to
demonstrate in my paper. Environment is part of these warscapes and as a
quasi-personage. In this paper we saw progressively how land becomes
part of larger patterns of violent contestation. Some of these violent con‐
testations were revealed and accentuated through natural events such as
the 2004 tsunami.
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Political Conflict and its Impact on Environment –
A Study of Kashmir of India
Babu Rangaiah / N. K. Kumaresan Raja
Armed conflicts and degradation of environment have always been inter‐
related. The experiences of such conflicts in South and Southeast Asia
have mostly lead to a common conclusion. As an outcome of the afforesta‐
tion of north eastern part of Sri Lanka, the clearing of the woods paved
way for a significant victory for the Government of Sri Lanka to defeat the
LTTE, the armed rebels who were known for their guerilla warfare. There
are references from the war of Vietnam that armed conflict has a negative
bearing on the maintenance of vegetation and consequently impacting up‐
on the environment of the war zone. In the case of Kashmir, the widely
known dispute between the State of India, State of Pakistan and the insur‐
gent armed groups, the political situation remains very tense for the past
several decades. It must be also mentioned that the thick forest cover of
Kashmir paves a natural asylum of armed rebels. Keeping this in view, a
study was conducted on the youth of Kashmir on various aspect of the
armed conflict including their assessment and awareness on environment,
which has given a never before vision of youth in trauma on environment.
Kashmir’s extravagant beauty used to draw millions and millions of
people towards its enchanting exquisite that is also known as the last
Shangrila and paradise on the earth. The land of Kashmir lies on the
ranges of Himalayan Mountain with its wonderful and marvelous lakes,
gardens, white cold deserts. Kashmir unfortunately has become disputed
with the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. The conflict in Kashmir
valley has resulted in destruction of the life, living, culture and environ‐
ment, as both India and Pakistan claims the control of the land that has al‐
ready seen two wars between India and Pakistan. A part of land has been
governed by Pakistan and China in the name of Pakistan Occupied Kash‐
261
mir.1 Kashmir valley witnesses proxy war and terrorist activities in the
name of a Liberation movement that was started by Kashmir militants and
has put the life of about eight million people in danger. According to re‐
ports about 44,638 people have being killed from 1988 to 2018 including
civilians, security forces and militants, and thousands of people being kid‐
napped and missing.
Kashmir conflict has negative bearing on the common man of the land,
who experiences regular traumatic events and its consequences. On the
other hand, Kashmir valley has witnessed the degradation of environment
over the years, which will have negative impact on the overall aspects of
human ecology. The present paper attempts to expound the situation in
Kashmir both for human experience and impact on environment as a result
of political conflict as on the one hand it affects human capital and on the
other it has direct as well as indirect effect on the environment. Armed
conflict can have negative impact on both environment and human wellbe‐
ing.2
People in Kashmir have been found to experience trauma as a result of
exposure to conflict.3 About 46.9 percent youth was exposed to two or
three traumatic events; about 28.6 percent found to be exposed to four or
more conflict-related events. Most of the people reported that the predomi‐
nant traumatic incidents have been prolonged curfew, beating or humilia‐
tion of a family member, or a friend who goes missing. A small percent‐
age (2.2 percent) of youth reported witnessing fight between militants and
security forces.4 Studies have also found that people experience mental
health issues and psychological distress like depression, anxiety, and post‐
traumatic stress disorder that affects daily living of the people as they do
not feel safe and they also suffer from socio-economic issues.5 The Insti‐
1 De Jong, K./Ford, N./Kam, S. (2008a): Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: Ex‐
posure to Violence. In: Conflict and Health 2, 10. DOI: 10.1186/1752-1505-2-10.
De Jong, K./Kam, S./Ford, N. (2008b): Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley II:
Psychosocial Impact. In: Conflict and Health 2, 11. DOI: 10.1186/1752-1505-2-11.
2 Saundry, P. (2008): Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of Armed Conflict
in Africa. In: Cleveland, Cutler J. (eds.): Encyclopedia of Earth. Washington.
3 Bhat, Rayees Mohammad/Rangaiah, B. (2015): The Impact of Conflict Exposure
and Social Support on Posttraumatic Growth among the Young Adults in Kashmir.
In: Cogent Psychology 2, 1. DOI: 10.1080/23311908.2014.1000077.
4 Bhat/Rangaiah (2015).
5 De Jong/Ford/Kam (2008a). De Jong/Kam/Ford (2008b).
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tute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (IMHANS), has observed in‐
creased cases of mental health issues.6
Climate change and environmental degradation is a global phe‐
nomenon. Nations are coming together to protect environment. However,
sometimes it is not possible to regulate the environment degradation, par‐
ticularly, when there are armed conflicts. The armed forces and insurgents
use and misuse the environment for their own purposes to destroy the oth‐
er or even to venture peace. For example, in Sri Lanka deforestation was
used as the method to end the conflict and to defeat the militants. The his‐
tory has shown that as a tactic, the devastation of natural environment can
destroy the enemy. However, in the modern world, the very presence of
armed conflict can destroy the natural environment in some or the other
manner. This scenario would best explain the case of Kashmir. The very
identify of Kashmir is its scenic beauty and green vegetation. Tourism is
the backbone of Kashmir Economy. Tourism and Environment in Kashmir
has been complimenting each other. During the course of armed conflict
that attained peak during the late 1990’s, the environment degradation has
been visibly seen. Even today, despite the sporadic peace that enables the
operation of Tourism Industry in Kashmir, the consequences of the armed
conflict, unplanned and unregulated rent seeking nature of contemporary
tourism have only further ravaged the environment in Kashmir. A classic
case of the inverse correlation between war and tourism potential could be
arrived in the case of Kashmir with scientific identification of the indica‐
tors.
The present study used a semi-structured questionnaire to collect the
data regarding the deforestation in Kashmir and rehabilitation. For the
present study the data was collected from the 85 students of Kashmir
studying in masters in universities in southern India. The results are pre‐
sented in the following sections.
The students were probed to understand the environmental situation in
Kashmir. The students were asked whether there was any difference in the
density of forest in their dwelling place twenty years back and now. The
results are graphically depicted and it shows that clearly there was a huge
difference now and prior to twenty years back in the density of the forest
area, about 90 percent of the respondents have responded yes there is a
6 Hassan, A./Shafi, A. (2012): Attitude Towards Mental Illness in Kashmir. In: Inter‐
national NGO Journal 7, 73–7. DOI: 10.5897/INGOJ12.019.
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huge difference and only about 0.07 percent say there is no marked differ‐
ence in the density of the forest. Presently, at most of the places forest
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Armed Conflict and Deforestatioon
The students were inquired whether they thought that both armed conflict
and deforestation has any relationship. And results show that about 71 per‐
cent of the respondents said yes whereas about 29 percent said no. It must
be stated that the respondents who answered affirmatively are those who
dwell in rural parts, directly dependent on the forest resources who have
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Armed Conflict and Deforestatioon
The students were inquired as who they think was responsible for the de‐
forestation. About 40 percent of the respondents opined that militants are
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responsible for the deforestation; when 51 percent of the students said it is
because of the armed forces and others like due to tourism and other un‐
regulated activities. However, about 11 percent of the students did not
have any opinion for this query. The fact remains that deforestation and
armed conflicts are correlated, and armed conflicts does have negative im‐







































Is Forest cleared for Agriculture
The respondents were questioned whether they agree with forest being
cleared for agriculture. Interestingly, about 70 percent youth said no
whereas 25 percent students said yes and 5 percent students were undecid‐
ed. On a deeper validation of the response, it is found that the students
who hail from semi urban areas convey the unplanned urbanisation as the
principle factor for the reduction of forest area, yet further investigation on
this is outside the scope of this paper. However, it can be understood that
the relative degree of impact of armed conflict on the alteration of natural
landscape is significantly higher because of urbanisation.








































Is Forest cleared for Agriculture
The students were probed to know whether they perceive that the forest be
removed to facilita e to eliminat  t  rebels, around 74 percent of the stu‐
dents said no when 26 percent students said yes. This agai  could be stated
as the reply was affirmative with the respondents hailing from the border‐






















number of  the  respondents said  forest was  their  resource  (yes 74 percent; no 11 percent) 
rather than their pride (yes 16 percent; no 84 percent). Incidentally those who hail from rural 













The biggest loss as a result of Armed Conflict
The students were explored to know what the biggest loss due to armed
conflict was. The majority of the respondents said it is the loss of the fami‐
ly (76 percent), followed by livelihood (59 percent) and destruction of for‐
est (53 percent). Very interestingly the gender of the respondents who per‐
ceived the destruction of forests largely is female.
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The biggest loss as a result of Armed Conflict
The respondents were asked to know whether forest was th ir pride or re‐
source. The large numb r of he respondents said forest was their resource
(yes 74 percent; no 11 percent) rathe  than their pride (yes 16 percent; no
84 percent). Incident lly those who hail from rural parts of Kashmir where
they make use of forest resources have replied as their resource. Those
from urban areas of Kashmir have disagreed it is a pride. At this point, it is
imperative that the socio political context in which urban youth, his mobil‐










said  it was  the  duty  of  an  individual  to  plant  trees.  The  reliance  on  State  apparatus  by  a 
majority of the respondents indicates the belief the people on the civilian establishment in 
Kashmir. The initiative of the Social Forestry Department of Jammu and Kashmir since 1982 





















Forest as Pride and Resource




Responsibility of Planting Trees
The respondents were probed to know who was responsible to plant trees
and majority of the students (70 percent) said it was the duty of the gov‐
ernment to plant the trees. However, about 35 percent of the respondents
said it was the duty of community and about 23 percent said it was the du‐
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ty of an individual to plant trees. The reliance on State apparatus by a ma‐
jority of the respondents indicates the belief the people on the civilian es‐
tablishment in Kashmir. The initiative of the Social Forestry Department
of Jammu and Kashmir since 1982 seems to have positive effects in this
regard.7 The respective table indicates the details of targets and achieve‐
ments, however, in the absence of independent verification the data could
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Responsibility of Planting Trees
Trauma for humans per se has never been the loss of life and property
alone but the loss of the ecosystem, which the Vietnam War for the first
time depicted to the world. We live in the era where obliteration of the na‐
ture and environment has itself developed as a method of war, which in
the context of the modern sovereignty gets legitimised. Emerging dis‐
courses on non-conventional security and the drive for emergent protec‐
tion of environment converge on areas of armed conflict. Emerging facets
of human security includes the protection of natural environment which is
linked to the foundational aspect of our security needs. The living habitat
of humans is conventionally understood within the framework of national
and political boundary ignoring the natural landscape that pre-existed po‐
litical formations. Across South Asia the natural disasters like tsunami
have reinforced that nature never accepts political boundaries. It is nature
that nurtures us humans and other living organisms or species. Hence
7 http://www.jksocialforestry.nic.in/Plan-Non-plan-2016-17.pdf.
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since nature is solely not humans but the biodiversity that envelops human
existence, it is rational that we recognise that every species have a basic
right to exist, and humans need to take cognizance of the reality that only
that part of environment that could sustainably support human life support
system could be harnessed and subjected to anthropogenic consumption.
In the name of sovereignty and legitimacy the modern nations cannot jus‐
tify warfare and military exercises at the cost of environmental destruc‐
tion. The findings of this paper underscores is, that destruction of nature
and natural resources in the name of armed conflict impacts irreversible
changes on the inhabitants adversely and thus the opportunity of any form
of perpetual peace becomes null and void. It is a well-accepted reality that
all wars are not waged aimed at controlling natural resources, but the end
result of all wars will be the decimation of natural habitat which inevitably
leads to resource depletion and irreversible degradation of environment.
This precarious situation could immerse any region into very powerful vi‐
cious circle of underdevelopment, poverty, political resentment, political
alienation and apathy leading to further escalation of war nerves and lead
to further catastrophe.
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Livelihood and Environmental Conflicts:
An Analysis of Development and Protests in Odisha, India
Sarada Prasanna Das
According to Global Environmental Justice Atlas, there are more environ‐
mental conflicts in India than any other country in the world. Most of the
environmental clashes are over water and extractive resource/industry. In
this context, the paper is presenting a brief profile of tribal resistance over
bauxite mining and aluminium industry in Lanjigarh Block of Odisha.
Drawing from extensive fieldwork the paper has analysed the impact of
the mining project on lives and livelihood of the native population. It has
also examined the participation politics of different communities, organi‐
zations as well as mainstream political parties in the movement against the
mining project.
Introduction
Resistance of the poor and marginalized communities for environment and
livelihood is not very new. But when this struggle for protection of envi‐
ronment and livelihood of the small communities sets an important prece‐
dent in a democracy, it becomes very significant to analyze. The Supreme
Court’s decision to go for an environmental referendum in two tribal dis‐
tricts of Odisha, India, on the basis of local communities religious and cul‐
tural rights over their habitation has put an end to a much hyped and long
environmental conflict in the state of Odisha.1 In the village council meet‐
ings with the presence of representatives of the Supreme Court of India,
12 Gram Sabhas (village councils) unanimously rejected the Vedanta Alu‐
minium and State-owned mining corporations’ plan of bauxite mining in
the Niyamgiri Hill. This people’s verdict has set a historic and significant
precedent, which could also determine the course of similar environmental
1.
1 Kalahandi and Rayagada district of Odisha. These two southern districts of Odisha
are mineral rich and 80 percent of Bauxite found in these two districts.
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conflicts in other tribal areas in Odisha and other parts of India. In this
context, the paper is presenting a brief profile of tribal resistance over
bauxite mining and aluminium industry with special reference to conflict
over Niyamgiri Hill of Kalahandi district, Odisha. It has also examined
and analysed the participation politics of different communities, communi‐
ty based organizations, and mainstream political parties in the movement
against the mining project.
Industrial Development and Environmental Conflicts in Odisha
Odisha, the ancient land of temples is one of the most resource-rich States
in the country. It is predominantly an agricultural state where nearly sev‐
enty percent of the working population depends on agriculture. The State
also is endowed with vast natural resources, mineral, marine, agricultural
and forest wealth. The recorded forest cover in the State is 58,136 km2,
which constitutes around 34.9 percent of the State’s geographical area.2
These forest regions of the state are home to the different tribal communi‐
ties, which constitute 22 percent of the state population. There are 62 dif‐
ferent tribal communities present there in the state and out of them 13
communities are considered Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs) and were as‐
signed special treatments. Almost 44.2 percent of the total land in Odisha
has been declared as Scheduled Area.3. Forests serve as major livelihood
2.
2 Official forest statistics, Government of Odisa, 2017.
3 Padhi, S./Panigrahi, N. (2011): Tribal Movements and Livelihoods: Recent Devel‐
opments in Orissa. New Delhi. Mishra, B./Mishra, S. (2014): Mining and Industri‐
alisation. New Delhi. Mishra, P. P./Pujari A. K. (2008): Impact of Mining on Agri‐
cultural Productivity: A Case Study of the Indian State of Orissa. In: South Asia
Economic Journal 9. 337-350. Mishra, R. N./Maitra, A. (2007): Industrialization
and Protest Movements in Orissa. New Delhi. Das, S. P. (2014a): Lanjigarh Mei
'Niyam Raja' Ko Leke Sangharsh. Bhartiya Samaj Shastra Samikhya 1. 121-126.
Scheduled Areas is a provision of the Constitution of India in which some areas are
declared under the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The basic thrust of
the Fifth schedule of the constitution of India is the protection of cultural distinc‐
tiveness of the tribal communities. It also deals with the control and administration
of the Schedule Areas. It provides protection to the tribal communities on account
of their economic disadvantages so that they could maintain their tribal identity
without any coercion or exploitation. The total area of the Scheduled Areas of the
state contains almost 70 percent of Orissa’s forest areas, even though they form on‐
ly 44 percent of the state area.
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resources for tribals and people living in forest fringes as they provide var‐
ious kinds of Non Timber Forest Produce (NTFPs). These small commu‐
nities living in and around the forest areas follow a traditional livelihood
system, which is based on the shifting cultivation and collection of edible
forest produce. In social terms, the traditional livelihood system was based
on customary, usufructuary rights of tribal communities over land and
forests. The survival of tribal communities critically depends on land and
forest resources.4
After independence industrial development and dam construction was
one of important part of national development. The state of Odisha has
built some major mega hydroelectric cum irrigation projects like Hirakud
(1948), Balimela (1963), Machhkund (1949), Upper Kolab (1978), Indra‐
vati (1978), Mandira, Rengali (1973) and Subarnarekha. Apart from that
there are mineral-based public industries like Rourkela Steel Plant (1950),
National Aluminium Company at Angul (1985), Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd. (1962). Furthermore, the iron mining in Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj and
Sundergarh districts, the bauxite mining projects at Damanjodi and Pan‐
chaput Mali of Koraput district by NALCO (1986) etc., were also done to
supply the raw materials to these mineral based industries and projects on
cement, dolomite and limestone were also established in that phase of in‐
dustrialization.
A rough calculation shows that, since Independence, Orissa has set up
190 such projects, which has deforested 24,124 hectares of forestland, the
basic source of livelihood of the tribal people. Estimates of the magnitude
of human population displacement in Orissa resulting from the establish‐
ment of various mega-projects during 1951–95 show that different kinds
of industrial development projects (dam, mining, big industries, sanctuar‐
ies) have displaced around 546,794 families, out of which only 192,840
(35.26 percent) have been rehabilitated.5
Diversion of forest and establishment of public and private mega-
projects in tribal regions has encroached on tribal people’s native lands
4 Padhi/Panigrahi (2011). Shiva, V. (1991): Ecology and the Politics of Survival:
Conflict over Natural Resources in India. New Delhi. Beck, T./Ghosh, M. (2000):
Common Property Resources and the Poor: Finding from the West Bangle. In: Eco‐
nomic and Political Weekly XXXV. 147-153.
5 Mohapatra, L. K. (1999): Tribals’ Rights to Land and the State in Orissa. In: Behu‐
ra, D. K./Pfeffer, G. (eds.): Contemporary Society Tribal Studies. New Delhi. Pad‐
hi/Panigrahi (2011).
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and thereby displaced them. All these projects have had an immense im‐
pact on tribal livelihood, community life and political structures, as it has
been documented through several empirical studies in the state.6 These
studies show that, tribals once dependent upon sustainable forest and
primitive agricultural economy and unaccustomed to the culture of wage
of work now hire themselves out as daily wageworkers. When they fail to
get any work, they move to the city as seasonal migrants to work either as
contract labours or informal sector workers as coolies. It shows that the
depletion of forest and other self-sustaining natural resources tribals and
other weaker sections of the population in the hinterland have been con‐
verted into unskilled wageworkers.
Available data shows that different industrial development projects
have displaced more families in the tribal areas and it still continues till
date.7 Lack of recent statistics might be one of the limitations of this argu‐
ment but if we look at the magnitude of the industrialization in Odisha es‐
pecially after the liberalization of Indian economy we can see that the state
has become a major destination of steel plants, thermal power plants, alu‐
mina/aluminium projects and oil refineries. The project/proposals in hand
include 13 steel plants, half a dozen large power projects, three alumina/
aluminum projects and two green field oil refineries, most of them by ma‐
jor national and international industrial enterprises. In 2005, the state gov‐
ernment has signed as many as 43 memoranda of understanding with vari‐
ous corporate bodies for setting up of their industrial units at an invest‐
ment of Rupees 1, 60,000 crore.8 These projects are also planned to estab‐
lish in the areas, which are mainly rich in forest and minerals to facilitate
the developers and minimize the difficulties of getting raw materials from
a distance places. Therefore, in recent years the state of Odisha has experi‐
enced several environmental conflicts and movements in these backward
regions of the state.
6 See Patnaik (2000); Dash/Samal (2008); Pattanayak (2010); Sahu (2008a); Lahiri-
dutt (2006); Mishra/Mishra (2014); Mishra/Pujari (2008); Das (2014a).
7 See Padhi/Panigrahi (2011); Mohapatra (1999); Swain/Panigrahi (1999); Das
(2014b); Das (2014a).
8 See Mishra/Maitra (2007); Das (2014a).
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Environmental Conflicts in Resource Rich Regions of Odisha
Against this background, if we throw some light on the history of Odisha
the responses of the tribals/small communities for their rights are not very
new. The incidents involving the subjugation and the deprivation of these
communities from their natural rights over resource have its history in
colonial as well post-colonial India. These incidents include the uprising
of Khodhs of Ghumasar (1835–37), the Gonds of Sambalpur (1857–64)
and Bhuiyans of Keonjhar (1867–1868).9 Major causes of these conflicts
were rights over land and forest resources, which is the major source of
livelihood of these small communities. After seven decades of the inde‐
pendence these resistances/protests are still going on because of develop‐
ment deficits and governance deficits in some regions. Recently the state
has also witnessed several conflicts around natural resources like land, for‐
est and water. The major environmental conflicts site includes Maikancha
in Raygada district, Kalinganagar in Jajpur district, Kashipur in Raygada,
Lanjigarh in Kalahandi districts, Laxmipur block in Koraput district Sind‐
higaon, Gopalpur (1997), Maikancha (2000) and Kalinga Nagar, (2006)
etc. Some of these conflicts have resulted police firing and loss of life.10
Battle over Bauxite
The state of Odisha, particularly the southern part of the state that is Kora‐
put, Balangir, Kalahandi, Raygada, Bargarh etc. is endowed with 70 per‐
cent of the total bauxite of the country. As stated, above in the post liberal‐
ization period these regions have attracted Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI). Apart from the Indian public and private enterprises like NALCO
and TATA, since 1985 several foreign companies have attempted to ex‐
plore bauxite ores in these districts. These companies include BALCO
Ltd. in 1986, Utkal Alumina, INDAL, TATA, Hydro (Norway), ALCAN
(Canada) and HINDALCO etc.
3.
4.
9 Das (2014a). Das, S. P. (2014b): Livelihood, Environment and Developmental
State: Consonances and Dissonances in the Mining Areas of Odisha. New Delhi.
Padhi/Panigrahi (2011).
10 Das (2014a).
Livelihood and Environmental Conflicts
275
Although the movement against bauxite mining in Odisha has started in
1985 in Balangir district to protect Gandhamardan Hill11 and continued
with the Kashipur (1993)12 but the case of Lanjigarh/Niyamgiri is one of
the unique which has attracted global attention on the issues of environ‐
mental and religious rights of the one of the primitive tribes of the country.
In Lanjigarh the local indigenous people were against Vedanta Alumina
Ltd. (VAL),13 which has planned to extract bauxite from Niyamgiri Hill.
The company has planned to mine bauxite deposit from the Niyamagiri
Hills jointly with Odisha Mining Corporation Limited (OMC) as per the
lease agreement between VAL and OMC in October 2004. For this pur‐
pose, 723.343 hectare of land is required by the VAL and out of this
232.75 ha of land was private and was acquired under Land Acquisition
Act, 1984 for public purpose. Most of this land belonged to scheduled
tribes. Another 721.323 ha of land are required for the bauxite mining on
top of the Niyamagiri Hill. Most of the land is categorized as forest. In ad‐
dition to that, a rough estimate shows that 173 villages are situated in the
project impact zone within 10 km of the area. The total population in these
villages is 50586 who will be directly affected by this mining activities.
11 Gandhamardam hill is considered the mother of all the local people in terms of
providing food, firewood, fodder, water (22 streams and 150 perennial springs)
and medicines, both for home consumption and sale. The major NTFPs collected
by the people are mahua flowers, sal seed, sal leaf (used for making of plats) bam‐
boo shoots, charseed, kendu leaf (some part of the Odisha, Chhattisgarh and
Jharkhand it is also called Tendu leaf and it is used for making of Bidi (Indian
cigar)), mango, harida and bahada. The region comprises of tribal peasants and
scheduled castes which together constitute 55 percent of the population. The major
tribal communities of the area are Gonds, Binijhals, Kondh and Kultas.
12 This movement has started from 1993 onwards. Plant in Kashipur directly affects
2500 people in the 24 villages of Kucheipadar, Haldiguda and Tikiri Garm Pan‐
chayat. However company claimed that ony 147 families from the three villages
would be affected. In addition to that 42 villages Chandragiri, Maikanch and Kodi‐
pari panchayat would be directly affected by open caste mining at Baphlimali. The
project has acquired 1000 hectares of land which has been use for years for culti‐
vation, forestry and shifting cultivation, Note: These data were referred from sec‐
ondary sources basically books and articles. After 1990s data are not available in
consolidated basis. It is generally available locally so it is very difficult to collect
these
13 VAL is a subsidiary of M/S Srrelite industries (India) Ltd.
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The tribal population constitutes 43 percent of the total population14. The
protest against this project stated around 2002 when the OMC and VAL
started the survey process.15
Conflict over Niyamgiri in Lanjigarh
The case of Lanjigarh is not very different from above discussed protest
sites (Gandamardan and Kashipur) in terms of the local livelihood and en‐
vironment. Agriculture and collection of miner forest products is the pri‐
mary activity of the people in this place. Agriculture as such is not in a
position to meet their basic subsistence needs, almost all household sup‐
plement this by collecting minor forest produces and non-timber fuel
wood from the forest, which they consider as their main subsidiary occu‐
pation. Mining has not started in this place because of the people’s protests
regarding the proposed mining site (Niyamgiri Hill range). But VAL has
started its plant and getting raw mineral from neighbouring states like
Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh for the production.
Lanjigarh/Niyamgir is the home of one of the most primitive tribe
called Jarnia Khond/Dongria Khond. These names are related to their
place of living, those Khonds are living near stream (Jharna) called Jarnia
and those Khonds are living in the hill called themselves Dongria (in their
dialect dong means hill). The hills are covered with dense forest and river
valleys. These small communities living there practice a subsistence econ‐
omy based on agriculture, forest products, fishing, and hunting. Their cul‐
ture is intimately entwined with the surrounding landscape. The Don‐
5.
14 Note on Bauxite Mining in Orissa: Report on Flora, Fauna, and impact on Tribal
population: The supreme Court of India in their order dated 06.09.2007 in IA No.
1324 and 1474 in Writ Petition (Civil) no. 202 of 1995 have sought the following
additional information, www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/Note%20on%20Bauxite
%20Mining[1].doc accessed on 19th June 2013.
15 Sahu, G. (2008b): Mining in the Niyamgiri Hills and Tribal Rights. In: Economic
and Political Weekly 43. 19-21. Samantar, P. (2006): Niyamagiri Waiting for Jus‐
tice. Brahampur. Nayak, S. R. (2007): Environmental Movement in the Context of
Development: A Case Study of Lanjigarh, Orissa. New Delhi. Das (2014a). Das
(2014b).
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garias believe that the hill belongs to Niyam Raja,16 a male deity repre‐
sented by a sword and worshipped during the festivals of Dussera and Ju‐
ra Parab.17 In addition to this, the region is ecologically and culturally
rich and significant for the local population. Several streams coming from
the hills are the major tributaries of the different rivers of the area. Apart
from that the livelihood and agriculture of these hill communities primari‐
ly depends on these water sources of the Niyamgiri. Other than this com‐
munity, there are other communities living in and around the hill, they are
mainly Kutia Khonds and some of Scheduled caste population. These trib‐
al communities together with Scheduled castes comprise above 50 percent
of the total population of the area.18
As stated above for their livelihood they fully depend on the forest of
the Niyamgiri Hill. The small communities living there maintain a sym‐
bolic relationship with nature and natural resources. They enjoy natural
rights over the resources surrounding them. There are 36 small and big
streams in the Niyamgiri Hill. All the communities living in this area de‐
pend on these stream water coming from the streams, for their agriculture.
Apart from that, most of the communities use stream water for their
household use and drinking purposes. In addition to that, most of the peo‐
ple collect and sale NTFP in the nearest weekly market which is their
main cash income. There are 112 villages which are totally depends on
this hill and forest. Most of the tribal communities practice podu cultiva‐
tion method, which is also called as shifting cultivation in the foothill of
Niyamgiri. Dongria Kondhs/Jharnia Kondhs, those who are living inside
the forest and uphill areas depend on the forest for their livelihood. They
use to cultivate Mandia (Ragi), which is their staple food. In addition to
that, they also cultivate turmeric, ginger and many fruits in the different
seasons like mangos, pineapples, orange, Red banana etc. that add to their
cash income apart from the selling of NTFPs like Sal leaves.
16 The King of Law and protector the communities living in the Niyamgiri hill range.
People believe that Niyam Raja provides food and shelter for the small communi‐
ties living in the area.
17 These are the festivals natives of the region celebrate and worship Niyam Raja for
a prosperous life. Nayak (2007). Sahu (2008b). Das (2014a). Das (2014b).




The tribal communities with others in the Lanjigarh have raised their voice
against this mega-alumina refinery and mining project like other places of
Odisha. As stated above, about 112 uphill and foothill villages will be di‐
rectly affected by this project and another 350 villages and roughly 10,000
persons around the Niyamgiri Hill will be indirectly affected by the min‐
ing. They have questioned the development process by asking Develop‐
ment for whom and at whose cost, noting that it basically affects tribal
people and their non-renewable livelihood resources. Here masses have
raised their voice because their life and livelihood are in danger due to the
faulty planning of the government and misleading statistics regarding the
loss of home land, forest, agricultural land, natural resources and human
resources. The conflict with Vedanta has begun with the land acquisition
and the people’s protest were started in 2003 with the Bhumi Puja (the day
foundation stone was laid) for the refinery. When the foundation stone was
laid, the agitators broke it down soon after two days and it took a shape of
movement when district administration and VAL tried to forcefully evict
people from five villages (Kinari, Borbhatta, Kapagada, Badugada and
Kordiwar village) took them to the resettlement colony. It took a different
shape when several people from village who were initially supporting the
project joined the movement because they were not compensated as
promised earlier. Most of the people are not compensated because they do
not have their land records.
There are mainly three different streams of the movement in the same
time, in the same place. First, stream of the people totally against the
project and demanding total scrap of the Vedanta Project. Second, group
of people are in support of the refinery but against the mining. The third
group is in support of the whole project but they demand good (more)
compensation and rehabilitation package for their land and livelihood. Lo‐
cal leaders of the first group of people criticized the project and pointed
out, that the project is affecting vast tract of fertile agricultural land, water
sources, forest, and wildlife. It has already displaced two villages fully and
two villages partially and it will displace more villages in near future and
finally it will destroy the only source of the livelihood and the religious
and cultural symbol of the local people that is Niyamagiri from which they
are going to extract bauxite for their refinery plant. According to local ac‐
tivists, the main point is the benefit from the project that will not reach to
needy local people, but, the benefit will reach to local elites, prosperous
6.
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and rich industrialist. Second stream of the people are in view that the
project is good for the development of region but they could not allow
mining Niyamgiri, because most of the people depend on the hill for their
livelihood. Apart from that, this group suggests that the state should pro‐
vide mining of bauxite at any other place for the refinery. This group also
demands that new rehabilitation package should be given to them because
several projects affected people have not got their actual compensation
due to corruption by the middlemen. The third stream of the people are ba‐
sically asking the compensation that they think is not good enough what
they are going to lose. In the Lanjigarh the villages and different social
groups are also divided according to their ideology and interest.
Civil Societies and its Participation
Apart from these, above social and economic divisions, people are also di‐
vided under many organizations according to their ideology and interests.
Organization like Green Kalahandi, Sachetan Nagarik Manch, Niyamgiri
Surakha Samiti etc. are participating in the movement for the protection of
Niyamgiri. These organizations have their own agenda, as well as, all of
them also have a common agenda. Sometimes these organizations partici‐
pate in the movement collectively and sometimes they protest separately.
Like the above organizations, some other Non-Governmental Organiza‐
tions (NGOs) are also working in the region. One of the leaders of the
Niyamgiri Surakha Samiti has stated that the organizations like Lanjigarh
Anchalika Bikash Parishad, Nabin Vikash Trust, Lanjigarh Unnayan An‐
chalika Samiti, Niyamgiri Adivasi Vikash Parishad, Shakti Organisation,
Kui Bikash Parishad are sponsored by Vendanta to create public opinion
for the refinery and mining. He also accused these organizations for mis‐
leading poor and illiterate tribal people in the name of development by
providing short-term benefits. Furthermore, some of the movement ac‐
tivists also stated, that Vedanta has employed several local people who
help them in creating public opinion for them. Most of the local leaders of
the movement are in opinion that the influx of non-tribal people in the re‐




Politics of the Political Parties
In addition to civil societies, mainstream political parties are also involved
in the movement through different organizations as well as supporting the
cause from outside. The mainstream political parties use these platforms
for their electoral politics. It is also evident from the last election that op‐
posing the project, Indian National Congress party candidate has won
election and some leaders of Biju Janata Dal19 (those who are in support
of the project) have lost the election because of the movement. During the
movement, several social activists and political leaders like Medha
Patkar,20 Rahul Gandhi,21 and Jairam Ramesh22 visited Lanjigarh and met
tribal leaders during the movement. These leaders also promised that they
will also fight for the livelihood and religious rights of the native popula‐
tion. In a setback against VAL in August 2010 Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change had withdrawn the forest clearance license
given for the mining in Niyamgiri. It put a stop to VAL’s plan to mine the
sacred Niyamgiri. The withdrawal of the forest clearance is considered as
a political decision. The clearance was withdrawn just after the Lanjigarh
visit of Mr. Rahul Gandhi (then Vice President, Indian National Congress)
where he promised to protect the sacred hill and its people’s livelihood.
In addition, the Supreme Court of India in 2013, for the first time in the
history of independent India, decided to go for an environmental referen‐
dum in the villages of the affected areas recognizing religious cultural
rights of the endangered communities under Scheduled Tribes and Other
8.
19 Biju Janata Dal is also known, as BJD is a regional political party, which is ruling
the state of Odisha from the year 2000 onwards. The Chief Minister and party
supreme Mr. Naveen Patnaik is one of very strong support of Foreign Direct In‐
vestment (FDI) in the mining sector in the state. Under his leadership Odisha’s
Mineral sector has attracted huge FDI for different steel, aluminium and power
projects.
20 Medha Pathekar is one of the prominent social activists. She played a very signifi‐
cant role in Save the Narmada Movement and known for her environmental ac‐
tivism in India.
21 Rahul Gandhi was the then National Vice-President and presently the President of
Indian National Congress (INC) the biggest political party in the United Progres‐
sive Alliance (UPA), which ruled India from 2004-2014.
22 Jairam Ramesh is a Member of Parliament from prominent member of INC. He
was also the Minister of Environment and Minister of Rural Development in the
UPA government during 2004-2014.
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Traditional Forest Dwellers.23 In this historic referendum, all the village
councils rejected the plan of bauxite mining, which stopped the project. In
February 2016, OMC, the state-owned mining corporation again chal‐
lenged the 2013 Supreme Court judgment. However, the Supreme Court
refused to accept the petition and directed OMC to approach appropriate
forums against the decision of the village councils held in July–August
2013. In this context, the communities and their leaders think that their
battle against VAL and for the preservation of their environment is not
over in a state where money matters.
Conclusion
Analysis of Lanjigarh environmental conflict reveals, the small and endan‐
gered communities are fighting for their rights to livelihood, environment,
identity and lifestyle, which is distinct from others. The conflict is also
against free market economy which natives of the region think is a major
risk to their distinct identity, culture and livelihood. It also reveals differ‐
ent layers of people’s participation in the movement. In broader sense, this
conflict is a rejection of the present model of development, which stresses
upon forceful integration of these small communities into the mainstream.
One of the major reasons of the conflict is trust deficit between state de‐
velopment model and the people, which has continuously ignored the peo‐
ple’s strength and cultural wealth of the regions. In the contrary, this trust
deficit has also created a space for the socially, politically and economical‐
ly lower section of the society to raise their voice and show their strength.
The people’s movement helped the poor and marginal groups to access in‐
formation on their right to life and livelihood. These movements and con‐
flict areas also remind us that there is a need for change in the present
model of development.
Indian judiciary and judicial activism has also provided a space for
marginal communities against oppression of state and market. Specifically,
Vedanta bauxite mine judgment of the Supreme Court provided a hope of
social democracy among these small communities. Further, this precedent
9.




also lays the legal ground for many more communities to fight displace‐
ment on religion and cultural considerations.
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